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SIliVIARY
Working-class politics in Birmingham and Sheffield contrasted sharply
in the 1920s - Birmingham was a bastion of working-class Conservatism,
Sheffield, a Labour stronghold. In the first half of the thesis, we
explored this contrast by an examination of the economic, social and
political conditions which underlay it.
Sheffield's large-scale industry was found to reinforce working-class
values and trades union traditions which facilitated Labour's political rise.
Birmingham's diversified, often small-scale, economy impeded the development
of working-class consciousness and eased inter-class relations.
These differences were reflected in the towns' working-class
cormtinities. The forms of Sheffield society consolidated the working-class
loyalties of which Labour affiliations became one aspect. Birmingham
society was more penetrable and possessed a powerful civic tradition of
cross-class cooperation.
In local government, Birmingham retained a confident, reforming
middle-class leadership fulfilling the heritage of Joseph Chamberlain.
Sheffield's middle-class politicians retreated into reactionary
oppositionism which hastened Labour's advance. Contemporary events in the
national economy and politics strengthened Labour's claim to be the real
party of the working class.
In the second half, we studied the content of working-class politics;
examining, firstly, Labour's principles and practice. Ethical and
constitutional values, combined with a corrrnitment to practical reform, were
found dominant. A genuine party life of extra-political activities existed
but its scope and ambitions were modest.
Cooperation shared similar values, allied with an ambiguous attitude
towards political action which strained relations with the wider Labour
movement. The revolutionary Left was active but its aggressive style and
far-reaching demands distanced it from the broader working class.
In conclusion, we looked at working-class Conservatism - still
influential and with several ideological and structural strains in working-
class culture perpetuating its appeal. We viewed it, particularly among
the poorer strata, as one method of getting by in a life deemed
fundamentally unalterable.
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PREFACE
This thesis sets out to examine the nature of working-class
politics in two of Britain's major industrial cities in the years after
the First World War. Our case-studies, Birmingham and Sheffield, have been
chosen both for their representativeness and uniqueness. In socio-economic
terms, they were manufacturing cities with a predominantly working-class
population and, though there were significant differences in the weighting
of these constituents, they each contained a representative range of large-
and small-scale industry, skilled and unskilled work, male and female
employment. There is scope, therefore, for both comparison and contrast.
In political terms, however, the two cities were markedly
dissimilar. Birmingham remained a bastion of working-class Conservatism
throughout the interwar period. Labour won only seven parliamentary
elections in the city between 1918 and 1945 and, of these victories, six
occurred in 1929. The Party fared equally badly in municipal contests;
at its peak in 1929, Labour had just 36 representatives on a council
comprising 120 aldermen and couricillors. In Sheffield, by contrast,
Labour secured its first parliarrentary victory in 1909 and thenceforth its
M.P.s were regularly returned with coninanding majorities. Only under the
exceptional conditions obtaining in 1918 and 1931 was this not the case.
More importantly, in 1926, Sheffield becan the first large town to come
under Labour control and Labour has, to date, retained its majority on the
city council for all but two of the subsequent years.
Our primary task is, therefore, to explain why the political
affiliations of these two working-class cities should have diverged so
dramatically. What made Birmingham the 'Mecca of Unionism'; why should
Sheffield have been so rooted in its loyalty to Labour? In the first half
of the thesis, we analyse the economic, social and political circumstances
of Birmingham and Sheffield in order to assess how their operation may
have influenced the two towns' differing political evolutions. Inevitably,
as we do this, larger questions concerning the means by which working-class
political loyalties were formed and shaped are raised as we seek to
discover the socio-economic bases of particular types of working-class
politics and to determine the autonomous role of politicians and their
actions.
In the second half of the thesis, though we continue to concentrate
our attention on Birmingham and Sheffield, the comparative framework is,
for the most part, abandoned. Here, we examine the politics of the working-
class activists themselves when we describe the nature of their activism
and ideology and their involvement in the extra-political side of party
life. Labour, the major party of the working class, is accorded the most
coverage but we also look at the political aspirations of those in the
working class who supported the Cooperative movement, the parties of the
revolutionary Left and Conservatism.
We have sought throughout this study to give due weight to the
sentiments and behaviour of the ordinary working person and rank and file
activist. It is unavoidable, however, that the sources which survive -
minute books, personal correspondence, newspapers, and the like - tell
mostly of those who achieved some kind of individual prominence in political
life. Within these limitations, we have, nevertheless, been concerned to
stress local perspectives and activism and the role of the parties' local
members rather then that of their national leaderships and central
organisation. where possible, the printed sources and official records
have been supplemented by oral history techniques.
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We are fortunate, as the bibliography makes clear, that plentiful
documentation survives for both Birmingham and Sheffield. Birmingham,
hover, possesses one invaluable source that is not shared by Sheffield -
a ekly Labour newspaper, the Town Crier. We have made considerable use
of this important source. There is also a disparity in respect of the
Conservative records which are extant - those for Birmingham being far
superior. Whilst this is partly fortuitous, it undoubtedly reflects too
the greater strength of Unionism in the Midlands city. The concentration
on the Birmingham case in our analysis of working-class Conservatism is
necessitated but it is also, in view of the unique vitality of the
phenomenon in that city, quite defensible.
A large number of librarians and archivists have been helpful and
informative but special thanks go to Marion Large and the staff of the
Social Science Department of Birmingham Central Library, the staffs of
the Local Studies Departments of the Birmingham Central and Sheffield City
Libraries, Richard Storey and the staff of the Modern Records Centre of
the University of Warwick Library, Stephen Bird of the national Labour
Party archives, and the librarians at Comirunist Party headquarters in
London. I am also grateful to Mr. Bill Moore and the Sheffield secretary
of the Malgamated Union of Engineering Workers (Foundry Workers' Section)
for allowing me to view documents held in private possession. A number of
people, politically active in Birminghamand Sheffield in the interwar
period, allowed themselves to be interviewed and I thank them for the time
and trouble they went to to help my work.
My father has been a conscientous and hard-working proof-reader of
my erratic type-writing. The errors and infelicities which remain are, of
course, my responsibility.
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Finally, I should refer to the support and assistance given by my
fellow students and the staff of the Centre for the Study of Social History
at the University of Warwick. Dr. James Obelkevich read the first draft
of the thesis and made a number of helpful and constructive suggestions.
My supervisor, Dr. Tony Mason, has given a great deal of advice and
encouragement and has been a constant source of useful, informed and always
good-humoured criticism.
NOTE ON FOOTNOTES
All works published in London unless otherwise stated.
The meetings of the Sheffield Federated Trades and Labour Council were riot
clearly differentiated by function until the late 1920s. Where a gathering
was explicitly described as a political (i.e. Labour Party) meeting in the
minutes, this information has been included in the relevant footnote.
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INTRODUCTION
This study is about the nature of working-class politics in
Birmingham and Sheffield in the thirteen years that followed the ending of
the Great War. It is concerned with working-class politics In a two-fold
sense: firstly, with the political attitudes and affiliations of the
working class as a whole; secondly, with the beliefs and behaviour of that
section of the working class which was politically active. These two levels
of popular consciousness did not exist in any simple juxtaposition but were
part of a gradation of sentinnt which stretched fran the apolitical and
apathetic at one extreme to the convinced and camitted at the other.
Nevertheless, it is an empirical division as well as a heuristic one and, as
such, it provides the essential organising principle of this work. The
thesis is divided broadly into two halves: in the first, we examine the
major influences which determined the political sympathies of the working
class in Birmingham and Sheffield; in the second, we explore the assumptions
and activities of their chosen or self-appointed representatives.
We begin in chapter one with a brief account of the historical
background to the conditions and events which we describe in the thesis
proper. Historical circumstances were to provide the inescapable context of
later struggles and, though not caiiprehensive, it is hoped that the more
salient and influential of past develonts are suiiiiarised in this section.
As it is based on secondary literature, the chapter also enables us to
survey the historiography of both towns. In the case of Birmingham in
particular, the writings on the town's earlier history have heavily
influenced the interpretation of its twentieth century evolution.
In the second chapter, we examine the role of work arid non-work in
the formation of working pe's political preferences. Thigh confined
to local evidence and instance, this section inevitably confronts a muidner
of topics which have received more general coverage in the literature
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of political science and sociology. Among the major questions tackled are
whether small units predisposed their workers to ('onservatism, whether
trades unionism was a radicalising influence which promoted Labour voting,
and whether the experience of unemployment politicised its victims or
tended to render them apathetic. It is felt that a close study of these
economic factors and others will provide a useful historical dimension to
recent discussion on these topics and provide a necessary corrective to the
less empirically grounded of later writings.
In the following section, this type of analysis is taken one stage
further when we look at the kinds of working-class conrnunity which the
differing forms of employment and industry tended to generate, and the
question is raised as to whether particular forms of working-class comnunity
conduced to particular political loyalties. Areas of slum, proletarian and
artisanal habitation are identified in Birmingham and Sheffield and discussed,
and the section is concluded by an examination of the new residential setting
provided by the burgeoning interwar council estates. While our concern is
primarily political, this chapter owes much to the sociological literature
on these topics and it is hoped that it, in turn, contributes to a deeper
understanding of the patterns of working-class life.
Though socio-economic conditions provided the terrain of the political
contest, its outcome, in the short term at least, was dependent on human
agency. In the final three chapters of the first half of the thesis, we
analyse some of the ways in which the political actors of the time influenced
the direction of working-class politics. Chapter three describes the rival
parties' organisational structures in Birmingham and Sheffield and the
scale and impact of their propaganda.
Our understanding of the operation of these local factors is deepened
in the following chapter which examines some of the circumstances and events
in the field of national economics and governrrnt which crucially influenced
the dynamics of political partisanship in the 1920s. The economic and
-3-
legislative records of the post-war administrations are assessed in terms
of their popular reception, and the political meaning and importance of the
General Strike is given a coverage commensurate with its role in the
evolution of interwar politics.
The first half of the thesis is concluded by a scrutiny of local
government. The style of the local parties' rule and their administrative
successes and failures were still significant influences on working-class
affiliations in our period of research and are given particular weight in
this study because of the stark contrast between the character of Birmingham's
municipal politics and those of Sheffield.
In the second half of the thesis, we turn our attention towards the
nature of working-class political activism. The major party of the British
working class was Labour and it, therefore, receives the major share of our
coverage - both in its own activities and in its relations with its
associates and rivals in the battle for political support.
Chapter seven explores the character of the Labour rank and file's
political beliefs and the meaning of their socialism. In contrast to the
extensive literature on Labour's governmental record and the thinking of its
leaders, little work has been done on the views and aspirations of the Party's
ordinary membership. This section is intended to partially redress that
balance and, in so doing, correct some o.f the misconceptions and distortions
which have vitiated some of the recent writings on Labour politics which
have analysed its history almost entirely in terms of centralised
manipulation and betrayal.
The concentration on central organisation and leadership has also
encouraged a view of the Labour Party as merely an electoral machine.
Surprisingly little work has been done on the interwar period to prove or
disprove this assumption. In fact, our research in Birmingham and Sheffield
reveals the existence of what may properly be called a Labour subculture of
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extra-political associations and activities which gave the Labour Party a
far richer group life than has commonly been supposed. Chapter eight seeks
to depict this side of the Labour Party's existence and assess its
significance for those members who participated.
Cooperation is another neglected theme in the Labour movement's
historiography and in chapter nine we analyse the nature of the Cooperative
movement's political beliefs and its strained relations with Labour and the
trades unions. At the other extreme, stood the parties and groupings of the
revolutionary Left. Though small in numbers, they were always active and
the following chapter sets out to explore the attitudes and activism of
revolutionary politics and the impact they made on the working class as a
whole and within the organs of the Labour mainstream.
Last but by no means least, the thesis concludes with an examination
of the ideology of working-class Conservatism and a study of the
organisational forms to which it gave rise. An important section of the
working class has always voted Conservative and they are due as full and
sympathetic coverage as is usually accorded to their more radical
compatriots. In applying this stricture to our own work, we also appraise
the validity and utility of the more recent literature on working-class
Conservatism and question sane of the assumptions that have usually
underlain its treatment.
Each chapter is coninced by a scene-setting introduction and rounded
off by a sumnatory conclusion. The work as a whole is completed by an
overall conclusion which tackles some of the issues of determinism and free
will implicitly raised in earlier sections and assesses the contribution of
this research to the extensive secondary literature on the Labour movement
and working-class politics.
Chapter 1
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1.1 Introduction
Birminghxn and Sheffield are ancient settlements with their quota
of old relics and remains. But the early years of their existence were
spent, for the most part, in a respectable obscurity and it was not until
the Industrial Revolution that they emerged as leading actors on the
historical stage. This opening chapter aims to give a brief introduction
to the evolution of both towns, noting in particular those economic and
political develoixients which were to shape their character in the interwar
period that is our primary concern. As it was industry that gave Birmingham
and Sheffield their strategic roles, we shall examine economic develoixrnts
first.
1.2 Economic History
Sheffield is a text-book example of the way in which geological and
topographical characteristics can determine the siting and growth of hian
settlement. Its position on the Don and its tributary rivers contained
abundant woodland, valley pasture and dry land suitable for building, and
offered fording points with access to the communications routes on the
nearby high land.' Sheffield also contained all the ingredients of a
successful iron and steel town. There was iron ore in the vicinity,
refractory material for the steel furnaces came from the local ganister
and an excellent flux was provided by the dolomite of the local Magnesian
Limestone. Charcoal from the neighbouring woodland and, later, coal
mined on the eastern edges of the settlement provided the heat whilst,
1. D. Linton (ed.), Sheffield and Its Region (Sheffield, 1956), p. 229
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for the working of the iron and steel, five sLeeply-inclined and fast-
running rivers were a source of motive power before the coming of steam.
Millstone Grit from the surrounding Pennines proved to be a very serviceable
grindstone.1
Birmingham, at first glance, enjoyed no such obvious advantages.
Although South Staffordshire, with its iron ore, lirrstone, coal and water
power, was nearby, other towns were better placed to reap the industrial
benefits that these resources provided. 2 Birmingham, though, enjoyed two
bonuses: firstly, an abundant supply of pure water; secondly, a central
position on a fording point between the mineral and metal area of South
Staffordshire and the wealthy agricultural area of Warwickshire at an
intermediary point between producer and customer. 3 Through its early role
as a local trading centre, Birmingham acquired an industrial and corirnercial
momentum that was to make it the second city of England.
At the time of the Domesday survey, neither Birmingham nor Sheffield
were of particular note but the centuries that followed were to lay the
foundations of the towns' dynamic growth in the Industrial Revolution. By
the 14th. century, Sheffield was already famous for its cutlery and edge
tools. Its natural advantages and, subsequently, its position on a through-
route to Hull and the high-grade iron ores of Sweden ensured that the
smelting of steel and its working became the staple trade of the local
economy. By the 16th. century, its population numbered 3000, and the local
craftsmen, concerned to safeguard the security of their livelihood and the
high reputation of their goods, had banded together to regulate their trade.
In 1624, the Company of Cutlets of Hallarnshire was granted legal incorporation
and the right to control the number of apprentices in the trade - rights
1. N. Jameson, 'A Study of Sheffield', Journal of the Manchester Geographical
Society, LXVI, (1935-36), pp. 57-58.
2. G.C. Allen, The Industrial Eeve1oçxint of Birmingham and the Black
Country (1966), p. 24.
3. ibid., pp.28-29; M.J. Wise, 'Some Factors Influencing the Growth of
Birmingham', Geography, 33, (1948).
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which it retained until the general abolition of guild restrictions in
1814.1
In the same period, Birmingham was developing a reputation for the
production of generally low quality but useful small metaiwares - knives,
buckles, nails, swords and a variety of other small metal goods had become
the town's stock-in-trade by the 17th. century. In contrast to Sheffield,
though, Birmingham grew without guild regulation and the town's freedom of
trade attracted many artisans to it who were forbidden or discouraged from
working in other areas by restrictive trade practices By 1700, Birmingham
had outstripped Sheffield in size and, at the time of the first census in
1801, the population of Birmingham was almost twice as large as that of
Sheffield.3
It was the Industrial Revolution that established the salient position
of Birmingham and Sheffield in the British economy though it can be argued
that the period marked more an acceleration and consolidation of the
divergent trends in the two local economies than any new departure. In
Sheffield, the embryonic split between the large-scale heavy trades (the
steel foundries, rolling mills and heavy engineering works) and the small-
scale light trades (producing smaller finished metal articles) became a
schism. Initially, it was the growth of the light trades that was the more
important; it was their demand that had promoted the early developnent of
Sheffield's steel industry and, in 1850, they employed four times as many
workers as were engaged in the heavy industrial sector. 4
 Apart from the
transition from water to steam power, the production methods of the light
1. Linton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 149-50, p. 172.
2. M.J. Wise (ed.), Birmingham and Its Regional Setting (Birmingham, 1950)
pp. 145-156.
3. According to the 1801 Census, Birmingham had a population of 70,670
and Sheffield, 45,755.
4. S. Pollard, A History of Labour in Sheffield (Liverpool, 1959), p. 78.
-8-
trades changed little. The trades remained handicraft-based and were
marked by a highly complex division of labour, both horizontally by product
and vertically by process. There was little or no rnechanisation and units
of production were small.' Nevertheless, the light trades continued to be
the major component of the local economy throughout the 19th. century and,
in terms of the numbers employed, they continued to expand. In 1841, they
employed a total of some 13,669 workers; by 1901, this figure had risen to
23,935.2
But their preeminence was slowly being eclipsed by the heavy trades.
By 1891, the heavy trades employed two thirds of the total engaged in the
cutlery and tool sectors. By 1911, after a phenomenal spurt which had
doubled employment in steel and engineering within the space of twenty years,
the heavy trades had supplanted the old staple industries of Sheffield as
the major employer. 3 The basis of this development lay in Benjamin
I-[untsman's discovery of the crucible process of manufacturing steel in the
1770s. By 1853, Sheffield contained between 80 and 90 per cent of Great
Britain's steel-making capacity. 4 The crucible process, thoigh, did not
allow the efficient production of large quantities of steel and the major
innovations came with the spread of the Bessemer process in the l860s and
the adoption of the Siemens Martin open hearth furnace in the 1880s.
Sheffield made full use of these more efficient and cost-effective processes
though its topography and its distance from the cheaper ores meant that it
was not advantageously placed for the production of bulk steel. It was able
to maintain its reputation as Britain's leading steel producer by its
concentration on the production and development of special steels - steel
1. G.I.H. Lloyd, The Cutlery Trades (1913), pp. 284-88.
2. ibid., p. 442.
3. Pollard, op. cit., p. 226.
4. R.M. Ledbetter, 'Sheffield's Industrial History from about 1700...'
(duplicated typescript, Sheffield City Library, N.D.), p.159.
-9-
alloys with particular qualities of hardness, durability or non-oxidation.1
The famous companies with which Sheffield is chiefly associated
were mainly founded in the mid-century period. They expanded massively in
the years leading up to the First World War to meet the demands created by
the prospering railway and ship-building industries and the requirements of
governments at home and abroad for guns, shell and armour plate. John
Browns, established in 1856 with 200 employees, had 5000 on its payroll by
1873; Canells, employing a 'handful' in 1844, had 4000 workers in 1872.2
The histories of Vickers (established in 1867), Fiadfields (established in
1872) and the other major companies would yield similar stories of growth.
The develoixnent of the heavy industries took place almost entirely
in the east of Sheffield, along the valley of the Don - the only area where
there was sufficient expanse of flat land to enable the siting of the new
large-scale works. Around these works developed the new working-class
suburbs of Attercliffe, Brightside and Darnall, inhabited principally by the
workers of the newly-opened mills and forges. Between 1891 and 1911, the
population o Attercliffe and Brightside increased by 40,300. Meanwhile,
the light trades and their workers continued to be concentrated in the central
districts of the town, thus adding a social and geographical dimension to
the already clearly demarcated industrial division of Sheffield.
The story of Birmingham's industrial develont is more complex but
is similarly one of great expansion. By the beginning of the 19th. century,
Birmingham had become a 'thriving manufacturing centre with a broadly based
industrial structure'. 4
 It was already established as an important local
market town and the opening of canals in 1772 and 1790 further enhanced its
position as a regional centre and provincial town of sane significance.
1. R.M. Ledbetter, op. cit., p. 165.
2. Pollard, op. cit., pp. 224-25, p. 162.
3. ibid., p. 185.
4. Wise (ed.), op. cit., p. 179.
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Its leading manufactures at this time were guns, small metaiwares, jewellery
and brassware. Its trades rose and fell. Some products were given up,
others were killed by the whims of fashion but, in general, Birmingham
contained a range of products and interchangeable skills that made possible
rapid adaptation and innovationJ
By the l850s, four sections of Birmingham's diverse economy had
established their preeminence - brassware, jewellery, button manufacture
and the gun trade. In addition, there were many employers of labour
manufacturing pens, bedsteads, wire, screws, edge tools and a great variety
of other necessary items of industrial and domestic consption. 2
 One
important characteristic that these varied trades shared was that they were
nearly all carried on in small units of production. Though Birmingham's
industries expanded greatly in the Industrial Revolution, they did so not by
mechanisation and large-scale production but by the multiplication of small
works. Typical T Brunrnagen' products were highly specialised, often
ornamental and frequently made out of wrought iron and brass. They were not
therefore susceptible of mass production, which required standardised products
and easily worked raw materials. The fluctuating demand of many of these
items was a further disincentive to costly investment in factory production.3
There was to be no fundamental change in the nature of any of these
industries with the partial exception of the brassware trade. Many firms
manufacturing these traditional staples continued to operate the old methods
of production until well into the 20th. century.
But fashion and changes in the nature of domestic consumption did
take their toll. The jewellery sector continued to expand throughout the
19th. century until its pre-war heyday in the Edwardian era, when up to
50,000 workers were employed directly or indirectly in the trade, nearly
1. Wise (ed.), op. cit., pp. 179-81.
2. Allen, op. cit., pp. 50-61.
3. G.C. Allen,'MAt.hods of Industrial Organisation in the West Midlands,
l860 .-192T, Economic Journal, Economic History series, 4,
(January, 1929), pp. 540-47.
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all in small workshops.' The arms trade declined as mass production for
military purposes developed elsewhere though a small remnant of the industry,
manufacturing guns by hand for sporting purposes, survived into the interwar
period. Button manufacture continued to employ sizeable numbers but fell
in relative importance.
Brassware, alone, was able to effect a partially successful
transition to the changed conditions of the 20th. century for it was a
material much in demand from the two major new industries that developed in
Birmingham from the 1880s onwards - car and cycle manufacture and electrical
engineering. Large sections of the brassware industry adapted themselves to
produce the components required by the new sectors as the old markets
provided by the gas industry and the ornamental tastes of the Victorians
declined. They did so, however, by standardisation, specialisation and an
increased scale of production.2
In this, they followed the pattern set by the two new industries of
Birmingham, both of which were based on mass production in factories. The
large number of firms engaged in the manufacture of cars and cycles was
gradually whittled down before the First World War to a few major companies
manufacturing completed products and those smaller firms concentrating on
the manufacture of specific components. By 1911, it was calculated that
there were 14,750 workers involved in the car and cycle trade in Birmingham.3
In addition, there were many more (such as the 4000 workers at Dunlops)
wI-iose livelihood was indirectly dependent on the prosperity of the local
motor industry.4
Electrical engineering, dominated by the firms of GEC and Lucas, was
another industry whose expansion, begun in the years preceding the War, was
1. J.C. Roche, 'The History, Developrnt and Organisation of the Birmingham
Jewellery and Allied Trades', M. Comm. thesis, University of Birmingham,
l927p.49.
2. Allen, op. cit. (1966), p. 292.
3. ibid., p. 296, p. 298.
4. A. Briggs, History of Birmingham. Vol. II, Borough and City, 1865-1938
(1952), p. 54.
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to continue through the interwar period. Aided by the presence of subsidiary
manufacturers and a pool of labour with the requisite manual skills, the
trade expanded rapidly to employ some 6000 workers by 1911.1
The economy of Birminghamwas being transformed in the years preceding
the War but it was not until the 1920s that the magnitude of the new trades'
impact on the local industrial structure became clear. By contrast, in
Sheffield the rise of the heavy industries had already fundamentally altered
the balance of the local economy. The consequences of these transitions
for both towns will be examined more closely in the folbwing chapter.
1.3 Political History
riat we might term 'modern' politics - the movement for democracy
and political reform - first emerged in Britain at the end of the 18th.
century. It was the French Revolution that initially stirred the artisans
of Shffe1d, giving focus and impetus to their growing discontent with
the depredations of an increasingly strong mercantile capitalism. In the
l790s, Sheffield was a centre of popular disturbance and political
agitation second to none - in 1792, the Sheffield Society for Constitutional
Information had over 2000 members, a higher membership than the London
branch.2
Birmingham, a town very similar to Sheffield in economic and social
structure, failed to emulate the example of its northern counterpart. The
Birmingham Society for Constitutional Information achieved little popular
impact. In fact, its leadership, addicted to high-sounding phrases ut
tremulous in action, lived in fear of a recurrence of the famous Priestly
Riots of 1791. The Church and King mob's attack on the leaders of
1. Allen, op. cit. (1966), p. 313.
2. F.K. Donnelly, J.L. Baxter, 'Sheffield and the English Revolutionary
Tradition', inS. Pollard, C. Holmes (eds), Essays in the Economic
and Social History of South Yorkshire (1976), pp. 91-92
-'3-
Birmingham's radical bourgeoisie on that occasion was to draw the teeth
of the reform movement in Birmingham for several years to come.' Sheffield,
on the other hand, was one of the few large cities not troubled by the
supporters of Church and King.2
On the surface, it is difficult to explain this contrast between the
two towns given their many similarities. John Money has concluded that its
explanation lies in Birmingham's successful adaptation to a sense of
regional identity in the previous thirty years. By its participation in the
Warwickshire election of 1774 and its influence on the surrounding county
boroughs (when it, of course, was unrepresented in parliament), Birmingham
had forged 'a tradition of popular but orderly participation, embracing all
levels of the community'. 3 Whilst the artisans of Sheffield were almost
forced into a recognition of their separate and antagonistic interests by
the neglect (or worse) of a wider society, the middle classes of Birmingham
and the county gentry had promoted a working compromise which enabled the
assimilation of urban with rural values and helped establish a sense of
regional community.
It is tempting to extend this argument forwards to the 1830s when
Birmingham was in the van of popular agitation for political reform. The
Birmingham Political Union was an organisation uniting middle and working class
in the agitation for the reform of parliament and a wider suffrage; its
leader, Thomas Attwood, constantly stressed the shared interests of both
classes and the necessity of cooperation to achieve their shared goals.4
In Birmingham, such arguments were not entirely implausible - the
predominance of the small workshop, the lack of mechanisation, the relative
affluence of the local workforce and the marked social mobility of the
1. J. Money, Experience and Identity: Birmingham and the West Midlands,
1760-1800 (Manchester, 1977), p. 236.
2. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harrnondsworth,
1968), p. 82.
3. Money, op. cit., p. 283.
4. A. Briggs, 'Thomas Attwood and the Economic Background of the Birmingham
Political Union', Cambridge Historical Journal, 2, (1948).
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local coninunity, combined with a shared liability to economic misfortune,
weakened impulses to class antagonism.' Most historians of 19th. century
Birmingham have explained the town's much vaunted traditions of class
collaboration and harmony by such circumstances. The more recent work
of Clive Behagg has refined our interpretation; he has shown that the
impostionof a capitalist rationality was certainly not dependent on the
operation of a fully-fledged factory system and has demonstrated the reality
of class conflict in Birmingham in the first half of the 19th. century.2
Nevertheless, though overstated, the arguments of the earlier explanations
should not be completely abandoned and it remains true that the middle-
class leaders of Birmingham were more steadfast in the cause of reform and
more willing to enlist the aid of their working-class fellow-townsmen than
many of their compatriots elsewhere.
The Birmingham Political Union was re-established in 1837 to agitate
for universal manhood suffrage, and it was the Union that instigated the
petition campaign which culminated in the Chartist National Convention of
1839. It was at this point that the famed class harmony of Birmingham
broke down. The middle-class radicals were unable to accept the more
aggressive posture and rhetoric of Chartism's national leadership whilst
an indigenous working-class leadership had emerged in Birmingham which
scorned their pusillanimity. 3
 A burst of trade union activity in the
mid-1830s had perhaps helped prepare the economic basis of this political
cleavage. 4
 The high-water mark of the split came with the Bull Ring riots
(July, 1839) and their aftermath. The use of the London police and the
1. A. Briggs, Victorian Cities (1963), pp. 188-89 and 'The Background of
the Parliamentary Reform Movement in Three English Cities', Cambridge
Historical Journal, 3, (1952), pp. 297-98.
2. C. Behagg, 'Custom, Class and Cleavage: the Trade Societies of
Birmingham', Social History, 4, 3, (1979).
3. T. Tholfsen, 'The Chartist Crisis in Birmingham', International Review
of Social History, III, (1958), pp. 462-68.
4. Behagg, op. cit., p. 473.
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arrest of several Chartist leaders at the behest of the Liberal mayor
seemed to confirm beliefs amongst working-class radicals of middle-class
treachery.
But the split did not develop further. There were no insurrectionary
attempts in Birmingham; rather, there was a swift transition to a more
moderate and self-consciously respectable movement of reform. The Christian
Chartists were influential in Birmingham and there was even some success in
re-establishing class cooperation in Joseph Sturges' Complete Suffrage
Union , founded in 1842. It has been argued that this rapprochement:'
reflected the deeper harmony of a well-integrated culture in which
masters and artisans of a small workshop economy shared a comiitment
to the social and moral values of the comunity.
This is a somewhat elegaic and exaggerated point of view. Artisans in
Birmingham were workers who naturally possessed economic and political
grievances against their employers and their impulse to respectability
should be understood as an assertion of self-respect, not a fawning
emulation of their social superiors. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
the middle class of Birmingham, by their genuine caiitment to a significant
degree of political reform and their willingness to involve the working
class in a cross-class campaign, attained a moral legitimacy in the eyes of
the workers of Birmingham that they had forfeited elsewhere. T ihere workers
were in trades being slowly killed by mechanical competition, or where they
were already enrolled into the harsh regime of the factory, this legitimacy
had been sacrificed on the altar of laissez-faire. In Birmingham, for all
the town was suffering the growth of the capitalist rationale even in its
smaller workshops, this clash of economic interests had not yet become the
determining factor in the nature of class relations.
Neither had it in Sheffield, and a broad similarity of political
trajectory is apparent in the l830s and 1840s. There had been strong
class cooperation in the agitation leading up to the 1832 Reform Act, a
brief pause in its aftermath, and a revival of political agitation in the
1. Tholfsen, op. cit., p. 461.
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late 1830s. In December, 1837, the Sheffield Working Men's Association
had been founded with the support of the local middle-class radicals but,
as in Birmingham, the Chartist upsurge of 1839 created a schism between
middle- and working-class reformers as the former were eclipsed by the
more far-reaching and class-conscious demands of Chartisrn's national and
local leadership.' Indeed, in tbe bitterness of 1840, after the failure of
the National Convention, there was even some move to insurrectionism. In
January, some 50 local Chartists arose in what they hoped would be the
prelude to a national uprising. They failed miserably and, clearly, this
must be seen as very much a minority current with little, if any, support
from the organised workers of Sheffield. 2
 Attempts to heal class divisions
in 1842 with the establishment of a local branch of the Complete Suffrage
Union were to prove abortive though.
But by 1848 the wheel had turned full circle. The small masters
and manufacturers re-entered radical politics with a vengeance and local
Chartism became a vehicle for their political and economic ideology. The
local artisans supported the new politics insofar as it coincided with
their own beliefs and aspirations but they were unable to influence matters
where their own interests and those of the middle-class politicians stood
opposed. The strength of this radical bloc was such that by 1849 Chartist
representaLives formed a majority of the elected council though they
remained in a minority overall. The Council, in its corporate capacity,
supported several motions for parliamentary reform, including one in 1851
for manhood suffrage, the ballot and triennial parliaments.3
In the period before the First World War, middle-class leadership
in politics was the norm but it took markedly different forms. while
1. Pollard,	 pp.41-47.
2. J.L. Baxter, Early Chartism and the Labour Class Struggle: South
Yorkshire, 1837-1840' in Pollard and Holmes (eds), op. cit, pp.147-51.
3. Pollard, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
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Birmingham became famous or, in some quarters, notorious for its radical
civic leadership and municipal reforms, Sheffield Council was content for
the most part to avoid grand schemes and it concentrated on the unglamorous
business of saving the ratepayers' money. The difference was personified
in the character of Joseph Chamberlain - a figure who, though he withdrew
from municipal politics in 1876, continued to dominate the Birmingham
political scene until his death in 1914. Indeed, his influence was to
survive even this critical juncture and posthumously he shaped the nature
of Birmingham politics right up to the Second World War.
Firstly, though, Chamberlain should be placed in context for he was
the inheritor and main proponent of a philosophy and ethos that had been
developing in Birmingham since the l850s. George Dawson, minister of
the 1ount Zion chapel, was Chamberlain's John the Baptist. Dawson preached
a gospel of civic service and municipal initiative. He believed in the
duties of an active citizenry and saw the municipal sphere as the rightful
place for these improving and self-improving motives to be acted out. 'A
town is a solemn organism, through which shall flow and in which shall be
shaped, all the highest, loftiest and truest ends of man's moral nature',
he proclaimed.1
However, more material impulses were needed to transform this pious
exhortation into concrete action. One such was the desire for Liberal
parliamentary representation. In 1865, •the Birmingham Liberal Association
was established; in 1868, it was re-formed into the Birmingham Caucus by
which the popular electorate was mobilised, through the carefully
organised use of their two votes, into returning three Liberal M.P.s..
The Caucus enrolled a mass membership and claimed democratic credentials
though the form of democracy that it practised was of a strictly Leninist
type - from the top downwards. 2 At this juncture, the radical,
nonconformist bourgeoisie of Birmingham was insurgent. It had successfully
1. Quoted in Briggs, op. cit. (1963), p. 199.
2. Briggs, op. cit. (1952), pp. 168-69.
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led the local agitation for the 3867 Peform Act wiith considerable working-
class support, it was leading the rnovcncnt for edicational reform in the
National Education League, and It was the prixr mover in the foundation
of the National Liberal Federation in 18/7.1 With Dawson's sermons
ringing in their ears, it was not surprising that the humble arena of
municipal government seemed to offer another opportunity for their talents.
The influx of large businessmen in the 1860s and 1870s effected a crucial
change in the caiposition and policies of Birmingham Town Council. The
cautious and penny-pinching administrators of the lower middle class were
overwhelmed by an energetic group of manufacturers and professionals with
the self-confidence and business ability to isnplerrient successfully a number
of long overdue reforms.2
Joseph Chamberlain was elected to the Council in 1869. He was
chosen as mayor in 1873 and retained this position until 1876 when he
resigned from the Council on becoming M.P. for Vest Birmingham. His
major achievements were to municipalise the gas and water undertakings
and to inaugurate the Corporation Street Improvement Scheme. These were
worthy reforms and, along with the increased health surveillance brought
about by the establishment of a Health Cctrniittee in 1875, they did a little
3to improve the lives of birmingham s working-class inhabitants. They
were riot, however, truly innovatory nor did they substantially ameliorate
working-class conditions; the reason that they attracted such attention
lay in the personality of Chamberlain hirrself. He invested his efficient
and business-like direction cf the Council with a moral purpose and
1. F. Herrick, 'The Origins of the National Liberal Federation, Journal
of Modern History, 2, (1965).
2. E.P. Hennock, 'Finance and Politics in Urban Local Government in
England, 1835-19D0', Historical Journal, VI, 2, (1963); and
'The Social Composition of Borough Councils in Two Large Cities,
1835-1914' in H.J. Dyos (ed.) The Study of Urban History (1968).
3. Sriggs, oo. cit. (1952), pp . 168-69.
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inflated the apparent magnitude of the reforms by the power of his own
ego. Chamberlain had charisma; he inspired devotion and, in equal measure,
hatred but he could not be ignored.
Whilst Birmingham Town Council was dominated by Chamberlain and the
town's other leading businessmen, the personnel of the Sheffield Council
was more modest and its abilities correspondingly less. 	 In fact, whereas
the Birmingham bourgeoisie was successfully supplanting the pretensions to
aristocratic influence of the Caithorpe family, the Sheffield middle class
was still somewhat in awe of their powerful local nobility.' Neither was
the Council able to achieve the leading role in civic life that the
legislature of Birmingham had assumed with such authority. Sheffield's
equivalent to George Dawson was Isaac Ironside who, during the Chartists'
brief domination of Sheffield Council, had actively promoted a practice of
highly localised democracy in the form of 'ward motes'. The functioning
of such a system illustrates the degree to which political life in Sheffield
was still focussed on the neighbourhood rather than the city.2
Another problem for the Sheffield middle class was the recalcitrant
behaviour of the local working class. The trade unions were strongly
entrenched in a local economy in which capital was a factor of relative
insignificance. Rather, it was the skills and experience of the workforce
that were crucial and this, allied with the absence of external competition
to the local manufactures, enabled a tightly-organised and cohesive
artisanate to wield considerable power. Though sectionalised, the trade
unions of Sheffield were united by a set of economic and social values
quite opposed to the prevailing Liberal free trade orthodoxies of the day.
The Sheffield trades societies believed that trades should be regulated
1. D. Cannadine, 'The Caithorpe Family in Birmingham, 1810-1910: A
"Conservative Interest" Examined', Historical Journal, XVII, 4, (1975)
D. Smith, Conflict and Compromise. Class Formation in English Society,
1830-1914 (l982), p. 27, p. 77.
2. Smith, op. cit., pp. 75-79.
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in such a way as to guarantee the livelihoods of those who worked in them -
a belief fostered by the earlier practice of the Company of Cutlers. On
the Government's abdication of these responsibilities by its abolition of
guild regulations in 1814, they undertook these regulatory functions
themselves
Physical reprisals against those who refused to join the appropriate
trade society or who worked at below approved rates were a corrmn occurrence,
and one particular incident - a gun powder attack on a saw grinder in 1866 -
attracted national publicity. Respectable opinion was shocked by the
so-called Sheffield Outrages and many local trade union leaders hastened to
join in the condemnatory chorus. In reality, as the investigating Royal
Conuiission discovered, the chief instigator of the attack was William
Broadhead (treasurer of the Sheffield Association of Organised Trades) and
a total of twelve local unions were implicated in the use of violent methods
2to enforce trade sanctions. 	 Amongst the artisans of Sheffield, there was
a widespread belief that trade societies did indeed have the right to
safeguard the livelihood and conditions of their members in this way.
The weakness of the trades unions in Birmingham caused them to seek
security in collaboration with the employers rather than confrontation.
The most important manifestation of this tendency was the network of
Industrial Alliances that arose in the 1890s. This was a system by which
the manufacturers of a particular item joined together and agreed to
operate a single price list, uniform wage rates and a ban on strikes. For
their part, the workers of the trade in question were offered a closed shop,
a sliding scale and bonus system, and a guarantee that wages should not be
reduced should selling prices fall. The Bedstead Alliance was the first
established (in 1891), to be followed by similar pacts in the mattress,
rope, rolled metal, coffin furniture and other trades. At their peak, it
1. S. Pollard, 'The Ethics of the Sheffield Outrages', Transactions of the
Hunter Archaeological Society, VII, (1953-54).
2. Pollard, op. cit. (1959), pp. 152-58.
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was calculated that the Alliances covered some 500 masters and 20,000
men.' By 1901, they had foundered on the insuperable difficulties posed
by the differences between large and small manufacturers, the uncontrolled
competition of newly-established manufacturers and the high bureaucratic
costs of their operation. Nevertheless, as an experiment in collaborationist
industrial relations, the Alliances are probably unsurpassed in British
economic history.2
It has also been argued that the working-class conmunity of Sheffield
was sociologically less susceptible to middle-class influence than that of
Birmingham. In the Midlands town, the trade unions had been unable to
resist mechanisation and the employment of female labour and had chosen to
accept the reality of a reasonable family income rather than the ideal of
the male breadwinner. 3
 To some extent, the artisans of Birmingham had
diverted their energies to politics where they could feel a genuine sense of
participation and, through the abilities of their local middle-class leaders,
a real belief in the efficacy of their actions. In contrast, the artisans
of Sheffield had resisted, with not a little success, encroachments on their
traditional working practices and retained strong loyalties to their
particular trade. Theirs was a more self-sufficient and enclosed corrrriunity
in which the degree of involvement in city-wide or cross-class organisations
was correspondingly less. This, essentially, is the argument put forward
by Dennis Smith in his comparative study of Birmingham and Sheffield between
1830 and 1914 which is sunmed up in the following passage:4
In Birmingham the habit of participating in formal associations...
was much more highly developed [than in Sheffield]. A complex web
of institutional bonds in the educational, political, religious
and industrial spheres provided a framework of interaction which
was more susceptible to subtle adjustments in power and opinion
than the encompassing particularism of Sheffield. The coninitment
1. Allen, op. cit. (1966), p. 365.
2. ibid., pp. 365-68; R. A. Church, B. Smith, 'Competition and Monopoly in
the Coffin Furniture Industry, 1870-1915', Economic History Review,
XIX, 3, (1966).
3. P.R. Shergold, Working-Class Life. The "American Standard" in Perspective
1899-1913 (Pittsburgh, 1982), ch. 4.
4. Smith, op. cit., p. 256.
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of members of working-class families in Birmingham to a plurality
of occupational spheres weakened the capacity and will to resist
innovations promoted by larger employers. However, their involvement
in poltical and welfare organisations alongside leading businessmen
and professionals gave artisan inhabitants a sense of participation
in the management of social reform.
In political terms, the hold of Joseph Chamberlain on his working-class
reformers was shown in a dramatic way by the events of 1886 . In that year,
Chamberlain resigned fran Gladstone's Government in protest at the Liberal
prime minister's policy of home rule for Ireland. Chamberlain became the
leader of the Liberal Unionists who gradually but unerringly drew closer to
their erstwhile Conservative opponents until, in Birmingham in 1890, a joint
conmittee was established to deal with matters of comnon concern. Five years
later, Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary in Salisbury's Conservative
Government. Chamberlain did not desert the cause of social reform but
henceforth it was to be found in curious admixture with his new-found
enthusiasms for Empire developnent and tariff reform. Remarkably, throughout
this quixotic progress up to his death in 1914, even in the Liberal land-
slide of 1906, Joseph Chamberlain retained the support of the large majority
of those in Birmingham who had, like him, previously been Liberals. Haute
bourgeois defections from the Liberals to the Conservatives were not
unconmon at this time but Birmingham was the only place where a substantial
section of the lower middle and artisanal classes similarly transferred
their loyalties.1
Local economic difficulties caused by the rise of foreign caiipetitiou
to the area's traditional industries and an increased interest in the benefits
of Protection may partly explain the rise of working-class Unionism. 2 it
has also been argued that the Liberal working-class vote had been undermined
in the central wards by disillusionment with the Liberal nunicipal programie
which had brought few concrete advantages and the growth of a populist
onservatism willing and able to harness these grievances. In this
1. P.C. Griffiths, 'The Caucus and the Liberal Party in 1886', History,
62, 2, (1973).
. R. Jay, Joseph Chamberlain. A Political Study (Oxford, 1981), p. 160.
perspective, Chamberlain's Unionism is seen as a cloak of principle to
conceal an opportunist move for political survival.' Hoever, while both
these arguments have elements of truth, it is the uniqueness of Birmingham
and its mass working-class Unionism that must be stressed. The additional
element of the political-class equation of Birmingham was Joseph Chamberlain
himself. Though assisted by a heritage of middle-class political leadership
and a local economic structure still broadly conducive to class collaboration,
it was by the vision, will and abilities of Chamberlain himself that
Birmingham was transformed into the 'Mecca of Unionism'. Chamberlain founded
a Unionist social and political hegemony in the city on the basis of his own
personality, an efficient electoral machine, a blatantly partisan press, and
a host of social institutions (such as the Territorials, the boys'
associations, the pubs) which helped instil a 'patriotic' and Conservative
world-view into their clients. 2 None but Conservative and Unionist M.P.s
were returned for Birmingham constituencies between 1886 and 1918.
Sheffield was more variegated in its politics and more typical. It
too had a core of working-class Conservatism based on the workers of the
light trades who were suffering, like those of Birmingham, from degraded
conditions and foreign competition. These were concentrated in the
central wards of the town - the Central Division was represented by Sir
Howard Vicc.n a prominent Conservative Protectionist from 1885 to 1908.
The Park constituency was unusual in that it was a predominantly mining
division with strong Conservative sympathies. Here, the local influence
of the I)ike of Norfolk appears to have been a determining factor. The
East End, however, populated mainly by steel workers, was principally
Liberal or Lib-Lab and in this area the major threat to Liberalism came
not from Unionism but from Independent Labour. By 1914, this was a threat
1. C. Green, 'Birmingham Politics, 1873-1891. The Local Basis of Change',
Midland History, 2, 2, (1973).
2. D. Blanch, 'Nation, Fnipire and the Birmingham Working Class, l899-l9l4,
Ph. D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1975, chs. 5-10.
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assuming form. 1 The emergence of Labour as an independent force and the
eclipse of the Lib-Labs was a slowly fermented process but in Sheffield it
occurred with unique clarity.
The first branch of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in Sheffield
was established in 1893. One year later, there were four branches with a
combined membership of some 400.2 In the same year, there was an important
parliamentary by-election in Attercliffe in which the Liberals, by passing
over the claims of a Lib-Lab working-man candidate (supported by the
Sheffield Federated Trades Council) in favour of a local saw-mill owner,
conspicuously failed to assist their cause. The ILP stepped in to field
its own candidate, one Frank Smithwhornwe shall meet again, who narrowly
received the endorsement of the Trades Council and gained a respectable
1249 votes in theelection itself though coming at the bottom of the poll.
The effects of the controversy at the time were not dramatic (except insofar
as they persuaded Ramsay MacDonald to throw in his lot definitely with the
ILP) but they were a clear harbinger of things to come.3
Gradually the supporters of independent Labour representation and
the Lib-Labs became increasingly polarised in their loyalties. Moreover,
this political split had a clear economic and even geographical basis for
the supporters of independent Labour came predominantly from the steel and
heavy engineering sectors of the East End while the staunchest Lib-Labs
came almost entirely from the light trades of the central wards. 4 (Though
the poorer inhabitants of the central wards might vote Conservative, the
respectable trades unionists of the area were adherents of the Liberal Party.
1. H. Mathers, 'Sheffield Municipal Politics, 1893-1926. Parties,
Personalities and the Rise of Labour', Ph. D. thesis, University of
Sheffield, 1979, chs. 3-5.
2. ibid., pp. 158-59.
3. J. Brown, 'Attercliffe, 1894: How One Local Liberal Party Failed to
Meet the Challenge of Labour', Journal, of British Studies, XIV, 2,
(May, 1975).
4. J. Mendelson et al, Sheffield Trades and Labour Council, 1858-1958,
(Sheffield, N.D.), pp. 46-48.
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The Sheffield Federated Trades and Labour Council became the focus of this
conflict. Hitherto dominated by the workers of the cutlery and allied trades
the Trades Council was transformed by the onset of mass unionism amongst the
workers of the East End in the late 1880s and early l890s. In 1902-1903,
the Sheffield Federated Trades Council comprised 29 branches of the light
trades, 32 of the heavy and 43 others, but this changing balance had not
found reflection in the Executive Committee where the heavy trades had just
two representatives compared to the seven of the light.'
National events cast their own shadow over Sheffield with the
establishment of the Labour Representation Committee (later renamed the
Labour Party) in London in 1900. A Sheffield branch of the Committee -
whose role was to unite trades unionist and political supporters of
independent Labour representation behind the running of their own candidates
was founded in 1903 with an Executive Committee composed of nine
representatives of the heavy trades, two from the light and seven from the
transport and general unions. 2 The Federated Trades Council refused to
associate with it and a compromise whereby Lib-Lab and Labour councillors
were to act autonomously on questions concerning labour whilst being
allowed to cooperate with the middle-class parties on other topics broke
down almost immediately. Events reached their logical conclusion when, in
May, 1907, the Labour Representation Committee voted to rename itself the
Sheffield Trades and Labour Council and undertook to carry out industrial
functions. Thenceforth, until their reunification in 1920, the Sheffield
working class was represented by two trades councils.
The Sheffield Federated Trades Council continued to be directed by
the Lib-Labs of the light trades; it was moderate and conciliatory and
adopted a strongly 'patriotic' viewpoint during the First World War. It
was also stagnant and old-fashioned and it saw its membership and influence
1. Mendelson et al, op. cit., p. 47.
2. ibid., p. 49.
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continuously decline. The Sheffield Trades and Labour Council, on the
other hand, committed to independent Labour and socialist representation,
comprising principally the workers of the heavy trades and other well-
organised sectors such as the railwaymen, tramwaymerl, and gasworkers, was
younger in personnel and more aggressive in stance. Under the influence of
the War, it was to become radically anti-militarist, even revolutionary, in
outlook. At the time of the establishment of the combined Sheffield
Federated Trades and Labour Council in 1920, the Trades and labour Council
had some 60,000 affiliated members and the Federated Trades Council just
18,256.1
The strength of Sheffield's Lib-Labs delayed the election of the
town's first independent. Labour councillor until 1905 when R.G. Murray
(ILP and Gasworkers) was returned for Brightside. But Labour made a bigger
splash in 1909 when it secured the return of Joseph Pointer as M.P. for
Attercliffe in a four-cornered contest. Pointer retained his seat in both
elections of 1910, assisted by the withdrawal of the Liberal candidate.
Events in Birmingham were less dramatic and less clear-cut. Here,
Labour was fighting not just Lib-Labism but a powerful populist Unionism.
Nevertheless, so far as the early proponents of independent Labour
representation were concerned, the first enemies to be overcome were the
Liberals. Both the Birmingham Trades Council and the Birmingham Liberal
Party vacillated in their attitudes towards claims for Labour representation.
At times, the Liberals made some effort to run working-class candidates
but they made few concessions in terms of policy. Their high-minded
preoccupation with the temperance and Irish Home Rule issues held little
attraction for working-class voters and they soon found themselves under
attack from the ILP and Social Democratic Federation (SDF) in the struggle
for municipal honours.
	 In 1897, Robert Taller, a leader of the Gasworkers,
1. Mendelson et al, op. cit., chs. 5-6; for membership statistics see
SDT, 3l;3;l920.
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was returned as Labour councillor for Saitley ward. In 1901, Birmingham
Trades Council became the first major council to affiliate to the national
Labour Representation Comittee. However, despite this conrnitment, the
Council continued to waver in its attitude towards the competing claims of
the Liberal and Labour Parties and its interest in Labour representation
remained pragmatic rather than ideological.'
But increasingly, in municipal and parliamentary elections, candidates
standing under Labour auspices were polling better than middle-class Liberals
or even Lib-Labs. In 1906, a Labour candidate came within only 600 votes of
defeating the Unionist M.P. for East Birmingham and it seemed as if only the
mystique of Chamberlain prevented the loss of the seat. 2 More generally,
there was a gradual accretion of Labour support in the Trades Council as in
the electorate as a whole as the Party came to be seen as a more effective
exponent of working-class concerns than the chronically weak and electorally
impotent local Liberals. the Liberals were increasingly inarginalised by
Chamberlain's clever playing of the social reform, protectionist and
imperialist cards, and by their own timorousness and inadequacy in protecting
and propounding the interests of their working-class supporters. 3 New
Liberalism came too late to save the Liberals of Birmingham who had already
been disastrously weakened by the events of 1886. In any event, the shots
fired by Gavrilo Princip at Sarajevo were to seal their fate.
1. A. Wright, 'Liberal Party Oirganisation and Politics in Birmingham,
Coventry and Wolverhampton, 1886-1914', Ph. D. thesis, University
of Birmingham, 1977, p. 173, pp. 344-45.
2. S. Roberts, 'Politics and the Birmingham Working Class: the General
Elections of 1900 and 1906 in East Birmingham', West Midlands Studies,
15, (Winter, 1982).
3. Wright, pç4t., pp. 385-92.
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1.4 The First World War
During the Great War, the factories of Birmingham and Sheffield
vied in their zeal to produce the agents of death and destruction. Sir
John French described the War as 'a struggle between Krupps and Birmingham';
Sheffield claimed to be 'the Arsenal of the World'.' The statistics are
staggering. During the War, Hadfields alone manufactured 3km. shells while
Sheffield in general was producing 90 per cent of the armour plate used by
British shipping and 70 per cent of all munitions produced by private firms
in Great Britain. 2
 Birmingham industry turned over en masse to the
requirements of war - by 1918, Kynochs was producing some 29,750,000
cartridges weekly, the Birmingham Small Arms Company some 100,000 rifles
weekly. The district as a whole was responsible for the manufacture of
some 15m. shells during the War which some statistical genius calculated
would have filled an unbroken line of ten ton railway trucks stretching
from Birmingham to Bournemouth. 3
 This might, perhaps, have been the best
place for them.
Such production was naturally accompanied by considerable upheaval
and change. In Sheffield, some fL3m. was spent on over 2000 extensions to
its steel and engineering works. 4
 In Birmingham, all the rationalising
and standardising trends of the previous thirty years were speeded up,
mechanisation and the use of electricity increased everywhere, and mass
production became the overriding imperative. 5
 The corollary of the
change-over to war production was a massive change in working practices -
in particular, an intensification of work and a 'dilution' of labour by the
1. Quoted in Briggs, op. cit. (1952), p. 225.
2. Empire Mail and Overseas Trade, Febraury, 1927, p. 138.
Anon., Sheffield. The Arsenal of the World (Sheffield, 1916), pp. 11-17.
3. R.H. Brazier, E. Sandford, Birmingham and the Great War, 1914-1919
(Birmingham, 1921), pp. 124-127.
4. Pollard, op. cit. (1959), p. 270.
5. Allen, op. cit. (1966), p. 374, pp. 414-17.
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ever-widening use of female and semi-skilled workers in jobs that were
previously the prerogative of skilled male workers.
It was primarily the issue of dilution and the conscription of skille
engineers to the armed forces that made Sheffield a centre of popular
disturbance during the War. Alienated from a compliant trade union
officialdom, the workers of Sheffield established a new militant leadership
based on working shop stewards and joint factory corffnittees. Arising in
ad hoc fashion, these new structures of working-class representation were
erected into a revolutionary theory by the leading Sheffield activist, J.T.
Murphy. 1
 The effectiveness of these bodies in mobilising the skilled workers
of Sheffield was demonstrated by strikes, total and solid, against call-up
and dilution in November, 1916 and May, 1917. But the militancy of
Sheffield workers went beyond the defence of obsolete craft privilege in
December, 1917 when the shop stewards' movement embraced nearly all the
factory workers in the town, skilled and unskilled alike, in a general
wages movement and strike.2
Moreover, the ever-rising toll of casualties o.n the Western Front
and the food shortages, inflation and loss of civil rights at home created
a war weariness that, in some, became a radical anti-militarism. To many
in this mood, the October Revolution in Russia was something to be admired,
to a few it demanded emulation. The shop stewarc' movement was one focus
of these feelings, the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council was another.
By early 1917, the pro-war members of the Trades and Labour Council were in
a small minority and the Council regularly pronounced in favour of a
negotiated peace, against the policies of the Government, and, more
radically, against the contemporary ruling class and the political and
economic system that sustained it. The historians of the Trades Council
1. J.T. Murphy, The Workers' Comittee. An Outline of Its Prinles
and Structure (1917).
2. 3. Hinton, The First Shop Stewards' Movement (1973), pp. 175-76,
200-07, 245-48.
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are justified in concluding that:'
From 1917 on, it is not too much to say that the leaders of Sheffield
labour considered themselves to be at war with their own Government,
critical of almost every single one of its actions, hostile to almost
all of its intentions, groping towards an almost treasonable loyalty
towards the international socialist movement instead of the Government
of their own country.
Such self-conscious and ideologically defined radicalism did not extend
deeply into the working class as a whole. Disgruntlement with contemporary
constraints and antipathy towards the situation and the authorities that
imposed them were the dominant sentiments. Nevertheless, insofar as a
militant working-class leadership was acting, for once, not in isolation
from its supposed followers but was giving their more inchoate
dissatisfactions focus and presence, and insofar as these dissatisfactions
were directed against the Government of the day and the system over which
it presided, the War was a radicalising experience for a large part of the
Sheffield working class.
Birmingham, though hardly the political and industrial storm-centre
that Sheffield was, shows points of similarity. A shop stewards' movement
arose for the same reasons as that in Sheffield but it was more weakly-
based and correspondingly less militant. The Austin works at Longbridge
were its principal base and the scene of large-scale strikes in June and
July, 1918.2 Another, more widely spread, strike occurred in July, 1918
when some 15,000 Birmingham workers struck against the new system of
Government embargoes that confined the employment of skilled workers to
specified factories. 3 But, in general, the shop stewards' movement made
liitle impact in Birmingham.
There were a number of reasons for this. One of them was that
Birmingham was not, to the same extent as Sheffield, a centre of heavy
1. Mendelson et al, op.cit., p. 67.
2. R.A. Church, Herbert Austin. The British Motor Car Industry to 1941
(1979), p. 149.
3. Hinton, op. cit., pp. 227-29, 231-32.
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engineering in steel (the area in which the Amalgamated Society of Enginee
the principal base of the shop stewards' movement - was strongest). The
Birmingham metal-working trades concentrated on iron and, more importantly
brass. The latter was an industry modernising only slowly in which the
workers were organised by the conservative National Society of Brass and
Metal Mechanics whose president, W.J. Davis, was a leading trade unionist
supporter of the War. Another reason lay in the deskilling of the local
engineering workforce that had taken place before the War. It was amongst
the semi-skilled workers of the Midlands engineering factories that the
Workers' Union had concentrated its burgeoning membership before 1914,
and the Union expanded to an even greater degree as it enrolled the newly-
recruited semi-skilled workers and dilutees of the war-time boom. 1
 The
president and Midlands organiser of the Workers' Union, John Beard, was
another staunch trade union 'patriot'. What was becoming the most importa
part of Birmingham's engineering industry - the car and cycle trade - was
newly-established and made use of the most up-to-date techniques of factor
based mass production; its craftsmen were few, weakly placed and continua
prey to innovations in production methods. 2 In contrast to Sheffield,
there was no firmly-anchored trades union organisation able or willing to
compete with the claims to power of the ruling forces in society.
Nor was Birmingham Trades Council radicalised to the same extent as
its Sheffield equivalent by the experience of war. Indeed, several leadin,
Birmingham trades unionists, including John Beard and Eldred Hallas (of
the Gasworkers), who had been militant socialists before the War, became
jingoistic supporters of the war effort. 	 Friction arose within the Counc
with those who were less enamoured of the War, and was heightened as the
effects of the War at home aroused working-class discontent. The Trades
1. R. Hyman, The Workers' Union (Oxford, 1971), cbs. 2-4.
2. Hinton,	 cit., p.
	
332-35.
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Council took a leading role in national campaigns for effective food
rationing and rent control. These antagonisms widened into a split on the
issue of conscription where the anti-conscriptionists were in a narrow
majority. 1 Feelings grew embittered and eventually, in June, 1918, the
trade unionist patriots of Birmingham, led by Beard, Hallas and Davis,
seceded to establish the Birmingham and District Trade Union Industrial
Council which was to be run on entirely non-political lines for the specifi
purpose of safeguarding and promoting Trade Union interests'.2
It is difficult to gauge the numerical significance of the split -
the Trade Union Industrial Council's claim of 100,000 members to the Trades
Council's 20,000 is clearly propagandistic. 3
 Certainly, there were a numbei
of secessions (notably fron the Brassworkers, the Jewellery Workers and
several Workers' Union branches) but these were outnumbered by new
affiliations to the Trades Counci1 It seems fair to conclude that the
Trades Council remained the principal and more legitimate expression of
organised labour in the eyes of most Birmingham trades unionists. It was,
after all, the pro-war section that had defected, and the caimitment of the
Trade Union Industrial Council to the war effort reduced the scope of the
action it could take even in what it claimed was its principal concern -
the defence of workers' organisation and conditions of labour. In any
case, the conclusion of the War just five months after its foundation
made the Trade Union Industrial Council seem increasingly anachronistic and
though it lingered on for several years to come, it was isolated and
ineffective and made little impact on popular consciousness.
1. J. Corbett, The Birmingham Trades Council, 1866-1966 (1966), pp. 107-13
2. ibid., pp. 1l L -l5. Quoted from a leaflet issued by the Trade Union
Industrial Council.
3. NSBMM,	 terly Journal, January, 1919.
4. BTC Annual Report, 1918, p. 8.
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1.5. Conclusion
Having reached November, 1918, we are now able to embark on the
main body of the thesis. The histories of Birmingham and Sheffield
marked them apart from each other and from other comparable cities, and
must inevitably form part of the explanation of the differences in their
interwar politics.	 In this chapter, we have sought to isolate and descrilx
those historical circumstances which appear, to this writer and others, to
have most strongly influenced the direction of later develoxnents. Many
of the themes and topics touched on here will be taken up and discussed
more fully in the chapters that follow as we try to account for the
particular forms assumed by working-class politics in Birmingham and Sheffi
in the l920s.
Chapter 2
WORK AND UNEMPLOYMENT
2.1 Introduction
Though Britain emerged victorious from the carnage of the First
World War, in the years that followed she faced unparalleled problems of
industrial adjustment and depression. Initially, victory had fuelled
optimistic expectations that Britain would once again dominate world markets
in her staple products and from early 1919 to mid-1920 there was a brief
but substantial trade boom caused by increased wages, the release of a
pent-up demand for cons..mier goods and the necessity of replacing worn-out
machinery and augmenting the stock of housing.' But in 1921 Britain
exnerienced one of the worst depressions in her history and thereafter,
though there was a slow and unspectacular recovery up to 1929, the
underlying reality was constant: the traditional leading sectors of the
economy - coal, iron and steel and cotton - contracted under the pressure of
falling demand; the newer growth industries prospered but could only
partially compensate for job losses suffered elsewhere. Britain's staple
trades were confronted by similar problems. Their export markets were lost
due to increased foreign competition, import substitution and the erection
of trade barriers, their machinery and plant were old and inefficient and
their products expensive. Our overall competitiveness was weakened by the
better wages and conditions enjoyed by British workers as compared to their
foreign counterparts and was hampered further by the decision taken in 1925
to return to the Cold Standard at pre-war parity which overvalued the pound.
and British exports by about 10 per cent.2
1. D.H. Aidcroft, The Interwar Economy (1970), p. 31.
2. S. Glynn, J. Oxborrow, Interwar Britain: A Social and Economic History
(1976), p. lO0
C.L.Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (1968), p. 267.
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From 1929 and through the early 1930s Britain suffered severely
in the world economic crisis triggered by the Wall Street Crash in October,
1929. The structural problems remained but Britain was hit particularly
by her dependence on export sales to the primary producers that were now
the countries struck hardest by falling prices for their own cotimodities
and reduced American demand.' The winter of 1932 to 1933 saw the trough
of the depression but recovery, when it came, was weak and regionally
disparate until the rearmament boom and the Second World War once more put
human labour at a premium.
These economic difficulties meant that the 1920s and l930s were
uncomfortable years in which to be a member of the working classes. Sotr
were lucky; those in regular, full-time employment enjoyed a rise in
living standards for, though money wages were reduced, real incomes rose as
a result of the fall in the cost of living. 2
 But, of course, many did not
have work; from 1920 to 1939, unemployment never fell below an average of
10 per cent and at times it rose far higher.
Naturally, these generalisations conceal a wide range of industrial
and regional diversity. The experience of the iron and steel trade was
very different from that of the prospering car trade, electrical engineering
boomed whilst heavy engineering was in deep depression. The contrasts were
also reflected geographically for the declining industries were concentrated
in South Wales, the industrial North and central Scotland whereas those
industries thatwere expanding were drawn to the relatively prosrous Soith-
East and Midlands. The hunger marches from the dying corrinunities of
industrial Britain measured in shoe leather and blisters the growing gap
between North and South and graphically illustrated the divergent experiences
of the British people at this time.
1. Aldcroft, op. cit., pp. 38-40.
2. E.C. Ramsbottom, 'The Course of Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1921-
1934', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 98, IV, (1935), p. 661
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2.2 The Local Economy of Birmingham
(i) The New Industries
Of all the major industrial areas, Birmingham was the most fortunate
between the wars. Though many of the town's traditional industries
continued the decline that had been apparent even before the First World
War, Birmingham was particularly well placed to adapt to the changed demands
and circumstances of the interwar period. Their lack of dependence on
heavy raw materials, the spread of electrical power and the flexibility of
road transport meant that the new industries of the 1920s and 1930s were no
longer attracted to the coalfields and ports as had been their predecessors
in the 19th. century. Other criteria dictated their location, notably the
desire for a conveniently central position to facilitate collection of raw
materials and marketing, the availability of cheap and plentiful land and
the existence of an unorganised and acquiescent workforce.1
On all these counts, Birmingham scored well. 	 It was strategically
placed geographically, possessed ample undeveloped land and boasted a
workforce renowned for its tractability and poor unionisation. 'Labour
unrest is practically unknown.. .Birmingham's labour is good, plentiful and
cheap', claimed the Corporation in a publicity brochure issued in 1931.2
Employers were also encouraged to set up in the area by the early surrender
of a large part of the local workforce to mechanisation and semi-skilled
labour and, conversely, by the pool of skilled workers provided by the
town's declining traditional industries. The very multiplicity and diversit
of Birmingham's trades meant that a wide range of skills and abilities were
available to the new entrepreneurs whilst local industrialists, faced with
falling markets in one sector, were better able than many of their
counterparts elsewhere Co invest in and adapt to the demands of new products.
1. A. Pluniner, New British Industries in the Twentieth Century (1937), p. 34
2. City of Birmingham Information Bureau, Birmingham the Hub of Industria'
jgd (1931), no pagination.
3. G.C. Allen, The Industrial 1veloçment of Birmingham and the Black
gy (1966), pp. 439-41.
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The expansion of the car industry was the major success story in the
British interwar economy. As prices and running costs fell and reliability
increased, a widening public took up motoring while the problems of foreign
competition that so afflicted other areas of British'industry were largely
obviated by the protective McKenna duties first imposed in 1915. After a
difficult post-war adjustment, the motor trade boomed and in the five years
up to 1929 U.K. car sales rose by 37 per cent. Austins, by the inauguration
of its first cheap, mass-production car (the Austin Seven), capital.ised
particularly on this expansion and between 1923 and 1929 the workforce of
its Longbridge works expanded from 2-3000 to 13,500.1
Whilst Austins was the largest single employer numerous other vehicle
and cycle firms in Birmingham enjoyed a similar growth. Morris, Rover and
Wolseley all had works in the city, and a number of firms continued to
concentrate on the manufacture of ycles and motor cycles - itself enjoying
a considerable boom in the later 1920s. By 1928, it was estimated that
there were some 200 firms in Birmingham engaged in the manufacture of cars
and cycles, employing a workforce of around 80,000.2
One significant disadvantage of the car and cycle industry was that
it was heavily seasonal. When demand was at its slackest in midwinter
and the early sunnier, a large proportion of the workforce was surrinarily
laid off. On the other hand, the trade employed large numbers in the
manufacture of components in addition to those engaged in the assembling
of the finished product. In all, it was calculated that the car and cycle
3
trade gave work to some 110,000 people locally by 1927.
Meanwhile, an analagous and complementary process was taking place
with the development of the electrical engineering industry. In Birmingham,
the trade rose from employing some 6000 workers in 1911 to over 20,000 by
1. R.A. Church, Herbert Austin. The British Motor Car Industry to 1941
(1979), p. 69, p. 84, p. 149.
2. Birmingham Corporation, Birmingham Commercially Considered (Birmingham,
1928), p. 25.
3. G.C. Allen, op. cit., p. 409.
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1927.1 The two major local employers, Lucas and GEC, each had 7000 workers
on the pay-roll by 1924.2
(ii) The Traditional Industries
The other side to this picture was the serious decline suffered by
Birmingham's traditional industries. Changes in fashion and technology
left these old-established trades struggling to survive. The evolution
of the jewellery and brassware trades may be taken as representative.
As we noted earlier, jewellery manufacture employed approximately
50,000 workers before the First World War. This figure fell to about
20,000 during tI War itself as production went over to munitions work
but rose again as the trade enjoyed a brief boom in the post-war years.
This was to be very much the swansong of the jewellery trade, however -
from 1921, a severe and chronic depression set in and the industry was never
again to enjoy anything approaching its pre-war glory. By the late 1920s,
around 30,000 were employed in jewellery manufacture; by 1937, the
wor1orce had fallen to just over 16,000.
There were a number of reasons for this transformation. Initially,
as boom turned to slump, jewellery was one of the first trades to feel
the pinch as a result of its luxury status. Thenceforth, changes in taste
in the 1920s, when prevailing trends were to emphasise the unadorned and
boyish in women's fashions, and the transfer of luxury spending to other
items were to compound the process. It is a good example of Birmingham's
economic resilience that a considerable part of this spending was to go on
motor cars and the new consumer goods - products that employed increasing
1. G,C. Allen, pp. cit., p. 339.
2. H. Nockolds, Lucas: the First Hundred Years (1976), p. 194;
B.M., 16;10;1925
3. J.C. Roche, 'The History, Develoent and Organisation of the Birmingham
Jewellery and Allied Trades', M. Comm. thesis, University of Birminghan
1927, pp.57-59, p. 90;
Memorandum of Evidence Submitted by the Corporation of Birmingham to the
Royal Cormiission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial
Population (Birmingham, 1937), p. 6.
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numbers in the area as the decade progressed and a large number of former
jewel lery workers.'
In 1914, the brass trade could claim to be the most important local
industry after jewellery but in the interwar period it too suffered
considerable upheaval. 2 In fact, the brass trade encapsulated the split
personality of Birmingham's economyfor while one sector prospered and
expanded through standardisation, mass production and adaptation to new
demands, the other, wedded to the manufacture of specialised products by
traditional methods, was in the depths of depression. Demand for the type
of product concentrated upon before the War fell as electricity superseded
gas, as aluminium and stainless steel were increasingly widely adopted for
domestic purposes, and as public taste moved away from the heavily ornate
to the cleaner and simpler lines of the post-war years. 3 Those areas of
the brass trade that had previously been the basis of the industry's
prosperity became stagnant and depressed and four Trades Boards were
established in the imdiate post-war period to oversee wages and conditions
in these declining sectors that were predominantly based in Birmingham. It
was estimated that there were 450 local firms that came under the jurisdicti
4
of the Stamped and Pressed Metalwares Board alone.
On the other hand, while the finished brass section declined, the
primary sector was thriving - a clear illustration of the extent to which
the trade was becoming subsidiary to the area's engineering industry and
turning over to the production of electrical and motor accessories. 5
 The
number employed in the brass trade remained a fairly constant 30- to 40,000
but the stability of the figure conceals the important transformation
occurring in the industry.
1. Roche, pp. cit., pp. 58-59, pp. 91-92.
2. R.S. Smirke (for the Board of Trade), Report on the Birmingham Trades:
The Brass Trade (1914), p. 4.
3. Memorandum of Evidence Submitted by the Corporation of Birmingham...
(Birmingham, 1937), p. 7.
4. Minutes of Evidence taken before the Conniittee of Inquiry into the
Working and Effects of the Trade Boards Acts (1922), p. 652.
5. G.C. Allen, op. cit., p. 412.
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(iii) The Local Economy of Birmingham, 1918-1931
Whilst we have covered the leading sectors of the local economy,
there remains a multiplicity of trades about which individually it is
impossible to give details. However, the processes at work in the brass
trade could be seen effecting similar changes in many of Birmingham's old-
established industries and for our purposes it is necessary to emphasise
only several characteristics of the local economy which, it will be argued,
had a strong influence on the nature of local politics.
One of these is simply that diversity and variety of industry already
corm-ented upon. It was calculated that there were over 8000 different
occupations in Birmingham and 1000 trades; the Birmingham Mail claimed
that there was 'probably no town in the world that has so great a diversity
of industries'. 1
 This circumstance alone had its own impact on the shape
of local politics and industrial relations.
It is thus difficult to generalise about any 'typical' size of
productive unit. The reality was one of utmost diversity in the type of
works and factory - not just between the different trades but also within
them. There were two broad trends in the local economy, though: one,
modernising and dynamic, towards mechanised, larger-scale production;
the other, stagnant and depressive, found in the traditional industries
based on small-scale, craft production.	 Clearly, the economically
strategic and numerically more important trend was the growth of the new
industries and their suppliers. For the most part, Birmingham, which in
the 19th. century had been able to expand its industry through the
multiplication of small units, was no longer to resist the many inducements
to large-scale production.
On the other hand, the figures given in Table 2.2 (which exclude
those working in shops employing less than ten workers) give an indication
of the number of tiny firms still involved in several typical Birmingham
1.	 B.M., 5;5;1924.
Needle, pin, fishhook
and small metalwares
Tools and implements
Finished brass trade
Small arms (private
companies)
	
80
	
59
	
7960
	
135
	
240
	
61
	
5808
	
95
	
417
	
213
	
21060
	
91
	
27
	
20
	
1007
	
50
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Table 2.2 Employment in Birmingham's Traditional Industries
Companies making returns Employees in Average no.
W. Midlands of employees
Ct. Britain W. Midlands	 per W.Mids fi
Plate and je1lery	 438	 258	 13889	 32
Note: The area here designated as the West Midlands covers Birmingham and
the Black Country.
Source: Final Report of the Fourth Census of Production (1930); Part II.
The Iron and Steel Trades... (1934).
trades. As can be seen, two major employers of Birmingham labour, jewellery
and brass, were still primarily organised in small units of production. Thou
these were trades whose importance was diminishing, the type of work
organisation and process they represented remained a significant part of
the Birmingham worker's industrial experience.
There are no overall statistics available concerning the numbers
employed in the different sizes of productive unit locally but at a rough
estimate perhaps one in five of the Birmingham workforce was employed in a
factory with over 2000 workers by the later 1920s.' Thereafter, there was
a graded continuum of every kind of work environment; many now worked in
mechanised factories employing several hundred hands but a still significant
proportion worked in the small works for which Birmingham was famous.
Finally, one characteristic that the new and older-established
industries shared was a prevalence of female employment. In the local
economy as a whole, over one third of the total workforce was female and,
unusually in Birmingham, women were strongly entrenched in manufacturing
1. My estimate, calculated from the evidence of brochures, newspapers,
Ptr - c.r, tHz.	 1	 .i i	 r. •	 .	 ,	 .
industry.'
There were a nixnber of reasons why women workers were exceptionally
prominent in the Birmingham economy. The most important was that the chief
industries of the town were concerned with the working of light metal. In
the brass, small metalwares and jewellery industries, manual dexterity and
attention to detail were demanded rather than physical strength and they were
deemed especially suitable employers of female labour. Having established
a foothold, women were able to extend their position through the particular
evolution of local industry where male craft privileges disappeared earlier
than elsewhere. Women were adjudged physically and temperamentally better
suited to the repetitive processes of the new productive methods and, of
course, they also accepted lower wages. 2 The seasonality of many Birmingham
industries and the relatively low wage rates of much of the male workforce
meant that the women's contribution to the family income was particularly
prized. There was thus a social acceptance of female labour in Birmingham
that was found in few other areas.
The 1931 Census showed that 22.8 per cent of the metal-working
labour force, 25.5 per cent of those engaged in manufacturing electrical
apparatus and 35.5 per cent of jewellery workers were female. 3 Even in
the car industry the proportion of women workers stood at ]9 per cent
compared to the national average of 7 per cent. 4
 But in whatever trade
they happened to work, women were almost invariably concentrated in the
least skilled and worst paid sections. Birmingham was no exception to this
generalisation though women formed a particularly large section of its
workiorce.
1. The 1921 and 1931 Censuses both suggest that 34.2 per cent of the
Birmingham workforce was female.
2. M.L. Yates, Wages and Labour Conditions in British Engineering (1937),
p. 159.
3. Census of England and Wales, 1931. Warwickshire, Table 16.
4. Church, op. cit., p. 152. These figures apply to 1924.
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2.3 Trades Unionism in Birming
Birmingham was a trade union organiser's nightmare. Conditions in
both the old and the new industries militated against the strong unionisation
of the local workforce. It was clearly a en de coeur when Walter L2wis
(local organiser of the Electrical Trades Union) claimed that Birmingham
was 'absolutely stinking' with non-unionists.' 	 In this section, we attempt
to document and account for this backwardness; firstly, looking at the
special factors in the old and new industries and the rlDre general
circumstances that inhibited trade union organisation, and latterly, by
contrast, examining those areas in which trades unionism was strong.
(i) The Traditional Industries
In the jewellery trade, trades unionism was a negligible force. In
1922, the National Union of Cold, Silver and Allied Trades (NUCSAT) had a
local membership of 2400 when the number of jewellery workers in Birmingham
might conservatively be estimated at ten times that figure. 2 Indeed, a
rival organisation set up by the employers, the Birmingham .Jewellery,
Silver, Electro-Plate and Allied Trades Union, had been rather imre
successful, having at its peak in 1920 a meiiibership of 3063. 	 Even though
the latter union was wound up in 1922, the membership of NUCSAT was to fall
both absolutely and proportionately in the depression of the 1920s.
Clearly, the jewellery workers' case is a classic example of the
problems of trade union organisation in a small-scale handicraft industry.
The trade was minutely subdivided both by productive unit and work process
and there was little opportunity for the developnent of any unified
industrial consciousness. The prime importance of manual skills meant
that the wage contract was frequently a private bargain struck between
1. T.C., 17;7;1925.
2. E. C. Shepherd, 'Unemployment in Birmingham (September, 1922)', in
J.J. Astor (ed.), The Third Winter of Unemplpent (1923), p. 96.
3. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societiesj Part C, TradeUnions. 1920.
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the employer and individual worker. Masters often worked alongside their
employees and had, in any case, frequently 'risen from the ranks' themselves.
The opportunities for a skilled workman to set up for himself in jewellery
were good for it was a labour intensive trade requiring little investment in
capital equipient.'
In brass, the picture was more complicated, mainly due to the greater
variety of the trade itself. Under the advantageous conditions obtaining
during the War and post-war boom, the National Society of Brass and Metal
Mechanics (NSBMM) was able to increase significantly its membership and
influence. In 1920, the union had some 22,836 members in Birmingham, at
which point probably two thirds of the local brass workers were organised.2
But in the slump of the early l920s, membership fell rapidly, reaching just
11,500 by l922.	 Thenceforth, little more than a third of the local
workforce was organised.
Of those that were in the union, most were concentrated in the
larger units of the trade. Henry Dawson, an organiser of the NSBMM,
defended the necessity of Trades Board supervision, stating that the
Society found it impossible to influence matters except in the 'large
companies' employing 200 workers or so. 4 If the size of manufacturing
unit was one problem for the NSBMM, another was the practice of suhcontractin
This had been declining since the 1880s but even in the 1920s it was not
unusual for a foreman or charge-hand to be responsible for hiring, work
organisation and piecework rates - a method that divided the working class
and distanced the employer from the expression of their grievances.5
The degree of organisation in an allied trade - bedstead manufacture -
was similar. Membership of the Bedstead Workmen's Association rose from
1. Roche, op. cit., p. 60.
2. T.H. Kelly, 'Wages and Labour Organisation in the Brass Trade of
Birmingham and District', Ph. D. thesis, University of Birmingham,
1930, p. 658.
3. Shepherd, op. cit., p. 96.
4. Minutes of Evidence taken before the Corrmittee of Inquiry into the
Working and Effects of the Trade Boards Act (1922), pp. 652-53.
5. Kelly, op. cit., p. 53.
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706 in January, 1919 to 1263 in 1922 (largely as a result of enrolling
women members for the first time) before declining once more to just over
800 by 1931.1 Keeping pace with the decline of the trade's fortunes in
the twenties, these figures meant that around 33 per cent of the eligible
workforce belonged to the Association.
What was true in the case of the jewellery and brass trades was also
true, mutatis mutandis, of many of the other traditional industries of
Birmingham. The only exceptions seem to have occurred where unions enjoyed
the active support or cooperation of the employing companies. Thus, in 1920
the Penworkers' Federation organised 4250 of a possible 4758 workers and,
though membership fell sharp1y in the following decade, it continued to
represent a high proportion of the trade's employees. 2
 Another example
was the Screw, Nut, Bolt and Rivet Trade Society, established by the
management of GKN and recruiting only among the company's employees, which
retained a steady membership of around 1700 throughout the 1920.
(ii) The New Industries
In 1929, not more than one in twenty of the workers of Austins
belonged to a trade union. 4 At Einlops, only the craft unions maintained
any semblance of organisation as the management successfully excluded
orthodox trades unionism with their inauguration of a comprehensive system
of works councils invested with full powers of negotiation. 5 The
proportions of trade union membership in most of the other major works of
1. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies; Part C, Trade
Unions, 1919-1931
2. Penworkers' Federation records; MSS42/3/1/45. Membership figures,
19;5;l920.
3. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies; Part C, Trade
Unions, 1919-1931.
4. B.G., 2;4;1929.
5. Dunlop Gazette, 20;l2;1927;	 BTC minutes, 23;10;l929.
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Birmingham were little, if any, better.
One major obstacle in the way of effective organisation of the local
workforce was the early erosion of craft privilege and the prevalence of
semi-skilled employment. In the surge of trades unionism before, during
and briefly after the War, a large number of semi-skilled workers had
been organised, notably by the Workers' Union. From 1918 to 1920, the pages
of the Workers' Union Record were buoyant with self-confidence and success
but by the end of 1921 they record only a succession of wage cuts and
worsening conditions. In the winter of 1921-1922, the Small Heath District
Workers' Union Recreation Society had to report that it had dispensed with
the usual turkey and trimings for its annual Christmas dinner; cold ham
and beef, cheese and mince pies were being provided instead so that 'it
might be brought within the reach of the members to be present' . 	 The
post-war depression broke the back of the Workers' Union and it proved quite
unable to regain its former position even in the recovery that followed.
Membership in the West Midlands fell from 50,000 in 1920 to 4000 in 1929.2
The corollary to the significance of semi-skilled employment was the
comparative weakness of the craft unions, notably the Amalgamated Engineerin
Union (AEU). At the end of 1920, there were 8745 AEU members in Birmingham:
by 1928, the number had declined to 537l.	 Given the importance of
Birmingham as an engineering centre and its size, these figures are indicati
of the Union's feeble local presence. such organisation as the AEU did
possess was crippled by the trades depression of the early 1920s when a
large number of members were made redundant and many companies took the
opportunity to rid themselves of trade union activists. 4	The 1922
1. Workers' Union Record. , February, 1922.
2. R. 1-lyman, The Workers' !)nion (Oxford, 1971), p. 149.
3. AEU Monthly Journal, Lcember, 1920;
R.P. Hastings, 'The Labour Movement in Birmingham, 1927-1945', M.A.
thesis, University of Birmingham, 1959, p. 95.
4. AEU Monthly Journal, November, 1921.
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lock-out both demonstrated and hastened the AEU's decline. The lock-out
of AEU members did not seriously affect local industry - no single factory
was closed completely and unemployment was even seen to go down slightly.
The involvement of the other 47 unions with members in engineering had a
little more impact but even then it could not be claimed that the lock-out
was a success from a trade union point of view; 'members of all unions
either refused to come out or returned to work in twos or threes'.' The
National Union of Eneral and Municipal Workers (NUGMW) recorded that even
before the lock-out 'many men, including our own members, went out of their
way to inform their foremen that they did not now belong to a union'
Of 60,000 workers in Federated firms in Birmingham and the Black Country,
not more than 20,000 actually stopped work; the employers put the figure
at only l6,000. There was no substantial advance in organisation in the
years that followed. In 1927, Robert Denipster, local organiser of the AEU,
admitted that there was not a single Federated firm with a functioning shop
ciittee.4
To suamarise, a number of factors militated against trade union
organisation in the new industries. The high proportion of non-skilled
work created a workforce that lacked traditions of craft and union that might
otherwise have provided the basis of ideology and organisation with which to
contest the employers' power. Even before the War the lack of apprenticeship
amongst the young workers readily recruited to the semi-skilled trades had
prevented the passing on and inheritance of a trade union tradition.5
Post-war circumstances merely consolidated this absence.
1. Workers' Union Record, June, 1922.
2. NTJGMW (Birmingham and Western District), minutes and reports of District
Council meetings. Quarterly Report, March, 25, 1922.
3. B.P., 12;5;1922,	 18;5;1922.
4. LAB 10/5, PRO, Trade Union reactions to proposed Trade Union legislation
Report of Chief Conciliation Officer, Birming, )3ll927.
5. C. More, Skill and the English Working Class, iiu-1ii4 l980), p. 112.
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And the newness of the workforces to their industries, and sometimes
to the area, restricted the likelihood of any alternative tradition being
formed. In any case, trade conditions were unpropitious for any trade
union fight-back. Many workers were grateful to have work at all in a
generally depressed economy and they knew well that there was a large pool
of labour willing to take their place should they lose the favour of their
employer - and most employers at this time made no secret of their
opposition to trades unionism. All the major firms of the new industries
opposed trade union interference in the operation of their factories,
sometimes with the 'carrot' of factory councils and generous welfare
schemes and sporting facilities, often with the 'stick' of redundancy for
known activists. Of course, the fact that most of these firms also paid
relatively high wages (higher than those in the older industries from which
most of their workers originated) was not without influence in creating a
manageable workforceJ
The more general conditions which hampered attempts at organisation
are well observed by John Parker. Referring to the paradox that labour
organisation was weakest where demand for labour was greatest, he argued
2
that this was due:
to the absence of homogeneity among the inhabitants, many of whom
are irmuigrants to the new areas, to the diversity of types and
conditions of work, and, in some cases, to the small size of the
employing firm. These obstacles in the way of the organiser are
aggravated in all large towns. . .by the fact that the homes of the
workers are frequently scattered over areas far removed from their
place of employment. There is thus little opportunity for a sense
of solidarity among fellow workers to rest upon a basis of
neighbourly contacts or even of family life.
(iii) General Conditions
There were other factors too that operated in both the old and the
1. J. Parker, 'Trade Union Difficulties in New Areas' in G.D.H. Cole (ed.)
British Trade Unionism Today (1945),
R.C. Whiting, The View from Cowlej': the Impact of industrialisation
upon Oxford, 1918-1939 (Oxford, 1983), pp. 44-45.
2. Parker, op. cit., pp. 241-42.
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new industries. One was the seasonality of many of the ajor trad.
In the first place, this was a factor which interrupted the thated
experience of work and reduced the continuity of organiatnnaI effort.
In the second, it was undoubtedly a phenomenon that local errp1ojer c
 used
to rid themselves of active trades unionists. A good examp'e of
occurred in the aftermath of the fanous strike at Au.tins In 'aroAVi,
1929. Vary few of the 10,000 strikers were trade unIon menbci b't t:ad
union officials came in to negotiate a settlement and for a sort riod
there was a comprehensive shop stewards' network and Austina r.as
thoroughly unionised. 1
 But the Company soon reaped its revenge. By
December, it was reported that, as seasonal variations exacerbated By rhe
international slump took their effect, the rrunber employed at igdge
stood at just 3000.2 In the early surrrr of 1933 when the u.sua
dismissals took place, many of those affected were shop stewards. 3 As
Dick Etheridge, a shop stewards' leader in the very different envirorrnt
after the Second World War, recalled:4
The break-up of the shop stewards plus the seasonsi form of emnIojrent
meant that no-one could get established. Uneploycenc was used
deliberately to undermine union organisation and it used to he said
that Austins couldn't be organised.
Another serious obstacle in the way of effective organsation was the
large number of women employed in many of the staple local tracte. Joren,
for a whole variety of interlinking and ccnplerrentary reasons, re far
harder to unionise than men. As Barbara Drake observed:5
The semi-skilled or unskilled character of wcrnens crades and
absence of trade monopoly; the "meantI1Te' character of fenaLe 1ahuur
leading a woman to attach less impertanQe than a man to trade
conditions; the consequent less effective trade union orgsrusacion,
aggravated by the lack of political power; the tradition of the
"pocket money worker" or "other means of subs is tencer; the low
standard of living accepted by a woman and the small value st by
1. Church, p. cit., pp. 151-52.
2. National Minority Movement, Midland Bureau minutes, 12;12;192g.
3. AEU Monthly Journal, July, August, 1930.
4. Quoted in R.A. Leeson, Strike. A Live Htstcry l887-I9i 1973
	 p. 15+
5. B. Drake, Women in the Engineering Trades .918), pp. 11-12.
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herself on her own labour.. .one factor reacts upon another, and
female labour stands a ready prey to exploitation by the employer.
All these factors applied, perhaps with particular force, in the ca3e of
Birmingham. 'Birmingham was again becoming a "black hole" of sweated
women', lamented the women's organiser of the NUGMW in 1926.1 	 In 1922,
it was estimated that not more than five per cent of the women in the
small metalwares s&ctor belonged to unions; in 1930, the proportion was
2
said to have fallen to between one and two per cent.	 Nor was the overall
picture any brighter - in the mid-twenties, it was reckoned that of
120,000 female workers in Birmingham just 3000 were un.onised.3
The attitude of the male-dominated trades unions was not calculated
to improve this situation; most were apathetic, if not actually hostile,
to the organisation of women though, when it had become clear that all
attempts to exclude women from the labour market had failed, a few
belatedly adopted a more constructive policy. The NSBMM refused to
affiliate women for nearly 50 years though it eventually c'oanged its
attitude for patriotic reasons during the First World War. 4
 The
Bedstead Workmen's Association was equally tardy. Though women formed
betwaen one third and one half of the workforce, the Association did
not agree to recruit women until 1919 and did not change its name to the
Bedstead Workers' Association until 1924.
	 Only the Penworkers'
Federation was an exceptin to this b1ea picture for 84 per cent of
its membership (and 84 per cent of the eligible workforce) were female
but here, clearly, somewhat unusual circumstances applied.6
1. T.C., 12;3;l926.
2. Minutes of Evidence taken before the Cormittee of Inquiry into the
Working and Effects of the Trade Boards Act (1922), pp. 655-56;
Kelly, p. ci, p. 236.
3. BTC, Annual Report, 1925-26, p. 7.
4. B. Drake, Women in Trade Unions (1920), p. 115.
5. BWA EC minutes, 3l;ll;1919, 27;5;1924.
6. Penworkers' Federation records; MSS42/3/l/45. Membership figures,
19;5;l920.
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Finally, we may amplify the camients made by John Parker on the
difficulties of trade union organisation in large towns with a diversity of
trades and work conditions. The overall heterogeneity of the Birmingham
economy and, in particular, the chasm dividing the experience of those in
the growth industries and those in the traditional trades, did much to
impede the develont of any unifying industrial consciousness. There
was too great a range of separate, sometimes competing, trades interests
for general or shared grievances to manifest themselves except on very rare
occasions. The reality was of a highly fragmented working class, divided
by industry and work experience, divided residentially and divided by sex.
(iv) Areas of Trade Union Strength
Those few sections of the Birmingham economy that were strongly
unionised may be separated into two broad categories: either they comprised
skilled workers, or they were located in what were termed contemporarily
the 'sheltered trades', which is to say that market forces were not the
prime determinant of employment levels and work conditions.
We have referred already to the pockets of unionised skilled workers
found in the large works of the new industries. Even in Dunlops, the Heating
and Domestic Engineers, the Building Trades Workers and the Patternmakers
all reported 100 per cent membership in 1929.1 The General Strike was a
good indicator of union strength. It appears that few factories were
completely closed down but considerable disruption was caused by the
withdrawal of such trades unionists as there were, who were often to be
found occupying key points of the production process. At Dicas, Lf95
engineers and others withdrew their labour. 2
 At Austins, a few wood
machinists, toolmakers and coremakers struck work in a rather risky and
lonely protest. 3
 Only the engineers struck at Dunlops. The only major
works to have closed down completely was the Metropolitan Carriage and
2 •
 Nockolds,	 cit., p. 208.
3. Church, op. cit., pp. 149-50; B.P., 19;5;1976.
1. BTC mrnutes, 23;1O;1929.
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Wagon Company (manufacturers of railway rolling stock) in Saltley. 1
 The
railway rolling stock factories were also the only important works to have
been completely shut by the 1922 engineering lock-out. 2
 Clearly, in these
works, which were unusual in Birmingham as centres of large-scale, heavy
industry, a large proportion of the men belonged to the AEU and other
engineering unions.
Turning to the so-called sheltered trades, here circumstances were
far more conducive to good labour organisation. The Council, for example,
had an electoral interest and clearly defined constitutional duty to
safeguard the wages and conditions of its employees. And though the rates
did not provide a bottomless purse, they did represent a more secure source
of income than did sales on the open market. Thus the NUGMW could claim
95 per cent membership in the Gas, Water, Electricity, Tramshed and
Permanent Way 1partments of Birmingham Corporation and all the bus workers
belonged to the Transport and General Workers Union. 3
 An analogous
situation occurred in the Post Office where the Union of Post Office Workers
(UP4) had a total membership in the district of 3317 out of a possible
3579•4
The railways, though still privately owned, were nonetheless the
subject of considerable Government regulation. They were also comparatively
free of competition and their workers were more secure than some in the
labour force. At this time, a job on the railways was highly prized and
the industry recruited a calibre of employee well able to organise. By
the First World War, the railways were thoroughly organised and in the
interwar period in Birmingham, as elsewhere, the National Union of Railwaymen
(NUR) and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF)
organised virtually all the manual staff while the Railway Clerks' Association
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/118/3; Dallas to Steel-Maitland, 5;5;1926.
2. 4orkers' Union Record, June, 1922.
3. NUGMW (Birmingham and Western District), District Cammittee minutes;
letter from T. Hurley, 1O;11;1927
B.C., 3;5;1926.
4. The Fellowship (Organ of the Birmingham District Council of UPOW),
June, 1922.
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(RCA) represented a high proportion of those on the clerical side. The
scale and solidity of the railwaymen's organisation was amply demonstrated
by the two major disputes that affected the trade in our period. The 1919
railway stoppage was total in Birmingham.' In the General Strike, the
railwaymen were probably the best organised and most nearly unanimous
section of workers in Birmingham; no more than 20 railway workers were
reported as having disobeyed the strike call.2
It is also worthwhile pointing out the geographical concentration
of trades unionism that occurred in East Birmingham. The works of the
Metropolitan Carriage Company and the Midland Carriage Company were both
situated in Saitley. Several of the Corporation's gas works were located
in Duddeston and Washwood Heath, whilst the majority of Birmingham's
railway workers lived in IXiddeston, Saitley and Washwood Heath. Here, at
least, in Birmingham there was a strong trade union presence.
Finally, we should refer to conditions in the Bournville Works of
Cadbury Brothers in Selly Oak. The Company was a major employer in its own
right with a pay-roll of between 8000 and 9000 during most of the 1920s,
but its influence spread further than mere numbers would suggest.3
Cadburys prided themselves on being liberal and humane employers and the
working conditions, educational and recreational facilities provided were
undeniably excellent. The Company also encouraged trades union membership
amongst its workforce but, as it also set great store by its system of
Works Councils, this was a more ambiguous process.
In 1918, Bournville had been one of the strongest bases of the shop
stewards' movement in Birmingham (a fact which speaks for its weakness in
the local engineering industry). By February that year, 54 shop stewards
4had been elected led by FJ.J. Morcornbe.
	 In the meantime, however, the
Company went ahead with its own system of shop and works coninittees and,
1. B.P., 27;9;1919.
2. Birmingham Central Railway Strike Comittee minutes, passim.
3. 1.0. Williams, The Firm of Cadbury, 1831-1931 (1931), p. 117.
4. Bournvijle Works Magazine, February, 1918.
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in November, when the first meeting of the official Men's Works Council
took place, H.J. Morcoinbe was the secretary of the employees' side.' The
stewards had supported the Company's scherrx in the belief that it would
enable the extension of workers' control. In fact, it killed off the
shop stewards' movement as an autonomous force and largely superseded the
necessity for trade union representation. The Company itself was honest
enough to admit that the Councils had no executive or policy-making functions.
Cadburys had, then, by their actions not altogether unwittingly
neutralised the independent organs of the Labour movement. In 1926, although
most trades unionists obeyed the strike call, it was reported that by May, 8,
they were 'stampeding and falling over themselves to return to work'. 3 In
the aftermath of the General Strike, the unions lost considerable numbers of
members. This was partly the result of genuine unhappiness amongst the
workers at the strike call insofar as it affected their own company but
reflected also a change of policy by the directors who withdrew the rule
that members of the Works Councils had to belong to their relevant union.4
In 1929, it was estimated that only one fifth of the Bournville workforce
were members of trades unions.5
There might, in fact, seem to be a good case to be made for taking
Cadburys as an example of trade union weakness but to take the figures at
face value would be to ignore the vital importance of Cadburys as a company
that, at least in principle, supported a virile trades unionism and that did
in practice welcome into its employment trades union and working-class
activists blacklisted elsewhere. In this sense, despite the decline of
trades unionism in the factory in the late 1920s, Bournville remained an
essential ideological and organisational base for the Birmingham Labour
movement in an otherwise hostile climate.
1. Bournville Works Magazine, December, 1918.
2. Williams, op. cit., pp. 116-21.
3. BTC General Strike collection of bulletins, leaflets, etc.; King's
Norton Joint Strike Coirnittee to Central Emergency Corrrnittee, 8;5;l926.
4. Correspondence between Cadbury Bros. and Birmingham Trade Union
organisations; C. Bannister (23;lO;1926), W.H. Surruwers (l;l1;l926),
F. Packwood (9;ll;1926).
5. New Leader (New York), 13;7;1929.
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2.4 Workplace Influence on Political Attitudes in Birmingiari
(1) Small-S2ale Manufacture
A matter of perennial interest to social scientists and one that
plays a major explanatory role in the historiography of Birmingham is the
political influence of small-scale production. As we have seen, it is the
peculiarly small-scale nature of Birmingham manufacture that is held to have
been an important base of the political class collaboration and Conservatism
of the local working class. Such conclusions are offered considerable
backing by research evidence indicating that small units support a
non-radical occupational and political culture among their workforces.'
Our findings with regard to interwar Birmingham broadly corroborate these
arguments though it will be argued that the situation was not static and
that, by the 1920s, the political impact of the small-scale economy can no
longer bear the explanatory weight sometimes placed on it.
The workgroup about which the strongest evidence exists is the
jewellery workers who were principally concentrated in the St. Paul's ward.
The evidence of voting patterns seems unambiguous; Labour won just two out
of thirteen municipal election contests in St. Paul's between 1919 and 1931
and the West Birmingham constituency of which it formed part was won by Lhe
Unionists in every interwar election. The organisation of the Birmingham
jewellery trade and the industry's weak trades unionism have already been
described and these two related factors must bear considerable responsibility
for the undoubted Conservatism of its workforce. The overwhelming
predominance of small workshops and the complex subdivision of the trade
prevented the development of a shared industrial consciousness while close
working relations with the employers encouraged the workers in a
1. S.M. Lipset, Political Man (1966), pp. 251-52;
E. Nordlirger, The Working-Class Tories (1967), pp. 204-05;
M. Stacey, Tradition and Change (1960), pp. 46-47.
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collaborationiSL industrial relations strategy which stressed the shared
interests of masters arid men. The Birmingham Jewellery, Silver, Electro-
Plate and Allied Trades Union (the association founded by the master
jewellers) was chided by the Trades Council for 'its child-like trust in
the employers' but the work experience of the jewellery employees predisposed
them to a sectionalised cooperation with their masters rather than a
unionised, oppositional stanceJ
There were other important economic and political circumstances
that encouraged the industry's Conservatism. One was the status of the
industry as a luxury trade. The oft-quoted refrain of the working-class
Conservative that he voted thus because it was the upper classes who had the
money and provided employment represented a simple economic reality for the
jewellery workforce and must inevitably have increased their support for the
traditional hierarchical class system which secured their livelihood.
Another was the industry's growing experience of foreign competition
and the consequent support for Tariff Reform shared by employers and workers
alike. In 1926, it was the Goldbeaters' Trade Association who proposed an
anti-dumping resolution to the Birmingham Trades Council, and in 1930 West
Birmingham returned the highest number of signatures in the Unionists'
Empire Pledge campaign of any constituency in the country.2
The political phenomenon that united these factors into devoted
adhesion to the Unionist cause was Joseph Chamberlain who, through his
campaigning for Protection and his constant efforts to safeguard the
jewellery trade's interests and popularise its products, earned his
reputation as the industry's 'guardian angel'.3
	 In this, as in many other
things, his sons followed self-consciously in their father's footsteps.
Both Austen and Neville took a close interest in the trade's affairs and
sought, without much success, to aid its prosperity.
1. BTC, Annual Report, 1918, p. 7.
2. BTC minutes, 24;9;1926;
	 BUA minutes, 5;6;1930.
3. Roche, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
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Turning to the brassware trade, the evidence fran the industry's
trade unions is largely of conservatism rather than Conservatism. Both the
NSBMM and the Bedstead Workmen's Association (BWA) took a right-wing and
'patriotic' line during the War and both seceded from the less jingoistic
Trades Council. The Brasaworkers' leader, W.J. Davis, nursed a particular
dislike of the pacifist and socialist elements he held to be becoming
dominant in the Labour Party, going so far as to publicly support the
candidature of Neville Chamberlain against the anti-war ILPer, J.W. Kneeshaw
in 1918.1 The Brassworkers and the BWA were also prominent advocates of
the Trades Union Labour Party proposed in 1918 as a means of circumventing
the middle-class, socialist take-over of the Labour Party apparently
signalled by the Party's adoption of its new constitution in that year.2
In 1920, however, a national ballot of the NSBMM voted by a five to
one majority to re-affiliate to the Labour Party. 3 In the same year, the
local branches resumed their membership of Birmingham Trades Council and
henceforth were to be leading subscribers to both the Council and Borough
Labour Party. In the following year, Davis resigned unwillingly from the
presidency of the union he had founded exactly fifty years earlier.4
Through the l920s, the NSB+1 was to be a stolid supporter of the Labour Party
both nationally and locally but it retained its traditional emphasis on
seeking the defence of its members' interests through conciliation rather
than conflict. Davis' successor but one, A.E. Gibbard, was on the executive
council of the National Alliance of Employers and Employed. 5
 The Bedstead
Workers, on the other hand, did not rejoin the Trades Council and maintained
no political fund.6
1. National Labour Party, NEC minutes, 3;l;1919.
2. NSBMM Quarterly Journal, January, 1919;
	
BWA minutes, 5;6;1918.
3. NSBMM Quarterly Journal, January, 1920.
4. For biographical details of Davis, see: J. Bellamy, J. Saville (eds),
Dictionary of Labour Biography, Vol. VI (1982), pp. 92-96;
W.A. Dailey, The Life Story of W.J. Davis J.P. (Birmingham, 1914).
5. B.P., 31;3;l925.
6. EWA minutes, 22;lO;1924.
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Bearing in mind that, for most of our period, no more than a third
of Birmingham's brassworkers belonged to trades unions, what do these facts
tell us about the political attitudes of the trade as a whole? As neither
union was strong enough to enforce a closed shop, union membership required
a positive decision on the part of the recruit and would seem to represent
an affirmation of a consciousness of separate working-class interests felt
more strongly than by other workers in the trade. The unions also recruited
disproportionately amongst male workers from the larger units. The tendency
of many women to be weaker in the perception of their interests as workers
due to their stronger domestic attachments was thus reinforced by their lack
of unionisation. It seems likely, therefore, that the politics of most
brassworkers would be to the right of those who were trades unionists. As
the latter tended to be conservative, it is probable that non-unionists -
without workplace or union influences tending to increase Labour affiliations -
were, to a significant degree, Conservative. The predominantly Unionist
voting of the central wards, where most brassworkers lived, would appear to
offer some support to this thesis.
The other traditional Birmingham trade of which we have firm evidence
is penmaking. The Penworkers' Federation organised a large majority of the
trade's workers though it was not a trade union in the conventional sense,
having been established in 1919, during the first flush of enthusiasm for
Whitleyism, with the full support of the local employers.' Its object was
to foster harLn3nious industrial relations by facilitating riutual
understanding and negotiated agreement between the two sides of industry.
But the Federation indignantly repudiated suggestions that it was a 'yellow
union' and the evidence does indicate that it may be interpreted as a
genuine expression of its members' attitudes and not merely as an instrument
of the employers' industrial strategy.2
1. Penworkers' Federation records, MSS42/3/l/14-16; miscellaneous
correspondence, 1919.
2. Penworkers' Federation minutes, 4;l1;1920.
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Nevertheless, it is clear that the union's predominantly female
umbership valued above all else harmonious relations with their employers.
when the Federation's president urged affiliation to the TUC, 'he spoke
with diffidence on the matter, knowing the conservative attitudes of the
members' but stressed that 'linking up with the Labour side of industry
would not affect the existing good relations with the Association of British
Steel Pen Makers' . 	 But even this mild symbol of Labour allegiances was too.
much for the delegates who first deferred the matter and then voted against
it. 2 Neither would the Federation affiliate to the Trades Council.3
The Penworkers, then, possessed no apparent sense of independent or
antagonistic working-class interests. Their belief in the two sides of
industry expressed no feeling of conflict but validated a hierarchical
division of labour in which the rule of the employing classes was accepted
so long as they honoured their obligations to the workers. It is noteworthy
that - with the important exception of the General Strike - the only
intervention made by the Federation in national affairs was to express
sympathy with the Royal Family during the King's illness in l928.
The conventional wisdom regarding the conservative influence of
small-scale manufacture has, to a large extent, been borne out. The workers
of Birmingham's long-established staple industries accepted, for the most
part, the traditional ordering of society. This acceptance was fostered
by the localised and personalised industrial relations of their trades
and was consolidated at the political level by the unique role of Joseph
Chamberlain and Birmingham Unionism in claiming to defend working-class
interests whilst reinforcing and speaking for a strong sense of local
identity which embraced all classes.
1. Penworkers' Federation minutes, 13;3;1923.
2. ibid., 4;12;1924.
3. 5;12;1929:
4. ibid., 6;l2;l28.
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(ii) Large-Scale Manufacture
All the presuppositions regarding small-scale industry are reversed
Ln the analysis of the political impact of large-scale manufacture. Here,
he impossibility of personalised management-employee relations, the higher
degree of intra-class contact and the relative ease of unionisation are
ield to be responsible for the predominantly radical sympathies of the
orIorces 1
Certainly, these arguments would seem to apply in East Birmingham -
an area of large-scale manufacture and entrenched trades unionism and the
area of Birmingham firmest in its loyalties to Labour. The Unionist Chief
Agent was forced to conclude of Saltley in 1930 that t was 'one of those
wards where we cannot expect to turn over the solid trade union vote'
In contrast to the firms of the traditional industries, here the employing
companies were national in composition. The two rolling stock companies,
for example, were part of the Vickers and Caiml1 Laird conglxrrates, and
BSA was a major combine in its own right. In the same way, the unions to
which the rrn belonged (and the area had a predominantly male workforce)
were national unions, often with leaders prominent in trade union and Labour
politics. The parochialism that could flourish under the peculiar conditions
obtaining in the traditional industries was not tenable here where the role
of national capital and the impact of national disputes were a reminder to
the workforces of their participation in a national economy as part of a
wider working class.
It is an irony that the one major works to practise successfully a
paternalistic industrial relations strategy - Cadburys - was a major
influence promoting Labour sympathies amongst its workers. The Cadburys
tiad been strong Liberals but in 1920 Cllr. George Cadbuxy Jr. joined the
Labour Party in protest at the Liberals' opposition to any asures of
J. 3. Coldthorpe et al., The AffluenttJorker: Political Attitudes and
and Behaviour (1968), pp. 51-64;
Nordlinger,	 p. 208.
i2. BUA minutes, l4;ll;1930.
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nationalisation and their reactionary foreign policy.' Henceforth, he was
to represent Labour on the City Council until his retirement from municipal
politics in 1927. The Selly Oak ward, which partly contained the Bournville
Works, was the other major Labour stronghold in Birmingham and the Unionists
had no hesitation in blaming the personal influence of George Cadbury Jr.
.2	 .	 .for this state of affairs.	 In fact, this was a little simplistic as the
Works itself was a principal base of Labour support. SIx Labour councillors
and a further six candidates were employees of the Company while the workfor
as a whole appears to have been strongly Labour in its sympathies. Clearly,
the example and emulation of a humane employer was one element in this but
another probable factor was that Cadburys employed working-class activists,
debarred from work elsewhere, who were to be a radicalising influence on
their fellow-workers. More indirect but probably equally important was the
fact that the Company was able to employ a high calibre workforce steeped
in the ethos of working-class respectability. It was peculiarly this milieu
that provided much of Labour's early support.
Cadburys was, of course, unique and elsewhere it is the weak labour
organisation and hostility to trades unionism that require note. The factor
militating against the unionisation of the new industries have already been
noted. Whether the same causes operated against the formation of Labour
sympathies is a moot point but the lack of experience of trades unionism
itself was surely one factor reducing wider working-class affiliations.
Such evidence as we have, though, suggests that a significant proportion of
the large works' employees had developed Labour sympathies by the late l92O.
In Erdington, Witton, where many GEC workers were resident, was knowt
as a stronghold of Labour support in the area as the area's M.P., Sir Arthur
Steel-Maitland, noted in sonwhat jaundiced fashion when he drew the
attention of a GEC director to the 'noisy socialists from the works who
at present are trying - successfully - to intimidate people in Witton'
1. T.C., 23;l;l920.
2. BUA minutes, 16;7;1926.
3. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/l17/3; Steel-Maitland to Dr. Railing,
l9;2;1926.
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Dunlops, at the other end of the constituency, also seems to have contained
many Labour voters. The Pype Hayes estate, in which around 40 per cent of
the houses were occupied by the firm's employees, was reported as
overwhelmingly Labour.1
Beyond this, we are reduced to surmise. The influences of cotmiunal
solidarity and trades unionism that made for Labour support in the older-
established large-scale industries were absent. The workforces of the new
works were newly recruited, geographically mobile and non-unionised. On
the other hand, the circumstances that encouraged Unionist affiliations in
the smaller-scale industries were absent. Management-employee relations
were purely pecuniary in nature and instant dismissal when seasonal demand
fell did not conduce to strong allegiances to the employing company. Strikes,
such as those at Austins (1919, 1924 and 1929) and Dunlops (1919 and 1925),
suggest that non-unionism should not be equated with industrial harmony.
Nor could there be any traditionalistic sense of localism in industries
where the capital was national and the workers came from disparate
occupational and regional backgrounds. On balance, we may conclude that
the workers of the new industries had fewer attachments to Unionism than
many in Birmingham but lacked, as yet, any powerful inducements towards
Labour voting. In the 1920s they represented a reservoir of potential
Labour support which the parliamentary election results of 1929 suggest
had been at least partly won over. 1931 crippled Labour's credibility
amongst this key group of workers and it was not until the rearmament boom
and the Second World War unionised and radicalised the workers of the new
industriesthat they became a major base of Labour support in Birmingham.2
1. Dunlop Gazette, 29;9;l927;
Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/1l8/3; Wiggins-Davies to Steel-Maitland,
4;ll;1927.
2. R. Croucher, Engineers at War (1982), pp. 352-55.
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(ii) Non-Industrial Sectors
To conclude this chapter, we will look at another group of occupations
with little in caiuon except the experience of governmental intervention
which was to encourage in them a highly politicised awareness of their
-L interests. The fact that the same circumstance promoted strong
unionisation made them particularly iiiiportant in the Labour movement.
The railway workers were amongst the earliest trades unionist
supporters of independent Labour politics. The authoritarian management
style of the railway companies, the background of state regulation and the
demand for greater state protection politicised the railway workers and led
them to an early and sustained comnitrnent to the Labour Party both at the
national and local level.' By the l920s, the transport policies of the
Labour Party and the interests of the railway workers had become closely
entwined; to the railwaymen, socialism was not merely an idealised vision
of the future but a practical solution to their industrial problems and
the Labour Party had become the natural vehicle of their industrial and
political consciousness.
In Birmingham, it was reported in 1930 that 75 per cent of the members
of the NUR had contracted in to pay the political levy to the Labour Party;
in King's Norton, the proportion had risen to 100 per cent. 2
 The practical
individual coninitment of many railway workers to the Labour Party was also
shown by the fact that, between 1918 and 1931, 15 Labour councill.lors and
candidates worked on the railways - they thus formed one in eleven of
Labour's representatives and just over one in a hundred of the local
workforce. The NTJR was also the largest single contributor to Trades Council
funds.
The Post Office workers were another group for whom the experience
of government intervention served to inculcate a belief in the positive
l D. Howell, British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 1888-1906
(Manchester, 1983), ch. 4.
2. BBLP minutes, 17;12;l930;
King's Norton Labour News, March, 1928.
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role of the state and coimlitment to the Labour Party as the main
proponent of this view. The Fellowship, the organ of the Birmingham district
of UPM, constantly urged the Labour case in its pages, and in 1924 the Union
established a Municipal Elections Comittee to fund UPCXAI candidates run under
Labour auspices..' In 1926-1927, the last full year before the Government's
ban on the political affiliation of civil service unions, UPG4 affiliated
what must have been its entire local membership of 3312 to the Trades Council.
The importance of both these groups was recognised by the Unionists.
P.J. Hannon, the M.P. for Moseley, argued that:3
Although one cannot be confident of any useful results, I think it is
desirable to get in touch with the railway and postmen through their
organisations, and show them we are anxious to understand their point
of view...and thus prevent these important classes from being
completely absorbed by the Socialists.
There is no evidence that the Unionists enjoyed any success in efforts to
lessen the disfavour in which they found themselves.
The concern of the Corporation workers for politics was always basic
and direct. The Council was their employer and it was clearly in their
interests to return either their own men or reliable Labour representatives
to the Council to watch over their wages and conditions. Indeed, before
the War the prime function of the Labour Party in municipal government in
Birmingham, as elsewhere, seems to have been to represent the Corporation
workers. The impact of municipal workers grew proportionately less as
Labour politics spread and strengthened between the wars but even in the
1920s five Labour councillors were union representatives of the local gas
and trarray workers, either through the NUGMW or the TGWU.
Finally, a brief reference is worthwhile to the case of the school
teachers for, though they were not members of the manual working class,
many were first generation products of scholarships and social mobility and
they were a group which wielded considerable social influence in the
1. The Fellowship, February, 1924.
2. BTC, Annual Report, 1926-1927, p. 39.
3. BUA minutes, 12;l2;l924.
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oninunity. The post-war Covernrint's reactionary educational policies,
particularly as manifested by the 1922 Geddes Axe reductions in educational
expenditure and teachers' salaries, alienated many teachers. The Labour
novement's genuine comTlitment to the progressive reform of education and
its defence of teachers' conditions encouraged some teachers to participate
actively in Labour politics.' Hannon certainly perceived the teachers'
role to be a threat to Unionist hegemony. Each Unionist M.P., he urged,
should make a special effort to conciliate the teachers, and he concluded:
I attach an irmnse importance to doing everything in our power to
establish a friendly understanding with the teachers. Conservatives
have left them too much to the Socialists.
IL. T.C., 2;3;1923.
. BUA minutes, l2;12;l924.
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2.5 The Industrial and Political Impact of Unemployment in Birmingham
Birmingham, despite its relative economic prosperity throughout the
interwar period, was no stranger to mass unemployment. The graphs in
Appendix D show this clearly but reveal too that Birmingham was, for the
most part, more fortunate than the majority of areas and was, in particular,
better placed than those towns such as Sheffield which were dependent on the
pre-war staples of the British economy.
Initially though,Birmingharn, as one of the centres of war-time
munitions production, suffered more than most in the adjustment to condition
of peace. All the trades of the district without exception had gone over tc
the production of military requirements and some 15,000 women had cow into
the town o make up for labour shortages due to conscription.' \fnen Jar
Office orders were discontinued, these female workers were suninarily
dismissed along with many of their male co-workers. 2 At the same time,
there was little demand for the labour of the returning soldiers and by Apri
1919 Birmingham had the h.Lghest proportion of unemployment of any town in ti
country - a rate of 724 per 10,000 of the population compared to the natton
average of 240. 24,118 males and 37,387 females were officially registered
as unemployed.3
There seems to have been no significant political response to this
phenomenon. The suddenness of its arrival, the preponderance of female
unemployment and the swift recovery that ensued in the post-war replacement
boom are probably sufficient explanation for this. By the end of 1919, all
the local industries reported heavy order books and full employment. The
withdrawal of women from the labour market had also eased the situation.
But when the boom broke, it broke with a vengeance. In 1921,
unemployment rocketed, reaching in June, due the exacerbating circumstance
1. R.H. Brazier, E. Sandford, Birmingham and the Great War, 1914-1919
(Birmingham, 1921), p. 137.
2. B.M., 20;ll;1918.
3. B.M., 3;4;lYlY.
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of a national coal strike, a figure of 91,458. There were in addition
46,881 on short time. 1 By this time, the Birmingham working-class movement
was sufficiently organised and self-confident to seek to organise and
politicise the vast army of unemployed. A rash of local co[mittees of the
unemployed were set up and numerous demonstrations and meetings arranged to
mobilise and exploit the discontent of those without work. Between September,
4 and September, 14, the Home Office correspondent reported ten unemployed
demonstrations in Birmingham in which probably some 3500 people participated.2
The Labour Party took the lead in the establishment and direction of many of
the conimittees, for example those formed in Sparkbrook and Rotton Park.3
Characteristically, the best organised was that set up by the local Labour
Party in King's Norton; its treasurer and secretary were employees of
Cadburys and nearly all the money donated to it came from the workers of
the Bournvilie factory. 4 The Unionists were not slow to blame these
activities for the six gains registered by the Labour Party in the November
municipal elections of 1921. The Unionist Chief Agent stated that:5
There is no doubt that the heavy increase in the poll of the Labour
Party is due to the fact that their Councillors and supporters, from
the very first, unscrupulously exploited the grave industrial
conditions of the moment. They pushed themselves forward into all
movements in any way connected with the unemployed and lost no
opportunity of making political capital out of the matter of the
provision of work by the State and Municipality, and more especially
the rates of pay, and of the allowances to those who continued to be
unemployed. They attended all meetings of unemployed [sicl and even
organised them...
The matter was not quite so simple, however, for there was a split among
the local unemployed between the 'moderate men' of the Labour Party and
the 'extremists' of the Corrinunist Party, anxious to radicalise the movement.6
This was given organisational form in the two city-wide bodies created to
unify the unemployed. The Birmingham Unemployed Association opposed the use
2. cAB 24/128/3309, PRO; Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the
United Kingdom, no. 123.
3. T.C., 23;l9;l921; l2;1;1923.
4. Bournville Works Magazine, October, 1923.
5. BUA minutes, 1l;ll;1921.
6. cp 24/128/3350, PRO; Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the
United Kingdom, no. 125.
1.	 B.P., 16;6;l92l.
T.C., 3;2;1922.
-68-
of the workiess for political gain and believed their first duty lay in
the defence and improvement of the conditions of the unemployed within the
1present system of relief. 	 The Birmingham District Corrniittee of the
National Unemployed Workers' Committee Movement, led by the Communists, saw
it as an obligation to draw the political lessons of unemployment so that
the problem might not merely be relieved but actually solved. Not
surprisingly, talks to arrange the fusion of the two bodies were abortive.2
These political differences were also carried through to the Trades Council
where an application for the free affiliation of the unemployed cormiittees
was refused in the not altogether unjustified belief that it was a move to
increase Communist influence within the Council.3
The squabbling was to little avail for by the end of 1923 the
unemployed comnittee movement was effectively dead except insofar as a few
of the local bodies continued to act as relief committees. 4
 The split
itself was one reason for this because many unemployed workers were alienated
by the apparent political exploitation of their grievances. 5 Another was
the extent to which the police authorities of Birmingham acted ruthlessly
to suppress any political agitation amongst the unemployed. In the early
l920s, the police in Birmingham regarded it as part of their duties to
attend all public meetings of left-wing organisations in the town in order
to check the expression of seditious utterances. At times, the practice
reached absurd levels; in August, 1921, an unadvertised business meeting
of the Washwood Heath Ward Labour Party Committee (called to discuss
arrangements for the children's annual outing) was attended by two
detectives. 6 But it was the Communist Party that suffered most; beten
1920 and 1922, 35 Communists were arrested in Birmingham - at one stage,
1. T.C., 9;6;1922.
2. 24;2;1924.
3. BTC minutes, 27;l;1922;
4. 29;ll;1922.
5. BTC minutes, 2;6;l922,
6. T.C., 26;8;192l.
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Winson Green prison boasted a twelve-strong ConTilunist Party branch!'
In 1923, the Home Office could conclude that 'in Birmingham the police
activities had practically obliterated the [unemployed] movement'.2
But the third and most significant reason was simply the decline in
the numbers unemployed. From 1923, there was a slow but general economic
recovery in which Birmingham shared. By early 1926, it was claimed that
unemployment had reached the lowest level that could reasonably be expected
in a major economic centre, and throughout the 1920s organisation amongst
the unemployed was at a 'very low ebb' . 	 Any lasting or solid organisation
was made more difficult by the very low incidence of long-term unemployment
in the city. At the beginning of 1930, it was reported that 90 per cent of
those on the registers had worked for at least 30 weeks in the previous two
years. The unemployment register as a whole changed in personnel once every
seven or eight weeks save for a few hundred of the old and disabled.4
There were few amongst the unemployed, therefore, with either the ability
to give any sustained comitment to the movement or the incentive given
the good job prospects locally.
The General Strike and national coal strike of 1926 was a sharp but
short-lasting break in the generally optimistic outlook for Birmingham. At
its peak, in August, unemployment rose to 43,617 (12 per cent of the insured
workforce) but the industrial troubles had no lasting impact and by the
later 1920s joblessness in Birmingham was running at a rate below the
national average. 5 The city, though, could not escape the effects of the
'economic blizzard' heralded by the Wall Street Crash. By September, 1931,
6
unemployment stood at 74,872 (19.7 per cent of the insured workforce).
On this occasion, the Conmunists had a free run; the hands of the
1. The Corrmunist, 14;lO;1923.
2. AB24/160/202, PRO; Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the
United Kingdom.
3. 9;1;1924;	 BTC minutes, 8;6;l925.
4. l;1;l930.
5. Ministry of Labour Gazette, September, 1926.
6. ibid., October, 1931; Local Unemployment Index, October, 1931.
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orthodox Labour movement were effectively tied by the fact that it was a
Labour Government which was presiding, with little credit to its
administrative talent or political ideals, over the economic mess.
Agitation peaked at the end of 1931 when the National Unemployed Workers'
Movement (NUWM) claimed to have organised six branches in Birmingham with
a total membership of 1000.1	 Its most effective moment came in October
when, according to Comnunist sources, some 20,000 people participated in
a demonstration against cuts in relief which achieved the concession that
benefits were to be made up to existing levels by the City Council. 2 Any
hopes that such activities might redound politically to the advantage of
the Conmunist Party were disappointed though. In the 1931 parliamentary
elections, Bernard Moore, the local organiser of the NUWM amd Corrrnunist
candidate in Duddeston, came third in the poll - above the New Party but
16,000 votes behind the victorious Unionist candidate. In fact, the Labour
Government's mishandling of the economic crisis seems to have discredited the
Left generally and contributed to a right-wing backlash which had little
sympathy for the analyses and prescriptions of the Corrrnunist Party.
In attempting to assess the political impact of unemployment on
working-class politics in Birmingham, we must look beyond the record of
organisation and demonstration to examine the ways in which the mass of the
unemployed reacted. l92lwascertainly a critical year - a year in which
the sudden onset of mass unemployment and the perceived niggardliness of
national and local authorities in dealing with the problem caused widespread
discontent. But in 1922, as unemployment fell and as the relief system
began functioning more smoothly, politicised expressions of mass resentment
evaporated. Writing in early 1923, one observer could state that:3
No criticisms at all have been levelled at the methods of
administering relief in the city. There is very little bitterness
1. Birmingham Parliamentary Election Literature, BCL; NUWNI leaflet,
Duddeston, 1931.
2. NUWM Monthly Report Bulletin, October-November, 1931.
3. Colston Shepherd s O. cir. - n	 -
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aniong the unemployed themselves. In fact, the general feeling
throughout the city is one almost of stoicism. Unemployment is
looked upon as a result of international upheavals; as a condition
that can only be relieved by tIe efforts of the city itself...
This would seem to be a fair assessment. Unemployment only really became
a political issue when the unemployed had concrete grievances and someone
to blame. In Birmingham, the operation of this radicalising combination
was, for the most part, minimised by local economic conditions and the local
handling of relief arrangements.
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2.6 The Local Economy of Sheffield
(i) The Heavy Industries
The heavy industries had come to dominate the economy of Sheffield
even before 1914 and the First World War, with its demand for armaments and
high-grade steel, merely consolidated the process by which they rose to
preeminence. 37 new foundries were opened in Sheffield in the period during
and shortly after the War but the expansive optiiism of the time was soon
shown to be full of hollow promise as steel became one of the industries
hardest hit by the recession that began in 1920.1
The general economic conditions that damaged Britain's traditional
staple industries have already been noted. The position of British steel
makers vis-a-vis their foreign competitors was particularly difficult. The
wartime devastation of large parts of the Continent had at least enabled
Germany, France and Belghmi to re-establish their steel industries on a more
efficient basis by the installation of large-scale, up-to-date plant.
Productivity in the British steel industry remained obstinately low, and
the higher wages and social charges in Britain left the trade in a weak
position on the international market.2
Sheffield's post-war production of steel ingots and castings actually
outran the 1913 total in all but three years (1921, 1922 and 1926) but, once
the feverish post-war boom subsided, the nimibers employed fell dramatically.3
In the last quarter of 1918, the iron and steelworks of Sheffield and
Rotherham employed an average of 31,000 people; by 1931, this total was
halved to an annual average of l5,00O.
The fate of the other major employer of labour in the heavy industrial
sector of Sheffield, engineering, was integrally related to that of steel,
1. D. Burn, The Economic History of Steelpjpg, 1867-1939 (Cambridge, 1961),
pp. 358-60.
2. ibid., pp. 408-22.
3. A.D.K. Owen, A Report on Unemploment in Sheffield (Sheffield, 1932), p. 31.
4. Ministry of Labour Gazette, 1918-1931.
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both processes often being carried out in the same firm. Engineering in
Sheffield terms meant the manufacture of heavy mechanical parts and products
sold to industry or the state rather than the domestic consumer. In
recession, it was this area of production that was hit first and hardest by
falling demand as industry and government retrenched.
Between 1923 and 1931, the insured workforce of the Sheffield
engineering and engineers' iron and steel founding section fell from 21,571
to 14,050.1 The decline was illustrated even more graphically by its
impact on the major union catering for engineering workers in 1921, there
was an average of 5957 AEU members in employment in Sheffield; ten years
2later, the comparable figure stood at just 2832.
For the coal industry, the post-war years were a period of great
turmoil. 1919 and 1920 were years of unprecedented demand for British coal
but in 1921 demand plummetted. At the same time, the Government withdrew
its undertaking to guarantee profits as decontrol came into force on April, 1.
Almost inevitably wage cuts ensued though they were not conceded by the miners
until the failure of a q day national oco-. The coalowners demands for
further reductions in 1925 were at first averted by a nine month Government
subsidy but on May, 1, when the new lower scales of remuneration came into
force, a national strike began which lasted seven months. Eventually, the
miners despite their own heroic resistance and the aborted General Strike on
their behalf, were forced to accept wage cuts, longer hours and district
agreements. Hopes for recovery in the later l920s were dashed by the onset
of the Great I)apression during which domestic consumption and export demand
reached a new low. In 1931, the mining industry employed 380,000 less
workers than it had in 1920, and the rate of unemployment amongst miners
stood at 28 per cent.3
1. Sheffield Social Survey Cournittee, miscellaneous materials, MD1228E.3,
Ministry of Labour returns, l923-J931.
2. S. Pollard, A History of Labour in Sheffield (Liverpool, 1959), p. 338.
3. M.W. Kirby, The British Coalmining Industry, 1870-1946 (1977), pp. 67, 139.
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In nearly all respects, however, the South Yorkshire district was
luckier than the other mining areas of Britain. Its thick and uniform seams
enabled efficient and large-scale production, and its high quality coal was
ideal for use in the public utilities and other sectors of the more stable
domestic market. Output increased in the South Yorkshire field and in 1931,
when it surpassed the chronically depressed and export-dependent South Wales
field, it became the largest coal-producing area of Britain j As a result,
wages and conditions were generally better in South Yorkshire than in the
older and less efficient areas, and in 1926 Yorkshire was one of only four
districts that were able to negotiate a seven and a half hour day rather
2that the general eight hours. 	 But Sheffield miners, though to some extent
shielded from the worst effects of coal's decline, were part of a netional
industry and national union. These circumstances ensured that they too
suffered in the post-war convulsions of the coal industry.
(ii) The Light Trades
Though now outweighed by the heavy industrial sector, the light trades
of cutlery, silverware and tool manufacture continued to be important local
employers. In terms of the numbers employed, there was only a slight decline
in the 1920s but to take the figures at face value would be to disregard the
considerable upheaval and difficulties faced by the light trades during the
decade.
Cutlery, for example, shared the pattern of boom and slump connion to
most industries. In May, 1920, The Times could report that 'the
disappearance of [German] competition had brought about a wonderful change.
All the world is crying for Sheffield knives and scissors' . 	 But the
return of German competition and the trade collapse of 1920 brought severe
1. R.G. Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners, 1881-1926: A Study in Labour and
Social History', Ph. D. thesis, University of Leeds, 1974, pp. 30-32.
2. ibid., pp. 72-43.
3. The Times, 26;5;1920.
Table 2.6a Employment in Sheffield, 1921-1931
1921
Heavy trades
Light trades
All trades
Female
3660
11869
54362
Female
4022
13265
52168
1931
Number
Male
employed
	
47003	 43343
	
31643	 19774
	
179892	 125530
Number
Male
employed
65724	 61702
41016	 27751
202662 150494
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depression. The numbers employed by the firms of the Sheffield Cutlery
Manufacturers' Association fell by over 2000 in the four years after 1920.1
Thereafter, employment was largely static in the industry - standing at 8965
111 1924 and 8465 in 1930 (though these figures conceal the amount of short-
time worked in the trade throughout the 1920s). The workforce in the
jewellery and plate trade underwent a similar decline, falling from 8225 in
1924 to 7533 in 1930. Tool manufacture was slightly more fortunate in that
the numbers fell by 200 only, from 13,445 in 1924 to 13,230 in 1930.2
(iii) The Local Economy of Sheffield, 1918-1931
There are two outstanding features of the Sheffield economy. One is
the pronounced contrast and dichotomy between its two leading sectors - the
large-scale heavy industries of steel and engineering, and the smaller-scale,
still handicraft-based, light trades of cutlery and tool manufacture. The
other is their overall predominance in the local industrial structure.
Source: S. Pollard, A History of Labour in Sheffield (Liverpool, 1959), p.250;
1921, 1931 Census occupational tables.
1. Pollard, op. cit., p. 289.
2. Final Report of the Fourth Census of Production (1930); Part II, the
Iron and Steel Trades...(1934).
These returns apply to the West Riding as a whole but the trades were
very much concentrated in Sheffield so the figures may be taken as
representative.
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Even with the decline in both sectors shown by the figures (for the 1931
Census counted only those actually in work), the metal-working industries
clearly had a dominating influence in the city. In the 1920s, it could be
reckoned that almost one half of Sheffield's workforce was directly dependent
on the smelting or working of metal for its livelihood.
Conversely, as Sheffield was not situated on any major corrrnunications
through-route and could not be considered a distribution centre for any but
a small area iniiiediately circurnjacent, conurcial life was relatively
undeveloped. Though, of course, conmrce and administration had grown to
service the cown's own needs, for a city of Sheffield's size, secondary and
tertiary employment were disproportionately small. Sheffield was 'as nearly
strictly primary as it is possible to find a large town', probably the
'largest purely manufacturing town in the country'.' Sheffield's
dependence on one sphere of economic activity and under-developed corrnrcial
life stand in stark contrast to the diversity of Birmingham.
As to size of unit, the heavy industries were large-scale employers
whose workers were concentrated in a few major companies. The point is
amply illustrated if we examine the numbers employed by a few of the most
important firms when they were operating at full capacity in the imiediate
post-war period. The Vickers River Ln works employed some 7500, Hadfields
5000, Firths 5000, Steel, Peech and Tozers 5000, Edgar Allens 2400 and
William Cookes 1120.2 Short-time and unemployment in the later 1920s
reduced these figures but the trade was one in which the production process
was required, physically and economically, to be large-scale. Foundries
were closed and workers laid off but the experience of the steel and
engineering trades' workers was essentially one of large units.
1. P. Abercrombie, Sheffield: A Civic Survey (1924), p. 6.
2. Vickers Ltd., Short History of the Vickers Company (Sheffield, 1920),
no pagination.
S.D.I., 4;6;l919; 2l;7;l924; 29;9;1919; 29;9;19l9.
Edgar Allen Works and Sports Magazine, September, 1920.
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Table 2.6b Emplqyment in Sheffield's Traditional Industries
Companies making returns
	
	 Average no.Employees in
Gt. Britain	 W. Riding W. Riding	
of employees
per W.Rid.firm
Cutlery
	 127
	
117
	
8465
	
72
Tools and implements	 240
	
130
	
13230
	
102
Plate and jewellery	 438	 74	 7533	 102
Source: Final Report of the Fourth Census of Production (1930); Part II
The Iron and Steel Trades.. .(1934).
In the light trades, the picture was very different as the statistics above
indicate. Small units remained and, indeed, there were economic circumstances
that encouraged the persistence of small-scale production. In cutlery, the
trade was divided by product and process: scissors, razors and the different
types of knives were all manufactured by separate firms whilst specialist
units concentrated on particular aspects of the production process. The
advantage of this complex division of labour was that it enabled the larger
firms to cope with a diversity of products without incurring the expense of
the specialist equipment required for each.'
After the First World War, it was calculated that a skilled workman
could establish himself in business for an outlay of just £5. If cheap
rather than quality production was in demand, the small employers were
particularly well placed to benefit as they could, with their lower labour
costs and overhead charges, undercut the prices of their larger competitors.2
In 1923, the Sheffield Chamber of Corimrce reported that the little master
was 'present with greater force and nre vitality than ever' . 	 In any case,
even in the larger firms many of the processes were still carried out by
hand and there was a strong division of labour.
1. H. Townsend, 'The Structure and Problems of the Sheffield Cutlery Trade',
District Bank Review, March, 1954, pp. 23-24.
2. ibid., pp. 24-25.
3. Sheffield chamber of Comrerce Journal, 	 cember, 1923.
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The Sheffield silver and electro-plate and tool industries were
closely allied trades with similar structures. In each, there were a
number of large and well-known firms but these existed in a symbiotic
relationship with many smaller companies, manufacturing in their own right
and servicing the needs of their larger compatriots.
There was, thus, a clear schism in the industrial experience of the
Sheffield working class. On the one hand, the numerically stronger trades,
such as iron and steel and engineering, were par excellence those of large-
scale industrial production. On the other, traditions of skill and
handicraft production still influenced the workers of the light trades.
While a third of the workforce could be said to belong to the industrial
proletariat as classically defined, the traditions of the artisan, enfeebled
though they were, lived on f or a further fifth.
The participation of women in the heavy industries of Sheffield
could be dismissed siirmarily as negligible. Less than one in twenty of the
insured workers in the steel, coal and engineering sectors was female.'
But, if women were debarred from the heavy trades by reasons of gentility
and physique, their particular qualities were much in demand in the light.
These were usually defined negatively - women were, or were thought to be,
cheap and pliant labour for the unskilled and repetitive processes in
cutlery and tool manufacture. In the 'precious metals and electro-plate'
category of the 1921 Census, women actually outnumbered men in Sheffield
but the true balance of power was shown by the fact that four fifths of the
women were employed as buffers and polishers and almost half the men as
smiths.2
In purely employment terms, this concentration in the less skilled
sectors was of some advantage to the women workers of the light trades in
the 1920s when there was a slight substitution of female for male labour.
1. Sheffield Social Survey Comittee, miscellaneous materials, MD1228E.3;
Ministry of Labour returns, 1923-1931.
2. Census of England and Wales, 1921. Yorkshire, Table 16.
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Whilst this development was in part a manifestation of changing social
attitudes, it was more directly the product of the industrial policies of
the employers who were enabled by increasing nchanisation to replace
their better-paid nn with cheap female labour.' The overall statistics
contained in the 1921 and 1931 Censuses show that the proportion of women
in the total workforce of Sheffield rose from 25.8 per cent to 27.4 per cent
a high figure but one still overshadowed by that of Birmingham.
L Pollard, pp.	 P. 250.
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2.7 Trades Unionism in Sheffield
(i) The Heavy Industries
During the First World War, the workers of Sheffield represented the
very peak of trades union organisattonal strength and militancy in Britain.
For a brief period after the War, they maintained this hard-won position
until the heart of the local trade union movement was ripped out by the
prolonged and severe depression of the 1920s.
To take iron and steel first, this was one sector where traditions
of organisation were weak. No steel union was recognised by the employers
until 1913 and it was only under the peculiar conditions of the First World
War that the steel unions (combined since 1916 in the Iron and Steel Trades
Confederation [ISTc7) were able to extend and tighten their grip. In 1914,
the steel unions had just five branches with a combined membership not
surpassing one or two hundred; by 1918, the ISTC could boast of 46 local
branches with a total membership of 8750. In the conditions of trade
prosperity and working-class militancy after the War, this number was
further increased to 11,000 by 1920.1
Six years later, under the impact of unprecedented industrial
recession, just 3500 members remained. 2
 The 1926 coal strike exacerbated
matters; in September, Walter Dodgson (local organiser of the ISTC)
reported that just one Siemens open hearth furnace was working and many
mills and forges were completely c1oed down. 3
 At the end of the year,
the subscribing membership of the ISTC in its Division Three (comprising
Sheffield, Rotherham and Scunthorpe) had fallen by 84 per cent.4
1. J. Mendelson et al., Sheffield Trades and Labour Council, 1858-1958
(Sheffield, N.D.), p. 74.
2. S. Benton, t Sheffield 1 in M. Morris (ed.), The General Strike
(Harmnondsworth, 1976), p. 426.
3. ISTC QuarteryReport, September, 1926.
4. ibid., December, 1926.
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Orgariisation improved somewhat as trade conditions Improved. In 1927,
Dodgson claimed that in the open hearth furnaces unionisation was
'comparatively good' but he could make no progress with the men who worked
in the rolling mills and forges whose particularly intermittent form of
employment made them especially difficult to organise.'
The ISTC, then, was crushed by the collapse of the steel trade in the
1920s. At the peak of its strength it probably represented some 75 per cent
of the iron and steel production workers of Sheffield; by 1931, the
proportion could not have been much above 25 per cent. 2
 Many of its
Sheffield members, hit hard by unemployment and lacking, in the words of
Arthur Pugh, 'a real understanding of trades unionism', simply faded away.3
The National Union of Foundry Workers (NUF1tJ), on the other hand, was
a society enrolling skilled workers with a strong sense of their craft and
power. In 1931, the Union listed 40 companies in Sheffield where foundry
workers were employed of which 30 were 'Society' shops, employing and
recruiting only NUFW members. 4 The NUFJ was hit no less hard by the
depression than was the ISTC. Its working membership fell by almost two
thirds between October, 1920 and October, 1931 (from 2043 to 702) but its
affiliated membership fell by only a half (from 2048 to 1l02) Clearly,
it retained its organisational hold on the skilled workers in the foundries
even though its industrial power was greatly weakened.
In the engineering trades, traditions of organisation reached back
into the 19th. century but, here too, it was the First World War that brought
trades unionism to a peak. The Amalgamated Society of Engineers had 3117
members in Sheffield in 1914; In 1920, through new affiliations and
amalgamation, the AEU (as it now was) claimed a membership of 7771.6
L ISTC Qiarterly Report, March, June, 1927.
2. S.D.L, 26;8;l920.
3. A. Pugh, Men of Steel (1951), p. 487.
4. NUFW Monthly Journal and Annual Report, April, 1930.
5. NUFJ Monthly Journal and Report, November, 1920, November, 1931.
6. Pollard, op. cit., p. 234, p. 338.
-82-
But thereafter, the decline in fortunes of the AEU was swift and sure.
The imediate post-war slump in the munitions industry had already been
used to weed out the active shop stewards in the Vickers works and elsewhere;
the depression of the early 1920s provided renewed opportunities for the
employers' counter-attack.'
In July, 1921, during the coal strike, over 50 per cent of the local
members of the AEU were totally unemployed and even during the slight
recovery that preceded the lock-out in March, 1922, the rate of unemployment
only fell to a third. 2
 During the lock-out itself, the number of AEU
members out of work again rose to over 50 per cent (those engineers
working for firms not belonging to the Engineering Employers' Federation
were unaffected). 3 But the lock-out was only ona ignominiously lost battle
in the struggle to safeguard rights and conditions. The skirmishes continued
but the AEU was in no position to withstand the onslaught and throughout the
remaining six months of 1922 the pages of the AEU Monthly Journal record the
dismissal of members and the victimisation of shop stewards. By 1926, the
membership of the AEU in Sheffield had fallen to under 4000 and in 1931 it
.4had fallen yet further under the impact of the Great Depression.
The evidence suggests that the other skilled unions in the steel and
engineering trades fared better than the Engineers. The Boilermakers and
the United Society of Spring Fitters and Vicemen were able to report 100 per
cent membership in all the major firms of Sheffield in which they organised
in l925.	 It seems that where unions were able to retain control of a
particular part of the production process through their monopoly of
specialist skills, they were better able to maintain their membership and
position. The skills that the AEU had once claimed as its prerogative had
been superseded by machine production and the rise of semi-skilled labour.
1. The Socialist, 17;7;1919.
2. AEUMonthlyJournal, July, 1921; S.D.I., ll;3;l92l.
3. AEU Monthly Journal, May, 1922.
4. Benton, op. cit., p. 426; Pollard, op. cit., p. 338.
5. SFILC minutes, Trade Union Organising Comittee, July, 1925.
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As to the unskilled workers of the heavy industries, their
organisation was left to a variety of general unions - most importantly
in the Sheffield area, the National Union of Ceneral Workers (NUGW) and
the National Amalgamated Union of Labour (NAUL) which were amalgamated with
the Municipal Employees' Association in 1924 to form the NUGMW. Even before
1914, the labourers of the East End works were better organised than any
other comparable group in the country.' Their organisation, too, prospered
during the War and, though no breakdown of their branches exists, the
indications are that the NAUL and the NUGW, with area memberships of 25,000
and 14,000 respectively, had enrolled the bulk of the unskilled workers of
the heavy trades by 1920.2
After this, statistics are hard to cane by though, even as an act of
omission, this silence suggests that all was not well. In the buoyant days
of the War and post-war boom, trade unions regularly cited their membership
and growth; officials were understandably less forthcoming in the period
of decline after 1920. We know that the national TUC-affiliated membership
of the NAtJL fell from 170,000 in 1920 to 53,000 in 1924, whilst the NUGMW's
membership fell from 359,697 on inception to 267,734 in 1931. 	 Lacking
any harder evidence, we may make the reasonable assumption that trades
unionism axmngst the non-skilled workers declined at least as seriously as
it did amongst the skilled.
In mining, the union was something more than an organisation to
protect the economic interests of the industry's wage-earners; it also
played a leading role in the social and political life of the area it served.
By the l920s, membership of the union had become an important element in
gaining acceptance in the coalmining cornunity. The social pressures to
conformity may not have acted so sharply on the 6000 or so miners living
in Sheffield itself but must have been considerable for the many living in
the pit villages of Handsworth and Woodhouse. Certainly, in Yorkshire as a
1. C. Burke, 'Working-Class Politics in Sheffield, 1900-1920', Ph. D.
thesis, Sheffield City Polytechnic, 1983, p. 61.
2. S.D.I., 26;8;1920.
3. I-I. Clegg
,Cenera1Unjon((Jfo
	 1954), p. 15, TD 28.
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whole between 85 and 90 per cent of aH mineworkers belonged to the
Yorkshire Miners' Association (YMA) in the first half of the 1920s. The
rate of membership fell by almost a half in the crisis year ci 1926 but it
is likely that it picked up considerably once more as labour re1aLior
stabiJised in the latter part of Llie decade.'
A better guide to the organisational and financial strength of the
YMA branches at the Sheffield pits is given by their participation in the
Sheffield Trades and Labour Council. Affiliated membership rose from
1000 in 1920 to 1913 in 1926, The impact of the coal strike is clearly
seen in the following year when just onebranch with 540 members paid its
subscriptions but by 1929 the enrolled membership had risen once rore to
1270.2 The figures are sufficient to indicate a certain resilience in the
local branches considering the upheavals they were subject to in the 1920s.
(ii) The Light Trades
Before the First World War, the principal feature of the light trades
was a strong tradition of trades unionism vitiated by an equally pcerful
sectionalism. In 1910, it was calculated that there were 17 trades societies
in the cutlery trades, 7 in the tool trade and 6 in the file trade with a
combined total membership of around 4000.
	 More rational organisation of
the light trades began in 1913 when the table knife grinders and cuders
joined forces with the NAUL. The process continued apace until 1919 when
the NAUL had absorbed some 20 local societies. The War also prarLpted
other moves towards unity - the Cutlery Union, an amalgamation of three
local unions, and the Sheffield Amalgamated Union of File Trades (SUFT'
comprising initially two societies, were both established in 1915. The
other major union in the light trades, NIJGSAT, which recruited prii1h
amongst the workers of Sheffield's silver and electro-plate trades, Kd
been formed in 1911 by the merger of seven Sheffield, six lden anJ
1. Neville, op. cit., p. 624, p. 748.
2. SFTLC Annual Reports, 1921-1931.
3. G.I.H. Lloyd, The Cutlery Trades (1913), p. 286.
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Birmingham societies .
Elsewhere sectionalism remained and a number of small societies,
catering for highly specialised groups of workers, maintained a tenacious
survival through the l920s. As late as 1932, the Ministry of Labour listed 10
entirely local unions which organised in the cutlery and small tool sectors.2
The general picture found in the trade union rnoverrnt of strength and
growth after the War followed by a serious decline in the mid- and late
1920s applies equally to those societies organising in the light trades.
The figures in 1920 and 1921 suggest that the NAUL and the Cutlery Union had
enrolled almost two thirds of the local cutlery workforce whilst NUGSAT
represented nearly three quarters of those workers employed in the silver
3
and plate trades.	 But in the eleven years to 1931, the Cutlery Union s
membership plurrmetted from 2000 to just 320, and the SAUFT's membership
fell from 2245 to 1386.	 In the same period, the national membership of
NUGSAT was nre than halved so it is unlikely that the Sheffield branches
of the Union fared any better than their counterparts in the cutlery and
tool trades. Indeed, some of the smaller societies were rather more
successful, especially where their members possessed skills essential in
the manufacture of products for which there was a steady demand. The
membership of the Wool Shear Workers' Trade Union, for example, actually
increased - from 81 in 1921 to 108 in l931. 	 In 1925, it organised 90
per cent of the workers employed in the five firms engaged in the trade.6
Generally, the situation for the unions was not so bright. Sidney
Pollard has estimated that by 1930 only one in five of the workers of the
cutlery trades belonged to a trade union. 7
 The establishment of a Trade
1. Pollard, op. cit., pp. 219-20, p. 298.
2. Ministry of Labour, Directory of Employers' Associations, Joint
gnisations, etc., 1932 (1932), p. 97.
3. S.D.I., 23;7;19211;	 31;l;l920.
4. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies; Part C, Trade
Unions, 1920-1931.
5. ibid.
6. SFrLC minutes, Trade Union Grganising Coimiittee, July, 1925.
7. Pollard, op. cit., p. 299.
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Board for the cutlery trades in 1933 provides a fitting coruentary on the
slow but steady forced retreat of the unions from the position of strength
that they occupied in 1920.
Trade conditions must inevitably play the major part in explaining
this decline but another, not unconnected, reason was the considerable
deskilling of the light trades' workforce and the substitution of women for
men that was occurring in the 1920s. The institute of apprenticeship was
dying out and to many of the new women workers their employment was a job -
of ten short-term - rather than a craft or career. The craft societies'
ability to assimilate and socialise new members was being superseded and
their reaction was more often a grudging refusal to accept the new realities
than any positive attempt to meet and adapt them. Only in exceptional cases
could a policy of outright opposition to the emplont of women succeed.
The Pen and Pocket Blade Forgers' Protection Society was able to restrict
women to a few specified processes and retained a largely static membership
(of around 70 to 80) in the l920s. 1
sort of power.
Few other societies still had this
As to the general question of the organisation of women, in the
heavy trades it was a topic that hardly arose but in the light trades -
where women formed a third of the workforce - it was an issue of some
importance. A large number of women joined unions for the first time during
the First World War - the Sheffield membership of the National Federation of
Women Workers rose from 350 before 1914 to 5000 in 1918.2 To some extent,
these gains were lost as munitions work and female employment were run down
after the War but it represented a solid base to build on. If, too, NIJGSAT
was organising 5000 of the 7000 silver and plate workers by 1920, a large
proportion of these must have been women for the trade was split fifty-fifty
1. Corrrnittee on Trade and Industry, Survey of Metal industries (1928), p. 264.
Membership figures based on affiliation to SEThC; see Annual Report.
2. Mendelson et al., op. cit., p. 74.
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between the sexes.'
But by the mid l920s, the women's organiser of the NUGI44 was forced
to admit that her efforts to extend oganisation among wonen were meeting
with very little success; rather, the story was of lapsed memberships lost
as a result of the slump or, in some cases, because Trade Boards had been set
up to oversee working conditions. 2 The fact that union memberships were
falling at a time when the proportion of women in the workforce was rising
seems to indicate a lack of success, and probably in many of the craft
societies a lack of effort, in the recruitment of women.
(iii) Non-Industrial Sectors
As regards the various non-industrial sectors, the position in
Sheffield was essentially similar to that in Birmingham and may be sunrnarised
quite quickly. Of the workers employed by Sheffield Corporation, nearly all
the transport staff belonged to the Tramway and Vehicle Workers' Union and
subsequently the 'IUJU, and a large proportion of the others were organised
by the NAUL until 1924 and the N1JG4d thereafter. 3 On the railways,
unionisation was effectively 100 per cent (as evidenced by the complete
success of the 1919 and 1926 strikes), and in the Post Office UPD4 had 1000
of the 1200 postal and telegraphic workers. 4
 Where workers were employed
by national or local government or where they were engaged in the provision
of official or quasi-official services, they had both the incentive and the
possibility to organise themselves thoroughly.
1. S.D.I,, 31;1;1920.
2. SETLC minutes, Trade Union Organising Coiimittee, July, 1925.
3. SFTLC records, General Strike collection; H. Fearnley to members of
the Tramways Conmittee, l0;5;1926.
Clegg, op. cit., p. 15.
4. SFTLC minutes, Trade Union Organising Conmittee, July, 1925.
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2.8 Workulace Influence on Political Attitudes in Sheffield
Ci) Small-Scale Manufacture
The split between large and small units of production was unusually
marked in Sheffield and was, as we have seen, one that had considerable
impact in the sphere of trade union politics. The largest body of support
fo: the Lib-Lab Sheffield Federated Trades Council came frcn the unions of
the light trades whereas it was the organisations of the heavy trades which
were predominant in the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council. This division
was also manifest in the 1918 General EI.ection when the local leader of the
NAUL, Cur. Albert Bailey, stood as as Independent Labour candidate in Central
constituency against the British Socialist Parcy candidate, R.G. Murray,
who was backed by the Trades and Labour Council. In the event, Bailey was
defeated but, as he gained over 5300 more votes than his left-wing rival,
it seems that his moderate and 'patriotic 1 attitudes reflected those of a
large number of light trades workers resident in the central wards.
Bailey accepted the Labour whip on the Council in 1919 but he remained
basically a Liberal and his fiercely independent line did not make
cooperation easy.' By 1922, he had been expressly designated a political
opponent. 2 Alderman William Wardley, first elected to the Council in 1890
and serving as a counciJior and alderman until his death in 1941, was
another representative of the light trades who, though briefly a member of
the Labour Group after the War, stayed sturdily and independently Liberal
in his politics.3
But, without dismissing these exemplars of an important tradition in
the Sheffield Labour movement, it can be said that by the l920s they were
part of a pre-war generation whose significance was fading. This was shown
1. SFTLC minutes,	 ll;11;1919.
2. H. Keeble Hawson, Sheffield. The Growth of a City (Sheffield, 1968),
p. 296.
3. ibid., pp. 334-35.
most clearly by the successful fusion in 1920 of the two trades councils.
All the light trades unions joined the new Federated Trades Council and,
though the amalgamation had taken place on the express understanding that
industrial and political functions were to be separated, the fusion
undoubtedly represented an important step in securing a united and Labour-
oriented trades union movement in Sheffield.
The only significant break in this united front came in 1923 when a
ballot of members of the Cutlery Union (led by Alderman Wardley) voted against
affiliation to both the national Labour Party and the local Trades Council.'
This position held until 1930, by which tune Warley had retired, when the
Union applied to join up once more with both the national and local Labour
2
movement.
The Cutlery Union was an exception to the general picture which
suggests that by the 1920s the light trades' unions saw the Labour Party as
the best medium of their political aspirations. The other extreme was
represented by the Pen and Pocket Blade Forgers' Protection Society which
affiliated its 70 to 80 members to both the national Labour Party and the
Trades and Labour Council throughout the 1920s and was firm in its corrrnitment
to Labour and wider working-class interests. 3	Between these two poles,
the light trades' societies generally seem to have shared a corrinon
understanding that the Labour Party was now the representative political
organ of the wider Labour movement to which they felt a basic loyalty. Five
Labour councillors were union officials or workers in the light trades which
in itself suggests that the unions of the traditional industries had been
successfully integrated into the political wing of the independent working-
class movement.
It is never entirely satisfactory to depend on the evidence of trade
union politics but there is a regrettable dearth of other firm information
on the politics of the small trades' workers. The municipal election results
1. SFTLC minutes, ll;8;l923.
2. National Labour Party, NEC minutes, 26;2;1930; SPI'LC minutes, 7;l;1930.
3. PPBFPS minutes, passim.
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in Walkey and Crookesmoor, wards in which large numbers of light trade
artisans were resident, do enable us, however, to conclude that Labour
sympathies, though strong and becoming stronger, were not yet overwhelming.
In Walkley, in particular, a continuing tradition of Liberal and Independent
politics was powerful.
In seeking to explain the workplace derivation of such political
attitudes, the usual strictures on the conservatising influence of small-
scale industry may be endorsed. In no case were the light trades' societies
known for their left-wing politics; rather, they represented a strain of
artisanal respectability, identifying always with labour interests but not
usually viewing industrial and political militancy as the best way to defend
these. The ambiguous legacy of the light trades' societies' contradictory
19th. century traditions - the fierce unilateral defence of their industrial
interests, and their political moderation and class collaboration - could
successfully be acconnodated in a Labour Party whose prirr rationale was
always a coninitment to the independent defence of working-class interests
rather than any political ideology.
In Sheffield, as in Birmingham, the localised nature of the
traditional industries and the narrow allegiances this fostered were
important but the context was very different. In Sheffield, the whole
balance of social and political power was tilted towards the working class,
a situation which not only encouraged psychologically the independent
defence of working-class interests but also made it a far more attractive
and tenable political and industrial strategy.
(ii) Large-Scale Manufacture
A major element in this balance of power was the mass of heavy trades'
workers who dominated the East End of the city. Their early cormiitment to
independent working-class politics was, as we noted, radicalised yet further
by the exigencies of war but the organisational legacy of the Shop Stewards'
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movement after the War was slight. By 1922, the shop stewards' network
had been shattered by unemployment and victimisation. The political legacy
is harder to assess. At one level, the movement becalle to some extent
politically isolated by its total ccxmnitment to the newly-formed CcxTrnunist
Party - the Sheffield Workers' Cocrmittee joined the local branch of the
Party en bloc in 1920.1 At another, through the heritage in popular
consciousness of the wartime militancy and, more directly, through the
continued prominence of sa're of its leading personnel, the Shop Stewards'
movement remained an important influence on the political life of Sheffield
in the post-war years.
The principal base of the shop stewards had been the ?EU but the
Union had been all but destroyed as a force capable of influencing the course
of industrial relations by the employers' counter-attack. Nevertheless, the
AEU retained the loyalties of a large, if declining, rrerbership and, though
defeated, it was not conciliated. If anything, the industrial reThtions
troubles after 1918 seemed to reinforce the message of the warti radicalism
and encouraged a considerable industrial and political militancy.
This was exemplified in the 1922 lock-out when a mass meeting of
engineers in firms unaffected by the dispute voted by a two to one majority
that members working in non-Federated firms should be called out too.
Twelve members of the Sheffield AEU District Cc*irnittee .ere suspended by
their national executive when they sought to enforce this decision. 2
 after
the defeat in 1922, such militancy had to take more political forms but, if
we are to take resolutions to the Trades and Labour Council as a guide, the
kEU had by far the most militant and left-wing membership of any local union.
Such evidence, of course, reflects the views of an activist mmnoritv
but the record suggests that it was a numerically large section in the AEU
which was operating in an environment tolerant and supportive of its anvses
1. SCP minutes, 18;8;1920.
2. S.D.L, 1;6;1922.
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and demands. The engineering workers were radicalised by their experience
of work, radicalised in particular by their defence of craft privilege,
ideologised as workers' control, against a hostile and aggressive management.
As craft traditions became obsolescent and traditional work solidarities
ineffectual, many members of the AEU turned to left-wing politics as offering
a means to re-assert their rights and dignities as workers.
The National Union of Foundry Workers was another union in which
defence of craft privilege was transmuted into support for radical politics.
The president of the Sheffield branch, J.T. Baker, was a leading activist
in the Minority Movement and the branch itself was affiliated to the Minority
Movement, International Class War Prisoners' Aid, and the Friends of Soviet
Russia - all of which were effectively Conmunist front organisations.'
While the scale of workplace clearly had sane impact in fostering the
radical political attitudes of these work groups, the more important factor
seems to have been a sectional craft consciousness. That the experience of
large-scale industry could be interpreted quite differently by groups lacking
strongly defined craft interests is illustrated by the case of the ISTC.
The Sheffield divisional organiser of the ISTC, Moses Humberstone,
was a Liberal councillor for Darnall and the secretary of the Federated
Trades Council and though he joined the Labour Group in 1919 he remained
firmly on the right of the Party. In this he was emulated by his fellow-
organiser, Walter D3dgson, who, as a trades unionist, was always keen to
stress the necessity of conciliatory relations between the two sides of
industry. 2
 If the numerous reports of the ISTC branch annual dinners are
to be taken at face value, his attitude appears to have been widely held
in the industry for representatives of the employing companies were always
honoured guests.
I . NUFW, Sheffield Cormiittee minutes, 28;4;1926; 3;3;1926; 29;2;1929.
2. Man and Meta., April, 1927.
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The difference between the craft consciousness of the AEU and the
occupational pride of the ISTC seems to lie in the fact that that the latter
could encompass the firm as a whole. Probably the ISTC felt less sharply
the threats to traditional work practices that so concerned the craft unions.
More importantly, the management and many of the workers of the great firms
of Sheffield seem to have shared a comon pride in the good name of the
company and the high reputation of Sheffield steel. in apparently unlikely
circumstances, a tradition of identification with ones job and one's
employers had developed which the managements took sane care to foster through
the works councils they set up and the welfare and recreational activities
they encouraged.1
On the other hand, though the iron and steel workers seem not to
have been class conscious in any very radical sense, they were undoubtedly
Labourist in politics. In the late l920s, Division Three of the ISTC (of
which Sheffield formed a major part), had a rate of contracting-in to
pay the political levy to the Labour Party of 61 per cent, compared to the
national average of just 37 per cent. 2
 The conservatism of the iron and
steel workers may not have pleased their more left-wing fellow-workers but
they too took their place in the famed broad church of the Labour Party,
even if they applied a somewhat less Calvinistic logic to the question of
class relations.
Of all the different sections of the British working class, none,
by the 1920s, was more firmly and solidly Labour than the miners. The ward
politics of Handsworth and the return of Thomas Grundy, the YMA-sponsored
candidate, in every parliamentary election in the Rother Valley (to which
constituency Handsworth belonged) from 1918 to 1931 are sufficient proof
of this.
1. Daniel Doncasters, William Cookes and Edgar Allens all possessed works
councils and published works magazines.
2. ISTC miscellaneous records, P63a; Membership, rancbes, Political Levy
(N.D.).
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The miners were a group which, more than any other in the private
sector, looked towards sympathetic state regulation and ultimately the
socialisation of the mines as their industrial salvation. When the
intervention of the state in right-wing hands proved unsympathetic, it is
not surprising that the miners' loyalties to the Labour Party which had
been forged before the War became even more rigid and solidaristic after it.
The betrayal of apparent promises to nationalise the mines in 1919, decontrol
and wage cuts in 1920, and, most notoriously, the Conservative Government's
handling of the 1926 coal strike were not actions calculated to endear the
politics or the politicians of the Right to the average miner. Working
conditions in the mines and the tightly-knit nature of the mining
conmunities fostered a cohesive and powerful sense of mining identity.
Labour politics became one aspect of this totality.
(iii) Non-Industrial Sectors
The railway workers had analogous political reasons for their support
of the Labour Party and were wholehearted in their cainlitment to the
Sheffield Labour movement. Throughout the l920s, the average number of
railway workers (in all unions) affiliated to the Trades and Labour Council
was 3139 at a time when there were little more than 3400 actually resident
in Sheffield.' More direct support of the political wing of the Labour
movement was channelled through the Railwaymen's Municipal Council (a
coordinating body for all the local branches of the various unions) which
spent £1600 on municipal election candidatures between 1919 and 1928.2
Much of this was spent on the railwaymen's own candidates; 11 of Sheffield's
Labour councillors were railway workers in the 1920s which meant that this
workgroup provided one in six of Labour's elected representatives whilst
forming just one in seventy of the local workforce.
In general, the railway worker politicians, predominantly members of
the NUR, were fairly middle-of-the-road in contemporary Labour Party terms.
1. Calculated from SFTLC Annual Reports and 1921 Census.
2. SFTLC minutes, 23;10;18.
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The members of ASLEF, however, appear to have been scxiiewhat nre left-wing
and even syndicalist in their politics. In 1920, the ASLEF no. 1 branch in
the city passed resolutions calling for workers' control of both the
railways and the mines and in succeeding years it several times demanded
industrial action to achieve political ends.' The igncninious dainfa11
of the second Labour Government confirmed its syndicalist distaste for
conventional politics and, in 1931, the branch recorded its desire that the
leadership 'use the strength of the union industrially and leave politics
alone as they merely sidetrack the members and delude them into a false
security' 2
Of course, the perennial question arises as to how far trade union
branch resolutions are representative of the merrbership as a whole. it is
to be doubted that the 500 or so members of ASLEF in Sheffield were all
convinced syndicalists but the branch undoubtedly did share a strong self-
identity (exemplified in the ASLEF club built and funded by the rrernhers
themselves) and industrial militancy (shown in the success of the 1924
ASLEF strike in Sheffield)? It seems fair to regard the branch resolu:ions
as one expression, albeit a sarewhat extreme one, of the locaictive
drivers' conmitment to their trade and perception of their industrial
interests. In this atmosphere, syndicalist sympathies should not be
considered 30 'extremist' aberration but as a manifestation of occupational
pride and self-regard. Though ASLEF cannot properly be thought of as a
craft union, it shared with the skilled unions descrLbed earlier a belief
in its own members special status and abilities.
The Corporation workers had a less exalted view of their calling
but a strong olitica1 interest in the defence of their conditions. As
in Birmingham, the earl jest independent Labour council lors wnre Corporation
workers and the traditIon continued into the interwar period then Cur.
1. ASLEF no. 1 minutes, l2;l2;1920; 18;l;1920.
2. ibid., 20;9;1931.
3. Workers' Dreadnought, 11 ;8;1923; S.D.I., 21;1;1924.
Fred Marshall and Cur. Frank Thraves (NUCMW and TGWU organisers respectively)
were both Labour representatives. The Corporation workers were generally
moderate men but being, as it were, living examples of the successful
operation of Municipal Socialism,it is not surprising that they looked
primarily to Labour to safeguard their political interests.
Post Office workers too were sturdily Labour. Three Labour councillors
were postal workers, the expenses of one of them being partially met by
UPOW. 1
 The Union also regularly affiliated its entire local irembership of
around 800 to the Trades and Labour Council and marked its forced departure
in 1927	 th a valedictory 1000.2
Finally, we noted in the case of Birmingham the marked Labour
sympathies of many teachers - an observation that applies even more
forcefully in Sheffield. This partly reflects the more conducive atmosphere
for left-wing politics in the city but it was a reaction too to the extreme
parsimony of the Citizens' Association-controlled City Council in its
educational provision and the deteriorating pay and conditions of teachers
that were particularly noticeable in the town. 3
 The Sheffield Teachers'
Labour Group was established in 1923 and was granted a regular column in the
Labour newspaper, Sheffield Forward, to put its arguments for better
education facilities. The Teachers' Labour Group affiliated 76 members to
the Trades and Labour Council in its peak year of 1927 but probably a
greater impact was made by the fact that four Labour councillors in the
l920s were either teachers or ex-teachers.4
1. SCoP records, CPR7; Municipal elections (Hillsborough constituency)
Neepsend ward, 1929.
2. SFI'LC Annual Reports.
3. Keeble Flawson, op. cit., p. 90.
4. SPfLC Annual Report, 1927.
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2.9 The Industrial and Political Impact of Unemployment in Sheffield
Unemployment was a massive and chronic problem in Sheffield in the
interwar period and it undoubtedly played a major role in determining the
town's political evolution. Unemployment in itself teaches no political
lessons; it can lead to activism or apathy depending on the way in which
its victims understand and analyse their plight. It was the strength of the
Sheffield working-class movement that it was, to a large extent, able to
inculcate a political comprehension and reaction to unemployment in which
the ideas of the Left played a leading part.
Sheffield adapted well after the Warand prospered in the short post-
war trade revival. In July, 1920, unemployment was deemed to be as low as
possible inatown of Sheffield's type.' But the national coal strike of
October that year signalled an end to the post-war boai and thenceforth
recovery was never to be any more than partial until the late 1930s. The
metal trades of Sheffield, in which coal was an essential raw material, were
always hit early and hard by any stoppage in the coal industry; in this
instance , 5000 men had been laid off from the East End works within three
days of the strike's comencement and unemployment trebled. 2 Unemployrrnt,
however, did not ease with the strike's cessation. In fact, it continued
to rise until in July, 1921, as another national coal strike took full effect,
it stood at an all-t	 peak of 69,30O.	 In this period, the Sheffield
Poor Law Union dealt with over 12,000 cases of emergency out-relief and it
was estimated that one in five of the local population was in receipt of
.4benefit.
The political reaction to this trauma was swift and strong though, as
1. S.D.T.., 17;7;1920.
2. S.D.I L , l9;l1;l920.
3. S.DJ, 7;7;].921.
4. Royal Comission on Unemployment Insurance, 1931; Minutes of Evidence,
Memorandum of the Views of the Sheffield City Council, Chart B.
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in Birmingham, it was not unemployment as such that sparked off the
fiercest discontents but the indignities that the condition attracted. A
particular source of grievance was the Government stipulation that those
drawing relief should undertake some form of task work. The unemployed
movement in Sheffield organised a number of protests against the task work
regulations. These began as simple marches and demonstrations but progressed
to nore sophisticated means of cocking a snook at the system, as on the
occasion when 1000 jobless men presented themselves simultaneously for task
work - a number with which the Guardians were quite unable to cope. More
generally, the men were entitled to time off to visit the labour exchange
and there is evidence that this proviso was used systematically in order to
render task work controls ineffective,'
The largest single demonstration occurred in June, 1921, when up to
50,000 gathered outside the Town Hall to protest at cuts in the Board of
Guardians' scale of relief. The crowd was such that the mayor was forced
on to the balcony of the Hall to promise that he would visit the Minister of
Health ininediately to seek some improvement in the new scales. Within 36
hours the Minister had, indeed, undertaken to defer the cuts for one month.2
Such strength and apparent success must have been exhilarating for the
unemployed and for a short period perhaps it did seem, as the Sheffield
Forward claimed, that 'they were the real rulers of the city'.3
In August, further demonstrations took place against Government cuts
and local regulations debarring single men from relief work. Up to 5000
men blocked off the city centre for several hours before assembling outside
theofficesof the Sheffield Daily Telegraph (which had been notably
unsympathetic to their cause) where they were broken up by a police baton
charge. 4
 Further mass demonstrations occurred when those arrested were
brought to trial.5
1. S.D.I., l9;3;1t921.
2. S.D.I., 14;6;11921;	 15;6;1921.
3. S.F', July, 1921.
4. S.D.I., l3;8;1921; The Times, 13;8;1921.
5. The Times, 18;8;1921.
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The City Council did little to soothe local discontent when, in
September, they issued 2600 surnonses for rate arrears and stated that
there were 10,000 more in the pipeline.	 The Council had abolished
compounding (by which landlords collected rates in return for a 25 per cent
allowance) in March; now, six months later, many thousands of the unemployed
and others found themselves quite unable to meet the sudden large bills that
arrived through the post. 2 Further protests forced the Council to defer
the issuing of the sumonses and agree an installment system for payment.3
in the 1921 municipal elections, Labour gained five seats and a Corimunist,
Albert Smith, standing as an Unemployed candidate won St. Philips ward.
Unemployment was alleviated somewhat by the ending of the coal
dispute but by June, 1922, as the engineering lock-out took full effect,
the numbers unemployed had risen once more to 49,605. 	 If those involved
in the industrial action are included too, the number out of work stood
at 75,QQQ•5 Once again, over one in five of the population was dependent
on poor law assistance.6
Under these conditions, the unemployed and their organisations
continued to be an important part of the life of Sheffield, and the lock-out
was a means by which the grievances of those in work and those out were
brought together and they were encouraged to take part in a cxrnion struggle.
Demonstrations of the engineers and unemployed demanding better treatment
from the local authorities, some 4000 to 5000 strong, took place in both
March and June. 7 The good organisation of the unemployed was shown too in
the tragic events of the so-called Battle of Walkley which occurred in June.
A crowd of around 1000 gathered to prevent the eviction of an ex-serviceman
1. S.D.I., 8;9;1921; S.F., October, 1921.
2. Keeble 1-iawson, op. cit., p. 35.
3. S.F., October, 1921.
4. S.D.I., 10;6;1922.
5. Sheffield Year Book, 1923, p. 62.
6. S.DT., 29;12;1922.
S.D.L, l4;3;1921; 27;4;1922.
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and his family. In the skirmish with the police that ensued one demonstrator
lost his life. His funeral, twelve days laLer, was the occasion of a further
mass demonstration when 5000 mourners paid their final respects to their
fallen comrade.'
Turning to the politics of the unemployed movement, the picture is a
little confused. A majority of the most important leaders of the local
unemployed were Coninunists but there were also currents, both to the left
and right, that were opposing Communist attempts to dominate the movement.
The Communist view of their role was well suiud up by their local
leader, G.H. Fletcher:2
The unemployed were the only fighting element in the working class,
the organised workers had suffered the onslaughts of capital without
resistance and therefore this fighting spirit should be developed by
putting [the] right men in [the] right place.
But at tins, Camunist attempts to achieve this goal were a little crude.
In 1922, elections were held to select camittees to run four vestry halls
whose use had been ceded to the unemployed. In Attercliffe and Meersbrook,
the Communist candidates were successful but in Burngreave Cur. Albert
Smith was selected chairman. 3
 Smith had severed his connection with the
Communist Party and was now closely involved with the Labour Group.4
Perhaps even worse in Communist eyes was the fact that Frank Horsfield,
secretary of the Sheffield Ccxmunist Workers' Group (an ultra-left body
deriving from Sylvia Pankhurst's Workers' Socialist Federation), was elected
president in Crookesmoor. Having failed to gain total control of the
committees, the Communist Party rather petulantly withdrew canpietely in
order to regroup and reorganise outside. 5
 This was recognised within a
short space of time to have been, in the words of George Fletcher, 'a
colossal blunder'
1. J. Baxter, The Battle of Walkley (Sheffield, 1983), passim.
2. SCP minutes, l0;5;1922.
3. ibid., 13;5;1922.
4. ibid., 3;5;1922.
5. ibid, 13;5;1922.
6. ibid., 16;5;1922.
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To sane extent, these actions had created space that people to the
left of the Coniiunist Party could exploit. One of the most active in this
regard was A. Carford who masterminded the unemployed's unofficial seizure
of a hail in February, 1922. The Unemployed District Camiittee, which
condemned the action, earned only the contempt of Carford for its lack of.
genuine revolutionism - the camiit tee men were supposed to be red-hot
revolutionaries, he stated, 'they had, however, only been sentenced for
making speeches and not for any direct action'.' In March, 1922, Carford
was arrested for the illegal possession of fire-arms but he claimed rather
tamely that they had only been brought to him to mend.2
But despite the zealous work jut in by the far Left, it was the
Labour Party which continued to be the principal representative of the
working class as a whole, whilst within the narrr confines of unemployed
politics the Cciiiainist Party regained its preeminence when Len Ycule became
secretary of the local branch of the Unemployed Workers' ?k,vement in 1923.
The organisation was never merely the mouthpiece of the current Party line,
though, and Youle was able to retain his position as the reccgnised leader
of the local workiess even after his resignation fran' the Camunist Party
in the late l920s. 3
 Mother important develoçment at this time was the
founding of a wanen's section of the unemployed movement which, by December,
1924, was claiming a membership of over 7O0.
In the mid-1920s, unemployment steadied saiwhat with the exception
of the turbulent year of 1926 when the ninbers on the register rose to
44,000 in June. 5
 Sheffield's tragedy was that even in the relatively good
years unemployment stayed at a stubborn 15 to 20 per cent of the workforce.
The general depression in the local econcxny also meant that unemployment
tended to be long-term; of the men wholly unemployed in Decerther, 1930,
1. Workers' Dreadnoug, 23;2;1922.
2. Workers Dreadnought, 23;5;1922.
3. 'An Interview with Len Youle', Bulletin of the Society for the SnxJy
of Labour History, 20, (Spring, 1970), p. 37.4. S.F., December, 1924.
5. Ministry of Labour Gazette, July, 1926.
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6.2 per cent had been totally without work for over three years, a further
23.9 per cent had had no work for over twelve months.1
There was, then, still plenty of scope for activity with the
unemployed and in many ways the real service that the activists of the
working-class movement performed for those without work lay not in the
demonstrations and mass actions but in the plodding representative work
before the Guardians' Rota Conmittees and Ministry assessors. 	 In this area,
beyond the clash of political interests and ideology, a real united front
was possible. In 1921, the Federated Trades and Labour Council agreed to
allow the Unemployed District Caiittee free representation at its executive
and delegate meetings and was granted in return representation on the
Unemployed Cormiittee's executive. 2 Such cooperation was further exemplified
by the occasional conferences arranged by the Trades Council between the
3Board of Guardians and City Council Labour Groups and the unemployed.
But the clearest case of joint action across party lines occurred in the
Sheffield Board of Guardians where for three years between 1922 and 1925
George Fletcher was leader of the Labour Group.
To circumstances combined to bring such fruitful collaboration to an
end. One was the Cormiunist Party's adoption of the New Line in 1928 by
which they treated Labour as the third capitalist party. This led to the
Sheffield Labour Party retaliating by expelling George Fletcher and the
other Coaniunist Guardian, Mrs. Annie Cree, from the Board of Guardians'
Labour Group, and to the Trades and Labour Council putting an end to the
dispensation allowing representation to the Unemployed District Cormittee.4
The second was the disastrous performance of the second Labour
Government in office. Trade slumped catastrophically in the Great
Lpression and in May, 1931 unemployment in Sheffield again reached over
60,000 - a figure which meant that one in three of the local workforce was
1. A.D.K. Owen, A Report on Unemployment in Sheffield (Sheffield, 1932), p.58
2. SFTLC minutes, l3;l2;l921.
3. ibid., 5;1;1924;	 5;7;1927.
4. ibid., 12;6;1928; 26;3;1929.
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1
unemployed.
The position of the orthodox. Labour movement was awkward. They were
only too well aware of the Government's failings but they realised the
difficulties of its situation and were unwilling to criticise their own men
and give apparent credence to their political opponents. The Carrnunist
Party had no such inhibitions and the Sheffield section of the National
Unemployed Workers' Movement was active in fighting for better conditions
for the local unemployed. A demonstration organised by the NUWM against the
Trades Council in January, 1931 was intended to bring home to the local
Labour movement its culpability in the serious state of affairs that prevail
There were many Labour activists, grown weary of defending an
unsuccessful Labour administration, to whom the formation of the National
Goverrnnt came almost as a relief. But, in sc ways, this marked only the
beginning of the Sheffield Labour movement's problems because it was the
Labour-controlled Public Assistance Conmittee that was responsible for
implementing the National Government's proposed cuts in the scale of relief.
In sri attempt to meet their legal obligations whilst maintaining a generous
system of benefits, Sheffield's Labour Council decided to bring down the
scales of relief in line with Government regulations, undertaking at the
same time to make up the reductions for those with dependents and with no
additional source of income by the granting of discretionary benefit. It
was a well-meaning strategy but a complicated one to put over and it did
mean that for some there would be reductions in the support they received.
The Council's attempts to placate both sides of the equation earned
it few bouquets. It was censured by the Trades and Labour Council and the
Cormiunists established a 'Council of Action' to coordinate protest. 3
 In
October, demonstrations, 4000 to 5000 strong, were organised against the cuts_
the particular target being Cur. William Asbury, the Labour chairman of the
1. Ministry of Labour Gazette, June, 1930; Local Unemplont Index, June,
1930.
2. 5.0.1., 28;l;l931.
3. SFTLC minutes, 29;9;1931; S.D.I., 5;lO;193l.
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Public Assistance Co,mnittee, bo was pursued relentlessly by the
led demonstrators.'
Politically, these attacks brought no rewatd to the C nijnis ufty
In the nvnicipal elections, nine Ccimunist candidates won a total of 20
votes; even the redoubtable George Fletcher won only 499, insufficient to
prevent the Labour incuabent retaining the seat. Orera1l, though, Labour
lost eight seats to Coalition opponents. In the parliamentary elections,
the two Ccxmunist candidates fared little better though it might be ciairtEd
as success of a sort that Fletcher's 2790 votes in Attercliffe were enough
to make possible the National Conservative candidate's defeat of C.ITL Wilson
by 165 votes. Attercliffe thus nt Conservative for the first, and so far
the only, time in its history. The rest of Sheffield follod.
Unemployment was always a highly politicised problem in Sheffield.
It affected directly or indirectly nearly all the city's inhabitants and its
chronic and pervasive nature meant that there could be no solace in the
expectation of 'good times just around the corner', nor iruch hope of
individual salvation. It was the Labour movement's success in the 1920s t
inform this discontent with a left-wing analysis of unemployment's cauSes
and remedies. The revolutionary Left was in the forefront of the agitatiôt
amongst the unemployed, but it was the constitutional Left which gathered
their votes. It was the ultimate failure of the Labour rrovement, whatever
justified excuses are made on its behalf, to have betrayed this trust. and
seemingly invalidate the critique on which it rested by its failure mn cffi
beten 1929 and 1931. The Labour movement had always held govenlrnents tc>
blame for unemployment. Now this blame was attached all the thore firmly to
a Labour Government that had actually pranised to solve the problem..
1. S.D.I, 22;10;l931; 23;10;1931.
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2.10 Conclusion
It is now necessary to draw together the threads of the preceding
chapters in order to attempt some overall assessment of the impact of
economic influences on the nature of working-class politics in Birmingham
and Sheffield and, in so doing, form a partial explanation of the political
differences between the two towns.
One fundamental contrast between Birmingham and Sheffield lay in
their very different economic structures. Birmingham possessed a thoroughly
diversified economy. Its new and traditional industries, booming and
depressed trades, large and small units all went to form a highly
heterogeneous local economy which, despite the growing importance of car
manufacture, had as yet no dominating motif. Its reputation as 'The City of
a Thousand Trades' was more than justified. One consequence of this was
the considerable economic fragmentation of the local working class. The
range of occupations which Birmingham workers undertook and the variety of
industrial conditions that they experienced meant that it was a rare
circumstance indeed for the local working class to be united by shared
grievances or nutual industrial interests. This lack of a carrrcn industrial
base or unifying occupational consciousness was one factor that debilitated
trades unionism in the city.
Sheffield, on the other hand,was known as 'The City of Steel'. Steel
had a dominating importance in the local economy and a majority of Sheffield
workers were dependent for their livelihood on the smelting and working of
metal. There was a close interconnection and interdependence between the
leading sectors of local industry which was brought out by their coimon
suffering in the industrial depression of the 1920s and by the impact of the
industrial disputes of the early l920s and 1926 which affected directly up
to one in three of the town's workforce. Whereas in Birmingham intra-class
contacts and affiliations were reduced by the particular nature of the local
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economy, in Sheffield industrial concentration and the generalised impact
of contemporary econcndc troubles helped to foster a more united and
aggrieved working-class consciousness.
To pursue this line of arg1nt imore specifically, in the small-scale
trades of Birmingham localism and traditionalism acted in conjunction with
a trades unionism that was weak or conciliatory or both to encourage the
city's workers to look for middle-class assistance in the defence of their
conditions. The early deskilling of large sections of the traditional
industries' workforce and the prevalence of female employment combined to
deprive these workers (under circunstances in which waren were the victims,
not the culprits) of levers of craft control and trade solidarity that
might otherwise have induced a more resistant and antagonistic occupational
echos.
In Sheffield, a similar localism and traditionalism might be found
but the context was very different. The considerable early successes in
resisting attacks on craft prerogatives and a heritage of militant trades
unionism ensured that the trades consciousness of the Sheffield artisans
was expressed in and transmitted through independent working-class
orgdnisation. An occuptional consciousness had arisen that stressed craft
identity and through it - and more particularly in the 1920s through its
dissolutin - a sense of class.
in the large-scale trades of Birmingham, the newness of the workforces
and their diverse origins and the other specialised factors hampering trades
union organisation discussed earlier impeded the developrnt and operation
of an industrial consciousness capable of forming the basis of a more
politicised awareness of working-class interests. Here again, the absence
of craft traditions militated against any strong ideology and defence of
working-class rights on the shop floor.
The workers of Sheffield's heavy trades had had tii to forge
traditions of unionisation which survived to influence popular consciousness
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even as their tateria1 basis was being eroded by the 1920s depression.
Craft and cccupadonal loyaldes were developed in an environment of large-
sLale manufacture and inpersonal industrial relations that conduced to a
sense of independent working-class interests.
There is thus a paradox that conterporary economic circumstances
perating similarly in both towns (for example, the disintegration of union
organisation and the erosion of craft privilege), as well as the structural
features held in coman such as large and small units of production) could
yield very different political results. The factors of timing and tradition
re vital here.
In irgm, the emplovers moves against craft rights and trades
uism isere Lrge1'' pre-eTptive, which is to say that they were able, before
nd after the r, to use the advantageous terrain offered by the diversified
the local ec nor-; and fragrented working class to prevent the
a f crgris tion and ideology that might have withstood or, at least,
U tre acntes ted ercise ef their industrial powers. Lacking thus
an	 er	 fmed or resilient sense of their industrial interests and
ang. c r:nly, the reans to operationalise such understanding as did
exist, the	 wrking class was unusually open to the possibilities
of altern.tIve ndustrial and pelitical strategies by which to defend its
irtersts. That mary chose a strategy of cooperative industrial relations
with tcir eolc-ers and politieal class collaboration was not, of course,
L"jitci5k. It reoriired the ,iorkin of other favourable environmental
f:t irs sod the irtervention and agency of unan actors to transform this
rcrsd pLtentlsl into the eca of Unionism.
in heffreld, the elcyers attacks on craft privilege and trades
uu- oraru atioc were es ntLallf retaliatory. Identities and solidarities,
fornawe and expressive ef a strcr sense of wor'in-class consciousness,
bad already hoen foirgad. The pst-war depression and eployers' counter-
attack were forces which, while weake-ruig the organisational base 01 the
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working-class movement, reinforced the analysis that underpinned it. An
overall sense of working-class identity, encouraged by the particular nature
of Sheffield's economic structure and strengthened by the economic
conditions of the 1920s, ensured that the working-class response to
contemporary problems was channelled via working-class media. Labour politics
was one means by which affiliations and critiques formed in the industrial
sphere were given expression when other forms of working-class resistance
were being undermined; another was activity within the unemployed workers'
movement.
Unemployment was a massive problem in Sheffield but was one which,
as it was so widespread in its effects, could not be isolated or ignored.
Nearly every family had some direct or indirect experience of unemployment
so the phenomenon was not so much one which fragmented the working class as
one which contributed to a shared understanding of cournon circumstances and
concerns. Neither were the unemployed isolated at the organisational level.
The Trades and Labour Council and the Unemployed Corrrnittee cooperated
usefully for most of the period and political differences, though never
submerged, were generally contained in the working-class movement's corrrnon
struggle to defend the conditions of the unemployed. The conflicts within
the unemployed movement's leadership should not be ignored but probably
more significant in terms of the unemployed's perceptions and behaviour was
the fact that such leadership existed. The input of former shop stewards
and union activists, acting within an environment where union traditions
were strong and militant, was vital in making the unemployed movement a real
force to be reckoned with.
In Birmingham, for much of the time the scope and the necessity for
activity amongst the unemployed simply did not exist. But even in such
periods of mass unemployment as did occur the unemployed workers' movement
was less firmly rooted and more fractured than that of Sheffield. The
movement lacked the sustenance of a background of strong working-class
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organisation and consciousness, political differences largely prevented a
united response, and cooperation with the Birmingham trades union movement
was strained. Acting thus, in relative isolation, it was comparatively
easy for the authorities to pick off the small militant leadership of the
local unemployed movement and effectively neutralise it. More generally,
the overall buoyancy of the Birmingham economy meant that there was more
hope for the local victims of unemployment and it was easier for them to
perceive the problem as an individual misfortune rather than as a
manifestation of systemic breakdown.
The experience of work and non-work was one of the most direct and
consequently one of the most important influences on working-class
consciousness. But economic conditions never in any simple way determined
the nature of working-class politics. What they did do, however, was to
provide a basic terrain in which human agency set towork. In the succeeding
sections, we examine the many factors in society and politics that mediated
and interpreted these primary work experiences and made actual such
ideological influences as were potential in this, the primary raw material
of the human social structure.
Chapter 3
CLASS AND COMMUNITY
3.1 Introduction
Labour's principal appeal, whatever its formal claims to represent
all classes and despite its eschewal of the more doctrinaire forms and
expressions of class-war politics, was to class - to a sense of working-class
identity and an appreciation of working-class interests. Birrnipgham and
Sheffield, though different in many ways, were both strongly working-class
cities. If we may take housing rateable values as a guide, the figures for
1930 suggest that 69 per cent of households in Birmingham and 75 per cent in
Sheffield could be defined as working-class.' A social survey of Sheffield
carried out in the following year concluded that 82 per cent of households
in the city were working-class as defined by income and manual occupation.2
There was thus considerable scope for a politics of and for the working
class in both cities. But class, though definable by objective socio-economic
criteria, becomes meaningful and operational historically only when it is
interpreted and expressed subjectively through the mores and mediixn of
corimunity.
This section sets out to explore the way in which class and coninunity
experiences interacted to promote particular political loyalties in the
variety of working-class conirunities found in Birmingham and Sheffield. A
typology of working-class comliunities is adopted which, though necessarily
somewhat schematic, is nevertheless useful in describing the main forms of
working-class social patterning and the political affiliations they generated.
1. City of Birmingham, General Statistics and Epitome of the City's
Accounts, March, 1930, Table 14, Valuation List;
City of Sheffield, Valuation List for the Sheffield Ratirigjr, April, 193(
Working-class houses are deemed to have had a rateable value of E13 or
below. See: M. Bowley, Housing and the State (1947), p. 273.
2. A.D.K. Owen, A Survey of the Standard of Living in Sheffield (Sheffield,
1933), p. 13.
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3.2 The Lower Working-Class Caiunity
The corrinunities here described as lower working-class are taken to
comprise a predominantly non-skilled working population residing in poor
quality housing and possessing few formal structures of self-help and
self-expression. They often, however, contained strong conmnunal loyalties
and solidarities fostered by informal means of working-class self-help and
expressed in the close coninunity relationships that were built up at the
neighbourhood level and through the chief forum of local sociability, the
public house.
In Birmingham, such a ccmnunity was found in classic form in the
city's seven central wards which were usually grouped together as the Inner
Ring (see Map 1). This was the oldest developed area of Birmingham,
comprising principally properties developed before the l880s. Back-to-back
housing predominated; 53 per cent of houses in the Inner Ring as a whole
were of this type while in St. Paul's the proportion rose to 63 per cent.'
The other chief characteristic of the inner city was the large number of
courts - groups of, mainly, six to eight houses, built back-to-back and
huddled around a small open yard, which shared toilet and washing facilities
and had access to the main streets by tunnels piercing the bordering
terraces. Even in 1934 almost half the houses in the central wards had no
through ventilation and over two thirds shared w.c.s.2
Though once considered respectable housing for the city's artisans,
by the interwar period the back-to-backs of the Inner Ring had deteriorated
sharply. The practice of hiring front rooms and top floors as small
workshops and the gradual infilling of the area's former open spaces created
an insanitary and unhealthy district, densely populated and heavily
industrialised. 3
 At the same time, the better-paid workers, who could
1. T.C., 23;1O;1925.
2. J.L. Rushbrooke, Birmingham's Black Spots (Birmingham, 1934), p. 6..
3. S.D. Chapman, 'The Contribution of Building Clubs and the Freehold Land
Society to Working-Class Housing in Birmingham' in S.D. Chapman (ed.)
The History of Working-Class Housiflg (Newton Abbot, 1971), pp. 224-25.
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afford to do so, nr.ived into the newly-built and better quality housing of
the surrounding wards. 1 The residue of low-waged workers which remained
was yet more isolated by the massive deveIopnnt of Corporatioci housing in
the 1920s because the higher costs of the new estates placed them beyond
their reach. They were dependent still on the low rental, private sector;
ninety-nine out of every hundred hcxis in the Inner Ring were rented from
private landlords.2
Occupationally, the bulk of the area's wage-earners worked in the
d.pressed small-scale trades which were based in the Inner Ring. The
conceitration of jewellery workers in St. Paul's has already been remarked
upon; even in 1939, after a period of considerable decline in the industry,
there were 411 jewellery firms and 371 ancillary metal firms located in the
ward of which 80 per cent employed less than 20 workers. 3 There was a
smaller convergence of the hand-made gun trade in St. Mary's while the other
wards contained most of BirmIngham's brassware and small metaiware
manufacturers. The sheer number of small works involved may be gauged by
the fact that Lëritend Division alone contained over 700 factories and
Cuddeston a further 9QQ•4
The area was the poorest and most deprived of Birmingham but it
supported Unionism to an extent that surprised even its strongest adherents.
The Unionists of [ritend were honest when they admitted as rriuch5
Frankly, we could understand many more of our electors voting
Socialist or Boishevist or anything that held out the slightest
hope of better conditions than those in which they live.
Writing of West Birmingham, even Austen Chamberlain could not comprehend
'why anyone who lives in such slums should not be a Socialist, Comunist or
Red Revolutionary'. 6 They were not however. The Inner Ring as a whole
I. A. Sutcliffe, 'A Century of Flats in Birmingham, 1875-1973' in
A. Sutcliffe (ed.), Hulti-Storey Living (1974), p. 182.
2. Bournville Village Trust, When We Build Again (1941), p. 54.
3. Board of Trade Working Party, Jewellery and Silverware (1946), p. 104.
4. BUA minutes, 12;3;1926; 8;1;1926.
5. ibid., 12;3;l926.
6. Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC5/1/250; Austen to Ida Chamberlain,
18;IIl ;1922.
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recorded just 32 Labour victories in a total of 91 annual municipal election
contests, the Unionists won half, Liberals and Independents the rest.
An almost exactly analogous situation prevailed in the central wards
of Sheffield, taken here to comprise St. Philip's, St. Peter's, Moor, Sharrow
and the innermost, more densely populated portion of Park. This area, which
contained almost two thirds of Sheffield's 16,000 back-to--backs, was by all
measurements the most thickly settled and unhealthy in the city.' The 1931
social survey also shows its workforce to have been the lowest paid and it
recorded not one single instance of working-class owner occupation. 2 The
central wards also contained the majority of the light trades' works and
factories, and a 1924 survey revealed that industry took up over 17.5 per
cent of the central district's land space andin large parts of St. Philip's,
St. Peter's, Moor and Park wards it formed over 50 per cent of the occupied
3
area.
But a majority of the light trades' artisans (as distinguished by
their skills and relatively high earnings) appear to have lived in the more
salubrious working-class suburbs, notably Walkley and Crookesmoor. 4
 Most
of the local working class were unskilled, many in the 1920s were unemployed.
A report on six courts 'represented' for slum clearance in 1925 showed 39
per cent of the male wage-earners to be without work, 16 per cent were
classified as labourers, 11 per cent worked in the light trades and mining
respectively, and just 7 per cent were employed in the heavy industries.5
Politically, the area was more mixed. Sharrow and St. Peter's were
anti-Labour strongholds but St. Philip's, Park and Moor were more evenly
balanced with a tendency for Labour support to harden in the later 1920s
1. J.N. Reedman, A Report on a Survey of Licensing in Sheffield (Sheffield,
1931), p. 37.
2. A.D.K. Owen, op. cit., p. 31, p. 35.
3. P. Abercrombie, Sheffield. A Civic Survey (1924).
4. H. Mathers, 'Sheffield Municipal Politics, 1893-1926. Parties,
Personalities and the Rise of labour', Ph. D. thesis, University of
Sheffield, 1979, p. 57.
4. Sheffield Social Survey Cornittee, miscellaneous materials, MD1227-R 1(B);
Medical Officers' Department report on Bailey Street scheme.
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until disillusion with the second Labour Government set in. Although
almost 90 per cent of the households in the central district were working-
class, clearly this was not translated in any unproblematic fashion into
support for the party which claimed to be the chief representative of the
working class.' It is to an explanation of these areas' political
affiliations that we turn to next.
(i) Lower Working-Class Conservatism
Though the Unionists of Birmingham expressed surprise at the
non-radicalism of the city's slum population, considerable evidence supports
the view that it was precisely the poorest strata of the working class who
were the most conservative. To some extent, this was a question of mere
survival; the day-to-day struggle to make ends meet left little time to
spend on ideas of self-improvement or social change. It was believed, in
any case, that such ideas led only to an unproductive discontent with one's
lot for there was little that could be done to alter prevailing conditions.
The world was too large, too complex and too impersonal in its operations
to be comprehended, let alone changed; it was better that the individual
should make the most of the situation as he found it and take such
satisfactions as life allowed.2
These satisfactions were generally short-term - a good night-out,
a brief visit by some local worthy - and sometimes even vicarious - a royal
baby, the employer's son's weiding, for example; but they were compensations
sufficient and comprehensible within the terms of a working-class life
'whose main stress [was] on the intimate, the sensory, the detailed and the
personal'. 3
 In this way, the poverty of the slum working class, their
economic vicissitudes, their lack of education, limited horizons and low
aspirations all merged into an indivisible continuum of ideology and
1. Owen, op. cit., p. 13.
2. R. Hoggart, The Uses of Literaçy (Harmondsworth, 1981), ch. 3,
M. Kerr, The People of Ship Street (1958), ch. 10.
3. Hoggart, op. cit., pp. 104-05.
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experience in which an ethos of working-class life emerged that not merely
reflected the conditions of working-class life but subtly reinforced them
too. 1 Thus it was, as noted by Robert Roberts of the mass of unskilled
workers, that 'the less they had to conserve the more conservative in
spirit they showed themselves'.2
In this context, the respectable and aspirant working-class candidates
of the Labour Party were as much outsiders as the predominantly higher-class
Conservatives. Indeed, to many they were rather more unwelcome for while
the Conservatives offered a rather patronising but in some ways empathetic
endorsement of the lower working-class life-style, Labour held out the
promise (or threat) of radical change. Norman Tiptaft, a radical politician
and would-be author of Birmingham, observed the phenomenon well though
sourly. Your average slum dweller, he wrote:3
is living below a decent human standard, and he believes that the
Almighty put him there. He doesn't want to get out. All he wants
is food, drink and amusement. What is the use of talking about the
"New Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land" to people like
that? Amuse the men and promise the wonxn a ride in the car. That,
in the twentieth century, is the way to get votes in many parts of
highly civilised England.
Elections were not, for the most part, fought on detailed policy issues.
Rather, for the Conservatives, they represented an opportunity to reaffirm
and reinforce the unspoken social contract that sanctified the inegalitarian
class system. A tour of the courts, some discreet treating, a ride to the
polls - by these means, the Conservatives were partly able to fulfil the
unonerous duties that the contract placed on them when, for once, the
working-class were in a position of power through their possession of the
ballot.
But the give and take of election time could succeed only through
the operation of more long-term factors. A further important component of
1. G. Knupfer, 'Portrait of the Underdog' in R. Bendix, S.M. Lipset (eds),
Class, Status and Power (1967).
2. R. Roberts, The Classic Slum (Harmondsworth, 1980), p. 167.
3. N. Tiptaft, The City Father (1925), p. 78.
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working-class conservatism, the lubricating oil of the social contract, was
deference - a respect accorded to the upper classes because of their high
social status and the special abilities and talents that this status was
held to entail. In Birmingham, the local council was of unusually select
composition; many of the leading figures in the social and cctrnrcial life
of the town were councillors and aldermen.' Over the years, the local
plutocracy had acquired almost patrician status - a transformation
personified above all in the Chamberlain dynasty. In Sheffield, where the
town's industrialists rarely had pretensions to be anything more than
spokesmen for industrial interests even when acting as public representatives,
this phenomenon was not so marked. To some extent, genuine aristocrats
still had influence; Jans Fitzalan Hope, the grandson of the fourteenth
Duke of Norfolk (the largest local landowner) represented Central Division
from 1908 to 1929.
There were some in the working class who voted Conservative through
the simple respect they held for their social superiors and the pleasure
they derived from identifying with a life-style and an eminence to which
they could not aspire. But motives were rarely pure. One of the most
valued attributes of the upper classes was their wealth; the deference
accorded to them also had to be earned. In Birmingham in particular, the
Unionists worked assiduously tomake secure their role at the to of the
social hierarchy. Annie Chamberlain (the wife of Neville) kept notebooks
containing the names of some 600 Ladywood constituents with details of their
family circumstances, number of children, illnesses and housing conditions.
The entries also recorded small gifts left by Mrs. Chamberlain, usually
flowers and plants, sometimes food and money. 2 This was unusually thorough
but is illustrative of the attention that the local Unionists believed it
necessary to devote to their constituencies. Smedley Crooke, the Unionist
1. D.S. Morris, K. Newton, 'Profile of a Local Political Elite:
Businessmen on Birmingham City Council, 1920-1966', University of
Birmingham Faculty of Cotmrcial and Social Science, Discussion
Papers Series F, 6,.(May, 1969).
2. Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC5/1l/l-2; two volumes of Mrs. Neville
Chamberlain's notebooks re visits to constituents, 1919-1922.
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M.P. for Deritend, set aside half his parliamentary salary for the relief
of distress in the Division. A comnittee 'of all classes without regard to
politics' was established to provide succour to deserving cases but it is
unlikely that the Unionists were so disinterested as to fail completely to
make political capital out of this arrangement, particularly as the
treasurer and chairman of the caimittee were Unionist councillors.'
Nevertheless, there was clearly an ethic of noblesse oblige that still
influenced many on both sides of the social divide.
Cross-class links were also strengthened by the essential traditionalisn
of both Conservative and slum working-class cultures; both looked to the past
and believed the established order to be legitimated by that past. Specific
Conservative policies were designed to appeal to and strengthen this ethos.
The working-class Unionist municipal candidate in IXiddeston in 1930 issued
a leaflet nicely calculated to appeal to local irimobilism, self-respect and
distrust of change:2
Housing. The Socialist policy is Slum Clearance. (They refer to
your house as a slum.) This means House Hunting and removal.
Frank Lannon's policy is repairs. This means every house in Duddeston
is made fit to live in.
Nowhere was the clash of working-class cultures better illustrated than in
the sphere of education. To the respectable working class that supported
the Labour Party, education was one of the principal means to individual
progress and social reform. To the slum working class, education was
irrelevant to their way of life and, at worse, disruptive of it. The
issue of the school leaving age encapsulated the contrast. Labour wished to
raise the leaving age to 15 with grants provided to parents who could not
afford the loss of earnings involved; the Conservatives opposed all forms
of compulsion. When a Labour Government took office pledged to take action,
the Unionists successfully made it one of the chief issues of the local
elections of l929.	 In the following year, Frank Lannon again issued a
1. Straight Forward, March, 1923.
2. Birmingham Municipal Election Literature, BGL; Duddeston, 1930.
3. BBLP minutes, l4;ll;1929.
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leaflet designed to appeal to and cultivate local prejudices, this time
those against both education itself and the interfering bureaucrats who were
a particular bate noir of the traditional working class:'
Do you know that the present Socialist Government intend raising
the school leaving age to 15? Did you ask them? Of course you did
not!! You only get 5/- if you're lucky and that after they pry into
your means. Protest against this Tyranny.
Patriotism was another unifying motif in both working-class and Conservative
value-systems. Being British and taking pride in British achievements were
compensating satisfactions that the lower working class was allowed, and
national celebrations frequently provided the pretext for a good 'knees-up'.
Against the easily understood and concrete appeal of patriotism, Labour's
internationalism appeared nebulous and idealistic, and the Party was often
accused by its opponents of betraying British interests through its
international links and sympathies. Tariff reform, which could merge
material self-interest, national sentiment and straightforward xenophobia,
was another popular issue in Conservative campaigning.
The ideology that united all these different components of working-
class conservatism in Birmingham was the Chamberlain Tradition. To some
extent, it survived merely as a tradition, as an emotional link with an
individual and a past that was treasured even as the conditibñs of its
formation were disappearing and its chiefprotagonist long dead. As late
2
as 1935, Austen Chamberlain could write:
It is wonderful how father's memory is still cherished - I saw your
dad, I carried a torch in the procession. We've always voted
Chamberlain. My dad thought everything of Joe and so on and so on
in every variety of expression.
Certainly, it was a local sentiment that the Unionists, and particularly
Joseph's sons, were eager to exploit. In 1922, Austen considered his most
effective piece of electioneering to be a leaflet with pictures of his father
1. T.C., 7;l1;1930.
2. Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC5/1/714; Austen to Hilda Chamberlain,
17;11;1935.
-119-
and himself under the heading 'You voted for Joe, now vote for Austen'
To Unionism's opponents in Birmingham, the respect and awe in which
Chamberlain was held became almost idolatrous. Tiptaft's none too subtly
disguised parody of local politics is, presumably, exaggerated but it gives
a vivid portrayal of the frustration experienced by Birmingham' s non-Unionist
politicians:2
No Conservative politician need be at a loss at a Brassville public
meeting to evoke cheers from his audience. He may not have a
scintilla of wit, his ideas may be of the foggiest, his brain power
below average, his oratory a minus quantity, his knowledge of politics
nil - all he has to do at the end of his most wearisce period is to
pause, strike an impressive attitude and then remind his audience -
not of the future, not even of the present but of what "Your most
distinguished citizen, now, alas, no longer with us, the Right
1-lonourable Benjamin Rademan, said in 1871-"
What it was the Right Honourable Benjamin Rademan said in 1871 no one
ever hears, owing to prolonged outbursts of applause.
But the devotion to Chamberlain was not mere irrationalism; Chamberlain's
message and appeal and his personal style were uniquely qualified to speak
to every aspect of working-class conservatism. Reform, patriotism, local
pride, working-class self respect and deference to wealth and ability were
all addressed and catered for in the very special hybrid that was
Chamberlainism. The Chamberlain Tradition survived into the interwar pericd
not merely as sthing vestigial but because it was responding to
continuingly felt needs in an environment still, in parts, conducive to its
mode of formation and operation. More directly, Unionist politics in
Birmingham prospered because its advocates continued to implement sorr.e of the
more radical prnnises of Chamberlain's social progranine. This point :ilI he
examined in more detail later; it is necessary now to explore some of the
ways in which the Unionist domination of the central wards was being
undermined.
1. Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC5/1/250; Austen to Ida Chamberlain,
18; 11; 1922
2. Tiptaft, op. cit., p. 11.
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(ii) The Growth of Labour Support amongst the Lower Working Class
In the 1920s, the political complexion of the lower working-class
comunity was undergoing important changes. Sir Artlir Steel-Maitland noted
with concern developments in Nechells:'
In the old days, the slum parts when they voted at all (which was
the problem) always voted Conservative. They now have a tendency
to grow Labour which they never had before,
By the end of the decade, Labour allegiances had developed in the poorer
wards of both Birmingham and Sheffield which were firmly rooted though the
upheavals of 1931 provided a temporary set-back. In this section, we attempt
to account for this transformation.
It is the active catinitment and personal dedication of many Labour
Party members to the interests and concerns of the poorer working class
that takes a large share of the responsibility for Labour's improved
performance. Gradually, local councillors and representatives were able to
establish personal contacts and a recognised presence in the slum corrrnunities
which won them the trust and gratitude of the local inhabitants. This was
achieved not by socialist rhetoric and promises of the New Jerusalem but by
a record of solid, unspectacular work and piecemeal gains won over a number
of years. Through personal influence and practical help, Labour activists
were able to overcome many of the local prejudices against interfering and
impractical outsiders that had previously operated to Labour's detriment.
The case of George Sawyer of [Xiddeston is a good example. He
represented the area as a Guardian from 1915, as a city councillor from 1921,
and, finally, as an M.P. from 1929. In all of this tinie, the Xiddeston
Divisional Labour Party was amongst the weakest and most poverty-stricken in
Birmingham - but what 'our George' lacked in organisation, he made up for in
personality. 2 Sawyer' s politics did not extend much further than a devout
belief in the taxation of land values but he worked steadily and sturdily
to defend the interests of his constituents. In this defence, socialism and
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/118/3; Steel-Maitland to Owen, ?;1l;1924.
2. T.C., 3l;5;l929; B.M., 10;lO;1931.
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sometimes official Labour Party policy (not necessarily the same thing)
played little part. In 1929, he publicly repudiated Labour's policy on the
raising of the school leaving age, going so far as to interrupt and
contradict other Labour speakers on the matter. Though brought before both
the Divisional Labour Party Management Conmittee and the Borough Labour Party
to account for his behaviour, George felt he was on strong ground:'
he was going to please himself; the seat was his with the biggest
majority in Birmingham: if the maintenance allowances were not
adequate in his opinion he would vote against it; he had won
Duddeston by his own effort and had carried the other two councillors
in his work; if the Labour Party decided to cut their throats like
they did in 1924 over the Capital Levy, he, George Sawyer, was not
going to cut his throat; it was his seat, he knew how to keep it
and he was going to keep it.
In the event, Sawyer was swept away like so many others in the Coalition
landslide of 1931 but he remained a Labour councillor until 1940 at which
point he resigned the whip to sit as an independent. He lost his seat in 1945.
Percy Shurmer was another Labour councillor (the representative of
St. Martin's ward from 1921) who established a personal reputation and
following. Unlike Sawyer, Shurmer was known as a left-winger in the local
Party but his platform was similarly down-to-earth. An election leaflet
which he issued in 1924 captures well the appeal he made to his working-class
constituents : 2
Stand by the man who has stood by you
Wno Prevented many Evictions!
Has made Landlords Repair Property!
Fought Pensions Case!
Had Your Yard Lamp Lit...
Vote for Shurmer
His Next Work: Gas and Taps in All Houses.
Shurmer also worked hard to brighten the lives of the poor children of the
ward for whom he organised an annual Christmas party. In 1927, he was able
to arrange for 1400 of 'Shurmer's sparrows' (as the children became known)
to enjoy tea and entertainment in the Town Hall, having earlier raised much
of the money himself by parading the local streets with a barrel organ.3
1. BBLP minutes; Sawyer subcorrrnittee, 17;1;l930.
2. Birmingham Municipal Election Literature, BCL; St.Martin's, 1924.
3. T.C., 28;1;l927.
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Such devotion earned some reward when Shunner was elected M.P. for
Sparkbrook in 1945.
Shunner's counterpart in the other ward of Deritend Division was
Alice Longden, the wife of the constituency's Labour candidate, Fred Longden.
Longden's victory in 1929 owed much to the hard work and practical Labour
propaganda put in by these two carrnitted Labour councillors.
The Unionists recognised that they were faced with a problem:'
we have got to find means in the weaker Divisions of establishing
personal contact and more intimate touch with the electors. The
Labour Party's success in one or two Divisions is due in no small
measure to the fact that their Councillors pay constant visits to
the courts and streets.
But, in this respect, Labour held an advantage that money and social status
could not overcome and even reinforced because working-class Labour
representatives, who understood their locale, were able to beccxne part of
the local corinunity in a way that Unionists rarely could. The social and
political eminence of many of the city's Unionist M.P.s and councillors,
which fostered deference at one level, operated at another to hairper the
development of a 'good secondary line of local leaders', capable of speaking
for, rather than to, the working-class corrrnunity.2
Labour even developed the ability Co beat Unionism at its own galr.e.
In 1924, it was noted with concern that:3
Unionist organisation [was] severely hampered in sane Divisions by
the local Socialist Councillors and their friends taking a very
prominent part in the distribution of city charity and relief funds.
The Unionists hoped to counteract such activity by stepping up their own
efforts in the sane field but such plans were to little avail because the
two main means previously employed by the lower working class to alleviate
the effects of their poverty - neighbourly self-help and private charity -
were being supplemented and increasingly superseded by a third - the public
provision of assistance at the national and local level. In this area, the
1. BUA minutes, l4;6;l929.
2. The Times, 7;9;1926.
3. Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC5/lO/23; P.J. Hannon to Neville Chamberlain,
l;l1 ;1924.
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activists of the Labour movement were peculiarly well placed to act as the
sympathetic interpreters and intermediaries of state intervention, By their
work on the Boards of Guardians and such local bodies as the Welfare and
Juvenile Employment Comittees, socialists were not only able to facilitate
the smooth functioning of a system in which they believed but could also cash
in electorally on the role such work gave them in the local colmiunity.' In
Sheffield, where the Labour Party won control of the apparatus of local
government in 1926, this was doubly the case.
In Birmingham, another quite contrasting phenomenon was also weaning
working-class support from Chamberlainism. In the 1920s, the local Labour
movement found figures with the personality and self-confidence to challenge
the Chamberlain Tradition head-on. One such was Dr. Robert instan, whose
bravura and rhetoric, old-fashioned in retrospect, succeeded in reducing
Neville Chamberlain's majority in Ladywood to 1554 in 1923. Another was
Oswald Mosley who became the Labour candidate in Ladywood when Dunstan joined
the Comnunist Party in 1924.
Mosy was a figure who might have been hand-picked to appeal to the
poor working class of the Division. An aristocrat himself and the son-in-law
of one of England's premier earls (and Conservative politicians), Lord
Curzon, darkly handsome, charming and wealthy, he possessed a style and a
charisma that he used ably in the service of his considerable political
ambition. As an orator, he was rated second to none and even today many in
Birmingham retain memories of his rhetoric and display:2
A marvellous speaker, marvellous! He wouldn't stand up to speak,
he'd got to stand on a table or a chair,he could never get high
enough to speak.
1. Sceel-Maitland Papers, GD193/117/4; Steel-Maitland to Dr. Featherstone,
26;l ;1926.
2. Saltley Local History Project, Scrubbing What Wasn't Dirty (Birmingham,
1983), p. 92.
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The inevitable comparisons with an earlier hero of the Birmingham working
class were made. After an eighty minute speech at the Town Hall:'
old men went up to him saying, "Back to Joey, back to the great
tradition!" One old man said "I have heard Bright, Joseph
Chamberlain, Lloyd George and all the giants of the past at the
sumnit of their powers, but never anything like this meeting. The
only thing comparable with this was Joe at the very height and
vigour of his manhood.
Joe's sons, particularly Neville, appeared pallid and insubstantial figures
in contrast, and the Unionists themselves were forced to admit 'the
extraordinary abilitities of Mr. Mosley as a showman' after Chamberlain had
scraped home by just 77 votes in the parliamentary election of 1924.2 The
industrial troubles of 1926 provided Mos]ey with another platform which he
eagerly exploitedand, after his 'intense activities' during the General
Strike, the Unionists were in 'no doubt that Mr. Mosley was getting hold of
some of our people and had a tremendous following in the Ladywood Division'.3
When Neville Chamberlain conceded defeat in July that year by the announcement
of his move to the safe seat of Edgbaston, the Birmingham Labour movement,
with Mosley in the forefront, felt able to confidently proclaim the end of
the Chamberlain Tradition.4
Mosley also worked quietly but effectively atamore intimate level
to secure political support in the ways normally favoured by the wealthy
politicians of the Right. He promised to buy the Ladywood Ex-Servicemen's
Guild a meeting-place, he invested ma supply of Dispensary Notes to give
to those who needed hospital treatment, and in 1926 he spent over £26 on
flowers to be sent in his name to deserving cases in the constituency.5
According to his biographer, Robert Skideisky, 'Mosley was the key
±igure in Labour's advance in Birmingham'. 6 While we may wish to redress
J. A.K. Chesterton, Oswald Mosley. Portrait of a Leader (N.D.), pp. 54-55.
2. BUA minutes, 26;1l;1924.
13.	 ibid., 18;5;l926;	 ll;6;1926.
. T.C., 20;8;l926.
5. Wilfrid Whiteley Papers, UL6/2; Ladywood Division Buildings Subcomnittee
minutes, 26;5;1925; UL6/3, G. Sutton to Wilfrid Whiteley, 28;6;l926;
UL6/4, Mosley/WhiteJey accounts, 1926.
R. Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (1975), p. 171.
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the balance somewhat by a due recognition of the work of the unsung heroes
of the local movement, there is no doubt that Mosley's self-belief and
personality played a crucial role in debunking the myth of Chamberlainism
and raising Labour's status as a credible contender for political power.
The Chamberlains were reduced to human proportions and their Birmingham
citadel no longer appeared impregnable.
Mosley was, of course, unique. In Sheffield, where working-class
Conservatism was weaker, there was less need of an opponent of his stature.
Though Conservatism held sway initially in all the central wards, it had far
less mystique and the only figure remotely comparable to Joseph Chamberlain
was Sir Howard Vincent, the pop.ilist Conservative Fair Trader who represented
Central until his death in 1908. To sane extent, his influence lingered on -
as late as 1927 his widow was asked to become the president of the Divisional
Women's Association - but, in general, the Conservitives in Sheffield
possessed neither the will nor the capacity of their counterparts in
Birmingham to strengthen those curcents in the life-style and mores of the
lower working-class coiuiiunity which promoted Tory snpathies.1
The politics of the lower working class were in a state of flux.
Old loyalties were being attacked both by attrition and frontal assault, by
means responsive to local customs and by means that challenged tradition in
the name of change, actual and envisaged. The armies of Labour were
advancing, at different paces, with different tactics and with varying success,
n all fronts and, indeed, it was the very catholicity of its approach and
the nuances and contrasts of its appeal that won the Party the position of
;trength that it occupied in the lower working-class corrinunity in 1929. That
ts position, especially in Birmingham where opposing forces were still
trong, was as yet not so firmly established as it would have hoped was
hown by Labour's rapid fall from grace in 1930 and 1931.
Central Division Women's Conservative Association EC.minutes, 23;1l;1927.
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social infrastructure established by the comunity itself.'
If the foregoing description is primarily a sociological ideal-type,
there were nevertheless areas in both Birmingham and Sheffield to which
the thrust of its analysis may be usefully applied. Taking the case of
Birmingham first, this is most obviously true of the area known collectively
as East Birmingham, comprising the wards of Washwood Heath, Saltley and
Small Heath. Industrially, the area contained the most important
concentration of large-scale manufacture in Birmingham - the two railway
carriage works, the factories of Rover and Wolseley, and the BSA works
were located in its midst, and the local railway depots and gas works were
further large employers. As a result, it was a more skilled, better
organised and more highly paid working class that lived locally, enjoying
markedly superior housing conditions. The tunnel-backed, terraced housing
which predominated in the area was monotonous but each house possessed its
own water supply, w.c. and yard and the housing density was less than half
that which prevailed in the Inner Ring. Nearly all the houses were rented,
the large majority from private landlords.2
The strong Labour affiliations of the area are amply illustrated by
the fact that in Washwood Heath and Saltley, Labour won 20 of the 26 annual
municipal contests between 1919 and 1931. The only Unionist victories
occurred in 1931. Small Heath, a more mixed area socially, was also more
mixed politically and here Labour won just five municipal elections.
The East End of Sheffield (comprising here Atterciffe, Burngreave,
Brightside, Tinsley and Darnall) was the base of the massive expansion of
Sheffield's heavy industries that had taken place from the 1860s onwards.
By the l920s, the major steel and engineering concerns of the city had grown
to take up almost the entire area of the Don Valley which passed through the
1. D. Lockwood, 'Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society',
Sociologçal Review, 14, 3, (November, 1966), pp. 250-51.
2. Boiivil1e Village Trust, op. cit., p. 52, p. 54.
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district.' The concomitant to this huge industrial concentration was a
degree of atmospheric pollution that today is difficult to credit.
Prevailing air currents channelled the smoke and smut belched out by the
local works up the Don Valley and through the most densely settled areas of
working-class habitation. It was reckoned that around 15.7 tonnes of soot
and dust rained down upon Attercliffe each month and it was found in 1918
that the ward enjoyed one third less sunshine than did a comparable area
to the west of the city centre.2
The local population had at least the consolation of living
relatively near to their place of work for the large majority of the area's
wage-earners were employed in the heavy industries. They were also, when
in work, fairly highly paid but the heavy toll taken by unemployment in
Sheffield's staple industries was shown by the 1931 social survey which
discovered 20 per cent of the local population to be living below the poverty
line. In two thirds of cases, lack of work was the principal cause of
3poverty.
It was overall a solidly working-class area; in Attercliffe,
Burngreave and Brightside, around 95 per cent of the households were working-
class - a proportion which made it as near a single-class corrrnunity as is
reasonable to expect in a town of Sheffield's size. 4 The local workers
earned their living in large-scale, heavy industry, they belonged or had
belonged to trades unions, and they ownd no property to speak of save the
labour of their hands (less than two per cent of the houses were owner-
occupied). 5
 It was a working-class camiunity to gladden the heart of Karl
Marx and politically it fulfilled his hopes, at least partially, by an
almost unwavering support for the Labour Party. In 55 municipal contests,
the anti-Labour coalition triumphed just seven times and the area returned
Labour M.P.s from 1922 onwards.
1. Abercrombie, op. cit., p. 5.
2. Sheffield YeEr Book, 1921, p. 87.
3. Owen, op. cit., p. 25, p. 28.
4. ibid., p. 13.
5. ibid., p. 31.
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In seeking to account for the proletarian coninunity's Labour
sympathies, to some extent mere description is sufficient. In terms of
both their occupational experience and their social environment, the working-
classes of East Birmingham and the East End lacked the opportunities to make
inter-class contacts and establish cross-class loyalties that existed in
different ways in both the slum and artisanal communities. Their defacto
social segregation promoted an ideological self-sufficiency, fostered by the
homogeneity of local conditions and life-style, in which class identity and
conmonalty were the central motifs, By the 1920s, Labour politics had
become just one part of the conmunity's self-identity.
The barriers to cross-class politics were not, of course, total but
they were seldom breached by middle-class incomers bringing with them a
middle-class world-view. The East End's two Labour M.P.s were an apparently
unlikely duo to represent an industrial working-class area - Arthur Ponsonby
was a former pageboy at the court of Queen Victoria, a member of the nobility,
and a former diplomat; Cecil Wilson, a Congregationalist industrialist and
temperance advocate - but they were accepted and, particularly in the case
of Wilson, held in affection to the extent to which they had come to identify
1
themselves with local working-class interests. 	 R.H. Minshall, a retired
civil servant who represented the citizens of Darnall on the City Council
from 1925, was another unlikely figure who was able to overcome class
prejudice by his unquestioned carmitment to the area's needs. 2
 Conversely,
the two Citizens' Alliance councillors elected for Brightside were both
workingmen. Clearly, in these instances class membership was a significant
factor determining political support which overrode political considerations.
In general, though, working-class Conservatives kept a low profile in an
1. For Ponsonby, see: S.V. Bracher, The Herald Book of Labour Members
(1923), p. 140.
For Wilson, see: J.M. Bellamy, J. Saville (eds), Dictionary of Labour
Biography, vol. 6 (1982), pp. 272-74.
2. Edward Carpenter Memorial Service, 1948. Record of Speeches in the
1947 Service (Sheffield, 1948), p. 1.
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environment where cormiunity mores and locaiI voting patterns marked out
their eccentricity. Attempts to establish a 'Labour Unionist' association
in Brightside were fruitless:1
The Labour Group fight shy of openly proclaiming themselves in shop
or factory, though knowing fuJi. well that there is plenty of roan
for their interference anng their fellow workers who are being
roped in by Socialists and Conuiunists.
In Attercliffe, Conservative organisation was almost non-existent.2
But there were also other, more positive, forces which inculcated and
consolidated the proletarian comunity's political affiliations. One such
was the workingmen's club which played an important role in the social life
of the working class. Almost one third of Sheffield's total of registered
clubs were found in the Attercliffe, Brightside, Darnall and Tinsley
registration subdistricts, and the wider role that such clubs could perform
in the cainiunity was well illustrated by the work of the AEU Institute in
Burngreave. 3 As well as being a meeting place for Sheffield's engineers,
the Institute, which claimed a membership of 4000 by 1929, also acted as
the local headquarters of the Union and the Unemployed Workers Movement.4
It also ran its own dramatic club for the purposes of cultural education and
propaganda. 5 In this way, the Institute was able to combine social,
industrial, political and educational functions under the one roof and it
became an important ideological and organisational base of the independent
working-class movement in Sheffield.
In Birmingham as a whole, the workingmen's club movement was less
developed and it is therefore of particular significance that a concentration
of clubs should occur in East Birmingham. Furthermore, to of the clubs,
the East Birmingham Trades and Labour Club (Saltley) and the Bordesley
Labour Club (Small Heath), were affiliated to the Borough Labour Party and
were the only clubs so affiliated in Birmingham.	 The East Birmninghan
1. Brightside Conservative Association minutes, 15;7;1923.
2. The Tirnes,15;12;l923.
3. Reedman, op. cit., p. 37.
4. S.D.I., 4;3;1929.
5. The Worker, January, 1920.
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Trades and Labour Club, which had a membership approaching 500 in 1930,
was run entirely in the interests of the Labour movement' and permitted
membership only to those who belonged to the Labour Party, the ILP or a
trade union. 1 The Bordesley Club also enrolled only members of the working-
2
class movement and even, in 1930, boasted its own branch of the ILP. 	 In
addition, it ran WEA classes, a choir, fishing, cricket and football sections,
and sick and benevolent societies. 3
 For those who wished it, the Club
clearly provided a 'total' environment, capable of meeting all the needs of
the socially active and class conscious worker.
Another area where working-class interests might be assimilated into
Labour sympathies was the Tenants' Association movement. In practice, in
Birmingham generally this was far fran being the case. Though the Birmingham
and District Tenants' Federation was founded with the active assistance of
the Trades Council, it always emphasised its supposedly non-political
nature and, indeed, the Federation's first president was a working-class
Conservative who was later to become a Unionist councillor in South
Erdington and its chief legal adviser stood as a Liberal parliamentary
candidate in Sparkbrook in 1922 and 1929. Some of the local associations
were more partisan though, and both the East Birmingham Tenants' Association
and the Small Heath Tenants' Association affiliated to the Borough Labour
Party during the 1920s. 4 They were, however, the only ones to do so in
Birmingham for the politics of the Birmingham working class as a whole were
too contested and too ambiguous to allow of such action except in East
Birmingham where Labour was already widely accepted as the natural political
vehicle for working-class interests. The consanguinity of the various
working-class bodies of East Birmingham is well illustrated by the fact that
the offices of the East Birmingham Tenants' Association were located in the
1. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies; Part 3, Industrial
and Provident Societies, 1930; T.C., 14;3;1924
2. ILP Annual Conference Report, 1930, p. 120; T.C., 13;ll;1925.
3. T.C., 15;7;1927.
4. BBLP minutes, 8;lO;l920; T.C., 25;l;l924.
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Trades and Labour Club.'
In this regard, the Binninghm Labour movement appears to sLanci in
advance of that of Sheffield because theSheffield Trades and Labour Council
only permitted the affiliation of organisations with directly political or
industrial interests. There were initially close relations between the
Sheffield Tenants' tfence Association and the Trades and Labour Council
but the former body seems to have becctne defunct by 192. 	 This may
indicate, however, that activity, which in Birmingham was channelled through
non-political or politically contested organisations such as the tenants'
associations, was in Sheffield, organised in and through the political organs
of the Labour and unemployed movements - a sign of the strength and so]idarism
of the local working-class movement rather than its weakness.
1. SteeI-bitland Papers, GD193/117 4; Miss ligan to R.S. eiIu, 15;2;1i26.
2. STLC rinutes, 4;9;1923.
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3.4 The Artisanal Working-Class Comunity
The artisanal working-class areas of Birmingham and Sheffield had
none of the clearly distinguishable characteristics that defined the other
types of working-class coninunity. What united them to sane extent was simply
a state of mind, a shared ethos of self-help and respectability which
expressed pride in working-class affiliations and attributes while being
careful to delimit this class consciousness within carefully prescribed
boundaries. The artisanal areas were composed of the upper strata of the
working class; their predominantly male workforce was skilled and relatively
highly paid and tended still to work in small-scale manufacture rather than
in the large, increasingly deskilled, factories. Trades unionism was one
badge of their respectability, others might be attendance at the local church
or chapel, membership of various welfare and provident societies, a degree
of education, and a continued ethic of self-improvement. Their politics,
now usually Labour though sometimes still Liberal, were in whichever case
normally of studious moderation. This caricature comes close enough to
the reality in King's Norton and Hillsborough to be profitably used.
King's Norton was an area of industry and housing first developed in
the 19th. century. It had expanded considerably since then, aid was to grow
massively in the interwar period through the develoçxnent of several large
Corporation estates, but King's Norton had always maintained a slightly
aloof relationship with the rest of Birmingham. The restrictive covenants
of Edgbaston and the middle-class exclusivity of Noseley formed a kind of
cordon sanitaire between the area and the political and social influences
of the wider city and, indeed, administratively, the district did not become
a part of the city of Birmingham until 1911. It was further marked out by
its high quality, low density housing and the lack of heavy industry or
thickly clustered small works. These conditions made King's Norton amongst
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the most healthy and salubrious in Birmingham.
The two major works were the Austins factory at Ungbridge (NorLhfield)
and Cadburys. Most Austins' workers ccxnmuted a considerable distance to
their work and a more important local influence was the l3ournville Works
which employed a large number of wage-earners resident in Selly Oak in
particular. 1 The Bournville Estate (containing 1618 houses in 3931)
not allocated exclusively to Cadburys' employees but it was estimated that
approximately 40 per cent of its population worked for the cctnpany. 2
 The
other major employers in the Division were predcninantly medium-izcd
metal-working and engineering firms.
Politically, the area was mixed. The Division was the first to return
a Labour M.P. in Birmingham (in 1924) hut was the only seat to be lost by
Labour in England and Wales in 1929. At ward level, Selly Oak was a Labour_
stronghold but in the more middle-class wards of King's Morton and
Northfield, Labour came a poor third behind the Unionists and the Lihera1
who polled better in this area than in any other in Birmingam.
In the Hilisborough Division and the Crookesmoor ward of Sheffield,
a majority of the local wage-earners were skilled craesren in the cutlerj
and small tool industries. Though in the hostile conditions of the 192C,
the light trades' workers' traditions of craft and union were therea5ngIy
under attack, these workers were in many cases able to mathtair tleir a,
partly by successful resistance to deskilling innovation and partly, where
this failed, through the continued support of the coiirunIty atructures of
self-help. Certainly, the evidence ía that even at the height of the Great
Epression the area as a whole boasted a level of wages and living tandardc
only surpassed by the smaller numbers of the affIuen orking cJas who
lived in the predaiimnantly middle-class wards to the weat of the city centre
1. M.J. Wise (ed.), Birmingham and Its Regional Setting (Birmingham, 1)
p. 329.
2. Bournville Village Trust, The Bournvtlle Village Trut, l9QO-I9
(Birmingham, 1955), p. 40.
3. Owen, op. cit., p. 9, p. 25.
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Other indicators, such as the generally good environmental and health
statistics and the better quality and low density housing of these wards
also suggest that they supported a relatively affluent and high status
working class.1
As to the politics of the area, Neepsend was a Labour stronghold for
reasons which will be examined more closely in a later section while
Crookesmoor and Walkley were more evenly balanced, Hillsborough ward was
predominantly the territory of the Citizens Alliance.
There were a number of contradictory impulses within the artisanal
comunity which, on balance by the l920s, were making for Labour sympathies.
The process by which political loyalties were formed was a contested and by
no means uniform one, however, though in Selly Oak at least most stimuli
were towards Labour voting. The personal influence of George Cadbury Jr.
and the industrial and political impact of the Bournville works were the bane
of the local Unionists. The Bournville Estate too was almost solidly Labour,
exhibiting the same interlinked processes of positive discrimination and
self-selection that made the Works itself a bastion of Labour support.2
The Estate attracted those with an ideological sympathy for the type of
experiment in social engineering that it represented, while the Village
Trust selected as residents those who displayed this kind of conmitnnt.
The Works and the Estate were bases of Labour affiliation which spread their
influence throughout Selly Oak and, from there, into the city at large.
In the 1920s, one in four of Labour councillors and candidates was resident
in the ward (which contained only one in thirty of Birmingham's population).
Nor were the Cadburys the only source of middle-class patronage for
the Labour movement of King's Norton. In its early years, the Northfield
Ward Labour Party was heavily dependent on the support of such men as
1. Reedman, op. cit., p. 37;
Census of England and Wales, 1931; Housing Report and Tables, Table F.
2. The Unionist Messenger, May, 1929.
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Harrison Barrow (a Quaker merchant and shop-owner, cousin to George Cadbury
Jr.) and Henry Lloyd Wilson (a local Quaker employer). 1
 Five of the seven
Labour councillors who represented Selly Oak between 1918 and 1931 belonged
to the professional and manufacturing middle classes;
The political importance of such middle-class assistance was not that
it created the organisations of the independent working-class movement but
that it provided a secure and supportive environment for such organisations
to develop and thrive. In 1922, there were some 41 trade union branches in
the King's Norton Division with a total membership of 8000 to 9QQQ•2 This
strength in depth meant that in 1929 King's Norton could boast 'the best
political machine of the Labour Party in the whole of the Midlands.' 3 A
dense tissue of working-class and cross-class organisations - stretching from
the trades unions and Labour Parties at one end of the spectrum to the Early
Morning and Adult Schools (which were peculiarly concentrated in the area)
at the other - created a 'comnon sense' that was Labourist in form and
progressivist in content. A socialism had arisen, deeply ethical in analysis
and strongly infused with Liberalism, that spoke to the pride and
respectability of the local working class whilst corresponding exactly to
the high-minded idealism of the area's middle-class radicals. In this way,
an apparently contradictory mixture of middle-class patronage from above
and working-class self-help from below, an amalgam of deference and self-
respect, came together - with especial force in Selly Oak - to form a
Labour hegemony that Unionism found it difficult to overturn.
The political challenge in King's Norton as a whole came, to a large
degree, from Liberalism. When, in 1922, the Ten Acres and Stirchley
Cooperative Society (which served the locality) withdrew its grant from the
Cooperative Party, the Management Committee of the Society was said to be
firmly in Liberal hands. 4
 The strength of Liberal electoral support in
1. Northfield Ward Labour Party, 'Northfield Ward Labour Party, 1904-1955',
undated duplicate typescript, BCL.
2. Birmingham District Cornnonwealth,January, 1922.
3. BUA minutes, l4;6;l929.
4. National Labour Party minutes, NEC,26;9;1923.
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the other two wards of the Division might be partly ascribed to their
larger middle-class population but it certainly reflects too a continuing
tradition of working-class Liberalism. Whereas in Selly Oak, Liberalism
had been crippled by the defection of two of its leading figures (George
Cadbury Jr. and Harrison Barrow had both been Liberal councillors before
the First World War) and the overall class balance was tilted towards the
working class, in King's Norton and Northfield - with their larger middle-
class population, where several popular Liberal councillors remained loyal
to the Party - Liberal voting could take place in a more supportive and
hopeful atmosphere.
Liberal sympathies remained in north-west Sheffield too, particularly
in Walkley where Liberals and Independents won almost half the local election
contests. (As official Liberalism was swallowed' up in the anti-Labour
coalition, many Liberals now stood as Independents.) The explanation for
Walkley's politics would seem to lie with the Lib-Lab affiliations of the
light trades' workers. Our analysis in chapter 2.8 showed that this was a
declining tradition but in Walkley, where it had several prominent upholders,
it was one which retained some vigour.
In seeking to account for the strengthening hold of Labour in the
local ccxmiunity, we may first note, as in King's Norton, the presence of
such independent working-class bodies as the trades unions and Cooperative.
In 1918, it was said that the Hilisborough Division contained some 25,000
trades unionists and 12,000 Cooperators. 1 The influence of trade union
politics does not need to be re-examined but it is of particular importance
in Hillsborough to note the ideological impact of the Cooperative movement
for here it was the case, in contrast to that in King's Norton, that
Cooperation became the base of a strongly independent working-class politics.
1. S.D.I., 30;12;1918.
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Hilisborough was the jewel in the crown of the political Cooperative
movement with a breadth and depth of organisation and activity second to
none in the country. 1	'The man who made Hillsborough' was Albert Ballard,
the Cooperative Party's agent in the Division and an organisational genius.
He maintained complete registers of all the constituency's Cooperative
members and voters, meticulously cross-referenced with details of their
political affiliations and political and Cooperative activities. 2
 In the
Division itself, a network of party workers was established with, it was
said, a 'captain' and a 'lieutenant' coveringevery 200 houses.3
But Ballard fashioned more than a political machine. He laid great
stress on the social side of the movement too, and the Hilisborough
Cooperative Institute, which he instigated, ran, amongst other things, weekly
educational meetings, Sunday morning Fellowship meetings, play-reading groups
and children's and adults' choirs. The Cooperative Party itself set up a
Ramblers' Club and organised trips and outings in which between 3000 and
4000 people took part annually. 4
 Many of those who participated in these
various activities were encouraged to become active supporters of Cooperative
politics. At one level, Ballard's organisation ensured that every
participant in any Cooperative-sponsored activity was recorded and canvassed.
More diffusely, there had developed in Hillsborough a total social
environment in which working-class consumerism, socialising and political
activism had become inseparably interlinked within the all-embracing
framework established by the distinct but interactive sections of the
Cooperative movement.
The Cooperative Party in Hillsborough was also fortunate to have
found in A.V. Alexander a parliamentary representative who understood
1. Albert Ballard Papers, ABC 2; A. Lockwood to Ballard, 9;2;1922.
2. SCoP records, CPR28(a); D. Allen, 'Memorandum on the Initiative and
tvelopient of the Sheffield Cooperative PartySince its Establishment
in 1919' (1959).
3. The Times, 14;lO;1924.
4. SCoP records, CPR28(a); D. Allen, op. cit.
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and responded to the particular nature of the artisanal corrrnunity.
Eschewing rhetoric and display, Alexander's election meetings were designed
to appeal to the intellect as he carefully ran through the issues and topics
before the electors.' From 1922 to 1950, apart from the brief four year
spell between 1931 and 1935, Alexander and Ballard formed a partnership
which dominated the politics of Hillsborough.
Cooperation was peculiarly the hallmark of the affluent and self-
improving working class. In simple economic terms, it was the upper strata
of the working class who were best able to afford the generally high quality
but slightly dearer products of the Cooperative stores. At the deeper level,
the Cooperative ethos corresponded almost exactly to, indeed was the creation
of, that strain of earnest respectability and woñcing-class pride whic'ti was
located most strongly in the skilled and craft-conscious artisans. In
Hilisborough, a form of Cooperative politics had been evolved which both
reflected and reinforced the mores and life-style of the artisanal camunity
which it served.
1. Alexander Papers, AVAR 10/2; The Wheatsheaf (Brightside and Carbrook
Cooperative Society edition), December, 1923.
-140-
3.5 Occupational Communities
In analysing the political influence of workplace experience, we have
already referred to the strong feelings of occupational loyalty and self-
identity to be found amongst the mineworkers of Sheffield and the railway
workers of both Birmingham and Sheffield. In this section, these themes are
taken up once more and examined particularly in the context of the corrniunity
which they formed and in which they were evolved.
The chief characteristic of the occupational community is that its
members perceive themselves primarily in terms of their occupational role;
they identify with their work, their reference group consists of friends
and acquaintances belonging to the same workforce, and they choose to
socialise outside working hours with these companions rather than with
others in different occupations.' In some cases, occupational communities
may also be geographically isolated from the influences of the wider society.
By such criteria, the mining village is the classic ground of such a
community. The economic organisation of the coal industry and the physical
nature of the occupationgave rise to highly segregated communities, united
both socially and occupationally by a strong sense of their industrial
2identity.	 The case of the railway workers is less clear because,though
there was a significanL degree of residential concentration around the
major depots, it occurred generally within neighbourhoods containing a
wide variety of other works and occupations. By other criteria though -
of self-image, values and associations - research in the l960s indicated
that the sense of occupational cc*mnunity among the railwaymen was still
strong. 3
 Given the degradation of social status and work practice
experienced by the workers of the railways since the Second World War, we
1. C. Salaman, Community and Occupation (1974), pp. 21-27.
2. N. Dennis et al., Coal is Our Life (1969), passim.
3. C. Salaman, 'Two Occupational Coniiiunities: Examples of a Remarkable
Convergence of Work and Non-Work', Sociological Review, 19, (1971).
may assun that Lhe sense oC eiinunLty functic,ried CVPfl IW)rC htro1gly
the interwar period.
Taking the case of the minors flrt., there i rio need to reitcate
their strong Labour affiliations and the work-haerJ influences behind
As to Handsworth, i t remained a separate ciMln1rtJ y Wi rh I La c*in di I
interests and outlook even after it was incorporated uuniicipally into
Sheffield in 1921. Indeed, its split loyalties were shirni by the fact that
for parliamentary elections it remained part of the mining eon ftuercy of
Rother Valley, and it was still to mining that it gave it prlary aIgir
The 1921 Census showed that the area then covered by the rworU 1Xran
District Council contained over 2760 mineworkers, a figure amountirg to jt
over half the total workforce.1
Occupational bonding alone would probably have sufficcd to for the
area's self-identity arid separateness but such feelings here furier
consolidated by the ward's political, cmircial and social institutin.
Politically, the J-Iandsworth Ward Labour Party remained aloof fron effle1d
politics by its decision riot to affiliate to the Trades and Labour Council.L
Conrcia1ly, the Handsworth and Woodhouse Industrial Cooperative Society,
catering purely for the ward and its inmdiate locality, maintained its
independence frau the two larger Sheffield societies. In 1931, its
membership of 3040 represented a rate of membership of a1nst one in five
of the adult population. 3
 Finally, at the social level, the wards caina1
and class image was reinforced by the densest concentration of orkinjn"s
clubs to be found in Sheffield. The total membership of the five
workingmen's clubs in Handsworth equalled 1436, a figure	 intirDg to one
third of the adult male population if duplicate memberships are disc
1. Census of England and Wales, 1921. Yorkshire, Table 11.
2. SFTLC minutes, LP EC 1;12;1931..
3. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies; Part 3, Incistral
and Provident Societies, 1932.
4. Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies; Part 3, lnuatri1
and Provident Societies, 1925.
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The ideological impact of such class-based and separatist social
structures was to encourage the developnent of a dichotomic world-view.
As Lockwood has argued:1
Thinking in terms of two classes standing in a relationship of
opposition is a natural consequence of being a member of a closely
integrated industrial conniunicy with well-defined boundaries and a
distinctive style of life.
Nlore recently, it has been contended, correctly, that shared religious and
political affiliations may transcend class barriers even in apparently
socially divided cormiunities. 2
 In the mining areas, however, Labour
loyalties and a more sharply defined class analysis of the world had becone
dominant by the 1920s precisely because the economic and social realities of
the coal industry were such as to create a schism between the two sides of
industry in which the actuality of conflicting interests and the social
divide could no longer be obscured by any apparently shared value-system.
Railway workers did not form distinct, geographically-defined,
cotmiunities in the same way as the miners but there were, nevertheless,
some notable concentrations in both Birmingham and Sheffield. Duddeston
was said to contain around 3000 to 4000 railwaymen and their wives, and
similar aggregations occurred in Washwood Heath and Salttley. 3
 In Sheffield,
Neepsend contained the principal concentration of railway workers. In these
areas, though the railwaymen were also participant members of a wider
working-class community, they possessed their own occupationally-based
organisations. Chief amongst these were the railwaymen's clubs of which the
ASLEF Club and Institute in Neepsend was a particularly noteworthy example.
It was built and financed by the members themselves and contained its own
lecture hall, games rooms and bars as well as acting as the centre for
nurous educational and sporting activities.4
1. Lockwood, op. cit., p. 251.
2. R.S. Moore, 'Religion as a Source of Variation in Working-Class Images
of Society' in N. Bulmer (ed.), Working-Class Images of Society (1975).
3. B.P., 22;l0;l924.
4. Workers' Dreadnought, 1l;9;l923.
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More unusually, and importantly in view of the fact that the railway
industry was an almost exclusively male preserve, the wives and daughters of
the railwaymen were also integrated into the occupational coninunity through
their own distinct social organisations. Both the NUR and ASLEF organised
women's sections which appear to have been well supported and which were
also to act as a significant base of Labour support and activity amongst
women. In the late 1920s, both the Saitley and Small Heath branches of the
NUR Railwaywomen's Guild and the Bournville ASLEF Women's Society were
affiliated to the Birmingham Borough Labour Party.' Furthermore, at least
six of the 18 women Labour councillors and municipal candidates in Birmingham
between 1918 and 1931 were railwaymen's wives. Clearly, Labour affiliations
and activism were not the sole prerogative of the male workforce but had
become part of a structure and ideology which united the railway-working
coninunity as a whole.
Such comilunity was further manifested by the close relationship
existing between railway worker councillors and the electorates of wards
which contained heavy concentrations of their fellow workers. The local
popularity of George Sawyer in Duddeston and Counci]lors Bancroft and Watkins
in Ncepsend - all of whom were railwaymen - indicates a strong sense of
identity uniting representatives and constituents. 2
 In Neepsend, the only
functioning political body was a branch of the Cooperative Party; as a
concrete illustration of the way in which two of the most salient structures
in the life of the railway-working comunity could act together to further
working-class political interests, it is worthwhile noting that throughout
the 1920s Cur. Bancroft was run as a joint NUR-Cooperative candidate, each
party paying half his expenses.3
This collaboration with and participation in the wider organisations
of the working class was a feature which distinguished the railway workers
from the miners. The unique conjuncture of industrial and social
1. BTC Annual Reports, 1926-26 to l931-32.
2. S.C., December, 1927.
3. SCoP minutes, 29;9;1920; 19;4;l923; l4;l;1926.
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circumstances that set the miners apart also inculcated a certain
separatism. In the case of the railway workers, socially more integrated
into the working-class coirimunity as a whole, involvement in the larger
structures of working-class life was as much an expression of their particular
sense of occupational coninunity as were their more occupationally-defined and
limited activities.
In both the workgroups studied here, it has been argued that the form
and nature of the occupational calminities which they developed were
conducive to Labour sympathies; Labour was the party whose class analysis
and identity corresponded most closely to the realities of the miners' and
railway workers' working and social existence and the ethos which it fostered.
The 'them and us' analysis that their life-style encouraged did not necessarily
have radical political connotations - it could lead as easily to a politically
incorporative and conservative ideology - but, as it happened, the particular
experiences of both the miners and railway workers in the interwar period
gave them a leading role in left-wing politics.
The case of the Birmingham jewellery workers might seem a convincing
example of an occupational conlilunity giving rise to distinctly Conservative
sympathies. However, though the jewellery workers were united by a shared
occupational ethic and distinguished by a certain geographical segregation,
they lacked the defining characteristics of the true occupational cornniunity
in that the industrial structure of their employment prevented the develont
of specifically workerist organisations and viewpoints and the style of their
conulunity lacked formal or class-based structures of social organisation.
Middle-class penetration and influence was thus possible in a way in which
it was not in the more close-knit and self-aware mining and railway
cormiunities.
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3.6 The Council Estates
A new form of working-class corrmunity that was becoming of increasing
importance throughout the 1920s was the municipal estate. The massive
housing shortage and a certain idealism occasioned by the War came together
to force central and local government to take up seriously for the first
time the provision of working-class housing. The results could be spectacular;
Birmingham Corporation built 36,825 houses between 1920 and 1931, new estates
were developed on a scale which was to completely transform the social
character of several of the city's outlying wards. Perry Barr was virtually
the creation of council development; from being an almost greenfield site
in 1928, 5187 houses were built in the ward by 1931. 97 per cent of the
housing stock was municipally owned. By the same date, almost half the
houses in Northfield and North Erdington were council houses.' Sheffield's
total of 9511 municipal houses was more modest but had a comparable impact
on some of the city's wards. The population of Manor ward grew by 18,000
between 1921 and 1931 through the construction of 3946 corporation houses.2
The new estates were designed to provide low density, high quality
housing. Their houses were generally semi-detached or constructed in small
rows and clusters, and were separated by wide streets, gardens and open
spaces. The major advantage of such planning, of course, was that it created
a home environment cleaner and healthier, than any most working-class families
had hitherto experienced. However, the same conditions weakened the sense
of comuunity of the residents because the separation of the housing and the
spaciousness of its setting militated against traditional forms of working-
class socialising. Corrmunity life was debilitated even more in the 1920s by
the fact that many of the early estates were developed without proper
provision of social amenities such as conrnunity halls and public houses.
1. Birmingham Medical Officer of Health, Annual Rert, 1931, pp. 36-37.
2. A.D.K. Owen, A Report on the Housing Problem in Sheffield (Sheffield,193l),
p. 64;
census of England and Wales 1931; Yorkshire Table 3.
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Circumstances imposed a more individuated and privatised life-style than
was normal in working-class circles, and some, particularly those from the
densely-peopled and socially cohesive traditional working-class cormiunities,
found it hard to adjust:'
There are many who regret the loss of the old life, with its
intimacies and street corner amenities, many to whom fresh air is
no more than a draught, and some to whom light and space are an
embarrassment rather than advantages to be prized.
On the Wybourn Estate in Sheffield (a Corporation developmnt earmarked for
the rehousing of those from the cleared central slum areas), it was found
that one third of the families originally settled there moved back to whence
they came.2
Before the vast slum clearance prograrrrnes of the l930s, though, the
Wybourn Estate was highly unusual in containing a predominantly lower working-
class population. Generally speaking, the higher rents of the council houses
and additional expenses entailed by life on the municipal estates precluded
settlement by all but the upper strata of the working class and the lower
middle class. As one conntator noted:3
The housing activities of Birmingham, while far in advance of those
of most cities, have solved neither the overcrowding of the worst type
nor the slum problem. The cynic might observe that they have, however,
been an admirable solution, in many cases, to the problem of the
middle-class salary earner wishing to live cheaply in the suburbs on
an income of, say, £200 to £350 a year.
The cynic would have overstated the case but there is no doubt that in both
Birmingham and Sheffield the new developiients were very largely the prerogative
of the affluent working class. They also contained a population comprising
predominantly young couples with children who were particularly well placed
to benefit from the Council's criteria of selection. In both cities, the
situation conforms closely to that described by John Burnett:4
In practice, council houses went largely to a limited range of income
groups - small clerks and tradesmen, artisans and the better-off
1. Ocien, op. cit. (1931), p. 37.
2. ibid., pp. 40-41.
3. P.H. Massey, 'Slum', The Architects' Journal, 22;6;l933, p.835.
4. J. Burnett, A Social History of Housing, 1815-1970 (Newton Abbot, 1978),
p. 233.
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semi-skilled workers with average-sized families and safe jobs...
Typically, then, the council tenant was a man in a "shelterc&
manual job which had not been severely endangered by the depression,
who earned slightly more than the average wage and had a family of
two young children.
As to the politics of the new estates, there was considerable evidence and
certainly a widespread contemporary belief that they were bases of strong
Labour support. Canvass returns in North Erdington showed, of two of the
council develojxnents in the ward, that 'Perry Conmon was 23 or 24 to one
against [the Unionistsj and Pype Hayes very little better'. 1 In the 1929
General Election, when Labour succeeded in overturning a 5342 Unionist
majority in Erdington, the local Unionists had no hesitation in blaming the
council estates for the turn-about. 2
 At the level of ward elections, the
growth of Labour support appears to have been a slower process. It might
have been expected that North Erdington, Northfield and Perry Barr would be
returning Labour councillors by the late 1920s but none had done so by 1931.
The lower turn-outs of municipal elections and the short-term unpopularity
of the 1929-1931 Labour Government would seem at least a partial explanation
for this and the fact that both Northfield and Perry Barr 'went Labour' in
1932 seems to back the general view of the council estates as bases of Labour
voting.
In Sheffield, Labour sympathies were not so exceptional as they were
in the Midlands city so it is perhaps more to be expected that Labour would
do well in the new develoents. Certainly, the Manor ward was from its
inception a Labour stronghold - Labour councillors were returned solidly
in every election, even in the crisis year of 1931.
In seeking to explain the predominantly Labour voting of the council
tenants, a number of arguments may be put forward. In Birmingham, it is
likely that the unsociability of the new estates contributed to the break-up
of old allegiances to the Unionist Party which had been so successful in
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/118/3; W. Wiggins-Davies to Steel-Maitland,
4;ll;l927.
2. BUA minutes, 14;6;l929.
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building up its political machine and social organs in the central wards.
To some extent, the Labour Party had succeeded in establishing its own
structures of cormiunity organisation. In North and South Erdington and
Northfield, Labour Party sections were formed in each of the major new
estates while the Women's Section on the Allen's Cross Estate (Northfield)
was particularly active in setting up its own concert party and canvassing -
several members who were nurses became especially well-known and popular
amongst the many young mothers who lived locally. 1 As Labour was extending
its organisation and contacts, Unionism was in retreat; in Erdington,
Steel-Maitland stated that the Party network 'had fallen to pieces' before
the 1929 election and he singled out the council estates as particular weak
2
spots.
On the other hand, it is important not to exaggerate Labour's
achievements in this field. Organisation and propaganda continued to depend
on an activist minority and sometimes it was the numerical weakness of the
Party in the new estates that aroused coment. The Manor Ward branch of the
Labour Party in Sheffield was said to have a very poor membership. 3 Labour
was not able to construct the social structures of Party support that had
been evolved in the older-established working-class coirnunities. The general
picture of the home-centred, family-based affluent worker of the new estates
• remained true even as he was putting his cross by Labour in the polling booth.
If the social structures of the new estates did not in themselves
conduce to Labour voting, except perhaps negatively in Birmingham, we have
to look towards other explanations of their Labour sympathies. The most
important of these is simply that the estates were inhabited by those
elements of the working class who were most likely to vote Labour in any case.
1. Siamons Papers, vol. 7; Erdington Divisional Labour Party Annual Report,
19311;
Northfield Ward Labour Party, op. cit., p. 13;
Interview with Mrs. Potter.
2. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/209; Steel-Maitland to W. Beardmore,
20;l2;1929.
3. Park and Heeley Gazette, January, 1930.
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Relatively well-off, in steady employment, with a higher thari average rate
of trades union membership, demonstrably self-improving - it was precisely
these characteristics of the workers of the new estates that were generally
found to correlate closely with habits of Labour voting. Labour support had
become part of this working-class's self-image and it was not merely due to
the operation of political favours, as the anti-Labour coalition hinted
darkly, that in 1930 twelve of Sheffield's Labour councillors and aldermen
were resident on municipal estates.1
An allied factor was the apparent working of a generational effect.
The population of the estates was young and their political socialisation
occurred when Labour was becoming or had become the second party of the
country. Labour sympathies came far more easily to this age-group than to
their parents and older relatives whose political attitudes were formed when
Conservatism and Liberalism reigned unchallenged.There is even some suggestion
that a process of political socialisation occurred in reverse; Mrs. Potter
of the Allen's Cross Labour Party Women's Section recalls urging the
sympathetic young couples of the Estate to try to persuade their parents
to vote Labour when they visited them in their homes in the inner wards of
2the city.
The political complexion of the council constructing the new housing
seems to have had little effect. Though the Sheffield Citizens' Alliance
accused the socialists of favouring municipal house-building as a means of
'bringing more and more people within their power and influence', the same
accusation could hardly be levelled at the Unionists who controlled
Birmingham City Council who, through their huge housing prograrrule, appeared
to be busy digging their own political grave. 3
 Analysing the reasons for
the 1929 defeats, the Unionist Chief Agent was forced to conclude:4
1. The Progressive Standa, N.D., 1930.
2. Interview with Mrs. Potter.
3. The Sheffield Citizen, August, 1927.
4. BUA minutes, 14;6;1929.
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We did not benefit from the progress in housing as those who had
obtained houses were not grateful and the building of new houses
was no consolation to those still living in bad conditions.
One reason for this apparent ingratitude may have been that those resident
in the Corporation estates assessed the municipal house-building progranIr
as manifestation of constructive state intervention and drew socialistic
conclusions as a consequence. This, however, is to presuppose an unusually
ideological world-view which can only be assuimd to have occurred in a
minority. More generally, we are forced to return to earlier argum2nts and
suggest that, on the whole, it was not the nature of the new estates
themselves but the nature of the working-class population from which they
drew which is the chief explanation of their Labour voting. It was to be
several years before Labour's particular concern for the interests of council
tenants became part of any evolved sense of conrnunity identity.
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3,7 Conclusion
The principal patterns of working-class coninunity were corrrnon to
both Birmingham and Sheffield as were, in broad terms, the political
loyalties which they generated. Yet the political contrast between the two
cities remains undeniable. What factors of class and corrrnunity might explain
their divergence?
At the most straightforward level, there was an important difference
in the composition of their working-class populations. The figures below
(which are based on the total number of inhabitants per ward) are necessarily
imprecise but they are, nevertheless, a useful indicator of the realities of
class stratification. Briefly, whereas one third of the population of
Birmingham could be said to belong to the slum working class (as gauged by
their area of residence), the comparable group in Sheffield forrrd just one
fifth of the city's total population. On the other hand, whereas Labour's
proletarian base in East Birmingham amounted to around 11 per cent of the
population, the East End of Sheffield was the horra of alnst one quarter of
the city's inhabitants.' It is a somewhat crude argunt but, clearly,
those forms of working-class coimiunity which conduced to Conservative
sympathies were notably stronger in Birmingham than in Sheffield whilst those
forms which encouraged Labour affiliations were correspondingly weaker.
Moreover, there was in Birmingham a greater residential mixing of the
classes than in Sheffield where the middle and upper classes lived almost
entirely in an exclusive area to the west of the city centre and the main
areas of working-class habitation. Zones of upper-class residence were
found interspersed with primarily working-class districts throughout
Birmingham; Edgbaston ward, which contained both the cream of local society
1. These statistics are calculated from the figures of ward population given
in the 1931 Census and from the details of the Sheffield Medical
Officer of Health's registration subdistricts given in Reedman, op. cit.,
p. 37.
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and - in its innermost portion - the poorest of the city's poor, was a
particularly graphic example of this social diversity.
This was significant in two respects. Electorally, the pockets of
middle-class residence vitiated the impact of the working-class vote because
people higher in the social hierarchy have a tendency to vote in greater
numbers. 1 Here we may supplement the findings of political science with
the more practically oriented work of Albert Ballard's organisation in
Hillsborough; in the 1928 municipal elections, they calculated that the
working-class areas of the ward polled to only 50 per cent of their strength
whilst the middle-class areas polled to some 70 per cent. 2 In the lower
polling characteristic of local elections, such differential turn-out
could have a significant impact on results.
Conversely, class-based voting has been found to be strongest in
areas of single-class residence where the pressures to political conformity
were greatest and the sway of cross-class influences weakest. 3 The social
uniformity of most of Sheffield's working-class wards meant that political
loyalties, once established, tended to be more firmly rooted than those in
the more heterogeneous wards of Birmingham where political cross-pressures
and class divisions were more marked.
Finally, we should refer to the overall social homogeneity and strongly
working-class composition of Sheffield as compared to that of most other
major cities. In his research into Sheffield politics undertaken in the
l960s, William Hampton found that not only the working class but the business
and professional classes of Sheffield voted Labour at a rate significantly
higher than the national average for their respective social strata.4
This he ascribed to the peculiar nature of the Sheffield cotrrriunity -
predominantly manufacturing and proletarian - which 'exerted a group pressure
1. K. Newton, 'Turn-out and Marginality in Local Elections', British Journal
of Political Science, 2, (1972).
2. S.C., December, 1928.
3. J. Blondel, Voters 1 Parties and Leaders (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 65.
4. W. Hampton, Democracy and Cmunity. A Study of Politics in Sheffield
(1970), p. 158.
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upon the electorate to vote for the Labour Party' . 	 As the figures given
in the introduction to this chapter indicate, Sheffield was less exceptional
in terms of its class composition in the interwar period than it was to
become after the Second World War but it was, nevertheless, a mainly
working-class city of unusual uniformity and solidarism. Whereas the forms
of Birmingham's economy and society were peculiarly open to middle-class
penetration and influence, those of Sheffield might have been designed to
inhibit cross-class contacts and inter-class cooperation.
Surprisingly, as the three following chapters will illustrate, the
middle-class politicians of Sheffield, rather than seeking to counteract
the hostile pressures of their socio-economic terrain, seem to have behaved
in such a way as to confirm their operation. It was not inevitable that
working people in Sheffield would support the Labour Party in greater numbers
than their compatriots elsewhere but social environment and human ineptitude
certainly made it appear so.
1. Hampton.	 p. 159.
Chapter 4
ORGANISATION AND PROPAGANDA
4.1 Introduction
The importance and effectiveness of good political organisation and
propaganda was not, for the most part, that they determined people's
ideological sympathies but that they reinforced them and gave them voice.
Organisation and propaganda were as much the products of a locality's
political norms as their creators but, inasmuch as they were able to
maximise and mobilise the potential support latent in their environment,
they were a significant influence on the forms of working-class politics.
This chapter examines and contrasts the central machinery, rank and
file organisation and propaganda output of the major contenders for political
power in Birmingham and Sheffield and attempts, in conclusion, sc
assessment of their role and impact in the local politics of the two towns.
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4.2 The Party
 Machine
(1) Labour
The heart and directing centre of Labour's political organisation
at the municipal level in both Birmingham and Sheffield was the trades
council which acted as the forum where delegates frcii the Divisional Labour
Parties and trades unions, Labour councillors and guardians met to formulate
and coordinate policy and action. In both towns, but particularly in
Sheffield, the close working relations between the political and industrial
sides of the trades council and the frequent identity of personnel make any
separation of Labour and trades union functions difficult and, in many cases,
artificial. In reality, both industrial and political work were practised
in the same arena under the cormon banner of Labour.
The weak trades unionism of Birmingham inevitably had a considerable
impact on the Birmingham Trades Council. Between 1920 and 1931, the
Council's average annual income from its affiliated societies amounted to
just E747. (In Sheffield, a town half the size of Birmingham, the Trades
and Labour Council enjoyed a yearly income of E706.)' Such poverty was
naturally reflected in organisational terms and until 1924 the Birmingham
Trades Council and the Borough Labour Party were forced to operate with one
chief secretary between them, the able but overworked F.W. Rudland. In 1924,
the position was improved somewhat by the appointment of Allen Young to the
post of Political Organiser. 2
 It is important to note, however,that Young's
position was not financed from the local Labour movement's own resources but
was funded by two wealthy private individuals - Young's salary and office
expenses were paid by George Cadbury Jr. and Harrison Barrow. 3 But while
Young was a talented and intelligent administrator, he alone could do little
1. BTC, S[TLC Annual Reports.
2. BBLP minutes, 3;4;1924.
3. ibiicL, Organisation Subcniiittee, 1l;l;l927; Finance Subcarmittee,
5; 12 ; 1930
-156-
to counteract the effects of the Birmingham Labour movement's dire financial
straits. Tn 1928, it remained true that the Borough Labour Party:'
had to make the best of a situetion in which twelve constituencies
had to be organised with a central machinery barely adequate for the
proper organisation of one constituency.
Such improvement as occurred in the later 1920s was made possible by two
'external' sources - the trades unions and wealthy Labour candidates. By
and large, trades unions were reluctant to run candidates in Birmingham which
for most of the interwar period seemed to offer bleak prospects of Labour
success; only 11 of the 60 Labour candidates who stood for parliannt in
Birmingham between 1918 and 1931 were trades union sponsored. Nevertheless,
both the ISTC,who sponsored Robert Dennison in King's Norton, and the
Palgamated Society of Woodworkers, who backed Archibald Gossl ing' s
candidature in Yardley, also paid for local agents. The ISTC went further
in pledging additionally to pay half the cost of Dennison's propaganda and
90 per cent of his election expenses.2
Only two other constituencies had local agents. One was Ladywood
where Oswald tlosley was the Division's Labour candidate between 1924 and 1926.
Mosley financed the agency of Wilfrid Whiteley out of his own pocket and,
when he was reluctantly released by the local Party to fight the Smethwick
by-election, it was done only on the express understanding that he would
continue to fund the Division until the next General Election to the tune
of £450 a year - £350 to go towards the agent's salary (Whiceley acted as
both agent and parliariintary candidate until 1929) and £100 towards the cost
of the new Labour Hall. 3
 In 1929, Mosley was also to contribute £150 Co
Ladywood's campaign expenses in addition to the £350 he gave to finance the
fight in Erdington and Sparkbrook Divisions. 4 The other constituency with
a full-time agent was Aston where Mosley's protd'ge' and fellow aristocrat,
1. T.C., 28;9;l928.
2. ISTC records, MSS 36, P69; Decisions on Parliamentary Work, 1923.
3. Wilfrid Whiteley Papers, UL6/4; Mosley to Whiteley, 2;4;l928.
4. National Labour Party minutes, Office Arrangements Ccxrrnittee, 4;6;1929.
-157-
John Strachey, was Labour's standard-bearer.
The role of 0.G. Willey, Labour's parliamentary candidate in West
Birmingham, was rather more obscure. In 1926, Harrison Barrow had sought
his appointment as an official Labour propagandist in the Midlands and had
offered £300 a year towards his salary.' The Labour Party NEC rejected this
somewhat irregular suggestion but in practice Willey continued to act as a
full-time political organiser in the area in an unofficial capacity which
was funded by 'one of the Cadburys' according to Austen Chamberlain.2
But such patronage could not solve arid, indeed, may have reinforced
the structural weakness of the Birmingham Labour Party. Tftroughout the late
1920s,the Borough Labour Party was spending on average something like £90
annually in excess of its income with little prospect of any up-turn in its
revenues.
In strictly organisational terms, the Sheffield Labour Party was little
better placed. As noted earlier, Hillsborough was well organised and
generously funded by the Cooperative Party, but in the late 1920s only two
other Divisions had full-time agents - Central, where the National Amalgamated
Union of Shop Assistants sponsored the candidature of P.C. Hoffman, and Park,
where George Lathan was the candidate of the RCA. 4 The return of Alderman
Fred Marshall as the NUGMW's candidate in Brightside in 1930 secured another
funded agency in that Division.5
Not surprisingly though, given the strength of the local trades union
movement and the more propitious electoral circumstances, Sheffield was far
more attractive to trades union sponsored candidatures than Birmingham.
Other national bodies, such as the ILP, were also more willing to invest in
election fights in Sheffield. Consequently, whereas 62 per cent of
1. National Labour Party minutes, Organisation Subcommittee, 26;7;1926.
2. Austen Chamberlain Papers, ACS/l/561; Austen to Ida Chamberlain,
24;l0;l931.
3. BBLP minutes, Report of Finance Subcommittee, 1930.
4. National Labour Party minutes, Organisation Subcommittee, 26;4;1926.
5. ibid., NEC, 26;2;l930.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Birmingham's parliamentary candidates were locally financed (many, in fact,
being supported by private money), in Sheffield the proportion was just 39
per cent. 12 of Sheffield's 36 parliamentary candidates between 1918 and
1931 were run by national political bodies and 10 were trades union
sponsored. There were some financial contributions from the rich. Tom
Snowden gave £130 to his election expenses in the 1923 and 1924 contests in
Cent:ral, and Cecil Wilson paid the bulk of his expenses in AttercliffeJ
On the other hand, Arthur Ponsonby pleaded poverty and sought as much
financial support from his Brightside Divisional Party as was possible.2
In general, Sheffield did not attract, nor had need of, the type of minence
grise who played such an iiiportant role in the Birmingham Labour movement.
(ii) Anti-Labour
The chief organisation of Birmingham Unionism was the Birmingham
Conservative and Unionist Association formed in 1918 by the fusion of the
local Conservative and Liberal Unionist bodies. On its establishment, the
Association was provided with six divisional agents and a central staff
comprising a Chief Agent, four clerks and a book-keeper but Labour's
electoral progress was such that in 1923 it was agreed to appoint an agent
in every division. 3 The money to pay for the upkeep of this comprehensive
political machine came principally from Birmingham's Unionist M.P.s
themselves and from local businesses and businessmen. Of its income of
£10,296 in 1923, £2203 came from the M.P.s and £6529 in donations; the
contribution of individual subscriptions and fund-raising amounted to £l564.
The total revenue of the Birmingham Trades Council in the same year came to
just £2093.
National Labour Party minutes, Organisation Subcocrmittee, 26;4;1926;
Francis Johnson Correspondence; Wilson to Clifford Allen, 12;9;1922.
Francis Johnson Correspondence; Ponsonby to Clifford Allen, 28;5;1922.
Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC5/lO/12; Draft estimate of running costs
of central organisation, 18;9 ;19l8;
BUA minutes, 9;ll;1923.
Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC5/l0/93; Draft statement of accounts, 1923.
BTC Annual Report, 1923-1924, p. 26.
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But even to examine the statistics of the central organisation alone
would be to underestimate the financial strength of the Birmingham Unionist
movement for M.P.s and industrialists contributed large sums to divisional
organisation too. Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland estimated that he spent between
£450 and £500 a year on his Erdington constituency - a sum made up of his
£150 subscription to the Birmingham Unionist Association, £100 subscription
to the Erdington Unionist Association, and Lady Steel-Maitland' s financial
contributions to the local paper and children's entertainments but which
cxiiitted his donations to local charities and societies.' The Erdingtori
Association was also able to call upon the financial support of local
businesses; in 1929, donations amounting to £400 were received from GEC,
the Metropolitan Carriage Company and Wolseleys. 2 Nor was Erdington wholly
exceptional in the financial resources upon which it could draw; the
Duddeston M.P., J.B. Burman, spent an average of £460 a year on his
constituency during the period of his parliamentary career and in the election
year of 1929 he spent over £1260.
There exists no comparable depth of information on Sheffield but,
given the organisational weakness of the middle-class parties in the working-
class constituencies of the city, the bulk of the money spent on organisation
and propaganda there clearly came from the candidates themselves, from
friendly companies and wealthy supporters. In 1919, it was laid down that
the Divisional Conservative Parties should contribute £50 a year to the
central machinery while the local M.P.s were expected to give £250, of which
£200 was to go towards supporting a constituency agent.4
At the municipal level, almost all the income of the Sheffield
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD1Y3/1l8/3; Steel-Maitland to Edwards, 19;l0;127.
2. ibid., GD1193/209; B. Docker to Steel-Maitland, 12;3;l928; W. Morris to
Steel-Maitland, 8;l;1929; N.J. Railing to Steel-Maitland, 29;1;1929.
3. K.W.D. Rolf, 'Tories, Tariffs and Elections: the West Midlands in
English Politics, 1918-1935', Ph. D. thesis, University of Cambridge,
1974, p. 150.
4. Brightside Conservative Association minutes, l7;6;19l9.
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Citizens' Alliance came from the 'Sheffield Racepayers' Economy Committee',
a body set up by and comprising representatives of most of the more important
local firms and businesses. In 1926, leaked documents revealed that of the
Economy Committee's total income of £2223 (almost wholly contributed in
donations of £50 to £100 from local companies), £1940 was made over directly
to the Citizens' Alliance.' The Sheffield Citizens' Alliance was, in every
sense, the creature of local industrial interests with little conrnunity role
or sustenance. In those few areas of Sheffield where the politics of the
Right was strong, the predominantly middle-class activists preferred to
channel their political input into the traditional party system.
Except in those areas where electorally it was least needed, anti-
Labour organisation was undoubtedly weak in Sheffield. It was not until 1929
that the Citizens' Alliance appointed a special organiser charged with the
responsibility of strengthening their political machinery; until that time,
as even the local Labour Party admitted, Labour's opponents do not appear to
have taken the question of organisation seriously.2
1. J1J. March, 1926.
2. SITLC minutes, Report on Result of Municipal Elections, 1930, 17;l;1931.
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4.3 Rank and File Organisation
(i) Labour
The Labour Party as such began the enrollment of individual members
only in 1918 and it took some time for the Party to establish a comprehensive
network of local branches. This was particularly the case in Birmingham where
it was not until 1924 that Divisional Labour Parties were set up in
Edgbaston, Moseley and HandsworthJ Nevertheless, by the mid-twenties, the
Labour Party had succeeded in creating an impressive array of locally-based
branches and activities. In 1926 in Birmingham as a whole, there were 28
ward parties or sections, 20 Labour Party Women's Sections and 6 branches of
the Labour Party League of Youth in existence. 2 There was in addition the
still flourishing apparatus of the ILP which boasted 16 parties in the city
as well as 3 branches of its own youth section, the Guild of Youth. 3
 The
Young Socialists' League, an independent off-shoot of the local Labour
movement, organised a further 5 junior sections. 4
 Finally, there were 4
branches of the Cooperative Party operating in the city in the mid-1920s.5
After 1926, there was little further organisational advance in the interwar
years and so far as the ILP in Birmingham was concerned the year marked a
peak from which the Party began its long-term and ultimately fatal decline.
As to the actual memberships, there is unfortunately a paucity of
hard information. The individual membership of the Labour Party in
Birmingham seems to have increased from around 3000 in 1924 to sai'thing
over 6000 in 1930.6 The ILP had a fluctuating membership which probably
averaged out at around 900 to 1000 through most of the 1920s. 7 As to the
1. Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1924, p. 280.
2. Calculated from reports in the Town Crier and Borough Labour Party and
Trades Council minutes.
For youth sections, see: National Labour Party minutes, Organisation
Subconinittee, 21; 6; 1926.
3. BTC Annual Report, 1926-1927, p. 40.
4. T.C., 30;4;1926.
5. BTC Annual Report, 1926-1927, p. 40.
6. BBLP minutes, l4;2;1924; 28;4;l930.
7. Labour Leader, 7;l0;1920; T.C., l3;4;1928.
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Cooperative Party, the only indication we have as to its local strength is
the total of 225 members affiliated to the Borough Labour Party in 1928.1
Given that most members of the IL? and many members of the Cooperative Party
would have been individual members of the Labour Party, we may estimate that
there were approximately 6500 fully paid-up members of the Labour movement
in Birmingham by the end of the 1920s.
In Sheffield, Divisional Labour Parties had been established in six
of the city' s seven constituencies by 1921, the only exception being Central
where, owing to the poverty of the local working class and the intervention
of some unofficial Labour activists, a properly constituted and recognised
Divisional Party was not set up until 1924.2 As to local organisation and
taking 1926 as our point of reference once more, there were gaps in the
party network which,at first glance, seem surprising. Of the 17 wards in
the city, only 10 had local Labour Party branches. Of those that did not,
two were in Central, two were in the predominantly middle-class Ecclesall
Division and two were in the Attercliffe Division which, due to jts caiact
and homogeneous structure, was organised on a unitary basis . 	In liIeepsencI,
the Cooperative Party was the only functioning political organisatian.
There were, in addition, 10 Labour Party Women's Sections but oniy one
constituency, Park, appears to have had any organisation catering for yoig
socialists
The IL? in Sheffield also had a weak local organisation. With the
demise of the Attercliffe branchin 1922, there remaird just one branch ofF
the IL? catering or the entire city though k maintained sone form of local
presence through its delegates to the Divisional Iix*ir Parties and ad hric
sections led together for the nunicipal elections. flre 1 as also a
1. BBLP minutes, 26;1l;l928
2. Laboui Party Annual Conference Reports, 1921, p.. 129; 1924 p. 2S3-8..
3. National Labour Party minutes, Organisation Subcooimittee, 2;4;l926..
4. Calculatec tram reports in the Sheffield Forwaitd and the tffie14
Cooperator
For youth section, see National Labour Party mirtes, Organtsatiia
Subcortntttee.21 ;6;1926.
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a branch of the ILP Guild of Youth.' The Cooperative Party was a little
more comprehensively structured for, in addition to the coordinating city-
wide Sheffield Cooperative Party, it possessed a divisional organisation
in Hilisborough and ward branches in Hilisborough and Neepsend, both of which
ran associated women's sections.2
It is not possible to give more than approximate indications of the
memberships of the various working-class parties. The affiliated memberships
of the seven Divisional Labour Parties to the Trades and Labour Council
suggest that by 1931 there were around 2250 individual Labour Party members
3in Sheffield.	 The ILP had a paid-up membership of approximately 500 in
l927.	 The Cooperative Party appears to have functioned on a much looser
basis and it was not until 1926 that the Hilisborough Divisional Party
inaugurated a specific membership list in addition to its ordinary roll of
supporters. As a minimum subscription of just 6d. a year was agreed upon,
it does not seem useful to define any figure of membership which was clearly
an elastic concept in the Party's thinking.5
(ii) Anti-Labour
The tradition of political organisation first established by the
Birmingham Caucus in 1868 lived on in Birmingham Unionism. Though, as we
noted, most of its income came from wealthy individuals and industrialists,
the Birmingham Unionist Association still sought, with considerable success,
to enroll a mass membership. To this end, each constituency in the city
possessed a comprehensive network of Unionist ward conmittees, women's
branches and junior sections. As might be expected, the most middle-class
divisions were the ones with the largest memberships but several working-
class constituencies also provided very large numbers of dues-paying
1. S.F., June, 1924.
2. S.C., passirn.
3. SFTLC Annual Report, 1931.
4. S.D.I., 30;12;l927.
5. , February, 1926.
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sympathisers; in 1930, around 1000 people paid subscriptions in Deritend,
2200 in West Birmingham and 800 in Yardley. In the six constituencies for
which fairly precise statistics are given in 1930, the Unionists enrolled
14,200 individual members, which suggests that in Birmingham as a whole
there must have been around 20,000 individual subscribers to Unionist Party
1funds.	 This figure represents a quite remarkable mass endorsement of
Unionist politics and it omits to take into account the women T s branches
which were separately organised though they shared a large, overlapping
membership with the Unionist committees as such. In 1930, there were 15,672
individual women members of the local Unionist women's associations of
rmham2
The only qualification to be made to these statistics is that they
do not by any means represent an active or even much politicised membership.
A large part of Unionism's appeal in Birmingham was deliberately couched in
overtly non-political terms. The men were treated to smoking concerts in
the local pubs, the women to shows in the neighbourhood's schools; and the
Unionist women's branches, in particular, functioned primarily as places
where the local wives and mothers could meet socially to enjoy some
congenial company and entertainment. Those men and women who joined the
Labour movement were, for the most part, making a decision of far more
positive commitment and awareness. But this argument should not be taken
too far. In the first place, the women, who formed the majority of the
Birmingham Unionist Association's subscribers, consistently carried out most
of the routine but essential clerical work in the election campaigns and
easily out-performed the men in their active political caffnitment. 3 In the
second place, it was precisely because Unionism was able to make its message
and role appear non-political that it was so successful auxigst the working-
class electorate. By taking an active part in the corrniunity life of the
1. BUA minutes, 10;1;1930; l4;3;1930; lO;l0;1930.
2. ftjL, 10;lO;1930.
3. ibid., 113;4;l923; 6;9;l929;	 lO;l2;193l.
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city, Birmingham Unionism reinforced the cross-class and localistic ideology
which it espoused. It was through its depoliticisation that Unionism in
Birmingham went furthesttowards creatingthe political culture that upheld
its hegemony.
Liberal organisation in Birmingham was, in terms of its mass support
and electoral impact, an almost negligible quantity. The only partial
exception to this generalisation occurred in Sparkbrook where, through their
active involvement in the district tenants' association, the Liberals had
succeeded in establishing a worthwhile local presence.'
In view of the unique political evolution of the Midlands city, it is
not surprising to find that there was no comparable depth of anti-Labour
organisation in Sheffield. For parliamentary purposes, the Conservatives
organised all seven of the city's divisions but the strength of political
opposition meant that the structure of party branches was far weaker than in
Birmingham. Hillsborough, where Liberal and Cooperative opposition was
strong, and Attercliffe, where Labour was dominant, were noted as particular
weak spots. 2 The Conservatives also had a hard row to furrow in Brightside
where, though there was a Divisional Carrnittee and an active 'Ladies'
Association', efforts to found junior and workingrnen's sections were
unavailing. 3 In fact, the only working-class constituencies with
comprehensive Conservative organisation were Park and Central where in both
there were strong pre-war traditions of working-class Conrvatism which
survived to influence their political affiliations in the l920s. 4
 Of
indigenous Liberalism, except in the isolated work of a few individuals,
there is no trace.
1. The Spark, February, 1928.
2. Sheffield Conservative and Unionist Association, ACM minutes, 23;3;192l.
The Times, 15;12;1923.
3. Brights ide Conservative Association minutes, 15; 7; 1921.
4. Park Division Women's Unionist Council minutes, 1931, passim.
Central Division Women's Conservative Association minutes, June, 1930.
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At the municipal level, the lion's share of the political
arrangements were undertaken by the Sheffield Citizens' Alliance which
claimed in 1923 to have local sections in twelve of the city's wards and
women's branches in thirteen.' There is little evidence that most of
these had any active existence outside of election periods, however, and
there is nosuggestion that the Citizens' Alliance played or sought to play
anything approaching the role in the local corrmJnity which the Unionists of
Birmingham had achieved.
There is, overall, a lack of documentation for the anti-Labour
forces of Sheffield which stands in marked contrast to the copious records
of Unionism in Birmingham. This in itself is not merely accidental but
reflects at a deeper level the generally weaker structure and activism of
the parties of the Right in Sheffield where history and environment were
far less conducive to a populist opposition to Labour than in Birmingham.
1. Sheffield Citizen, September, 1923.
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4.4 Political Propaganda: the Press
If the organisational frameworks described above formed the basic
structure of the political parties, what gave them their raison d'être and
popular impact was propaganda. Probably the most influential organs of
political opinion in the interwar period were the newspapers and journals.
The consistently anti-Labour bias of the press has guaranteed it a
particularly prominent place in the Labour movement's demonology and
nowhere was this bias more pronounced than in Birmingham where the two major
local newpapers, the Birmingham Post and the Birmingham Mail, were virtually
the official organs of Unionism. Personal visits by Neville Chamberlain in
1919 brought the two editors firmly into line and thereafter the Birmingham
Unionist Association went on public record several times to thank the Post
and the Mail for their material contribution to Unionism's electoral victories.
In what little space it received, the Labour case was consistently distorted
and derided; coverage did not extend much beyond the stock cartoon image
of a Labour activist depicted as a sinister but slightly ridiculous figure
complete with beard, beaver hat and hissing bomb. The Birmingham Gazette,
the Liberal evening paper, was fairer but its circulation was smaller and
it had little of the local influence possessed by its more prestigious
Unionist counterparts.
The Sheffield equivalents to the Post and Mail were the Sheffield
Daily Telegraph and the Sheffield Evening Telegraph and Star. Their role
was to bolster local Conservatism; as the Telegraph's editor quite candidly
told Labour leader, E.G. Rowlinson, 'we aren't in the business of giving you
free publicity	 But significantly, the Liberal newspapers, which gave
Labour sympathetic coverage, had a far larger impact than those in Birmingham.
1. BUA minutes, 8;lO;1920;
Straight Forward, December, 1920; BUA minutes, 14;ll;l930; l3;ll;193l.
2. J.S. Rowett, 'The Labour Party and Local Government: Theory and
Practice in the Interwar Years', Ph. D. thesis, University of Oxford,
1979, p. 37.
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In 1920, the Sheffield Daily Independent had a circulation of 65- to 69,000
compared with the Telegraph's 57- to 59,000, whilst the Liberal Sheffield
Mail battled it out on even terms with the Telegraph's evening sister paper.'
The Sheffield Mail, in particular, anxious to establish its reputation, gave
powerful service to the Labour cause. In 1923 and 1924, it provided E.G.
Rowlinson with a regular daily column during the municipal election campaigns,
and in 1923 the paper's expose of Citizens' Alliance slum landlord councillors
2
on the Health Comittee undoubtedly played some part in the Labour victories.
Labour never expected too much help from the capitalist media, though,
and it hoped to strengthen its propaganda by the establishment of its own
newspapers. In Birmingham, the local Labour paper, the Town Crier was
published weekly from 1919 and through the devoted efforts and journalistic
ability of its editor, Will Chamberlain, it was able to provide the local
working-class movement with a consistently bright organ and forum of Labour
opinion. But there is no evidence that it succeeded in reaching a readership
beyond the Labour faithful for whom there was, in any case, no need of
political conversion. The best estimates suggest that its circulation stood
at around 1500 in the early 1920s and rose gradually to some 3000 after the
1929 General Election. 3 Obviously, in relation to the 40,000 odd
circulation of the Birmingham Post and the wider readership of the more
populist Mail, this was a paltry figure indeed. 4
 In practice, the
importance of the Town Crier lay not in its popular impact but in the service
it gave to the local Labour movement for which it acted as a mouthpiece,
informant and source of identity.
A similar role was carried out in Sheffield by the Labour-sponsored
Sheffield Forward. The Forward fulfilled its propaganda role even less
1. S.D.L, l0;3;lY2l.
2. Sheffield Mail, 29;20;1923; S.D.I., 27;lO;l923
3. P. Drake, 'The Town Crier. Birmingham's Labour Weekly, 1919-1951' in
A. Wright, R. Shackleton (eds), Worlds of Labour: Essays in Birmingham
Labour History (Birmingham, 1983), p. 109.
4. H.R.G. Whates, The Birmingham Post, 1857-1957 (Birmingham, 1957), p. 191.
169-
successfully, though, as it was a monthly, published only from 1921 to 1927,
which possessed on closure a circulation of just 1100J
As few people could be persuaded to buy Labour newpapers, it becaijw
necessary for the local Labour movement to give them away. A number of
Divisional Labour Parties published free newpapers, largely supported by
advertising and distributed at no cost by the Party members themselves.
Most, such as the Yardley Labour Torch and the King's Norton Labour News in
Birmingham and the Park and Heeley Gazette in Sheffield, were published at
monthly intervals though on occasion their appearances became more infrequent.
The Park and Heeley Gazette was one of the most successful of these efforts,
pushing its circulation up from 8000 in 1922 to 18,500 in 1929 by which time
.2it was even making a small profit.	 The greater wealth of the Cooperative
movement meant that the Cooperative Party was able to distribute freely a
number of organs of Cooperative politics for which the advertising largely
derived from the movement's cainrcial side. The Birmingham District
Corrmonwealth, the Fritend Conmonwealth and the Sheffield Cooperator put
forward the Cooperative and Labour case in the two cities. In all, the free
Labour newspapers of Birmingham probably reached 35,000 households when at
their peak in 1930, whilst those in Sheffield were being circulated to
49,000 households
Such Labour propaganda was not, of course, allowed a free run in
either city. In Birmingham in particular, the Unionists responded
vigorously with the distribution of their own free newspapers, broadsheets
and leaflets and the wealth of the Unionist machine was such that these
could be published in huge quantities, often with the help of conrrrcia1
distribution. For example, it was estimated in May, 1927 that some 350,000
leaflets had been distributed in the city; in December, 1928, the eight
1. SFTLC minutes, l5;ll;1927.
2. S.F., February, 1922; Labour Organiser, March, 1929.
3. Calculated from the newspapers' own circulation figures.
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Divisions which filed returns gave figures suggesting that 52,000 papers and
pamphlets had been circulated to the local electorates.'
In Sheffield, characteristically, opposition to Labour was far weaker.
The Citizens Alliance began the publication of a monthly free journal with
a print	 of 50,000 copies in 1923 but it folded in l927	 cn the
Citizens' Alliance was revamped as the Municipal Progressive Party in 1929,
the latter issued a paper called the Progressive Standard which was
distinguished by its very infrequent appearance and lack of circulation
figures.
Though provincial papers had a larger circulation and greater
influence in the interwar period than they have today, it has, of course,
been a serious omission to ignore the impact of the national press. The
only national newpaper to support the Labour Party was the Daily Herald but
throughout the 1920s its circulation was small when compared to those of
its rivals. Even in the Labour stronghold of Sheffield, the Herald sold
only 2200 copies daily in l922.
	 With no other details of national
newspaper sales in the localities, we can only re-state the obvious point
which is that most working-class newspaper readers took their news and
opinions from organs which were, in varying degrees, anti-Labour. That many
voted Labour despite the 'dope' from Fleet Street suggests that we should
look beyond the press to examine the influence of other forms of political
propaganda.
I. BUA minutes, 26;5;l927; l4;12;l928.
2. Sheffield Citizen, September, 1925.
3. SFTLC minutes, 5;9;l922.
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4.5 Political Propaganda: Meetings, Canvassing and Marches
(i) Labour
Lacking the resources to spread its message through conventional
channels, Labour was forced to rely on cheaper and more direct means of
reaching its public. One of the most important of these was the street-
corner meeting. At any spot where an audience might be found, Labour
activists would set up their improvised platforms to claim the attention of
the passing public using the only means at their disposal, their voices and
rhetorical ability. At first they would be talking into thin air but
gradually a knot of interested or curious listeners would congregate - some
staying, others drifting away - until by the end of the meeting perhaps
thirty or forty people were listening to the arguments being put forward and
receiving the literature being distributed by the other Labour supporters
present. Even the meetings in the quieter back-streets and courts could
reach sizeable audiences as those indoors or relaxing on the doorsteps paused
to listen to this diversion from their usual evening routine.' These open-
air meetings, concentrated in the sunmer months and during the November
municipal election campaign, in which everyone could participate and the
venues were free, were the ideal propaganda vehicle for the poverty-stricken
but idealistic local Labour Parties.
They were supplemented at a more. formal level by the less frequent
meetings arranged to give a hearing to the local Labour councillors and
candidates. These were usually held in local school halls and during
election times as many as three meetings a night would be addressed in
different parts of the ward or constituency.
Finally, there were the large, set-piece public meetings organised
when the local Labour Party had been able to secure the presence of one of
1. Interviews with Ted Smallbone, Lily Moody and Ray Jones.
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one of the great names of the Labour movement. Jim Simiins, later to be a
Labour M.P. and propagandist himself, recalled the impact that these occasion5
had on him and others in the days of his youth:'
the young socialists... .were unashamed hero-worshippers; names meant
something to us and a meeting to be addressed by one of our working-
class heroes was an event we looked forward to for weeks before it
took place.
A meeting addressed by Ramsay MacDcnald in the Smithfield Market in Birminghan
in 1924 was attended by 35,000 people. The almost spiritual impact of an
assembly of such size and enthusiasm on the Labour activists present can be
imagined, and Will Chamberlain, editor of the Town Crier, came close to
articulating such an emotion when he described the 'lumpy" feeling in the
throat and an absurd inclination to laugh and cry at the same time' that he
experienced as MacDonald was roared onto the platform. 2
 These meetings
accomplished more than the mere dissemination of political propaganda. To
the Labour activists in attendance, they were occasions of justification and
rededication, times when their humble and prosaic work in the Labour Party
was once more related to the great tasks and ideals of the Movement as a
whole. To the general public who went along, they were entertainment, an
opportunity to see a celebrity in the flesh, to enjoy some good heckling and
participate in an atmosphere and an event far removed from their workaday
lives.
As to publicity, Labour, unable to afford the more expensive posters
and leaflets, relied heavily on 'chalking'. Late at night, being careful to
avoid the attentions of any passing policemen, local activists would set
off around their neighbourhood to write the details of forthcoming meetings,
the latest political slogans and such like on the pavement in chalk.3
Such was the importance of this form of advertising to the Labour movement
that when the Birmingham Watch Comiiittee threatened a by-law prohibiting
1. J. SinTmons, Soap Box Evangelist (Chichester, 1972), pp. 13-14.
2. T.C., 24;lO;1924.
3. Interview with Ray Jones.
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chalking, the Borough Labour Party wrote to the Home Secretary in protest.1
However, even as the 1920s progressed.1 the political meeting was in
decline. The outdoor meetings, in particular, were losing their impact on
an electorate which was increasingly educated and phisticated; and the
widening availability of other forms of entertainment (for this was a major
part of the meetings' attractiveness to the uncommitted) such as the cinema
and wireless, even Sunday opening of the parks, reduced the audiences they
2
reached.	 A second and related factor in their decline was the growing
realisation amongst Labour workers that the meetings were failing to get at
large sections of the electorate. As early as 1923, a Sheffield activist
had concluded that 'street-corner propaganda has served its day and generation.
We do not get into contact with the people who matter with either open-air
or indoor meetings'.3
In Birmingham, where the odds against Labour were far stronger, the
question of tactics aroused particular concern. An inquest into the 1922
parliamentary election campaign recorded that Labour had failed deplorably
in all the more systematic forms of electoral work. Canvassing, knocking-up
of known supporters on the day, even the basic task of compiling lists of
sympathisers were almost entirely neglected. The report concluded that:4
There was no lack of willing workers, but there was a great lack of
coordination and instruction of workers as to their respective duties
during the campaign...
It is unfortunately too true that in the past Labour has relied too
much on what may be termed mass (or mob) action at election tunes,
and has not seriously tackled the question of effective organisation.
One direct result of this criticism was Allen Young's appointment as Political
Organiser and there is more general evidence that the Birmingham Labour
movement made serious efforts in the later 1920s to make its methods of
propaganda more electorally effective. Here, King's Norton, a division with
a relatively affluent and educated working class and its own agent, was in
1. BBLP minutes, 26;l;l931.
2. Interview with Lily Moody; T.C., 28;2;1930.
3. S.F., August, 1923.
4. BBLP minutes, Report of Organisation Subccnniittee, 1923.
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the van.' Many of the other Divisional Parties, beset by problems of
finance and small irrnberships, lacked either the means or the ability to
introduce any of the more 'scientific. 1 forms of electoral organisation
espoused by Head Office and its local protdgds.
There was, however, a definite shift towards more direct and personal
means of contacting the electorate. By personal visits, face-to-face
discussion and practical representative work, Labour councillors and workers
were gradually able to establish an accepted presence in the wards which did
much to dispel the Mail's caricature of the untrustworthy and disreputable
'Bolshie'. In the 1929 election, such work was redoubled; few areas were
able to organise a complete and systematic canvass but doorstep work during
the campaign and the whipping-up of supporters on the day were the key-notes
of Labour's strategy.2
There is no evidence that the nature of Labour propaganda in Sheffield
differed in any significant way from that in Birmingham. Only in two
divisions were records and resources such as to enable the systematic
canvassing of the local electorate: Hillsborough was one; the other, Park,
was similar both in that it catered for a relatively well-off working-class
population and in its possession (in the person of E.G. Rowlinson) of an
able and resourceful agent. In Central Division, the sarri circumstances
militated against the more sophisticated forms of propaganda work as prevailed
in the central wards of Birmingham. In Brightside and Attercliffe, however,
the problems were rather those of success than failure. By the late l920s,
Brightside had become an apparently safe Labour seat and when, in 1930, the
local Party was called upon to fight a parliamentary by-election, it was
found ill-prepared for the task G.R. Shepherd (Labour's chief national
agent) discovered
The Labour Party organisation in the Division consisted of a
1. Labour Organiser, April, 1926.
2. BUA minutes, l4;6;1929.
3. National Labour Party minutes, NEC, 26;2;l930.
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comparatively small number of individual members and it had not been
taught the essentials of electoral organisation and procedure.
Labour won the by-election despite these misgivings so perhaps this apparent
organisational weakness in a staunch Labour constituency was not so
surprising.	 Generally, as the particular case of Brightside makes plain,
there were far fewer agonisings on questions of organisatiori and propaganda
in Sheffield than in Birmingham. Labour's early electoral successes and the
inadequacies of its opponents ensured that such topics assud a far less
urgent importance than they did in the hard-pressed Birmingham Labour movement.
(ii) Anti-Labour
The financial strength, organisational spread and propaganda output
of the Unionist movement of Birmingham stood unrivalled and, at times, taken
in conjunction with a blatantly partisan press, they must have seemed to
present almost insuperable obstacles to Labour's advance. It was simply, in
the words of the New Leader, the 'most efficient Tory machine in the country'
Labour's efforts in most areas of propaganda activity were matched and
surpassed. Labour was even worsted in the field of outdoor meetings which
were traditionally the prerogative of the indigent parties of the Left; in
the sunmer of 1927, it was reported that the Unionists had arranged an average
of 53 open-air meetings per week. 2 Furthermore, the sheer number of Unionist
subscribers in the city and the organisational skills available to every
division through its local agent and the central party machinery meant that
most areas were reached by the numerous social-cum-political entertainments
discussed earlier and that nearly all were thoroughly canvassed. At
election times in particular, the Unionists had the additional advantage
that they could call upon a generous supply of motor cars, loaned by wealthy
supporters, by which to transport sympathisers to the polls and even, it wai
claimed, attract the votes of wavering electors. The perceived scale of
1. New Leader, l4;9;1928.
2. BUA minutes, 16;ll;1928.
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electoral advantage achieved by the Unionists through these means and the
allegedly corrupt use to which they were put led Labour supporters in the
early l920s to call for a ban on thd use of cars at election times; sane
went further in demanding the prohbition of all forms of canvassing.'
Such pleas were heard less often in the latter part of the decade
principally, no doubt, because Labour was making progress despite the
electoral disadvantages it suffered. But as the Labour threat to their
Birmingham power-base became daily more tangible, the efforts of the local
Unionists to counteract Labour propaganda became even stronger. During the
late l920s, Unionist propaganda reached almost fever pitch; in 1928 and
1929, there were, at peak, at least 50 meetings - of a variously social,
political or 'educational' character - being organised in the city under
Unionist auspices weekly. 2 The 1929 General Election saw the culmination
of this activity. There was a complete canvass in almost every division
while local efforts were supplemented by the £1400 spent by the central
association on paid distributionof propaganda bulletins, the provision of
speakers for outdoor meetings and the hiring of 'missioners' to canvass
hostile areas In the event, of course, itwas a salutary reminder of what
organisation and propaganda could not achieve, however liberally-funded and
comprehensive, that the Unionists lost six seats.
Unfortunately, there is not sufficient documentation of anti-Labour
efforts in Sheffield to allow more than a few generalisations on the
situation in that city. A similar variety of open-air and indoor meetings
was held but canvassing activity, given the more feeble organisational
presence discussed earlier, was inevitably weaker. The bulk of such electoral
work as did take place was carried out by the women members of the
Conservative Party or Citizens' Alliance though it was sometimes necessary
1. T.C., 5;l2;1919;	 l7;12;1920.
2. BUA minutes, l6;ll;l928; 8;3;l929.
3. ibid., 8;3;l929.
The
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to add to their efforts with paid help. 1	In general, local party efforts
were highly dependent on the wealth and generosity of the parlianntary
candidates and their middle-class supporters but there was little of that
close personal involvement of M.P.s and candidates which existed in
Birmingham and organisational loyalties and activism were far weaker.
Whereas in Birmingham the Labour movement viewed its opponents' political
machine with something approaching awe, in Sheffield Labour politicians
could even afford to be a little contemptuous of their challengers, going
so far in 1926 to accuse the Citizens' Alliance of a 'hopeless inability to
organise even their election fights efficiently'.2
The only important form of Labour propaganda which remains to be
covered is the march. A number of such demonstrations occurred in both
Birmingham and Sheffield during the l920s, directed variously against such
things as the allied interventionagainst Russia in 1920, the inadequacy of
unemployment relief and the 1927 Trade Disputes Act. More important than
these occasional protests, though, was the Labour movement's annual
celebration of May Day.
As Ben Pimlott has argued, demonstrations were essentially 'expressive,
rather than instrumental, declarations of faith, rather than displays of
power' .	 This was particularly the case with May Day which the chairwoman
of Birmingham's May Day Demonstration Conmittee described as:4
a great gesture, an assertion in every town, in every country, that
we are at one with our fellow workers, in suffering, in faith, in
Hope and Determination. It is our Holy Day.
These were not idle words because in Birmingham especially May Day was the
high point of Labour's annual calendar. By the late 1920s, around 20,000
people were participating in the procession each year, and in 1926, just
1. Sheffield Conservative Women's Advisory Conmittee minutes,
Park Division Women's Unionist Council minutes, 7;4;l932.
2. S.F., December, 1926.
3. B. Pimlott, 'The Labour Left' in C. Cook, I. Taylor (eds),
Party. An Introduction to its Flistory, Structure and Pc
p. 182.
4.. T.C., 24;4;1925.
9;5;1932;
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days before the industrial crisis erupted into the General Strike, 30,000
people took to the streets in what was clearly a powerful and emotional
expression of their support for the miners.' 8 bands and 18 tableaux,
arranged by various working-class groups under such evocative titles as
'1-lope', 'Awakening' and 'The Power of the Vote', took part in the 1926 parade.2
In Sheffield, the local Labour movement's celebration of May Day
peaked in the early l920s when some 5000 marchers were taking part each year.
By 1930, only around 500 people were attending the demonstration and there
was serious consideration given to cancelling the procession altogether
owing to lack of support.3
It seems surprising at first glance that the strong Sheffield Labour
movement should have been up-staged by its far weaker Birmingham counterpart
but it was probably precisely because the Birmingham movement was numerically
small and electorally unsuccessful that its activists took the opportunity
provided by May Day to reaffirm their socialist caiiiiitment and express
their mutual solidarity. The sense of power and purpose given by the May
Day demonstration was far more important to the embattled minority of Labour
supporters in Birmingham than it was to the Labour Party in Sheffield which,
through its electoral victories, had come to be more concerned with problems
of policy than political ritual.
1. B.M., 3;5;1926.
2. Birmingham Trades Council and Labour Party Lmonstration Comittee,
Souvenir Programie of May Day Demonstration s
 May, 2, 1926 (Birmingham,
1926).
3. S.D.I., 5;5;l930; SFTLC minutes, LP EC, ll;2;l930.
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4.6 Conclusion
Organisation and propaganda are best considered as essentially second-
order phenomena, which is to say that they did not, except in rare cases,
determine popular beliefs but that they did, in many cases, reinforce and
mobilise them. Their main purpose was, of course, to secure votes and win
elections for electoral success and the conquest of political power were the
goals by which the orthodox political parties directed and justified their
existence.
Judged at the technical level, the Unionist machine in Birmingham was
highly successful in precisely these terms. The Unionist bias of the local
media and the impressive range and scale of Unionist propaganda powerfully
reinforced local sympathies, whilst excellent electoral organisation ensured
that support for Unionism was given practical effect where it counted most,
in the polling booths. In fact, the sheer magnitude of Unionism's
organisational presence was a form of propaganda in itself insofar as it
strengthened popular images of the political alternatives available.
Unionism had come to appear the 'natural' party of government in Birmingham
and both the form and content of its local organisation consolidated its
ascendancy.
It was the misfortune of the Labour movement in Birmingham that its
weak trades union base and inadequate resources left it particularly ill-
equipped to counter an opponent of Unionism's stature. The factors of
electoral failure and organisational weakness became mutually reinforcing
and together they served for many years to undermine Labour's political
credibility and standing in the Midlands city. On the other hand, Labour's
partly forced reliance on personal contact and direct persuasion was well
attuned to certain mores of the working-class life-style, and by the later
1920s the Party had won a role in the local comunity that more formal
methods of propaganda could not have achieved. At the same time, Labour's
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position in national politics was being consolidated and en]arged. The
Birmingham Labour movement was gradually able to reach out fran die ghetto
of its party faithful to a wider mass electorate and many, even in Birmingham,
were persuaded that the Party was a genuine and trustworLhy contender for
power.
The anti-Labour opposition in Sheffield was a far less worLhy opponent
to a Labour Party which was, in any case, far better placed to secure electora.
victory. At the municipal level, the establishment of the Citizens' Alliance
was in itself an admission of failure which becarr a self-fulfilling propheej.
As a marriage of convenience between two previously opposed parties, it
could never generate the popular support amongst political activists of the
Right to transform its organisational structure into an effective campaigning
force. In Birmingham, anti-Labour propaganda was strong because the Unionist
Party could point to a genuine local presence and record of achievement; in
Sheffield, it sounded weak and hollow because it lacked canainity resonance
and response. The apparent opportunism of the municipal anti-Labour coalition
also discredited the two middle-class parties when they stood sepaateiy in
parliarrntary elections.
In strictly organisational terms, the Sheffield Labour moveffr€nt was
little, if any, better placed than its Birmingham counterpart but, because
of the many other circumstances favouring Labour's progress, technical rans
of hastening its electoral advance were not so important. In Bthgha,
where countervailing structures of Labour affiliation were particularly
needed in order to offset the rrany local currents uph.lding the Unionist
hegemony, they were lacking. As the Borough Labour Party was honest enough
to admit, the local Labour movement had 'grown, generally speaking, not as a
result of its organisation, but in spite of j 1	In the next section, we
examine some of the events and issues of the postwar period which made thi
possible.
1. BBLP minutes, Memorandum on Organisatlonal Proposals suLitted to the
OrganiLsing Comittee, 1930.
Chapter 5
THE I1'[PACT OF NATIONAL POLITICS
5.1 Introduction
In the preceding three sections, we have mapped out a basic terrain
of working-class life as it was experienced and assimilated at a local level,
examining in particular the ways in which the different forms of work and
working-class conuunity interacted with the more directly political
influences of organisation and propaganda to create the environment in which
ideological loyalties and affiliations were formed. But the working class
was part of a national culture and an international economy and, while our
analysis is concerned to emphasise the continuing importance of local
influences on working-class politics, it is also necessary to assess the
impact of national trends and issues. In this section, we analyse the role
of some of the major economic and political developnents of the l920s in
determining the shape of working-class politics in Birmingham and Sheffield.
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5.2 1918-1922: Years of Disillusionment
The General Election held on Lcember, 14, 1913 was the first fought
in Britain on a genuinely democratic franchise. The 1918 Representation of
the People Act swept away previous disqualifications and inaugurated virtual
manhood suffrage for those aged 21 and over. (Discrimination against women,
who were not granted the vote if aged under 30 unless property holders in
their own right, continued.) The rate of adult male enfranchisement leapt
dramatically - in Birmingham, from a pre-war average of 62 per cent to a
rate of 99 per cent in 1921; in Sheffield from an average of 58.5 per cent
1to 99.3 per cent.
The inuediate political consequences of the reform were not of a
comparable impact, however, owing to the peculiar nature of the 1918 contest.
A large part of the franchise extension went to men currently serving in the
anid forces who, for various political and administrative reasons, abstained
or were unable to vote. At home, the old register and the high rate of
removals contributed to an exceptionally low turn-out - in Birmingham, only
48.3 per cent of the qualified electorate voted; in Sheffield, just 47.8
per cent.
Perhaps more important in determining the results then these technical
considerations was the political nature of the contest, which was held just
four weeks after the conclusion of the Armistice with the intention of
cashing in on the short-term popularity of the outgoing Coalition Government.
The election was staged as a vote of confidence in the administration which
had won the War; Conservatives and Liberals sunk their party differences
and united behind the leadership of Lloyd George who now, bathed in the light
of victory, appeared as the man whose personal abilities and temperament had
done most to bring success. Politicians of all parties scrambled to place
themselves behind the banner of the Coalition and there was a pervasive
1. H.G.G. Matthew et al., 'The Franchise Factor in the Rise of the Labour
Party',	 glish Historical Review, XCI, (October, 1976), p. 728, p. 732.
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feeling in the country at large that the nation which had ccrr together
through the troubles of war should now stand together to face the problems
of peace. In Sheffield, the Lib-Lab trades union leader, Thomas Casey, ran
as a Coalition candidate in Attercliffe, while in Birmingham, Eldred Hallas,
now of the British Workers' League, formerly an ardent socialist and ILPer,
was the duly endorsed Coalition candidate for Duddeston. Hallas' manifesto
perhaps sums up the mood of the election better than most:'
Down with Pacifism. Down with Party Politics. Up with the Coalition.
Peace would have handed us over to the Germans.
Party politics will hand us over to Chaos, Unemployment and Poverty.
The COALITION has saved us from Germany and the Coalition CAN and
WILL save us from unspeakable distress in the Peace and Reconstruction
Period.
The Coalition, then, combined several different appeals in its overall call
to the electorate. It played on popular feelings of gratitude and relief at
the ending of the War, and it mobilised a general sentiment of goodwill
behind the message that things could never be the same again. There was
briefly amongst all classes a genuine idealism and a belief that the current
moment offered the nation a real opportunity to progress and reform. It
was widely recognised, in particular, that the workers, whose lives and
labour had done most to win the War, were entitled to better and fairer
treatment. Neville Chamberlain, for example, advocated a number of radical
reforms in his election address, including shorter working hours, a mininiurn
wage and a comprehensive state-funded house-building prograrrre. 2 In the
same spirit, the Sheffield industrialist, Sir Robert Hadfield, urged that:3
The main thing for masters to recognise and act upon is that human
labour is not a marketable conux1ity like a bale of cotton or a ton
of pig iron. . . but rather that the worker is a sentient being with
desires that should be recognised, not ignored, with aspirations
which should be fostered not crushed.
Another, less savoury, aspect to the Coalition's appeal was the desire for
revenge. It was argued that Germany should make full reparations for the
1. Birmingham Parliamentary Election Literature, BCL; Duddeston, 1918.
2. Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC5/12/9; 1918 election address, Ladywood.
3. Sheffield Year Book, 1919, p. 39.
-184-
costs of the War, for which she was to be held solely responsible, and it
was suggested that the Kaiser be tried and punished for his own culpability
in the conflict. Sir Herbert Austin, who was standing as the Coalition
candidate in King's Norton was typical in his use of the slogan, 'Vote for
Austin and help Lloyd George Strafe the Brutal Hun'. 1 Given the suffering
and hardships of the previous five years, it would be surprising if such
sentiments did not hold some popular resonance.
Labour, by its decision to leave the Coalition and fight the election
independently, stood aloof from all this and, although scine of its leaders
had given whole-hearted support to the War and others had been in radical
opposition, it made little difference to the results. The kudos of victory
went to Labour's opponents while Labour, popularly identified with a grudging
and critical attitude to the War's conduct, if not outright pacifism, was
for the tiii being thoroughly discredited. George Shann, a serving soldier
and Labour's candidate in King's Norton, and W.C. Anderson, the leading ILP
.P. and pacifist, standing in Attercliffe, were both convincingly defeated
in the Coalition landslide.
But thecampaign was not fought, contrary to widespread myth, in an
atmosphere of jingoism and vengeful hysteria. 	 It took place in a rather
sober and quiet mood and aroused little excitement. 2
 According to Austen
Chamberlain, everywhere there was 'want of workers, absence of organisation
and great apathy'. 3
 Labour lost the election primarily because it had
distanced itself from the national consensus and, given the popularity and
united political strength of its opponents, it lacked credibility as an
alternative government. On the other hand, Labour stood far more candidates
and won far more votes than ever before, and, owing to the peculiarly
unbalanced nature of the new House of Corrnons, it becan the official
1. Birmingham Parliarwntary Election Literature, BCL; King's Norton, 1918.
2. S.D.I., l6;12;1918. See also, C.L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars,
l918-l9Q (1968), p. 5.
3. Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC5/l/1l3; Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 8;12;19l8
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Opposition for the first time. On these grounds, 1918 can be accounted a
crucial moment in the Party's national rise to power though at the time the
electoral rebuff must have seemed crushing.
The idealism briefly kindled by the allied war victory was rapidly
dissipated and forgotten in the years that followed as the realities of
Capital and Labour asserted themselves once more. The employers hoped that,
now the War was over, the workers would be willing to accept more 'realistic',
which is to say less generous, agreements on wages and conditions - a
prerequisite, they believed, in the fight to safeguard Britain's premier
position in an increasingly competitive international trading environment.
In this, they were supported by the 'hard-faced men' who made up the Coalition
majority who were themselves often businessmen and industrialists. As for
the workers, they were determined to entrench and extend the gains made at
a time when their labour was in unique demand. Economic 'realities' which
meant lower wages and degraded conditions were treated with hostility and
suspicion, all the more so when mouthed by politicians and businessmen who
seemed to be doing rather nicely out of the present set-up.
It was reckoned that 34,969,000 working days were lost as a result of
industrial action in 1919. Over 2km. people struck work. 1 If we add to
the account those workers in dispute who were not forced into strike action
and those indirectly implicated in the grievances of others, there were
clearly few groups of workers without some personal experience of the
industrial unrest of this period. As employers and the State tried to
rescind earlier concessions, they were met by a massive resistance which
sought not only to defend these gains but, under the favourable conditions
of full employment and heavy demand still obtaining, to enlarge them. The
late surrmer saw industrial relations at their most fraught. There were
1. Statistical Abstract for the United Kipgdom for each of the fifteen years,
1913 and 1918-1931, Qid. 4233, (1933), p. 113.
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national strikes of railwaymen, moulders, bakers and furniture workers. In
Sheffield, these were complemented by local disputes involving the tramwaymen,
the Yorkshire miners, Cooperative employees and taxi-drivers; even the
funeral attendants withdrew their labour though with less impact on the
iriuiediate consumer.'	 In Birmingham, there were strikes by the Dunlops
rubber workers and 1000 or so of the local jewellery workforce. 2 And
although in the evcnt only 112 officers actually ceased work, Birmingham did
rank as one of the chief centres of the national strike called by the
National Union of Police and Prison Officers.3
A second front, so to speak, of the working-class offensive was
opened in the municipal elections of November, 1919 in which Labour made
sweeping gains throughout the country. In both Birmingham and Sheffield,
Labour outpolled its chief rivals, gaining in the process nine seats and
seven seats respectively. The way in which the contemporary wave of strikes
could directly influence the results was well illustrated in Neepsend where
the Labour candidate, Frank Edwards (himself a moulder currently on strike),
made much of national and local government involvement in the recent
railway strike. 4 Edwards' candidature, politically and financially backed
by the local Cooperative Party, must also have been unusually sympathetically
received by the ward's railway-working corrmunity as a result of the £650
loan made by the local Brightside and Carbrook Cooperative Society to the
railwaymen during their dispute.5
The links between the political, industrial and consumerist interests
of the working class were rarely so explicit but there is no doubt that the
municipal elections were widely viewed as an opportunity to voice a wider
working-class resentment against the employers and the administrations which,
1. S.D.I., passim; S.D.T., 9;8;1919.
2. Ministry of Labour Gazette, August, October, 1919.
3. R. Shackleton, 'The 1919 Police Strike in Birmingham' in A. Wright,
R. Shackleton (eds), Worlds of Labour: Essays in Birmingham Labour
History (Birmingham, 1983), p. 72.
4. S.D.I., 3;ll;19l9.
5. ASLEF no. 1 minutes, 19;lO;1919.
both at a national and local level, seemed to be ruling in the employers'
interests. The Government's betrayal of apparent promises to nationalise
the mines and its attempts to cut wages on the railways seemed indicative
of a general bias against working-class aspirations and helped spread a
powerful disillusionment with the Coalition amongst its erstwhile working-
class sympathisers. The resignation of Eldred Flallas from the National
Democratic Party and his decision to take the Labour whip were examples of
a wider process by which working-class support was going over to Labour.'
The Labour Party, free of the Coalition taint, secure in its trades union
affiliations, now began to appear the more trustworthy means of defending
working-class interests.
The first half of 1920 continued with a similar pattern of industrial
and political militancy. In Sheffield, there were strikes in the cutlery
and tool, iron and steel, and building trades; in Birmingham, car workers,
brassworkers and gunmakers struck work. 2 Political militancy reached its
height in August when national protests, coordinated by the Labour Party,
against the Coalition's aid to the anti-Soviet forces in Poland, seem to
have been at least partly influential in persuading the Government to change
tack. But as economic conditions slumped, the latter part of the year
marked the beginning of a period of working-class retreat. As unemployment
rose and profits fell, the employers' counter-attack was resumed with a
vengeance and whereas most earlier industrial action had been waged in order
to wrest improvements in rates and conditions, it now became primarily
defensive.
One exception to this was the national miners' strike in October,
called in furtherance of a claim for a wages increase. Amongst the
Yorkshire miners, whose resources were already severely strained by earlier
1. Monthly Journal of the Amalgamated Society of Gas, Municipal and General
Workers, October, 1919.
2. Ministry of Labour Gazette, 1920.
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actions, it was an unpopular strike motivated partly, they believed, by
political considerations.' Amongst the wider working class, there was
even less sympathy for the miners' strike which, by the severe industrial
disruption it brought in its wake, added to the many hardships already being
suffered by workers in the grips of economic depression. The miners'
action could easily be seen as selfish and destructive and was readily
portrayed as such by Labour's enemies. This time, the annual municipal
elections saw the Labour vote fall and the Party lose seats (four in
Birmingham, one in Sheffield). The miners' strike was certainly one factor
in this rebuff. 2 Another, more diffuse but probably equally potent, was a
general sense in which the reverses suffered since mid-1920 had shattered
the self-confidence of the working class and temporarily put an end to
hopes of industrial or political advancement. The retreat from Labour
politics was just one facet of the air of disillusionment and defeat which
hung over the working class at this time.
Conversely, the even greater attack on working-class conditions in
1921 had the effect of reviving Labour's fortunes. The political impact of
the massive unemployment of this year has already been examined and should
bear the brunt of any explanation of Labour's electoral successes. However,
it was far from inevitable that the Opposition should benefit from the
economic crisis; for this to happen, it was necessary that political blame
for the crisis be attached to those in power.
That such blame was ascribed to the Coalition Government was well
illustrated by the very different popular impact of the national coal strike
of this year. On this occasion, the miners' strike was essentially defensive
in nature, sparked by the ending of Government control and subsidies on April,
1st. and the simultaneous introduction by the coal owners of new reduced
1. R.G. Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners, 1881-1926: A Study in Labour and
Social History', Ph. D. thesis, University of Laeds, 1974, pp. 575-76,
p. 583.
2. BBLP minutes, 8;ll;1920.
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rates. The miners resisted for 0 days and were then forced back on terms
which, by their inclusion of wage cuts and the principle of district
settlements, represented a crushing defeat. This time, there was no doubt
among working people that the miners were more to be pitied than blamed.
They were readily identifiable as the cainon victims of a Government and an
employing class acting in apparent concert to impoverish working-class
conditions. The Sheffield Trades and Labour Council put the issue in
unusually forthright and ideological terms but it was undeniably voicing a
widespread sentiment: 1
The lockout of the miners was.. .the first round in the fight which
Capitalism was corrmencing in order to crush and starve the workers
below the 1914 level. .We never wavered from the opinion that the
miners were fighting a battle which would affect the wages and
conditions of every worker in the country.
Events in the remaining part of the year seemed to confirm the truth of this
analysis. There was barely a single group of workers who did not suffer
some degradation of rates and working practice. In the month of November
alone, wage cuts were announced affecting seventeen occupational groups in
Birmingham and nine in Sheffield; not one of the major employing sectors
was without some experience of reductions.2
Strikes remained one means of working-class resistance but they were
costly and arduous to wage and, during a time of recession, rarely effective.
Another means, unproblematically available and apparently increasingly
necessary, was the ballot box. Six Labour gains in both Birmingham and
Sheffield in the November municipal elections were an eloquent testimony to
a range and depth of working-class anger, prevented expression in other
forms, finding outlet in support of the one major party not implicated in
the betrayal of wartime promises and hopes.
1922 saw the culmination of the post-war process by which victory was
turned into defeat for a large section of the British population. Politically,
1. SFTLC, Annual Report, 1922, p. 8.
2. Ministrl of Labour Gazette, December, 1921.
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the Government continued to alienate working-class support by its ruthless
pursuit of economy, manifested particularly in the spending cuts made by the
'Geddes axe' in health and education.- Industrially, the year was marked by
further unemployment and dispute, most notably in the engineering lock-out
which cauwnced on March, 11, and finally ended in the division and defeat
of the industry's workers on June, 14. The defeat of the engineers was
given particular resonance by the fact that the dispute had revolved around
a point of principle - the right of the working man to have some control
over his own working conditions - rather than mere wages and hours. The
victory of the engineering employers sounded the death knell of any
lingering ideals of co-partnership and industrial cooperation and reasserted
the reality of the class divide in British industry.
In the meantime, important events were taking place in the political
arena with the Conservatives' decision to withdraw from the Coalition taken
at the famous Carlton Club meeting on October, 15. In practice, however,
the move had no marked effect in either Birmingham or Sheffield. In
Birmingham, the power and electoral successes of Unionism had long reduced
the role of independent Liberalism to insignificant proportions. In
Sheffield, whose Liberal traditions were stronger and more recent,
Liberalism's eclipse was a more contemporary phenomenon. In 1918, four of
the victorious Coalition candidates in the city had been Liberals. In 1922,
all four stood as National Liberals (that is, as supporters of Lloyd George
and the Coalition) with no opposition from the local Conservatives. Indeed,
in Brightside the candidature of Tudor Walters was fully endorsed and
practically supported by the divisional Conservative Association.'
Superficially seeming to represent some degree of political success for the
Liberals, these arrangements in fact illustrated the extent to which
Liberalism and Conservatism had become synonymous in Sheffield. At the
municipal level, the anti-Labour coalition which had ruled the city since
1. Brightside Conservative Association minutes, 4;1l;l922.
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1919 had virtually assured the identity of the two old parties in most eyes.
To many in the working class, the Liberal Party had cctr to seem at best
irrelevant, at worst antagonistic, to the pursuit of working-class interests.
Unable to hold on to its working-class constituency, Liberalism in Sheffield,
had sought to maintain its electoral support in alliance with Conservatism -
a strategy which alienated yet further the Party's lingering support among
the working classes whilst rendering ineffectual any political opposition
that Liberalism could mobilise against its old enemy.
The Labour Party, on the other hand, whatever the real or imagined
inadequacies of its class analysis, was undeniably a working-class party
which put working-class interests in the forefront of its propaganda. In
the peculiar circumstances of the post-war era, when both the old parties
almost appeared to be in a conspiracy to debase working-class conditions,
this in itself was a significant point in its favour. Labour stood free of
the morass of Coalition politics and aligned itself radically with those
who felt betrayed or victimised by the Government of Lloyd George and the
rule of the middle-class parties.
In the municipal elections of 1922, Labour outpolled the Sheffield
Citizens' Association for the first time since 1919. In the General
Election held two weeks later, Labour gained Attercliffe, Brightside and
Hilisborough, defeating in each case a National Liberal. In Park, the sitting
Liberal retained his seat by less than 1000 votes. In Birmingham, the Labour
Party had a considerable way to go before it could claim a comparable
mandate but the municipal election results - in which the Party came within
951 votes of the Unionist total - and the parliamentary results - in which
Labour almost doubled its vote from the 1918 figure - must have given the
Party's supporters some grounds for hope.
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5.3 1923-1925: The First Labour Government
The Conservative administratio which took office in October, 1922
succeeded to a situn Lion where economic conditions were stabilising, where
the industrial workforce was quiescent and where, at last, things seemed to
be returning to some kind of normality. Conservative poliLicians breathed
a sigh of relief arid avoided for the most part any political adventures.
It was Neville Chamberlain, who had become Minister of Health in
March, 1923 who provided at least a partial exception to this observation
however. Chamberlain's Rent Restrictions Act maintained rent control but
also gave landlords increased opportunities to raise rents and evict tenants.
It was not quite, as Labour propagandists claimed, a 'Landlords' Charter'
but it did undoubtedly diminish the protection previously enjoyed by working-
class tenants in privately-rented acconinodation. Chamberlain's 1923
Housing Act had the laudable aim of stimulating house-building which had
been at a virtual halt since the Coalition Government's axing of the Addison
scheme. But it did so in a way which, by its preferential treatment of
private house-builders and its encouragement of local authority provision
of smaller, 'non-parlour' homes, seemed to discriminate against the working
1
class.
Both Acts were to lose the Conservatives some popular support and
Chamberlain himself rapidly realised the extent to which his Rent Act had
become a political liability. He sought vainly to offset some of its
adverse impact on his working-class constituents by privately subsidising
a local solicitor to represent them in cases brought under the Act in
Birmingham but the measure was, as we shall see, one that continued to
bedevil the Unionist cause in the city for several years to come.2
In October, 1923, Stanley Baldwin, who had taken over the premiership
on the resignation of Bonar Law in May, announced his support for the
1. A.J.P. Taylor,	 lis	 orl9i4-1945 (1965), p. 206.
2. Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC5/i0/16; Chamberlain to A.F. Lovett,
8;3;1924.
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protection of the home market. This necessitated the calling of a new
election for Bonar Law had earlier given an undertaking not to introduce
any measures of tariff reform without a clear popular mandate. In the
General Election held on December, 6, the Conservatives sought such a mandate
while Labour and Liberals opposed them in a rigid adherence to the principles
of Free Trade. This was the chance that the Unionists of Birmingham,
following in the footsteps of Joseph Chamberlain and coninitted as a man to
tariff reform, had been waiting for. They fought wholeheartedly on the
issue, waging their campaign around such deceptively attractive slogans as:'
Be British! Liberals and Labour-Socialists propose to employ
foreigners and tax you!
Conservatives and Unionists propose to employ you and tax the
foreigner!
Such sentiments clearly had some appeal to parts of the Birmingham working
class, particularly those in the depressed traditional trades hardest hit
by foreign competition. A parallel situation existed in Sheffield where
the Conservative candidates in Park and Central Divisions made much of the
utility of the tariff against unfair German competition in the cutlery
trade. The Labour reply was confused for, while attacking the Protection-
Free Trade argument as essentially diversionary and irrelevant, they
nevertheless made the defence of Free Trade the chief plank of their platform.
4ore particularly, they hairnred home the message that Protection would mean
dearer food.2
In the event, Labour's vote as a proportion of the poll was virtually
static in Birmingham whilst that of the Unionists roseby three per cent.
Labour had held its own but there was no doubt that Protection was a cause
that continued to exercise the mind of the Birmingham working class. 3
 The
propaganda of Joseph Chamberlain and his sons and followers and the impact
of the depression in the city's old staple trades ensured that the issue
1. Birmingham Parliamentary Election Literature, BCL; King's Norton, 1923.
2. J. Barnes, D. Nicholson (eds), The Leo Amery Diaries; vol. 1, 1896-1929
(1980), p. 356.
3. T.C., 7;l2;l923.
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retained some popular resonance. In Sheffield, too, the Labour vote
declined proportionately and, though the seats gained in the previous year
remained safe, hopes that Central and Park Divisions would fall to Labour
were disappointed. The attraction of the tariff to some of the craft trades
workers was a factor in the Conservative successes; in Park, in particular,
the result, in which the sitting Liberal M.P., who had recently announced
his conversion to Asquithian, Free Trade Liberalism, was returned at the
bottom of the poll indicates that Protection was a popular cause
The General Election of 1923, which was otherwise unremarkable, did
have one significant effect - it led to the assumption of office of the
first Labour Government. Though the Conservatives remained the largest
single party, they were outnumbered in the Comions by a Free Trade majority
in which Labour had the largest share. 1nen Baldwin was defeated in a
Con'rnons vote in January, 1924, Ramsay MacDonald was asked, and agreed, to
form a Labour administration.
The actual work of the Labour Government may be passed over fairly
rapidly. It boasted few niajor achievements though the Housing Act of John
Wheatley, Snowden's Free Trade budget and MacDonald's shrewd and diplomatic
handling of foreign affairs might be accounted popular successes. Probably
more important in working-class eyes was the style of government: Labour
had ruled with dignity and responsibility and had laid to rest the old bogy
of its unfitness for office. The biggest blot on the Labour record, at
least so far as its right-wing opponents were concerned, seemed to lie in
its dealings with the Corrniunists. Recognition of the Soviet Union and,
more particularly, the agreement by which Britain made a loan to Russia in
return for guaranteed sales were portrayed as unpatriotic and servile moves
in support of a murderous and unfriendly power. The actual incident which
occasioned Labour's fall - the abandonment of the prosecution for sedition
1. The Tins, 4;12;1923.
-195-
of the editor of the Ccxrniunist	 erWeekl - was adduced as further
evidence of Labour's 'softness' on, or covert sympathy for, CouTnunism.
The wave of anti-Red propaganda which these actions had unleashed
reached its climax four days before the election with the publication of
the Zinoviev Letter, a document purporting to be from the Russian president
of Caiiintern ordering subversion in Britain. Whatever the doubts about its
authenticity, in the short term it undoubtedly provided an opportunity to
push the Red bogy. 'Bolshevik Attempt to Ruin Britain! The Russian Reds
Call for Revolution! British Foreign Office Exposes Malignant Plot!',
screamed a handbill issued by the Unionist candidate in Yardley.'
However, despite and maybe even because of these crude attempts to
discredit Labour, the Party's vote increased by about six per cent in both
Birmingham and Sheffield. The support of Labour's working-class sympathisers
had been in no way weakened by its tenure of office which, given the
Government's minority position, seemed quite worthy, and they felt little of
the anti-Red paranoia which could be used to whip up a right-wing backlash
among the middle classes. The real losers were the Liberals whose three
representatives in Birmingham received insignificant votes and who in
Sheffield had been unable to field a single candidate. Their role appeared
irrelevant to the middle classes when the real issue was perceived as being
between Corrrnunism and Constitutionalism.
Working-class voters were more down-to-earth and their increasing
distrust of Conservatism was fortified by the actual operation of several
earlier acts of Conservative legislation. Chief among these, and with
porticular political impact in Birmingham, was Chamberlain's 1923 Rent Act
which was ruthlessly exploited by Unionism's opponents, and the Labour
candidate in Ladywood especially, as evidence of the Party's callous
disregard for working-class interests. With regard to Ladywood, the
1. Birmingham Parliamentary Election Literature, BCL; Yardley, 1924.
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Unionists conceded that:'
the effect of the Rent Act in that particular Division was deadly.
There were actual instances there of people having their rent
increased, and also of losing their houses under the operation of
the Act.
Chamberlain won by just 77 votes after a dubious recount. His opponent,
Oswald Mosley, surrirned up the contest and the result in the vituperative
rhetoric that he conmanded so easily:2
A downpour of rain and hundreds of motor cars enabled the Unionist
candidate to scrape home and the lifeless body of the last of the
Chamberlains had been washed back to Westminster. The Labour
campaign of six weeks had killed a tradition of sixty years, and
the Chamberlain majority fell to vanishing point. Birmingham had
said they no longer wanted a name but something greater than a name.
Mosley's oratory was, as usual, overblown but there could be no doubts that
the citadel of Unionism was crumbling at its very centre. On the periphery,
it was already falling for, in King's Norton, Labour had won its first ever
seat in Birmingham when Robert Dennison defeated the sitting Unionist, Sir
Herbert Austin. Dennison's campaign, boosted by sane 700 active workers,
focussed on Austin's personal record - he had voted in only one in three
parliamentary divisions - and Dennison's slogan, 'Sack the Boss', must have
seemed apt to the local workers.The fact that the car industry was reviving
despite the repeal of the McKenna duties and, once more, the local workings
of Chamberlain's Rent Act were also played up to considerable effect.3
In Sheffield, where Labour already stood in a stronger position, there
was no dramatic breakthrough though in Central the Conservative majority was
reduced to just 305 and victory secured only through the solid Tory voting
of the 800 or so plural voters with business premises in the Division.4
Despite these local successes for Labour, Baldwin once more cotrinanded
an overall majority in Parliament and he set about forming a new
administration in which men from Birmingham played a prominent part.
1. BUA minutes, 26;ll;1924.
2. B.P., 3;ll;l924.
3. Man and Metal, November, 1924.
4. S.F., December, 1924.
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Neville Chamberlain was again made Min.LsLer of Health, Austen Chamberlain
became Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland was nand Minister of
Labour and L.C.M.S. Amery, Colonial Secretary.
No pressing problems seemed to threaten the stability and political
sLrength of the new Government but, as usual, trouble was brewing in the
coal industry. In June, 1925, the owners gave one month's notice of their
intention to end the current wages agreement and introduce sharply reduced
rates of remuneration. The trades union movement mobilised in opposition
and on June, 30th. the Government intervened to prevent industrial action
through its announcement of a nine months' subsidy to maintain wages and
profits and the establishment of a Royal Commission to investigate means of
making the industry more efficient and remunerative. The Labour movement
celebrated the victory apparently represented by Red Friday but, nine
months later, it was to face the same problems and a far better prepared
government.
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5.4 1926: The General Strike
The General Strike of 1926 was an event which, more than any other
in the interwar period, established the class allegiances and illustrated
the reality of the class divisions in British society. It was a conflict,
fuelled on both sides by feelings of class sentiment, which broke down the
conventional industrial-political divide which usually operated to
deradicalise popular consciousness and placed the major issues of British
politics along indisputably class-determined lines. The miners? dispute,
which caused the General Strike arid continued long after it was called off,
had an equal if not greater impact. The misgivings, widely felt and
skilfully exploited, on the alleged constitutional impropriety of the larger
action did not apply here. The miners were manifestly the underdogs and
their struggle, waged amidst great hardship and against almost impossible
odds, to protect a way of life and standard of living already considerably
degraded attracted widespread public support and sympathy.
It is not our purpose here to give more than summary accounts of
the conduct of these disputes in Birmingham and Sheffield for which full
details may be found elsewhere. 1
 Rather, we set out to explore the way
in which the disputes influenced the evolving patterns of working-class
consciousness and politics. It will be contended that 1926 was a crucial
moment in the rise of Labour; this section is concerned to suggest how and
why it came to play this role.
1. For Birmingham, see:
R.P. Hastings, 'Aspects of the General Strike in Birmingham, 1926',
Midlands History, II, 4, (1974),
?.?.	 silns,	 rr' in J. eiey (ed.), The General Strike 1
 192b
(1976).
Birmingham Public Libraries, The Nine Days in Birmingham (Birmingham, 1976)
l"or Sheffield, see:
S. Benton, 'Sheffield' in M. Morris (ed.) The General Strike
(Harmondsworth, 1976),
}iolberry Society, General Strike in Sheffield. Documnts of the Strike
with an Introduction by Bill Moore (Sheffield, 1981),
J.H. Copley, 'The General Strike in South Yorkshire', M.A. thesis,
University of Sheffield, 1972
J.A. Peck, The Miners' Strike in South Yorkshire, 1926 (Sheffield, 1970).
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The General Strike was not in fact, nor was it intended to be,
general. The strategy of the TUC depended on the withdrawal of key groups
of workers in a series of waves: transport, print, building, metal and
chemical workers were called out in the first wave on May, 3rd.; engineering,
shipbuilding and power workers were ordered to cease work on May, 12th. In
consequence, it is estimated in Birmingham that, out of a total workforce of
approximately 445,000, only 20,000 to 30,000 workers participated directly
and willingly in the Strike.' It was, nevertheless, a great success for
the local trades union movement. All those called out responded solidly and
vigorously to the call and others were eager to support the action. On May,
5, the Trade Union Iergency Comittee set up to oversee the local operation
of the dispute, could report:2
Everything in Birmingham in regard to the stoppage is proceeding
satisfactorily. The extent of the stoppage is much greater than
anybody anticipated and all road, passenger and carrying traffic,
both trams and buses, has been stopped.
Coimiercial road transport has, in practically all cases, responded
loyally to the cause. On the railways the stoppage is complete.
Traffic locally and clerical staffs have unanimously answered the
call. In the factories the difficulty is to keep people at work;
all are anxious to be out and in the fight.
We can forgive a little exaggeration born out of the buoyancy of the moment
in order to savour the mood. During its long years of struggle in extremely
adverse conditions, the Birmingham trades union movement had won few battle
honours. Of course, there had been strikes and labour unrest but generally
their scale and impact had been dissipated by the class collaborationism
which pervaded local industrial relations and politics. Most recently, the
engineering lock-out had been a humiliating demonstration of trades unionism's
impotence in this, one of Britain's major manufacturing centres. Now, in
1926, the unions were fighting a popular cause, widely supported by local
trades unionists, in which, briefly, they seemed to hold the upper hand.
1. Hastings, op. cit. (1974), p. 258.
2. Birmingham Trade Union Emergency Committee minutes, 5;5;1926.
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To this extent, therefore, the Trade Union Enrgency ComiiiLtee was
justified in describing the Strike in Birmingham as 'a magnificent
demonstration by the workers of their power and a lesson to the Government
and employing classes'.' The trades unionists of Birmingham, with some
wider working-class support, had acted together and in concert with the
national Labour movement to display solidarity with the struggle of their
fellow workers. It was class sentiment rather than a highly politicised
class consciousness which united the trades unionists of Birmingham with
the miners' cause but even as such it represented a sharp break with a
tradition of cross-class politics that was beccrning increasingly difficult
to sustain. As John Strachey explained, the strike call was initially
greeted with some trepidation in Birmingham:2
a city where Trade Union organisation was at least ten years behind
the best organised areas, in which 50 per cent of the workers have
habitually voted Conservative...LBut] as everywhere else the railwaymen,
the tramwaymen and printers, and other affected trades came out with
virtual unanimity. The engineers were discontented because they had
not been surrmoned. For the first time the Birmingham workers acted
as a class.
Sheffield was already renowned as a storm centre of industrial
militancy and it was inevitably drawn into the front line of the dispute
for, as well as containing around 9000 miners, the city also possessed a
large concentration of those industries most dependent on the coal industry
and those workers called out by the TUC in the first wave. The fact that
Sheffield's engineers were currently engaged in their own bitter wages
struggle added even greater iimdiacy and militancy to the local conduct of
the Strike. 3 In all, probably some 50,000 workers (over one fifth of the
city's workforce) struck work - a total made up most importantly of the
9000 mineworkers themselves, 8000 iron and steel workers, 7000 engineers,
5000 cutlers, 3500 railway workers, and 3000 public transport workers.4
1. BTC minutes, l8;5;1926.
2. 18;6;l926. Emphasis in original.
3. Benton, op. cit., p. 428.
4. Copley, op. cit., p. 49.
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In Sheffield too, the Strike was a massive demonstration of working people's
support for the miners' cause, aptly suimied up in its conduct and conclusion
by the closing report of the Trades arid Labour Council's Central Disputes
1Conriut tee:
The morale of the workmen concerned in the City was exceptional
throughout the entire period, our chief difficulty here being, not
to get the men out who had been instructed to cease, but to keep
those at work whom the General Council desired should for the tirr
being remain...
1W/hat has been proven to be the most magnificent display of working -
class solidarity in support of a principle was to a large degree
marred by the eagerness with which the Strike was ended, without
consideration for the miners' cause, and without adequate provision
being made for all to return.
iile the General Strike was called off by the TUG on the pretext of
concessions which proved illusory, the miners continued the fight for a
further seven months. In South Yorkshire, one of the last three areas to
return to work, it was not until November, 29th. that the coal owners and
miners were able to agree terms and so bring an end to the dispute which had
lasted 222 days. 2 Throughout this period, the , coal-dependent economy of
Sheffield was devastated by the lack of one of its basic raw materials, and
the widespread unemployment and short-time that ensued were an ample reminder
to the local working class of the coal dispute and the industrial and
political forces which were perpetuating the suffering of the miners and
their own discomforts. Birmingham was hit less severely but it too suffered
considerable economic disruption as a result of the upheavals of the coal
industry.
The miners' struggle, both in its own right and in the impact it was
having on a wider public, remained the most salient issue in popular
political consciousness for the rest of the year. The undoubted widespread
sympathy for the miners existed on two levels. Firstly, there was a ccmTnon
belief, given considerable plausibility by the public statements of many
1. SFTLC minutes, Report of the Central Disputes Committee, 1926.
2. S.D.I., 30;ll;1926.
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industrialists and middle-class politicians, that the attack on the miners
was part of a more general move to reduce workers' wages throughout
industry as a whole. It was reported in Erdingcon, for example, that there
existed:1
a feeling through most of the shops that if the miners were beaten,
it will be the thin end of the wedge for reducing wages in all
industries throughout the country.
But there was also a simple human compassion for the mineworkers and their
families in the privations which the uneven contest had imposed. Such
sentiments operated across the class spectrum but were given additional
impact in the working class in particular by the insouciance of the
Government and its apparently wilful failure to bring the dispute to a
satisfactory conclusion. Even in its inaction, the Government appeared to
be siding with the coal owners against the embattled miners, a position
which jarred with many whose political affiliations might otherwise have led
them to support the economic case by which the Government justified its role.
These were attitudes which the Labour Party could legitimately
exploit. A municipal by-election in Ladywood in June, 1926 was turned into
a virtual referendum on the Government's handling of the dispute. House-to-
house collections to relieve distress inthecoalfields were made both
for the practical aid they could render and to point the moral of the
Baldwin administration's callousness. 2 At the same tine, the Unionists of
Birmingham were forced to abandon any attempt to canvass the electorate
personally as a result of 'violent Labour opposition'. 3
 Such popular
antipathy to Conservatism wasnotunusual in the suimr of 1926. In
Erdington, the Unionists did not try to hold their usual open-air meetings:4
People are not in the frame of mind to listen to reason when they
had been forced to support their families on something under 30/-
per week and that is the condition of things in many parts of the
Division today.
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/118/3; Dallas to Steel-Maitland, 5;5;1926.
2. The Times, 9;6;1926.
3. Ladywood Ward Women's Unionist Association minutes, l4;7;1926.
4. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/1l8/3; Dallas to Steel-Maitland, 29;7;l926.
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It is noteworthy that, despite these severe industrial difficulties,
the working class in both Birmingham and Sheffield responded with
considerable generosity to the fund-raising efforts of the local Labour
movements on behalf of the miners and their dependents. In Birmingham,
trades union and Labour Party activity raised almost £5200 and over 200
children from the hardest-hit areas were given temporary homes with local
sympathisers.' Even in Sheffield, itself the victim of considerable distress,
£1692 was raised for the miners' cause by the Trades and Labour Council.2
Significantly, such practical suppport came not only from those previously
sympathetic to Labour's arguments but from some who had hitherto been
antipathetic or apolitical. The Penworkers' Federation showed its solidarity
with the miners by a £100 donation to the South Staffordshire Miners' Relief
Fund and the Bedstead Workers' Association made a grant of £500 to the MFGB.3
Whatever the emotions behind popular support for the miners, and
they were various, it was the Labour Party who stood to be their principal
political beneficiary. The Conservative Government's apparent sympathy for
the coal owners discredited it in working-class eyes and Labour stood out
as the major force arguing for a more rational and humane solution to the
problems of the mineworking coninunities. Labour also offered a political
response to the economic vicissitudes currently being experienced by working
people at a time when industrial action had been nullified as a means of
working-class resistance.
The Ladywood by-election, which had been the first real test for the
Conservative Party, resulted in the overturning of a Unionist majority of
145 to give Labour victory by a margin of 1146 votes. 4
 Three months later,
in September, 1926, the neighbouring ward of Rotton Park was the scene of a
further municipal by-election. Political excitement was still at fever pitch,
1. BTC General Strike Collection, vol. 2; 'What Birmingham Has Done for
the Miners', N.D.
2. STLC Annual Report, 1926.
3. Penworkers' Federation minutes, 3;6;1926;
BWA minutes, l8;8;l926.
4. The Times 9;6;1926.
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three to five meetings were addressed each night during the campaign, and
Labour was on the offensive. In the exhilaration of victory (another Labour
gain from Unionism), the Labour candidate, W.H. Mimer, proclaimed:'
We foughton out-and-out socialism and the workers responded. They
showed in unrnistakeable fashion their resentment at the attempts
of the boss class, backed by the Tory Government, to reduce them
to abject servitude.
This was to go too far but there is no doubt that the Conservative Government'
mishandling of the coal dispute and the acute symbolism of the miners' uneven
contest created a situation where Labour's usual attacks on the depredations
and injustices of the capitalist system had an unusually wide and deep
resonance. For once, Labour did not need to mute its critique of the
prevailing system because the system stood condemned by its own practice.
In the city-wide round of elections that took place in November, the
Birmingham Labour Party surpassed the total Unionist poll by over 11,000
votes and gained eight seats. And while the chief contestants could agree
on little else, they were in accord that the coal dispute had played a
dominant role in the campaign. There were many unemployed or on short-time
in the city and the high price of coal was hitting the poorest sections of
the cormiunity. The results proved, concluded the Unionists, that:2
these people definitely, though mistakenly, blame the Unionist
Government for this state of affairs and consider the strike could
have been settled by the Government had there been a real wish to
do so.
The Trade Council concurred insofar as it ascribed the results to the people's
'complete disgust with the Government's open support for the mine-owners'
policy of starving the miners back to work', but it clearly placed a rather
different ideological slant on its interpretation. 3
 In fact, it was the
strength of the Labour case in this situation that both industrial and
political resentments, personal concerns and class sentiments could combine
within the political and class ideology espoused by the Labour Party in its
opposition to the Conservative Government and its economic philosophy.
1. T.C., 3;9;1926.
2. BUA minutes, l7;ll;1926.
3.. BTC Annual Report, 1926-1927, p.13.
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In Sheffield, the results were even more dramatic for it was the
municipal elections of 1926 which gave Labour control of the City Council
for the first time. Labour gained an absolute niajority of votes cast and
six seats in the elections of November, 1st. and became the largest party.
It consolidated its position by the appo:intment of seven Labour aldermen and
eight Labour victories (including one additional gain) in the ensuing
by-elections. Again, though there were local issues which emphasised and
ccxnplemented the chief disagreements of the contending parties, it was agreed
that it was the mining dispute which aroused the fiercest passions - not
surprisingly given its imediate and local impact. Both Labour and Citizens'
candidates concluded that the electorate had taken the opportunity to
express its dissatisfaction with the policy of the Baldwin Government though
the Labour councillors claimed their victories were a protest against
Baldwin's biassed handling of the coal dispute while their vanquished
opponents were readier to put the blame simply on the material deprivations
being suffered by the local working class. The defeated Citizens' Alliance
candidate in St. Philip's explained the result starkly but eloquently with
the statement that 'there are people in St. Philip's not getting as much
food as they would like' .	 This was true but nor was it unknown; the
difference in this instance was that the working class had an obvious
figure to blame. They plainly felt that their suffering was not inevitable
but had direct human causes. Voting Labour seemed to offer at least a partial
hope that these causes would be removed.
1.	 S.D.I., 2;ll;1926.
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5.5 1927-1929: Baldwin's Downfall
Any hopes that Baldwin may have entertained that the Government's
treatment of the General Strike and mining dispute would be forgiven and
forgotten in the years to follow were not to be fulfilled. 	 Class
consciousness was not a one-sided phenomenon and there were many in the
Conservative Party who believed that the time was ripe to extract some
political revenge on the Labour mevement for its imprudent behaviour in 1926.
In May, 1927, the Government introduced the Trade Disputes Bill which
outlawed sympathetic strikes and strikes intended to coerce the government,
forbade civil service unions to affiliate to the TUC or Labour Party, and
laid it down that henceforth trades unionists who wished to contribute
financially to the Labour Party had to contract in.
The Bill was widely viewed as a class measure, taking advantage of
an already weakened oppositionand crudely calculated to secure political
benefit for the Conservative Party. Even among scxw Conservatives there was
a recognition that the Bill was ill-conceived; in a discussion at the
Erdington Conservative Club:1
opinions were expressed that the Bill was in some forms a Class Bill;
and that it was out to crush the Trade Unions although the employer
will be in a much stronger position, and that it was the wrong tin
to bring out such a bill.
To many in the working class, it strengthened the impression that the Baldwin
Government was ruling principally in the interests of the employers and
capitalists by its apparent intention to weaken yetfurther an already
debilitated trades unionism. The Bill antagonised working-class opinion and,
if any political advantage was created, it accrued mainly to the Labour
Party. The Chief Conciliation Officer in Birmingham described local reaction
to the proposed legislation in his report to the Ministry of Labour:2
Suggestions of legislation against the Trade Unions give politics
and politicians a larger place than usual in industrial circles
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/118/3; Beardmore to Steel-Maitland, 12;4;l92
2. LAB 10/5, PRO; Trade Union reactions to proposed Trade Union legislation.
Report of Chief Conciliation Officer, Birmingham, l3;1;1927.
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The indications are that any legislation will be held up as a
political move in the employers' interests and will be so regarded
by the bulk of Trade Union branches and members.
The opinions seem to be held fairly generally that if the Government
do amend the law relating to the trade unions.. .both the political
and industrial Labour movements will be strengthened in proportion
to the extent of the changes made.
The unions are not penitent; there is no change of heart, no
goodwill; just exhaustion.. .In /theJ mind of Lthe] average trade
unionist the Government, coalowners and employers generally are
lumped together as "they".
That this should be so in Birmingham, the city where middle-class politicians
and industrialists had been the most successful of any in the country in
converting the working class to the benefitsof political and economic class
cooperation, was of especial significance. In Sheffield, whose militant
traditions had frequently put the working class in opposition to their rulers,
such attitudes did not seem so remarkable but, even here, there is little
doubt that the Conservative Government of 1924 to 1929 had succeeded in
alienating such working-class support as the Party had hitherto possessed.
A correspondent from Brightside reported that among the local miners 'there
is a desperate feeling of hatred and the very name of Baldwin is as poison'.'
But working-class antipathy to the Prime Minister was also spread more widely:2
Electors who have been known to be strong Conservatives have left the
defence of their policy severely alone, and do not attempt to even
discuss in public as they previously did. There does seem to be a
very definite wave against Baldwin and his Party.
Throughout the period of the miners' strike and its aftermath, the
Conservatives acted with a political ineptitude and an apparent
incomprehension of working-class sentiment which did much to contribute to
their electoral downfall in 1929. Even during the 1929 General Election
campaign, they revived the mining issue with a Central Office leaflet urging
working-class voters to remember the General Strike. They did - and the
Conservatives lost votes as a result because, so far as the majority of
working people were concerned, it was the Conservative Party and Conservative
1. Ponsonby Papers, Ms Eng Hist c670; C.J. Richardson to Ponsonby, N.D.
2. ibid.
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policy which were to blame for that unfortunate ep:Lsode.1
A number of other Tory enactments in the years before 1929
individually aggravated working-class support arid contributed in total to a
widespread view of the Baldwin Government as insensitive and antagonistic
to working-class concerns. The derating of industry and agriculture in 1928
was one such. It must have seemed as if the poorer rate-payers were being
asked to subsidise the corporations and the land-owners, an appraisal which
became all the more persuasive when the reassessments which were carried out
at the same time led to extensive increases iii working-class rates demands.
'Derating was certainly not understood' and lost the Conservatives votes.2
The reductions in milk allowances for nursing mothers, the anomalies and
omissions in the Widows' Pensions and Old Age Pensions Acts and the reduction
in unemployment benefit all had the same effect. 3 The general suspicion of
the Tory administration came to be such that it was widely held culpable
for failings in which it was blameless. E.R. Canning, the chairman of the
West Birmingham Unionist Association, bemoaned the fact that:4
even the tea duty remission did us no good because our ignorant voters
put the heavy rise in bacon down to our Party and were so told by the
Labour canvassers!
In Erdington, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland had particular problems owing to his
role as Minister of Labour. A charge made by the periodical John Bull that
he had abused public funds subscribed to relieve distress in the mining
conrnunities by using them to subsidise colliery owners employing miners at
below the legal minimum wage was given wide publicity. 5
 The truth - that
the funds were being used to pay for an apprenticeship scheme for young
miners - was less reprehensible but came too late to save his seat and would
perhaps have made little difference even if it had been more extensively
known. It was an exaggeration to claim - as his wife did - that 'a Minister
1. BUA, Letters relating to West Birmingham Constituency, 1922-1937;
West Birmingham Election, Chairman's Report, [19291.
2. ibid.; The Times, 30;5;1929.
3. BUA minutes, 14;6;1929; BUA, Letters relating to West Birmingham, 1922-
1937; West Birmingham Election, Chairman's Report.
4. BUA, Letters relating to West BirminghaniConstttuency. .Chairman's Report.
5. Sirrmons Papers, vol. 2; Labour Party leaflet, Erdington election, 1929.
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of Labour always loses his seat', but it was certainly the case that Steel-
Maitland was especially vulnerable to the widespread dissatisfactions
almost inevitably caused by the working of the State system of benefits.'
By 1929, all these many and various complaints and disgruntlements
had come together in a general and pervasive feeling that the time was ripe
for change and that the Labour Party should be given the opportunity to put
some of its policies and promises into action. In his diary entry explaining
the reasons for the Conservatives' defeat, Neville Chamberlain's 'feel' for
the realities of mass politics is persuasive even though he seems to
underestimate the part played by the Conservatives in their own downfall.
Labour's victory, he ared, was due:2
to the ceasless propaganda that has been going on for years among
the working classes that things would never be right for them till
a 'Labour" Govt /jç7 came in. Every grievance has been exploited
to point this moral - people who have not got pensions, people who
have had their assessments raised, people who could not get a
municipal house, people whose wages were low or who were unemployed,
or were excluded from benefit, etc., etc. - all these were told this
is what you must expect so long as you have a capitalist Government.
And though they hardly expect the millenium they have said: well,
let us give these fellows a chance. Something is wrong, the present
Govt /jçJ haven't put it right, the other side say they would have
righted it. Let us see if they can do something for us. There is
no conversion to Socialism. It is merely the present discontents
showing themselves in a desire for change.
While Chamberlain is correct in suggesting that the 'desire for change'
manifested in the 1929 General Election was not particularly radical or
highly politicised, it was, nevertheless, in some degree 'class conscious'.
Indeed, his own bland dismissal of problems widely felt and genuinely
burdensome in working-class circles might be taken to epitomise the
insensitivity at the heart of the Conservative administration which had so
estranged the support of working people. Middle-class politicians had cane
to appear neither to truly comprehend working-class concerns, nor to wish
1. Erdington Division Women's Unionist Branch minutes, l6;7;1929.
2. Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC2/20; Diary entry, 8;6;l929.
-210-
genuinely to defend them. The Labour Party, a working-class party in a way
in which no other party could claim or aspire to be, as yet unblemished by
real power or failure in office, now seemed the most realistic and attractive
alternative available to the two tried and distrusted parties of the middle
class. Unionist politicians could lament the fact that the 1929 elections
had demonstrated more class feeling in the working-class electorate than they
had ever before experienced but they appeared powerless or unwilling to
alter the economic and political realities which had given it form and
1presence.
Labour's rise was also associated with a generational change in the
make-up of the electorate. 'The old people still supported us', claimed
Austen Chamberlain, 'but the young were sullen and resentful and voted
socialist almost solidly'. 2
 The older generation, whose politics were
shaped in an arena where Conservatives and Liberals reigned supreme, who in
Birmingham retained fond memories of the pre-war heyday of Charnberlainite
politics, was fading away to be replaced by a younger age-group whose
political socialisation occurred in the 1920s. Their political consciousness
was evolved in the political and industrial ferment of the post-war period
in which both the old parties were discredited and in which Labour stood out
as a viable and hopeful alternative. They had no traditional loyalties and
few practical incentives to vote for a Conservative Party whose chief
promise appeared to be more of the same.
Thus it was that in 1929 Labour took six of the twelve Birmingham
constituencies with 42 per cent of the total poll. Aston, Deritend,Duddeston,
Erdington, Ladywood and Yardley fell to Labour; in West Birmingham, Austen
Chamberlain held on to his father's seat by just 43 votes. The one fly in
the ointment so far as Labour was concerned was the loss of King's Norton -
a defeat ascribed to the fact that the new Unionist candidate was more
1. BUA, Letters relating to the West Birmingham Constituency, 1922-1937;
Austen Chamberlain to E.R. Canning, 20;6;l929; E.R. Canning to
Austen Chamberlain, 21;6;l929.
2. Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC5/l/475; Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 6;6;l929,
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personally appealing than had been his predecessor, Sir Herbert Austin, and
Austin's predictions that the Longbridge works would be forced to close
should a Labour Government be returnedJ
In Sheffield, Labour polled just over half the total vote and won five
of the seven local constituencies. The victories in Park and Central by
large margins meant that every working-class division was held, apparently
safely, by the Labour Party.
In the country at large, Labour was now the largest single party
though still outnumbered by Conservatives and Liberals combined. This time
there could be no doubt that Macfnald would form the new government and,
in June, 1929, Labour took office amidst many bright hopes and much popular
goodwill. To the activists of the Labour movement, the second Labour
Government promised a period of radical change and genuine progress towards
the Socialist Conimnwealth; the less comitted believed, at least, that it
could do noworse thantheConservative administrations that had gone before.
The dreams were shattered, the hopes turned sour; Labour failed and failed
ignominiously, and it was to suffer its greatest-ever electoral set-back in
1931. How did this transformation take place?
1.	 T.C., 7;6;1929.
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5.6 1929-1931: The Second Labour Government
Five months after Labour took office, the international economic
order was plunged into chaos by the collapse of American business confidence
manifested in the Wall Street Crash. The Labour Government inherited a high
but relatively stable figure of im. unemployed; within a year, this figure
had doubled, and by the smr of 1931 it seemed destined to top the 3m.
mark.
Labour had been elected on prcises to end unemployment but now its
reaction was confused and inadequate. Genuine perplexity and impotence in
the face of a problem of supra-national proportions mingled with a certain
schadenfreude in the difficulties of international capitalism and led to a
response which, while satisfying Labour ideologues, could have done little
to placate the victims of unemployment and disillusioned Labour voters.
T Why should the Labour Party be expected to shoulder the responsibility of
Capitalist unemployment?' asked Fred Montague M.P. of a rally of the
Sheffield Central Labour Party faithful who probably did not have the nerve
or inclination to reply 'because it was the elected Government of the country'
Unhindered, Montague continued:'
For the last forty years Socialists had been saying that unemployment
was inevitable, and that eventually it would mean the breaking up of
the capitalist system. Despite this, however, the Labour Government
was doing its best, although severely handicapped, to deal with the
problem. The Government was in office on a minority vote and the
best it could do was to provide scine alleviation to the problem.
To some, and to increasing numbers as the Party's failure grew more obvious,
this anodyne and complacent treatment of a massive social evil was
unsatisfactory. Within the Labour Party, the most prominent figure to urge
more radical action was Sir Oswald Mosley who, in February, 1930, submitted
a Memorandum to the Cabinet advocating planned foreign trade, greater
goverrnnt direction of the economy, and the use of credit to promote
1.	 S.D.I., l4;6;1930.
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expansion. On the rejection of his proposals, Mosley resigned his official
position to continue the campaign in the Party at large. He was unable to
overcome the conservatism and financial orthodoxy which dominated Labour and
trades union circles, however, and in February, 1931 he abandoned the Labour
Party and founded a new and separate vehicle for his ideas and ambition.
Only four other M.P.s joined the New Party, one of whom was John Strachey,
his faithful lieutenant and the Labour representative for Aston. They were
followed by an even smaller nnmber of Labour activists; Mosley had coiunitted
the cardinal sin in the Labour movement - that of disloyalty. Birmingham
Labour, with few exceptions, rejected their erstwhile hero and his breakaway
party and closed ranks behind its traditional leaders. As George Sawyer M.P.
put it, he preferred 'to trust Mac1nald and Snowden who had given life
service to the Movement rather then new and unstable men'.'
Nevertheless, even the instinctive loyalty of those in the Labour
Party was being tried to the limits by the Government's unquestioning
adherence to the tenets of orthodox finance even when they conflicted with
the interests of its working-class supporters. The 1929 Unemployment
Insurance Act, which retained the 'waiting period' and the 'not genuinely
seeking work' clause and kept the rate of adult male benefit at 17/- a week
despite earlier Labour pleas for its increase, was a case in point, and there
is no doubt that Labour's economic record and its poor treatment of the
unemployed were the major factors in the electoral reverses of 1930. In the
Brightstde parliamentary by-election in February, 1930, Labour's majority
fell by 8734 votes. In the annual municipal elections in November, Labour
lost five seats in Birmingham and six in Sheffield.The report of the
cormiittee of the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council established to
investigate these losses was unequivocal:2
During the past twelve months Lhe unemployment] figures have
increased considerably,and the man in the street believes that
1. T.C., l4;6;1931.
2. SFTLC minutes, 'Report on result of Municipal Elections, November, 1930',
l7;1;l931.
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the increase is due to the fact that a Labour Government is in
power.. .In other circles, the view is held that the Government has
not taken all the steps which are within its power to ameliorate
the position, and that in addition the administration of the
Unemployment Insurance Act has operated in a harsh manner against
thousands of unemployed claimants.
The fund of popular goodwill which the Labour Government could draw on was
being rapidly diminished and by the sumner of 1931 it seems to have become
almost exhausted. For the activists of the Labour Party, the last straw
was the Unemployment Insurance Anomalies Bill introduced in July and
designed to cut down on the so-called abuses of the benefits system,
principally by women and seasonal workers. J.W. Holland of the Sheffield
1ILP put the views of the rank and file in a nutshell:
They wanted to know why the Government was so panicky of the banks
and financiers.. .They knew the Government's difficulties at the
present time and therefore it was difficult to oppose them, but
they contended that the bill would injure the unemployed...
He though it was one of the biggest mistakes the Government had made.
They were taking £5 million from the workers to save the rich from
taxation.
In both Birmingham and Sheffield, the Labour movement passed resolutions
condemning unreservedly the legislative proposals of its own Government.2
The final crisis for the MacDonald administration began at the end of
July with the publication of the report of the May Committee on Economy.
The report predicted a budget shortfall of £170m. in the current year and
recommended that, in order to balance the budget, cuts of £96m. be  made in
public spending, two thirds of which were to be made up by a cut in
unemployment benefit by 20 per cent. 3 . The Corirnittee's dire analysis
triggered a crisis of confidence in financial circles and fears were
expressed that a run on the pound would cause German-style inflation and
economic collapse. It became imperative for the Government to balance the
budget but the Cabinet was unable to agree on any progranine of cuts. On
August, 23, when a minority of nine ministers (including A.V. .Alexander,
the M.P. for Hillsborough) opposed the suggested ten per cent cut in
1. S.D.L, 29;7;l93l.
2. ibid.;	 3;7;1931.
3. Taylor,	 cit., p. 288.
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unemployment benefit, it became clear that no solution would be reached
and that Labour would have to resign. Twenty-four hours later, by a process
and logic which is still not clear, Ramsay MacDonald had become the Prime
Minister of a national coalition government.
Only seven Labour ministers and eight M.P.s followed MacDonald; the
Parliamentary Labour Party and the Labour movement in Birmingham and Sheffield
and the country at large united behind the leadership of Arthur Henderson
and the dissenting ministers. 1
 The Labour Party was able to return to the
luxury of opposition and, when in September the National Government carried
out the threat to reduce state salaries and unemployment benefits by ten
per cent, Labour politicians were briefly optimistic that the support of
those whciii they had previously failed would now come swinging back. A.V.
Alexander claimed that 'the working classes throughout the country were
united in their support for our stand' 	 Other Labour M.P.s, such as Fred
Longden and George Sawyer in Birmingham, predicted convincing Labour
victories in the forthcoming General Election. 3
 That such beliefs were
not merely the product of wishful thinking and tunnel vision was evidenced
by the fact that even the Birmingham Mail forecast that Labour would probably
lose at most two or three of its seats in the city.4
Such optimism was severely misplaced. In Birmingham, even in Sheffield
Labour lost every seat and in the country as a whole it was reduced to a rump
of just 52 M.P.s. 554 M.P.s were returned pledged to support the coalition.
In the municipal elections which followed one week later, Labour fared
equally abysmally. In Birmingham, the Party failed to win a single seat;
in Sheffield, where Labour loyalties were a little firmer, the Party held
on narrowly to seven seats but lost eight others.
In seeking to account for this appalling reverse to their Party,
1. BTC minutes, 5;9;193l; T.C., l8;9;l931; SPILC minutes, 25;8;193l.
2. S.C., September, 1931.
3. T.C., 23;lO;1931.
4. B.M., lO;lO;l931.
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Labour activists were in no doubt of what and who to blame. To Fred Longden,
it was 'The 'Panic" that was called an Election', and he accused the
National Government and its allies of . every underhand means to win popular
support:1
INTIMIDATION through the workshop and the press,
BRIBERY by "shillings" and other means,
DEMORALISATION by booze and bilge,
FAVOURITSM by property owners,
UNTRUTHS by the score,
BROADCASTING with a distinct bias against Labour candidates.
However, it would be mistaken to accept this burst of spleen as an accurate
portrayal of the temper of the times. Though the campaign was fraudulent
in the sense that we can see, with hindsight, that it was fought on issues
and proposals which were irrelevant to Britain's real economic problems, it
was not a stampede. The 'panic', if it can be described as such, was
controlled, actuated by the belief that the country's problems needed a
united effort by all men of goodwill to overcome its short-term difficulties
through the 'common sense' solutions so widely canvassed. As M.A. Hamilton
observed :2
The appeal of the National Government carried everything before it
because it was felt to be an essentially non-material appeal. Voters
believed that the country was in danger. In that belief, they were
ready to make sacrifices, even welcomed sacrifices. MacDonald
interpreted their mood far more truly than the Labour Party "realists"
who counted on a solid working-class vote against cuts in unemployment
benefit.
In more reflective mood, even the Birmingham Labour movement recognised the
.3truth of this analysis:
The campaign was fought in an atmosphere of patriotic fervour and
national fear. The people responded to an appeal for "National
Unity" and were not in a mood to reason. Experience has shown how
futile it is to offer arguments against the deceptive slogan -
"Country First".
In fact, nationally the Labour vote held up relatively well considering the
style of its departure from office, and Labour was crippled not so much by
the unprincipled nature of the National Government attack as by the fact
1. rendCommonwj, Ecember, 1931.
2. Quoted in R. Bassett, Nineteen Thirt y-One (1958), p. 334.
3. BTC Annual Report, 1931-32, p. 48.
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that it faced a united opposition with no significant third party
intervention to split its opponents' vote.' Even in Birmingham, where the
local Movement had suffered the additional shock of the defection of two of
its former heroes, the Labour poll was higher than in any other election but
1929. Labour was annihilated by the rise of 110,000 votes in the Unionist
poll. Labour's opponents drew their maximum poll; those previously
agnostic or apathetic, those who had earlier been willing to give Labour the
benefit of the doubt, now returned with a vengeance to the safe haven of
Unionism and the 'national' cause. The tragedy for Labour in Birmingham was
that 1931 had dealt a lasting blow to the Party's standing; thereafter,
Labour maintained a plateau of support in parliamentary and municipal
elections but it showed no signs of breaking through. It was not until 1945
that the Party was to make significant gains amongst the local electorate.
The hope that Birmingham would soon fall inevitably into socialist hands
which had buoyed up the local Labour movement in the l920s, given credence
by the Labour Party's steadily improving performance in the polls, was now
dissipated. Birmingham's quick recovery from the economic recession and its
unparalleled prosperity in the l930s were additional reasons for the local
working class to retain its old allegiances.
In Sheffield, the inuiediate results of the electoral dbcle of 1931
were even more serious for, as well as losing its five parliamentary seats,
Labour was to lose control of the Council in the following year. In 1932,
Labour actually increased its vote and outpolled its rivals but the
adjustment of the aldermanic seats after the losses sustained in 1930 and 1931
gave a temporary majority to the anti-Labour coalition. But Labour gains in
1933 restored the Party to power and were supplemented by the regaining of
four of its parliamentary seats in 1935. Sheffield retained a far larger
hard core of Labour support and its loyalty was reinforced by the NationalS
Government's failure to alleviate the very serious economic problems which
continued to beset Sheffield throughout the 1930s.
1. C. Cook, J. Stevenson, The Slump (1977), ch. 6.
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5.7 Conclusion
Between 1918 and 1931, the wheel appeared to have turned full circle.
Once more a pitifully weak and ineffectual Labour Party faced a coalition
government elected with overwhelming public support. But, despite these
superficial similarities in the two situations, important changes had taken
place. Nationally, Labour had won almost three times as many votes in 1931
as it had in 1918; in Birmingham and Sheffield, almost four times. It was
necessary for the editor of the Town Crier to sound a note of hope in this,
Labour's darkest hour, but he spoke truthfully when he proclaimed that:'
The cause of Labour has reached rock bottom. But what a wonderfully
strong and solid rock on which to build.
There was a sense, belied, admittedly, by its electoral performance, in which
Labour's title as the real party of the working class held good even as it
was being devdstated at the polls. Labour maintained a bedrock of class
support and a touchstone of class ideology which the middle-class parties
could not and did not seek to challenge. 	 It had begun to seem natural for
working people to vote for the Labour Party.
But such statements, once considered unexceptionable, must now be
hedged and qualified. It is no longer sufficient to explain the rise of
Labour as the inevitable corollary of a class system and class-based patterns
of voting. As Labour's 'Forward March' has been halted, as the Party's stock
among working-class voters has fallen, many coffmentators have attempted a
deeper and more meticulous analysis of the way in which class and party
allegiances evolved and interacted. From our own study, three broad themes
stand out.
In the first place, class-party loyalties were not innate or
predetermined but were formed and forged in the historical practice of
individuals and groups. As it happened, many of the events and issues with
1.	 T.C., 6;ll;1931.
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the widest popular impact in the 1920s were ones in which divided class
interests and sympathies were unusually clearly illustrated. The nature of
the employers' counter-attack, the-conduct of the General Strike and the
form and content of Conservative government were such as to highlight the
class affiliations of their principal agents and participants and enhance
Labour's standing as the working-class party. The political and economic
realities of the post-war decade were, in general, peculiarly suited to
accentuate and consolidate the Labour Party's credentials as a party which
put the interests of the working class foremost.
But, in following this argument, it is not necessary to suppose any
naive faith in the Labour Party among working people; Labour support may
have grown simply because their distrust of the alternatives was greater.
In the light of recent electoral developments, political scientists have
called into question the old model of party identification; it has been
suggested that party loyalties do not result from an overriding corrnitment
to one party but, rather, from a supposition that other parties would be
comparatively less satisfactory.'
In :e-exa.'ining the history of the l'20s, this argument appears
particularly apposite. The record of Lloyd George's post-war Coalition
Government tainted both the traditional parties but it discredited Liberalism
especially. The credibility of the Liberal Party had already been
disastrously weakened by the long-running split between its Asquithian and
Lloyd George factions, and by the early 1920s the Party seemed to have ruled
itself out of the running as a realistic or trustworthy alternative
government. (This was all the more strongly the case in Birmingham and 	 -
Sheffield where the Liberals' subordination to, or acconmodation with, their
Conservative opponents virtually destroyed the possibility of their playing
an independent role in political life.) The Conservative Party, on the other
hand, remained the principal party of government and, as such, it inevitably
1. I. Crewe, 'Party Identification Theory and Political Change in Britain'
in I. Crewe at al. (eds), Party Identification and Beyond (1976).
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shouldered a large part of the blame for whatever contemporary events and
developments were causing discontent amongst the electorate. The Labour
Party, vehement in its condemnation of the old parties, scornful of
contemporary iniquities, redolent with promise of better things to come,
stood forth as the one, genuine, untried alternative. This, in itself, was
a major factor in its advancement. Conversely, the shameful failure of the
second Labour Government robbed the Party of this important element in its
appeal and ensured that the more naive and high-flown of the hopes placed
in it were laid to rest. Thereafter, Labour made little real headway until
the unique conjuncture of circumstances found in the Second World War
revived its standing and attractiveness.
Finally, we would argue that, though class-party loyalty is one of the
constants governing electoral behaviour, it cannot be considered in any
uncomplicated fashion as the principal constant. In 1967, a respected
observer could write that 'class is the basis of British politics; all else
is embellishment and detail' .	 Nowadays, this generalisation no longer
appears valid. To some extent, its case has been superseded by socio-
economic changes such as the decline of the traditional manual working class
and the contraction of blue collar trades unionism; but its argument was
always wrong, or at least simplistic, in principle.
One reason for this is that class-party loyalty has always been, in
essence, a pragmatic judgment. Class affiliations could predispose people
to assume the worst of one party and give the benefit of the doubt to another
but, in the final analysis, any political party had to justify the support
given to it by its performance in office or the credibility of its
opposition. Many working people have voted Labour because they believed
the Party to be the best safeguard and guarantor of their interests, and a
shared class identity has undoubtedly been one element which has strengthened
1. P.G.J. Pulzer, Political Representation and Elections in Britain (1967),
p. 98.
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their attachment to the Labour Parcy. But, on the other hand, others, with
the same judgment in mind and the same interests at heart, have voted
Conservative. Class influenced but did not dictate political loyalties.
Secondly, class has not, by any means, always been the most salient
factor determining political choice. Class has always been countervailed,
and sometimes overshadowed, by other important realities in working-class
life. Not the least of these, of course, has been nationality, and the
elections of 1918 and 1931 should be sufficient evidence that party loyalties
based on class may be readily overturned when national interests arc
uppermost in popular consciousness.
To sum up, therefore; class was a political variable - a constant
element in Labour's support and a particularly important one in the 1920s
but never one which acted purely or autonomously. Class and party loyalties
were developed in the post-war decade within a specific conjuncture of
political and socio-economic circumstances, and they should be explained
rather than assumed. Labour's growing identity as the working-class party
did stand it in good stead amongst working-class voters in the years to
come but it did not, in itself, guarantee it working-class support and it
never operated to the exclusion of other ideological or empirical judgments.
Class biassed the critical faculties but never overrode them.
Chapter 6
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
6.1 Introduction
The one other major point of contact between the working class, their
employers and the State was local government. In fact, given the direct
concern of municipal administration with issues such as housing, sanitation,
education, gas and electricity, and public transport, it was, in many ways,
the sphere of government which had the largest iiiipact on working-class
lives. As a consequence, the nature of local political rule was one of the
most important influences determining the political affiliations of working-
class electors. Clearly, this was particularly the case in the municipal
elections but the style of local government, by the impression it gave of
the character and capacities of the chief contenders for national political
power, also went some way to modifying patterns of support for the major
parties at the parliarrntary level.
The sphere of local government assumes particular importance in our
case studies because nowhere was the contrast between Birmingham and
Sheffield more sharply drawn. The middle-class politicians of Birmingham
showed skill and a genuine compassion in their administration of the city,
and the record of local Unionism was an important element in the continuing
strength of working-class Conservatism. In Sheffield, the right-wing
parties seemed content to rule against rather than with the local working
class, an attitude which attained its nemesis in their electoral downfall
in 1926. Thereafter, it was Labour politicians who ruled and, by most
1
objective accounts, ruled well.
1. Appendix E gives details of the results and voting figures of the
municipal elections in Birmingham arid Sheffield between 1919 and 1931.
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6.2 Birmingham
It was argued earlier that it .is a mistake to treat Birmingham's
Unionist traditions as mere reverence for the past. chamberlainism was
sustained by more than an anachronistic ancestor worship; it was given
fresh life and purpose by a Unionist administration of the City Council
which continued to infuse its political rule with a powerful and popular
mixture of social reform and civic pride. The Civic Gospel lived on, though
in muted form, through the continuing belief of many middle-class politicians
in Birmingham in the duties and beneficent capacities of local government.
In Birmingham, the City Council continued to attract an unusually high-class
and talented leadership, imbued with a political and ethical corrrnitment to
its reforming role and the part they played in it. The Birmingham Mail was
being partisan but not entirely unfair when it argued that:'
"the Chamberlain tradition' in Birmingham stands for sarthing higher
and nobler than party allegiance, though it stands for that as well
in a degree which is unique in the political history of the great
cities of Europe. Indeed, it is part of a great tradition - that of
zealous service to the community which, happily for our city, has been
and is still maintained by many distinguished local families. The
Beales, the Kenricks, the Cadburys, the Martineaus, the Lloyds -
these and other familiar names have been household words in our city
for long past.
The practical effects of such devotion were to be seen in a range and depth
of municipal services and facilities which were probably unequalled in the
country. ThePublic Health Department of the Council employed almostone
thousand people and ran two isolation hospitals, four tuberculosis sanitoria
and 25 infant welfare centres. 24 bathing establishments were operated by
the Municipality, offering the public the use of 26 pools and 664 private
baths. Educational provision, though admitted to be unsatisfactory at
secondary level, was otherwise impressive, with special schools for blind,
deaf and disabled children and two open-air schools for the weakly and anaemic
in addition to the normal schooling facilities.2
1. B.M., l7;ll;1926.
2. W.S. Body (ed.) Birmingham and Its Civic Manage (Birmingham, 1928),
passim.
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Birmingham was also unique in possessing its own Municipal Bank,
established in 1916 after a persistent campaign against much institutional
opposition by the then Lord Mayor, Ne.ville Chamberlain, and a Labour
councillor, Eldred Hallas. By 1928, there were 45 branches of the Bank and
almost a quarter of a million depositors The Municipal Bank, in particular,
attracted the admiration and envy of many Labour councillors and activists
up and down the country because it seemed to offer a means of taking
financial power from the bankers and placing it in the hands of the people's
elected representatives. But Birmingham remained unique. Though the
establishment of a municipal bank was one of the most dearly-held objectives
of the Labour Party in Sheffield, its attempts to implement the policy
foundered on the rigid opposition of the Treasury.2
Perhaps the Corporation's greatest achievement lay in its programme
of municipal house-building where it boasted a record unparalleled by any
comparable authority. Between 1920 and 1931, Birmingharnbuilt 502 new houses
per 10,000 of its population; its nearest competitor amongst the eleven
major cities attained a rate of only 359 per lO,0OO.	 Birmingham's
30,000th. municipal house was opened by the Labour Minister of Health,
Arthur Greenwood, in July, 1930, and in all 36,825 new municipal house were
constructed in the city between 1920 and l931.
Such a scale of civic enterprise did not fail to impress even the
Labour politicians of Birmingham though, of course, they put their own gloss
5
on the achievement. As the Labour councillor, hH. Mimer wrote:
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about Birmingham is that whilst
for 45 years, it has been the "Mecca of Toryism and Private
Enterprise", and its Council, composed of a large majority of people
who, by training and instinct, have an inherent dislike of any
1. Body, op. cit., p.133.
2. J.S. Rowett, 'The Labour Party and Local Government: Theory and Practice
in the Interwar Years', Ph. D. thesis, University of Oxford, 1979,
pp. 127-128.
3. A. Briggs, History of Birmingham. Vol.11, Borough and City, 1865-1938
(1952), p. 230.
4. Birmingham Medical Officer of Health, Annual Report, 1931, p. 36.
5. ILP Easter Conference, 1930. Birmingham Souvenir Programi, p. 49.
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suggestion of public ownership, yet it can probably show a greater
measure of municipal enterprise than any other municipality in
Great Britain. Its civic history is an inspiring record of the
success and practicality of social ownership, even when administered
by those who do not believe in it.
In local politics, the Birmingham Labour movement was clearly in a difficult
position. There was much about which there was justifiable room for
complaint - many thousands of slums remained, there was a long waiting-list
for council housing, serious discrepancies remained in the wards' health
indices, municipal services might have been run more cheaply, and so on -
and Labour always argued that more could and should have been done by the
Corporation. But at times, set against the Council's positive achievements,
the Labour Party's critical stance may have seemed to represent a rather
querulous and negative opposition for opposition's sake.
Reading through the municipal election addresses of the Unionist and
Labour Parties in Birmingham, one is struck by the many siiiilarities in
their programes and proposals. Both stressed the need for more housing,
sanitary improvements and work-schemes for the unemployed; both were
broadly pledged to reform. The following election address, issued in 1927,
could have been put out quite happily by either party but for the party
1label:
As a working man, as one who has to work for his weekly wage, I claim
fully to understand the needs and difficulties of working-class
people, and if elected my one big object would be to urge and
support a boldprogressive and sound policy for the bettent
the conditions under which you and I have to labour andJj.. I
stand as a Unionist candidate because I honestly believe that the
Unionist Party is doing its level best to achieve that object.
To the editor of the Town Crier, this was a sign of Tory hypocrisy:2
Once a year - always a week or two before the November elections -
the Unionists pose as social reformers and preach the gospel of
social reform as ardently as the most "extreme" Socialists.
But equally, the charge might be reversed. In 1921, the Unionist organ,
3Straight Forward argued that:
the utter weakness of the Labour case is further revealed when we
1. Birniinghani Municipal Election Literature, BCL; St. Nary's, 1927.
2. T.C., 5;2;l926.
3. Straight Forward, October, 1921.
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find that there is hardly a line in [their] address which could
not be issued withperfect sincerity by any Unionist candidate.
The truth was that the Unionists had effectively dished their Labour
opponents both by their political platform which continued to stress reform
and the defence of working-class conditions, and by the practical
achievements of their long record of municipal government. This was admitted
even by Labour politicians; according to W.H. Mimer, 'the average man or
woman sees very little difference between the t prograrrrnes and therefore
does not bother'.' Mimer proposed that the problem should be solved by
Labour consciously making its programme more ideological, by raising the real
issue as one between Socialism and Capitalism. It seems fair to conclude,
however, that, had this advice been followed, its principal effect would have
been to isolate the Labour Party yet further from a working-class electorate
more concerned with practical reform than apparently theoretical argument.
The one important difference with regard to the city-wide appeal that
the two parties could make was that, while Labour was committed by its
structure and ideology to preaching a single, primarily class-determined,
message, Unionism could vary its platform according to the specific
electorate it was trying to reach. Whereas Labour candidates generally
campaigned on a single manifesto, the Unionist Party functioned as a
coalition of middle-class and working-class politicians who, within a broad
unity, were able to emphasise the policies which were most attractive to
themselves and their constituencies. A Unionist candidate in a middle-class
ward might stand for rigid economy whilst his counterpart seeking working-
class votes could be advocating expensive reform. There is a sense in
which the long dominance of the Unionist Party in Birmingham had led to a
situation in which it was widely perceived as by far the most legitimate
and realistic option open to the city's would-be legislators. It attracted
a wide variety of politicians, from strict economist to idealistic reformer,
1.	 T.C., 5;2;1926.
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and gave leeway and hope to them all. This, in turn, fostered the broad
appeal by which it was able to maintain its political supremacy. The
position conformed closely to that described by S.M. Lipset where:'
a self-perpetuating political cycle develops in which the existence
of a legitimate political monopoly forces people into operating
within that framework to achieve reforms; and since they operate
within it, its security is reinforced.
Unionism was able to appear, as a result of the broad class spectrum it
contained and the balanced policies its pursued, almost apolitical or, at
least, non-party political in its administration of the city. As the
preceding chapter demonstrated, national economic and political issues
intervened in the l920s and, to sai extent, they were able to reveal the
essential class interests represented by Unionism. At such times, a
politics based on the reality of class could and did assert itself;
otherwise, Birmingham Unionism was remarkably successful in cultivating an
appearance and a reality of impartial and progressive civic administration
which won for it deep and lasting support among all classes.
1. S.M. Lipset, Political Man (1966), p. 273.
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6.3 Sheffield
In Sheffield, the middle-class administration formed by the Sheffield
Citizens t Alliance, which ruled from 1919 to 1926, had no comparable
tradition of municipal reform and civic service. Though in the past both
Liberal and Conservative Parties had taken significant steps to improve
conditions in the towri, the coalition they forrrd together after the War
was founded on almost entirely negative premises. Its raison d'être was
opposition to the Labour Party; its motivating force, anti-Socialism, and
it seemed constrained by its make-up and ideology from making any more
positive appeal tothe electorate. The one post-war election in which the
Citizens' Alliance made any attempt to outline a progressive role and
comilitment for the Corporation, that of 1919, saw it badly defeated by the
Labour Party. 1 Thereafter, the Alliance, despite the fact that it was the
ruling party, seemed to retreat into a purely oppositional and negative stance.
The chief policy of the Citizens' Alliance administration was one of
cheese-paring economy in order to keep down the rates.- a policy which held
little attraction for the disadvantaged working class who stood to gain
most from an enlightened municipal administration. Thus it was that, in
1926, Sheffield Corporation operated just eight public baths and no wash-
houses, that the city possessed just one infant and maternity welfare centre,
and that plans to build a sanatorium for the city's consumptives (a
particularly pressing problem locally due to the nature of the cutlery and
tool trades) had been continually deferred on economy grounds. 2 The
Council also had an especially bleak record of educational provision, in
which area it was spending proportionately less than any other local
authority in the country. 3 The effects of such economy were seen
1. H. Mathers, 'Sheffield Municipal Politics, 1893-1926. Parties,
Personalities and the Rise of Labour', Ph. D. thesis, University of
Sheffield, 1979, p. 233.
2. H. Keeble Hawson, Sheffield. The Growth of a City, 1893-1926 (Sheffield,
1968), pp. 49-51, pp. 86-87.
3. ibid., p.
	
7.
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dramatically on the Manor Estate where in 1926 just 1014 of the 3000 local
children were attending any sort of school and, of these, only 232 were
1provided with educational accommodation on the Estate.
Neither was the coalition administration's record on housing and
sanitary reform notably impressive. 5811 municipal houses were constructed
between 1920 and 1927 (cf. Birmingham's total of 17,791 in the same period),
and public health continued to be endangered by the large number of privy
middens and fixed ashpits still in use in the poorer parts of the city.2
Popular confidence in the good intent and real commitment of the Citizens'
Alliance to sanitary reform was probably not much bolstered when the
Sheffield Mail publicised the fact in 1923 that the Medical Officer of Health
had sent 147 letters to members of the Council's Healith Committee with
respect to insanitary conditions in properties of which they were the
landlords. 3
 This expose of the coalition's slum-owners becarm a major
issue in the elections of 1923 and was widely believed to have been an
important factor in Labour's gains that year.4
If the Citizens' Alliance administration gave the impression of being
frugal to the point of miserliness, it did not even possess the excuse that
its policies were placing the Council on a sound financial footing. In the
early l920s, the administration took a number of measures in the name of
short-term economy which, in the longer term, were to add considerably to its
financial burdens. The Alliance's policy of raising loans at unnecessarily
high interest rates to meet immediate demands saddled Labour with a debt
of Elm. on its accession to power. Its decision to abolish the compounding
of rates led to the issuing of 255,000 suninonses, 289 imprisonments and a
1. Sheffield City Council Labour Group, Six Years of Labour Rule in Sheffield
(Sheffield, N.D.), p. 5.
2. A.D.K. Owen, A Report on the Housing Problem in Sheffield (Sheffield,
1931), p. 18.
3. Sheffield Mail, 19;l0;l923; S.D.I., 25;10;l923.
4. S.D.I., 2;ll;l923.
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loss in revenues of 7OO,OOO.1 By 1924, even some Citizens 1 Alliance
politicians were admitting publicly that the abolition of compounding had
become an electoral liability. One defeated candidate expressed the view:2
that the present rating system would have to be altered. There was
no better argument for Bolshevism and Communism than the present
system.
In the first half of the 1920s, Labour consistently attacked the financial
ineptitude of the coalition administration. Their charges struck home and,
in so doing, robbed the Alliance of its principal fig-leaf of respectability -
the belief that businessmen and middle-class professionals were best suited
to take responsibility for the finances of a large city.
The Sheffield Citizens' Alliance complemented its reactionary
policies with an aggressive and intolerant style of government which was
personified in the figure of its leader, Sir William Clegg. Even his
political allies were forced to admit his failings as a politician:3
He failed to see that the Socialistic-Labour agitation which was
growing required careful treatment. . .When in the course of events
it became necessary for him to deal with questions raised by the
Labour party, his advice was "Well, let us fight them" and this
course he pursued blindly to the end.
By the l920s, Clegg - who was in his seventies, was temperamentally and
ideologically incapable of making any attempt to accommodate Labour or the
aspirations it represented, and he exhibited his antipathy to Labour claims
in the Council by a series of actions which can only be viewed as unjust
and politically ill-conceived.
In both 1921 and 1923, Labour was forced to boycott the committee
work of the Council in protest at the demonstrably unfair allocation of
4Coimutteeplaces which had been made by the Citizens Alliance majority.
Thus in 1923, while Labour representatives (who formed one third of the
elected Council) were granted one seat in fifteen on the most important
1. V. Thomas, A. Ballard, Forty Years of Labour Rule in Sheffield (Sheffield,
N.D.), p. 7.
2. S.D.I., 3;ll;l924.
3. R. Styring, y Life Story (Frome, 1940), p. 229.
4. S.D.I., l0;1l;l921; 	 12;ll;1923.
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corrmittees, on those with less power and political 'glamour' they took
one in three)' Even more blatantly, the Citizens' Alliance refused to
grant any increase in Labour's aldermanic representation despite its greatly
enlarged role on the Council. By 1925, this policy had reached the point
where the Citizens' Alliance was represented by 23 councillors and 15
aldermen, and Labour by 22 councillors and just 2 aldermen. Clegg justified
the position with the motto 'To the victor, the spoils' but hIs taunt
rebounded on him in the following year when the coincidence of seping
Labour gains with the triennial aldermanic elections led to the victricus
Labour Party taking the opportunity to evict Clegg and six other lcg-
serving coalition aldermen and replacing them with its n men. Clegg"s
departure was not widely mourned; his stewardship had aroused fierce
antipathy and even his one-time political ally, Alderman Moses l3uberstone,
described him as 'the biggest autocrat I know'. 2
 In the East End, political
opposition was married to a pronounced personal antagonism dating ft his
deeply unpopular chairmanship of the local Munitions Tribunal during tihe
First World War.3
Clegg, though by far the uos t praninent opponent of Labmr ±u tihie
public eye, was not alone in an attitude and style which scesd caII1ated
to repel rather than attract the working-class voter.. Cl was a Lileral,
his political alter ego on the Conservative benches was Sir Albert Hibsnirii,
an irascible and single-minded proponent of 'economy'. A speech he
in 1922, in which he claimed that the people of Sheffield had thscrd a
new industry - breeding - by which to claim additional berefit, was widely
exploited b1 Labour propagandists and won him few friends in a dply
troubled working class . In general, the coalition politicians of Sheffield
seemed unable to conceive of the Labour Party as anything sore than an
1. S.DI., 12;ll;1923.
2. S * DII ) ].8;lll926.
3. S.D.I., J26;lO;1923.
4. S.D.I.,26;lO;l922,
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opponent to be derided and vanquished; that their behaviour might increase
Labour sympathies amongst a working-class electorate in which the Party
already played a secure and trusted role appears to have gone unnoticed.
'What are the Labour Party?', asked Cllr. Matt Sheppard at a by-election
meeting on behalf of the Citizens' Alliance. He answered his own question
with the reply, 'They are colossal humbugs, hypocrites, Bolshevists, Fabians
and the cosmopolitan refuse of Europe' l To the working-class electors of
Darnall, this probably seemed a little hard on the Labour Party whose
outgoing councillor was Cecil Wilson and whose current candidate was the
mild-mannered and deeply respectable, R.H. Minshall. Sheppard's outburst
may have satisfied his own temperament but did little to win over the
electorate who returned Minshall by a large majority.
In short, it seems as if the Citizens' Alliance, by its policies and
bearing, conspired in its own downfall. H. Keeble Hawson, the historian of
the Corporation and himself a Conservative councillor, surrmed up judiciously
the role played by the Citizens' Alliance until its defeat in 1926:2
The sudden postwar depression had produced a startling change. All
ideas of progress and expansion had been forgotten. Economy in all
directions and at all costs became paramount. The men who had
guided the Council for so long and had inspired the vigorous policies
of earlier years had grown old; they could not face the challenge of
the times and so Sheffield in 1926 became the first of the big cities
to fall under Socialist control.
When it took office in 1926, the Sheffield Labour Party faced a
legacy of political misrule and a local economy, still gripped by a deep
and long-lasting depression, which would have tested the most able and
experienced administrators. Espite these adverse conditions, most
observers agree that Labour ruled competently and humanely in the years
that followed and achieved a real and worthwhile improvement in the quality
of life of its working-class supporters.
Labour took the opportunity to carry out a series of long overdue
1. S.D.I., 22;3;l924.
2. Keeble Hawson, op. cit., p. xxii.
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reforms. After one year of its tenure, it could claim to have abolished
privy middens, begun an extensive progranme for the abolition of ashpits,
and stepped up the rate of house-building. Health provision for consumptives
and for expectant and nursing mothers and the facilities for the blind and
disabled were all considerably extended. Plans for fourteen new schools
had been passed, and the city's finances and administrative apparatus had
been reorganised to enab'e greater cost-effectiveness and efficiency.1
Six years after taking office, on the occasion of its first one-year
loss of power, Labour published a celebratory pamphlet on Six Years
of Labour Rule in Sheffield, Though clearly written with a propagandistic
intent, the work points to a record of achievement and progress that cannot
be gainsaid. Secondary school provision had been increased by over 80 per
cent, direct labour had been introduced for the Corporation's house-building
and printing, almost 9000 ashpits had been replaced by a total of 15,000
new dustbins, care of consumptives, the blind and those formerly treated
in the Poor Law hospitals was taken over by the Corporation and extended,
almost 8000 houses had been constructed, library issues had been doubled,
2500 courts had been lighted, and so on and so forth. 2 The Council was
justifiably proud of its fine record of practical, socialist reform.
The Sheffield Labour movement was fortunate in the quality of the
personnel it could call on to undertake the arduous and derianding work
required by municipal government. T.H. Watkins, a railway accountant,
played a dominating role in the Corporation's financial planning; Albert
Ballard and J.H. Bingharnwere the principal architects of Sheffield's
educational reforms; William Asbury had an unrivalled practical knowledge
and concern for health provision. 3
 But the key figure in the Labour
administration was E.G. Rowlinson .*io led the Labour Group, with the
exception of two one-year spells, from 1926 until his early death in 1941.
1. S.F., October, 1927.
2. Sheffield City Council Labour Group, 2P_cit., pssim.
3. V. Thomas, A. Ballard, çp. cit., pp. 3-4.
-234-
On Labour's assumption of office, Rowlinsori became practically a full-time
administrator, a chairman of two conmittees and a member of six others.
He also possessed special qualities of leadership; through his patience
and diplanacy, it was said that the Labour Group never came to the Council
Chamber divided on any issue of principle.' Politicians are apt to be
fondly remembered after their deaths but there is no doubt that in
Rowlinson's case the plaudits were deserved. As Fred Marshall stated:2
In 1926 he found himself at the head of a rather raw large party
invested with the responsibilities of City Government. With
consuninate ability he guided it towards its great achievements
untLl it became a model and an inspiration to struggling Labour
Parties all over the country.
1. J. Bellamy, J. Saville (eds), Dictionary of Labour Biography, vol. 6
(1982), p. 235.
2. Edward Carpenter Memorial Service, 1947. Record of Speeches in the
1946 Service, p. 8.
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6.4 Conclusion
In this section, we have emphasised the crucial role played by middle-
class politicians in shaping the prospects for an independent politics of
and for the working class. Middle-class politicians could not alter the
reality of class divisions but they could mitigate their impact insofar as
they chose or were able to pursue policies which showed a genuine regard
for working-class interests and sensibilities. Given the economic and
social structures of working-class life, it can be said, at least, that
class-based politics were an immanent possibility, but they were not
inevitable and it was certainly the case that they need not be dominant.
Whether the politics of class was a powerful or insubstantial influence on
local affairs still depended to a large degree on the temperannts and
capacities of those acting in the political field. Social determinations
and ideological predispositions inevitably influenced their actions but
politicians were participating in a drama that was improvised and open-ended,
not a Greek tragedy. Circumstance circumscribed their roles but left room
for initiative and self-responsibility.
Nowhere are these generalisations better illustrated than in the
sphere of municipal politics where the middle-class politicians of Birmingham
acted wi.th skill and vision in the successful aLLetIipL to hold on to their
working-class constituency, while their counterparts in Sheffield chose to
behave in ways seemingly calculated to alienate working-class support. It
was not, therefore, mere 'false consciousness' which impelled the working
class of Birmingham to give such strong support to Unionism; the Council
had an undeniably excellent record of reform and continued to demonstrate a
genuine commitment to the amelioration of working-class conditions. Its
middle-class politicians had the self-confidence and ability, bolstered by
their electoral strength and ideological traditions, to take on the Labour
Party and defeat it on its own terms. In contrast, those in Sheffield
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retreated before the Labour advance and followed a strategy of reaction
and opposition whose effect was to surrender the field of reform and the
defence of working-class interests entirely to their opponents. Space was
left open for an independent working-class politics which a talented and
cohesive Labour Party proved more than able to fill . As a result of
socio-economic conditions and the inadequacies of its political opposition,
Labour came to dominate the centre ground of Sheffield's municipal politics.
In Birmingham, where social and economic circumstances provided a more
difficult terrain, the Labour Party was pushed to the margins of political
life by the power and talents of the city's Unionist rulers.
Chapter 7
LABOUR'S ETHOS AND IDEOLOGY
7.1 Introduction
The Labour Party was founded in 1900 by an alliance of trades
unionists and socialists whose primary aim, as its original designation -
the Labour Representation Conmittee - implies, was to increase the working-
class presence in Parliament. It was not a doctrinal party, a party formed
around a shared corpus of ideology or one united in a common adherence to
certain texts and prophets. Its strength (and, many would argue, its
weakness) was as a vehicle in which different interests, different emphases
and different aspirations could all discover a role, in which all could find
hope. Trades unionists, committed to the independent representation of
labour and the defence of working-class interests, and socialists, committed
to these of course but fired also by a larger vision, came together in an
uneasy but potentially fruitful marriage - cooperation made possible by the
objects and methods they shared but always strained by the ambitions and
analyses that they held separately.
To some, the Labour Alliance was from the outset a betrayal of
socialist hopes; thus Joseph Clayton, writing in 1926:1
In reality the year 1900 is not the date of a forward movement
towards Social Democracy, rather does it announce the turn of the
tide. The high-water mark had been reached. Quietly, imperceptibly
at first. . . the forces that helped to create a Party for the
establishment of Socialism turned from the Socialist propaganda to
the propaganda of party.
To such critics, ethical socialism, embodied in the liP, was tainted,
debilitated and finally overwhelmed by its pact with the tepid reformism of
the trades unions, and was chronically undermined by its own growing
1. J. Clayton, The Rise and Decline of Socialism in Great Britain, 1884-
1924 (1926), p. 106.
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preoccupation with the electoral struggle. The very circumstances of
Labour's parentage and birth condemned it to be a compromising and
compromised dereliction of socialist aspirations. Clayton's gloomy
assessment has been echoed with greater academic precision and detachment
by many other comentators subsequently.'
Nor, it is argued, is it possible to see the adoption of the Party's
new constitution in 1918 - with its socialist corrrnitrnent encapsulated in the
famous Clause IV - as a belated change of heart. Clause IV arose out of an
organisational-cum-political need for differentiation from the Liberals and
through the necessity of conveying an avowedly radical but non-revolutionary
alternative to Bolshevism. 2
 It was acceptable to the Party as a whole
because it spoke to the narrow collectivist objectives of the trades unions
and Fabians whilst, at the same time, appealing to the more radical conmon
ownership principles of the socialists. 3 As Royden Harrison has written:4
Clause IV does not indicate.., the presence of a coherent ideology.
It is better regarded as a rallying point around which the adherents
of different ideologies and the representatives of different interests
assembled.
Labour continued to be therefore, in a phrase become c1ichd but
nonetheless apposite, a broad church. It was a church of considerable
scriptural diversity and much sectarian competition but it was, despite its
heterogeneity, a body in which an assortment of believers and aspirants
could come together to practise the rites conrnon to their respective faiths.
1. See: S. Pierson, British Socialists. The Journey from Fantasy to
Politics (Cambridge, USA, 1979);
S. Yea, 'A New Life. The Religion of Socialism in Britain, 1883-1906',
History Workshop Journal, 4, (Autumn, 1977);
D. Howell, British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 1886-1906
(Manchester, 1983).
2. S. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivtst Age (New York, 1969), pp.
137-49;
J. Winter, Socialism and the Challenge of War (1974), p. 276.
3. R. Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism (New York, 1964), p. 62.
4. R. Harrison, 'The War Emergency Workers' National Committee, l9l4-l920'
in A. Briggs, J. Saville (eds), Essays in Labour History, 1886-1923
(1971), p. 259.
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There was too a developing consensus within the Party. The old
antithesis between trades unionist and socialist - perhaps always
overplayed - was losing its edge. Shared assumptions and interests were
forged in the day-to-day struggle and tempered by the exigencies of national
and international politics. The Party was becoming scthing greater than
the sum of its parts, and loyalty to its mariners and modes was becoming note
than a mere calculation of political tactics. That, in the interwar period,
the means had become, at least in part, an end was incontestable. What
remained in dispute was the precise purpose for which the Party had been
formed but this potential conflict was, for the most part, practically
obscured by the ideas, methods and short-term objectives which united
Labour's diverse elements.
It is Stuart Macintyre who has argued most fully for the existence of
a distinct and comprehensive Labour Party ideology - which he terms Labour
Socialism - in the 1920s but he observes correctly that its decisive
influence emerged most clearly at the local level. 1
 Those political
ideologues who have tried their hand at history have been quick to interpret
Labour's story in terms of its leaders' treachery and ideological
inadequacies but, in fact, the working-class rank and file of the Party
cannot be acquitted so easily. If Labour failed, and this is usually the
gist of the ideologues' analysis, it failed with their - the rank and file's -
active complicity. The politics of the Labour Party were not imposed from
above; they were a reflection and a refraction of the ideas and aspirations
of the Party's grass roots, the product of an interaction of central and
local influences in which neither was determining but in which both were
mutually reinforcing. The structure and form of Labour politics that
MacDonald and the other Party leaders built up at the national and
parliamentary level depended for its existence on the assent or, at the
1. S. Macintyre, A Proletarian Science (Cambridge, 1980), p. 65.
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very least, the acquiescence of the rank and file. In practice, the local
activists endorsed the national consensus that was emerging and gave it
local content and impact by their ownpolitical work.'
In this section, we describe and document the ethos and ideology of
the Labour Party as it was evinced and practised at the local level in
Birmingham and Sheffield. Where possible we have sought to use the actual
words of its adepts and spokesmen. Terminologically, we have chosen to
distinguish between two layers of the Party's thinking. By its ethos, we
mean that set of barely defined and, for that matter, barely definable
assumptions and beliefs that underpinned Labour's philosophy and practice.
By its ideology, we refer to the more articulatedand coherent statements
and policies ich fod the practical reality of Labour's politics. 2
 The
real point, though, is that, while these two positions are logically
distinguishable, they had in fact by the 1920s become so deeply
interpenetrated and enmeshed that any but a heuristic separation of their
roles would be artificial and misleading. The account is divided into three
sections: in the first, we examine the basis and nature of Labour s anti-
capitalism; in the second, the forms and means of its socialism; in the
third, the practical character of its political reformism and the internal
conflicts to which this gave rise.
1. See also: B. Barker, 'The Anatomy of Reformism. The Social and Political
Ideas of the Labour Leadership in Yorkshire', International Review of
Social History, XVIII, (1973).
2. This distinction was initially formulated by H.M. Drucker in his
Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party (1979), pp. 8-12. It is felt
here, however, that Drucker's exposition of Labour's ethos is too
limited in scope and should be expanded to include the more profound
and quasi-religious aspects of Labour's philosophy.
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7.2 Labour's Anti-Capitalism
In essence, Labour's case against the prevailing econcxnic system was
of the utmost simplicity and rested on an outright condemnation of the
status quo
The present system brings great wealth and luxury to the privileged
few, and poverty, bad housing, ill health and never-ending worry to
great masses of the people. This system is based on the private
ownership of the people's needs, and profit-making is placed before
the welfare of the corrinunity.
The vast amount of Unemployment, the Shortage of Houses, and the fact
that over 100,000 of our citizens are living in overcrosided, wretchedly
unhealthy and insanitary conditions, the high cost of living and
consequent underfeeding, increasing rents and rates, and the continuous
efforts of the employers to lower wages and conditions of employment
are all, undoubtedly, the results of the present system of Government
(both local and national), the principle of which is based on the
Right of the Individual to take Rent, Interest and Profit out of the
needs of his fellows.
Labour's propaganda and the thrust of its analysis were not sophisticated
but neither were the contemporary workings of the system against which it
inveighed and it must have seemed to many in the Labour movement that mere
description of the glaring iniquities that surrounded them would, of itself,
be sufficient to rouse their fellow-workers to revolt. The working class's
own experience of inequality was backed up whereever possible by the hard
fact provided by census and survey reports and the work of the local
Medical Officers of Health. W.E. Wheeldon's election address to the
constituents of St. Barto1omesrecounted the ward's health statistics and
then drew its moral:2
Every slum and courtyard, every ill-clad and ill-nourished man and
child is a memento of Liberal and Tory rule.
Put an end to it! You can if you will!
These were Labour's public pronouncements, part of the appeal it made to an
unconverted and ill-educated electorate, but it cannot in truth be claimed
1. Birmingham Municipal Election Literature, BCL; Rotton Park, 1927;
ibid.; Birmingham Borough Labour Party's riLinicipal manifesto, 1921.
2. ibid.; St, Bartholomew's, 1927.
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that its own understanding of the processes underlythg the wrongs it
portrayed went much deeper. For the most part, the Labour pioneers felt it
sufficient to publicise the evils of capitalism, name their cause and
proclaim an alternative vision of how things might be.
The one exception to this (understandable) aversion to the dismal
science of economics was the theory of underconsumption which had the sarr
importance to generations of Labour activists as surplusvalue did to those
who called themselves Marxists - which is to say that it was a vague and
barely understood concept with just enough of an air of scientificity about
it to lend it credence and explanatory value. Underconsumption, explaining
as it did why private ownership and competition inevitably brought
unemployment and poverty in their wake, was felt to be the key which unlocked
the mysteries of capitalism.
The rudiments of the case were long-established and oft-repeated.
Because capital and the means of production were in private hands, the
workers received little of the wealth created by their labour. The prior
demands of interest and profit meant that workers' wages and the purchasing
power of their class were low. Because capitalism was competitive, those
who owned capital and machinery were compelled both to produce as many
saleable items as possible and to cut labour costs to a minimum. The first
consequence of this two-fold process was to cause periodic crises of over-
production when the glutted state of the market led to factory closures and
unemployment. The second, chronic, consequence was that the wages, hours
and numbers of those employeci were constantly undermined and degraded in the
drive to reduce the costs of production. Again, the effect was to diminish
working-class living standards and purchasing power. This reduced
purchasing power became, in the economic jargon of the day, 'underconsumption'
which meant, in real terms, the working class's inability to afford the goods
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and services they needed and, more cruelly, even the goods and services
they actually provided in their working lives. But underconsumption, as
part of a dynamic chain of circumstances in the capitalist mode of production,
was not only effect but cause. Because the working class was poor, it lacked
the ability to translate its genuine needs into effective demand; because
effective demand was low, goods could not be bought or were not produced;
because capitalists could not sell '
 the products of their factories, they
laid off their workers; because the workers were unemployed, they were poor
and so on in a vicious circle of deprivation and poverty.
This is to describe the theory in full, in all its ramifications and
subtleties. The breadth and impact of its popular appeal lay in the way
that the complex reasoning of these arguments could be readily expressed in
a few clear and apparently common sensical nostrums. Jim Sirrnions, then
Labour's parliamentary candidate in Erdington, put the case well in populist
terms:
Everywhere I go I find ample evidence that there is among the people
a great need for all kinds of goods:- boots, clothes, food,
furniture, etc.. Alongside the existence of this great need we have
workers,who could be engaged upon the task of producing to meet the
need, unemployed. We pay them for being unemployed and allow the
need to remain unsatisfied. What madness! Yet it is part of a system
that we call Capitalism.
The critique became all the more powerful when applied in a favourite
parah'e in Labour circles - that of the bootmakers' shoeless children.
Reuben Farrow, in an address on the fundamentals of socialism to the
Northfield Junior Imperial League, traced the processes by which competition
led to overproduction and lay-off s in the shoe industry and concluded in a
ringing phrase intended to leave no-one in any doubts as to the absurdities
of the capitalist system, 'hence we see bootless children, who are bootless
because their fathers have made too many boots'. 2 In the underconsumptionist
1. Sin'mons Papers, vol. 2; Erdington Labour Party,	 yterly Letter from
prospective Labour candidate, no. 8, July-September, 1928.
2. King's Norton Labour News, June, 1930.
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critique, capitalism became not merely culpable but preposterous.
Its second point of attraction lay in the fact that, because it rested
on a multi-layered and multi-facetted analysis, people from different
backgrounds and of different persuasions could take up the argument at that
level which best fitted their interests and objects. At one level, it was
enough to draw the moral that the workers' wages were too low. The remedy? -
higher wages for 'by giving real wages to the mass of the people. . .demand
for useful goods would be increased and stabilised'. 1 The ordinary worker
could cite sound economics as well as material constraint in his demand for
a fair day's pay. For trades unionism, a high wage policy justified its
role and gave theoretical backing to its attempted practice. The
Birmingham and District Coriinittee of the NUGN1W resolved in 1923:2
that the problem of unemployment is seriously aggravated by the fact
that masses of the people have suffered reductions in wages which
have so impaired their spending power that they are unable to lend
adequate support to trade by their individual wages; and that a
higher standard of wages should be promoted in all industries as the
first and indispensable step towards the recovery and maintenance of
good trade.
On the other hand, an ILPer using the same basic arguments could conclude
that it was private ownership which led to the evil of unemployment. His
remedy? - the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and
exchange. 3 If unemployment and poverty were ascribed to low wages, the
socialist had no doubt that low wages were inevitable under capitalism. The
underconsumptionist thesis was a train of thought which possessed different
connotations for the various members of the Labour movement; most, as it
were, followed the argument's passage for a few stops in the middle, a lesser
number followed it from its beginnings in questioning the fundamentals of
capitalism to its terminus, that distant land - the Cooperative Commonwealth.
1. S.C., July, 1924.
2. NUCMW District Committee (Birmingham and Western District) minutes,
ll;8;1923.
3. Sheffield 112 minutes, 30;6;1921.
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The theory of underconsumption was part of the Labour movement's folklore
with a lineage stretching back to the Chartists and beyond, and it owed
little corisciousor acknowledged debt to the radical economists of the 19th.
and 20th. centuries who had articulated and honed its analysis.
Essentially, however, the economic arguments were a 'scientific' gloss
on a basically moral and moralistic condemnation of capitalism. Capitalism,
it was said, encouraged greed, selfishness and destructive competition;
indeed, its very existence and functioning depended on these malign motive
forces. Socialists seldom tackled in any depth the question as to whether
these regrettable traits were part of some basic 'human nature' or the
product of socio-economic conditioning but, in practice, they constantly
repudiated any political version of the doctrine of original sin. As Frank
Andrews (of the Birmingham ILP and Union of Post Office Workers) expressed
.1it:
the Socialist is a man or woman who believes in the ultimate
magnificence of the people, because the Socialist believes that our
religion and morals are so far ahead of our economics /that]... the
present expediency and money power are but ape-like things and
unfit for later dignity.
Capitalism would not be overcome because its economics were unsound -
although they were - but because its ethics were intolerable. Reason would
revolt and man's basically moral instincts would build anew once the ruinous
and shabby logic of capitalism was sufficiently exposed. Socialism would
come about through:2
first, a revolution in the mind and heart to abolish profit-seeking;
and then a revolution in industry to abolish profit-making.
As Alfred Barratt Brown, the author of the foregoing piece, rightly concluded,
'the spirit of our movement.. .means a great faith in the possibilities of
1. rward (Organ of the Birmingham District of UFOW), August, 1928.
2. T.C., 4;6;1920.
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human nature?.i
The critique of capitalism's imoral basis acquired added trenchancy
after the First World War. Though the Labour movement contained a wide
range of pro- and anti-war views, one interpretation that became widespread
in the disillusionment which followed the conclusion of peace was that war
was caused by the international rivalry of the leading capitalist nations.
To Alfred Barton, a Sheffield ILPer, capitalism had simply:2
fulfilled its foredoomed course. Trade, expansion, overseas
investment, annexation, competition of nations, appropriation of
unoccupied territories, competition of armaments, diplomatic
intrigue, War and Hell.
War was the pursuit of capitalism by other means, and, even if one did not
follow or endorse this argument in its entirety, it had become easy to
syrnpathise with the view that (in the words of the Birmingham Trades Council):
War is a game in which the worker never wins, whatever the official
result, and, under the glorious capitalist system, the capitalist is
all right whatever the result.
The ethos of Labour, with notable exceptions, had always been deeply anti-
militarist. World War One temporarily shattered this unity but the conduct
of the War and, more particularly, its aftermath sharpened the anti-
militarist critique and gave it a more popular resonance than it had ever
hitherto enjoyed. Small colonial wars that brought increased employment in
the armaments firms - attractive in both Birmingham and Sheffield - and a
little military 'glory' were one thing; a world war, with its massive
carnage and privation, was another. After 1918, jingoism evaporated and
Labour's comilitment to peace and disarmament became less a liability and more
an electoral advantage.
1. T.C., 4;6;1920. Alfred Barratt Brown (1887-1947) was the vice-principal
of the Woodbrooke Settlement (an educational establishment supported
by the Cadburys) and was to become principal of Ruskin College, Oxford.
He was a Quaker member of the ILP andNo Conscription Fellowship and had
been imprisoned several times for his anti-war activities.
(Information kindly supplied by his son, Michael Barratt Brown.)
2. A. Barton, A World History for the Workers (1923), p. 102.
3. BTC Annual Report, 1920, p. 8.
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Finally, it would be wrong to over-intellectualise the nature or
impact of Labour's appeal. Labour, as any left-wing party must do, rested
its case overwhelmingly on a straightforward opposition to the status quo.
Whatever grievances arid wrongs existed in contemporary society were
stigrnatised and redress was promised. The cameo of a street-corner meeting
given in the Town Crier must have been typical:'
Mr. H. Parsons asked his audience, "Are you satisfied with the present
life you are living?". The answer was a loud "No!". "Then vote
Labour atall elections", replied Mr. Parsons.
Labour, having never yet formed a majority government, could stand in the
interwar period as the antithesis of all that was unfair and irkscx in the
present system. 2 For the working class as a whole and the less ideologically
minded of the Party's own membership, the promise of reform was enough. What
was wrong under right-wing governments would be put right by a Labour
Government. For the socialists, there existed an analogous dualism with a
more radical connotation; what was wrong under capitalism would be
abolished by socialism.
As with the theory of underconsumption, a shared structure of belief
united the disparate strands of Labour activism and thinking when a deeper
analysis and closer contact with the problems of power would have brought
out their divergences. Differences in Labour ideology could be obscured by
the essential manicheanism of Labour's ethos. The heart of Labour's anti-
capitalism lay in its condemnation of the effects of capitalist economics
and morals. The basis of its constructive case rested on the unproven
assumption that Labour could and would remove these effects. On these two
principles, Labour could unite.
1. T.C., lO;9;l920.
2. cf. Neville Chamberlain's assessment of the 1929 General Election on
p. 209.
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7.3 Labour's Socialism
The essential moralism of Labour's anti-capitalist critique found
ready reflection in the highly ethical nature if its socialism. The spirit
of ethical socialism still pervaded the Movement throughout the l920s. It
is true that few now preached a self-proclaimed religion of socialism but it
was still the basic precepts and presuppositions of a religion of socialism
that continued to mould the Movement's practice and self-image. The first
section of this chapter will examine this quasi-religious side to Labour's
philosophy.
In the spiritual interpretation of its role, the Labour movement was
identified as a religious faith attempting to give practical expression to
the teachings of the world's prophets, most notably those of Christ himself.
Will Chamberlain, a Quaker pacifist and editor of the Town Crier, stated
that he believed:1
the Labour movement to be more truly religious than any Church...
deep down in the heart of the Labour movement there is the same
religious passion for righteousness that burned in the hearts of
those who followed the Carpenter of Nazareth on the shores of
Galilee.
It was a theme he stressed repeatedly and, when asked to give his own personal
definition of socialism, he replied that to him it was:2
a practical interpretation of the principles taught in the Sermon on
the Mount. While the parsons are praying that God's Kingdaii may come
on earth, Socialists are working to bring it into being.
And he concluded by citing a text probably more widely quoted in the Labour
movement than any other:3
"I am come that they may have life, and have it more abundantly" said
the Carpenter of Nazareth. That is the message of Socialism.
1. T.C., 4;5;l925.
2. D. Griffiths (ed.), What Is Socialism? A Symposium (1924), p. 22.
3. ibid.
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Chamberlain may have been in a position of unusual prominence but he
was far from alone in the religious gloss which he gave to his socialism
(nor in his emphasis on Jesus' working-class credentials). Wilfrid Whiteley
acknowledged that while:'
to some Socialism was a political dogma or an economic theory; to
him it came with the emotional power of a religious faith.
Whiteley had abandoned the Church of England in disgust at its lack of
practical concern for the people's welfare but his politics remained
profoundly ethical in inspiration. 2 Jim Sinmons was another impelled into
political action by his belief that the churches were failing to practise
their principles but he remained a lay preacher for the Primitive Methodists
and an avowed Christian Socialist. 3
 Frank Smith (who fought Attercliffe in
1894 and West Birmingham in 1922 and 1923) and Clir. Percy Shurmer were both
past or present members of the Salvation Army. 4
 Socialism in Birmingham,
appropriately given the impact of the nonconformist-inspired Civic Gospel,
was still deeply imbued with religious strains and imagery.
Turning to Sheffield, here too a number of the Labour movennt's
leading figures acted under religious influence. Cecil Wilson was a
Congregationalist Bible Class leader and Sunday School superintendent who
had joined the Labour Party because of his pacifist opposition to the First
World War and because, in his words, it represented 'most nearly as a
political faith the ethics of the New Testament' . 	 Arnold Freeman (the
director of the Sheffield Educational Settlement and Labour's candidate in
Hallam in 1923) was similarly convinced of Labour's calling:6
1. T.C., 18;3;l927.
2. 'An Interview with Wilfrid Whiteley', Bulletin of the Society for the
Study of Labour History, 18, (Spring, 1969).
3. J. Sinmons, Soap-Box Evangelist (Chichester, 1972), p. 9 and passim.
4. For Percy Shurmer, see: J. Bellamy, J. Saville (eds), Dictionary of
Labour Biography, Vol. 2 (1974), pp. 341-42.
5. A.C. Wilson, Cecil Henry Wilson, 1862-1945 (Sheffield N.D.), p. 3 and
passim.
6. S.D.I. , 28;ll;1923.
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The Labour Movement is not Party politics. It is the living,
practical expression of the Christianity of Jesus Christ.
Freeman even went so far as to send copies of the New Testament to his
acquaintances during his election campaign, asking that they might pray for
his success.' Arthur Ponsonby, in his work on Religion in Politics, came
close to implying that socialism might surpass Christianity in its religious
worth:2
Political idealism, indeed, if it be sufficiently elevated, can be
religion in itself. Love, altruism, cooperation, brotherhood,
service, sacrifice, justice, freedom, equality of opportunity,
increasing antagonism to materialism and riches, and a complete and
absolute denial that force should be a regulatory factor in
individual, in national, or in international affairs, is a surer,
more practical, more spiritual, and a loftier creed than the
Apostles, the Nicene and the Athenasian creeds rolled into one.
While Ponsonby was another disillusioned by the conduct of the established
churches, his counterpart in Hilisborough, A.V. Alexander, retained his
.3Christian faith and was a Baptist lay preacher for most of his adult life.
In terms of actual political conduct, the religion of socialism
entailed a difference of style and emphasis with the more secular strands
of Labour ideology even though it had little other practical effect. In
style, it led to a fondness for Biblical allusion and language - the Labour
programne could become the 'Socialist Gospel', an election campaign could
be described as a TGreat Evangel', the 'Cause of Labour' became the 'hope
of the world'. 4
 In emphasis, it led to a stressing of the more messianic
aspirations for Labour's role and economic reforms were considered to be
1. W. Albaya, Through the Green Ior (Sheffield, 1980), p. 34.
2. A. Ponsonby, Religion in Politics (1923), pp. 29-30.
3. Graham Mayhew's research into the religious backgrounds of Labour's M.P.s
shows over half in Birmingham and Sheffield to have had a thorough
grounding in Christianity and religious values which continued to
inspire their politics. See: G.J. Mayhew, 'The Ethical and Religious
Foundations of Socialist Politics in Britain: the First Generation
and their Ideals, 1884-1931', Ph. D. thesis, University of York, 1980,
Appendix.
4. Ladywood Labour News, 25;5;1929; T.C., 30;4;1920.
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'merely material means to a spiritual end' 	 Socialism was not simply to
be a better version of the present society hut something radically different
in kind. When, in June, 1926, Wilfrid Whiteley was asked to address the
monthly delegate meeting of the Birmingham Borough Labour Party, he took as
his subject 'Socialism on Canvass'. He concluded his talk (on the painter,
G.F. Watts) with the admission that:2
if socialism meant only the obtaining of the material things of life,
he should not think it worthwhile. The reason why he wanted to make
it possible for all to have the necessary material things of life
was in order that all could enjoy to the full the real beauty of life.
The religion of socialism took the notion of God's Kingdom on earth, mixed
it with the utopia of William Morris and proclaimed the vision of the
Cooperative Conmonwealth.
It was further reflected in the anti-militarism which was one of
the most sincerely held principles of many Labour activists. During the
First World War, pacifist socialists suffered persecution and imprisonment
for their anti-war beliefs; in the post-war years, conditions were less
harsh and the personal choices less onerous. 3
 Nevertheless, through
resolutions and demonstrations, Labour Party members reaffirmed their belief
in cooperation, negotiation and disarmament and their opposition to the use
of war as a means of solving international disagreements. In addition, many
in Birmingham and Sheffield and many thousands more up and down the country
flocked to sign Arthur Ponsonby's 'Peace Pledge' by which they signified
their personal refusal to take part in military action. Ponsonby himself,
at the meeting in Sheffield which inaugurated his campaign, eloquently
articulated the Labour movement's anti-war sentiments:4
Warfare is not the Wembley tattoo. It is a dirty, foul, criminal
1. Bertram Jacobs speaking at the Sparkhill Labour Church, T.C., 30;4;l920.
2. T.C., 18;6;l926.
3. Jim Siimons, Fred Longden, Harrison Barrow and Will Chamberlain were
among those imprisoned for their anti-war activity. Wilfrid Whiteley
was a Conscientious Objector though exempted by his employment from
military service.
4. S.D.L, l9;lO;l925.
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business and the people who have been through it are behind this
movement to prevent war. Your country does need you - but alive not
dead. It needs your living health and not your rotting corpse, your
full strength and not your shattered body.
From the Birmingham Borough Labour Party's demand for international
arbitration and total disarmament to the Selly Oak Ward Labour Party Women's
Section's call for a ban on toy soldiers and guns, Labour Party activists
made the same plea and evinced the same hope - an aspiration that human
affairs could be ordered by rational discourse and considerations of
humanity.' They were rarely able to put their principles into practice
except, in a small way, in Sheffield where the Labour-controlled City
Council barred the Officers' Training Corps from its schools and cancelled
the annual military tattoo. 2
 Labour's anti-militarist idealism remained
strong until well into the thirties but it was rudely treated and ultimately
shattered by the more brutal principles of Hitler's Nazi dictatorship.
Although the religion of socialism was gradually being superseded by
a more practically-based socialism as the prospects of political power
beckoned and the more optimistic dreams of the pioneers faded, many of the
basic forms of its credo remained integral to Labour practice. The nub of
Labour's strategy remained the conversion of individuals to its cause and
case; in short, on 'making socialists'. Will Chamberlain spoke for many
others when he argued that:3
the only way to the Socialist Commonwealth is to make socialists;
that when we have converted a sufficient number of people to the
justice of our case against the present order, then, and not till
then, it will make way for a better order.
The experience of the Second Labour Government and the d&bcle of 1931
strengthened rather than weakened this analysis. After the full extent of
1. BBLP minutes, lO;5;1928;	 T.C., 4;4;1924.
2. S.D.I., 7;4;l927.
3. T.C., 28;l;l921.
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Labour's defeat had become known, the Town Crier bravely led with the
headline 'Get Ready for Next Time' . 	 To Jim Siniions, the moral was clear:2
If the people had understood Socialism no amount of personal abuse,
of intimidation by bosses or of panic propaganda by opponents and
erstwhile friends would have shifted them - therefore we have got to
make them understand Socialism. It is "back to the soap-box" in
real earnest.
The ideological corollary to this stress on individual conviction was a
deeply ambiguous approach to the question of class. Surprisingly, for a
body whose raison d'etre was the representation of labour, the Labour Party
constantly sought to rebut the charge that it was a class party. As Alfred
Barratt Brown argued:3
we admit the existence of class struggle today but we are out to end
it, not by the transfer of privilege from one class to another, but
by the abolition of privilege and all class distinctions.
Ten years later, his thesis was supported by another exponent of socialism
who nevertheless sought to come to terms with the reality that Labour was
basically a working-class party:4
It is true that we who are Socialists base our appeal to the dustman
more than the millionaire, but that is because the dustman and his
class suffer more under the present system than a millionaire.
As, however, socialism was essentially a 'conviction of mind' and a prograrrme
of action which would benefit all classes, the writer went on, it would be
quite mistaken to denigrate Labour as a solely class-based party. 5 Jim
Sininons, on the Laft of the Party, was nonetheless keen to emphasise in his
1929 election address that Labour was 'the real National Party - its policy
is designed to serve the whole ccmiiunity and not a class'.6
These same attitudes enabled the easy reception and positive welcome
given to such middle- and upper-class incorners to the Labour Party as Mosley
1. T.C., 30;lO;1931.
2. T.C., 13;ll;193l.
3. T.C., 4;6;1920.
4. King's Norton Labour News, February, 1930.
5. ibid.
6. Birmingham Parliamentary Election Literature, BGL; Erdington, 1929.
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and Strachey, Wilson and Ponsonby. On one level, such high status converts
were seen as demonstrating the truth of Labour's contention that it was a
non-class party whose idealism and gcod sense would ultimately win over
people from all strata of society. At another, more psychological than
political, feelings of working-class pride mixed with good old-fashioned
deference. Pride was fortified by the fact that these prestigious converts
had come over to their side, the side of the workers; deference by the
genuine self-confidence and supposed talents of leadership and administration
that the converts possessed.
On the other hand, as argued earlier, Labour's advance rested
principally on its claim, and on its being seen, to better represent working-
class interests than any other party. Against these professions of political
piety should be set the realities of Labour's electoral practice. Labour's
working-class candidates, who still formed by far the largest proportion
of its representatives, repeatedly stressed that their fitness for office
rested on their first-hand knowledge of working-class conditions. The
manifesto of Charles Auger in the municipal elections of 1925 epitomises
this approach:1
In offering myself for election, I desire to say that my only
credential is that of a Working Man who has known what it is to
work for a livelihood ever since the age of 11 years. The majority
of the residents of Ladywood Ward are working people, and it is
because I believe that the experiences I have gained in the Labour
and Trade Union movement will be a service to my own class that I
offer myself as a Labour candidate.
In Sheffield, Cur. Frank Thraves said that he had 'no desire to represent
those who cannot be classed as workers'.2
These attitudes could slide easily into a form of inverted snobbery.
After the disappointment of the defections of Mosley and Strachey, doubts
1. Birmingham Municipal Election Literature, BCL; Ladywood, 1925.
2. S.D.I., l;ll;192l.
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about the trustworthiness of upper-class converts lacking 'groundings in
the work and struggles of the movement' came to the fore.' The Town Crier
was quick to emphasise the working-class origins of Tom May (Strachey's
successor as Labour candidate in Aston):2
He cannot claim Eton or Harrow or Oxford or Cambridge as his Alma
Mater, But he can claim to have been educated in the hard school
of experience.
Insofar as Labour possessed a theory of class, it espoused a broadly
dichotomous class model of society. In the words of a Sheffield Labour
activist, 'From the Labour point of view, there were only two classes -
those who lift and those ho lean'. 3 To Will Chamberlain, Labour was 'the
People's Party.. .fighting the battle of the People against the profiteers
and sweaters and slum-owners and rack-renters and war-mongers'. 4 Two
fundamental ambiguities with important consequences for Labour's theory and
practice resulted from the vagueness of this analysis. The first lay in
Labour's appraisal of the middle-class role in politics. As a result of its
deeply held rationalism and 'faith in the possibilities of human nature',
Labour was unable to ccir to terms with middle-class opposition to its
progranme. Arnold Freeman believed that it was 'only the cowardice and
snobbery of the middle classes' which prevented them supporting Labour.5
Labour's class analysis was designedly not rigorous enough to exclude middle-
class interests but neither was it sophisticated enough to include them. If
'class' was a hazy concept in Labour terminology, 'status' was a non-existent
one and, despite its good intentions, Labour failed to canprehend those
parts of the middle-class value-system that blocked its progress.
The criticism, however, more often levelled at the Labour Party was
1. T.C., 6;3;193l.
2. T.C., 29;5;193l.
3. S.D.I., 27;6;l923.
4. T.C., 3;ll;1922.
5. S.D.I., 28;ll;l923.
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that it failed to mobilise its 'natural' working-class constituency. The
working class was perceived as an essential base of Labour politics but not
as an active agent of change. Labour's commitment to moral and intellectual
conversion and its disavowal of the means of class struggle were rarely
qualified. nen Jim Simmons argued against any attempt to apply Bolshevik
methods in Britain, he urged that 'there was no short cut to Socialism; it
could only come through years of hard work in educating the people up to its
principles'.' Inconsequence, Labour treated working-class consciousness
as an essentially passive phenomenon and it rejected as a means to socialism,
both theoretically and practically, the rapid radicalisation of the working
class that might result from their involvement in political or economic
dispute. The 'dialectic' is probably more properly assessed in its role
as a political myth than by its 'scientific' validity or otherwise, but it
did give the Communists a sense of dynamic change more constructive than the
naive evolutionism corirnon in Labour circles.
Labour's dependence on 'making socialists' as its sole strategy of
political transformation also brought deep disillusionment when change was
slow or regressive. Though, in most regards, Labour activists tried to see
the best in human nature, they were seldom in any doubt about one of its
chief vices - gullibility. Public opinion was viewed as almost entirely
the product of capitalist manipulation. In Unionist Birmingham, the
frustration of Will Chamberlain was perhaps understandable when he wrote:2
The task of educating our fellows in the face of the mass propaganda
methods of the anti-Labour forces in control of the Press, the
Pulpit, the Pub and every other instrument capable of being used in
their attacks on Labour is.. .almost hopeless at times.
But, while some gave way to resignation in the face of the apparently
overwhelming forces arrayed against them, others turned against those they
1. T.C., 6;2;1920.
2. T.C., 17;9;1920.
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were out to help. 'Socialist', writing in the King's Norton Labour News,
allowed contempt and conceit to mix in unhealthy measure with the obvious
anguish he felt in the bleak days of 1931. It's hardly a typical passage
but it'sworth quoting at length as an illustration of the more troubled
side of Labour's relationship with its class:'
I know a man to whom the fortunes of a certain football team are of
more absorbing interest than any Government legislation against
Trade Unions; to whom the fortunes of a certain centre forward are
of greater concern than any municipal election...
Of the causes of crime, disease, degradation, and famine, he is
completely ignorant. He does not want to know. He is content. He
wallows in his ignorance...
Imagine a wall of solid rock, a hundred yards thick, a hundred yards
long, nd a hundred yards high. . . inmy more despairing moments, I
liken the mind of a large section of my class to that wall.
It rears itself up like some hideous monster, and blots out all
hope and sunshine. It rears itself up and grins at you, grins
cynically, maddeningly, sickeningly...
The Wall! You areunder the Wall!!
The Wall is there and on the other side is Socialism...
What are we to do, we who have seen the light?
And there, in that final sentence, lay both the source of 'Socialist's'
anger and its consolation - anger that the vision which he had caught could
be ignoredand denied by others, consolation that he had caught the vision
just as others surely would in the future.
For the more zealous adherents of the Cooperative Conmjnwealth, there
was a sense of election which was not diminished and might, indeed, be
augmented by their Party's more secular faiJures in contemporary elections.
Alfred Barratt Brown warned the socialist convert that their faith would:2
mean no easy life - it will mean the opposition of every selfish
interest, the contempt of worldly men, unpopularity, perhaps
imprisonment and persecution; but it will mean something all men
can do to you - the fellowship of loyal comrades, the joy of
serving a great Cause, and the triumphant certainty that though
you fail time and time again, the Cauae cannot fail in the end,
because it is the hope of the world, and the gates of Hell cannot
prevail against it.
In these quasi-religious and hyperbolic terms, Barratt Brown expressed a
1. King' s Norton Labour News, November, 1931.
2. TC., 4;6;1920.
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basic sentiment, widely held in the Labour movement, that their cause was
right and that right would win out. It was a sentiment that gave heart
even, or perhaps especially, in Tory-dominated Birmingham where Will
Chamberlain was always eager to assure Party workers, should their spirits
flag, that even the 'stars in their courses' were fighting on the side of
Labour.' Given Labour's appalling electoral record in Birmingham, it must
have been reassuring, if not always convincing, to learn that:2
whatever temporary hindrances the Labour movement can experience,
it can never experience defeat. Its onward march is as inevitable
as the march of Time.
In Sheffield, of course, such reassurances were not so necessary and the
Party even had the audacity to admit, in 1930, that it had perhaps reached
the plateau of its support and further advance could not realistically be
expected. 3
 In Birmingham, such talk would have savoured of sacrilege and
would have seemed a denial of the very hopes which motivated and sustained
the Labour Party's arduous struggle. In this, as in much else, the Labour
activists of Sheffield could afford to be more matter-of-fact. Pointedly,
the exception to this was in Hallam where, after his defeat in the 1929
General Election, the Labour candidate, Basil Rawson, was quick to point out
that 'the result of the fight, apart from the numerical result, had been a
Socialist victory' because of the new converts won to the cause.4
Two factors gave practical edge and impetus to Labour's frequently
proclaimed belief in its final certain victory. One, at least up to 1931,
was the constant incremental rise in the Party's popular vote. The other
was the perceived growth of socialism in practice through the rise of
municipal enterprise and state intervention. The Labour candidate in the
Ecciesall municipal by-election in l924:
1. T.C., 17;9;l920.
2. T.C., 31;lO;1924.
3. SFTLC minutes, 'Report on result of Municipal Elections, November, 1930',
l7;l;l931.
4. S.D.I., 31;5;1929.
5. S.D.I., 31;10;l924
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urged her hearers not to be afraid of Labour or socialism.
Socialism was already in operation in many things, including the
trams, the electric supply, the water and the schools, and they
only wanted to get the other things by a gradual process of
evolution.
Socialism not only would work, it did work and Labour supporters could not
believe that the principles of conmon ownership and conmunal control so
successfully applied locally and applied unavoidably during the War would
not be extended as the failure of free-market capitalism became increasingly
undeniable.'
The keystone of Labour's political philosophy was its comnitment to
the conversion to socialism of a majority of the population. The
methodological corollary to this was a virtually unshakeable allegiance to
the electoral road to power; parliamentary government seemed the best and
fairest instrument of majority rule, while the individual ballot seemed to
represent in microcosm the process of rational and conscious choice that
ought to underlie representative government.
It is, however, worth recording one exception to this generalisation.
In 1919, the Attercliffe branch of the ILP urged its national leadership to
adopt a nre radical constitution and it suggested that all references to
'Conrnonwealth' in the Party's progranm be deleted and replaced by the words
'Soviet Republic'. The Attercl iffe branch further argued that the
constitution should state openly that the ILP was a 'revolutionary political
organisation' whose ultimate object was the establishment of a 'socialist
Soviet Republic'	 But the branch hardly reflected this revolutionism in
its actual political practice. It continued to actively support the Labour
Party and went so far as to support unanimously a proposal that Cecil Wilson
(who was certainly not a revolutionary) should stand as Labour's
1. 4pg's Norton Labour News, November, 1929.
2. Attercliffe ILP minutes, 15;l;19l9.
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parliamentary candidate in Attercliffe.' Without wishing to belittle the
genuine radicalism and militancy which fired Labour's supporters in the
inirdiate post-war years, it is clear that Attercliffe's corTinitment to
Soviet principles owed more to enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution and
rhetorical excess than it did to any real support for, or understanding of,
Bolshevik ideology. Certainly, it is the case that, though a few members
of the branch subsequently joined the Communist Party, most remained active
in the Labour Party, and on the dissolution of the branch in 1923 its funds
and resources were donated en bloc to the local Labour Party. 2 The episode
was an exception to the Labour movement's constitutionalism which, in fact,
proved the rule.
Labour's committed adherence to electoralism and 'bourgeois'
democracy has been criticised by many, but, by its own criteria, these were
the ideal means by which to achieve its genuinely democratic ends. As a
matter of principle, Labour wished to spread and share its ideology; it
wanted to represent the majority by their own volition and sanction and did
not conceive that it could rule 'objectively' in their interests while, in
fact, being opposed by the mass of the population.
Against the Communist critique that the State was in capitalist
hands and would remain so even after Labour had won a parliamentary majority,
Labour reaffftmed its belief in the power and legitimacy of education alone
to overcome capitalist opposition. Ernest Green, editor of the Sheffield
Forward, argued:3
That the capitalists have captured all the machinery which governs
the "State" is undeniable but that is entirely the fault of the
Henry Dubbs who acquiesce every time they have a chance to vote...
And any Labour Government returned would realize that when it had
obtained office, its next step must be to obtain power, and that
could come only as they found themselves backed by an educated,
intelligent democracy.
1. Attercliffe ILP minutes, ll;8;1919.
2. ibid., 29;9;1922; 22;4;1923.
3. S.F., September, 1923.
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The case was put even nore explicitly by the Selly Oak ILP in a discussion
of the likelihood of revolution in Britain:'
The general trend of opinion was that any real attempt by a Socialist
government to adopt Socialist legislation would be resisted
violently by the Capitalist class and their dependents.
But this gloomy assessment did not lead to notions of armed workers and
revolutionary justice. Instead:2
The conclusion was drawn that the only safeguard against such a
happening lay in the work of the ILP and in ceaseless propaganda
to create Socialists.
Labour's belief in political rationalism and, more particularly, in the
sense of fair play of the British upper classes was overwhelming and
enabled the Party to sidestep a real and worthwhile issue raised by the
Marxists in their concentration on the non-accountable but ultimately
decisive economic power held in private hands. Labour ignored the very
real problems it would face in any attempted transition to socialism and
turned the argument (admittedly with the complicity of not a little
posturing revolutionism by some in the Corrrnunist Party) into one between
the advocates and opponents of force. Labour stood four-square behind the
methods of peaceful persuasion and justified its position by both moral
and practical arguments. Percival Bower, a Labour alderman in Birmingham,
reiterated a point widely made in Labour circles:3
if we cannot convince our class to fire ballot papers into the
ballot box in support of men and women from their own ranks, we
shall not get them to face machine guns.
In any case, it would be an uneven contest; 'pocket knives against aircraft
and resolutions against mustard gas', according to one Birmingham activist.4
Ernest Green concluded his defence of Labour's strategy with a sharp attack
on Bolshevik tactics:5
1. T.C., 23;8;l929.
2. ibid.
3. T.C., 5;8;l92l.
4. Letter from Walter Hill, T.C., 19;ll;l920.
5. S.F., September, 1923.
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You cannot transform the Proletariat" by giving them a gun instead
of a vote. If they were as skilful with the gun as they have been
with the vote, God help the men behind as well as those in front...
Education is the only weapon which can destroy capitalism and make
freedom possible. Not the freedom of the Coimiunist armed coup,
freedom forced by authority and enforced by brutality but freedom
obtained by sanction of majority opinion and made secure by the
voice of the majority.
In our period, Labour made just one exception to its proscription of
direct action and it occurred, with a certain irony, not in the General
Strike which (despite Government propaganda) was never anything more than a
sympathetic action on behalf of the miners, but in defence of the Russian
Revolution. In August, 1920, the threat of British intervention on the
side of Poland in its war with Soviet Russia led to an unparalleled display
of working-class opposition. 'Councils of Action' sprang up throughout the
country with the object of pursuing a down-tools policy should war become
likely. The upsurge may have been actuated chiefly by a repulsion against
the idea of war itself but the political implications of a deeply unpopular
right-wing Government taking action against the only socialist country in
the world were not lost on the mass of workers. For once, Labour could
seize the initiative, knowing that it was leading a popular crusade against
a Government whose legitimacy was doubted and whose policies were profoundly
distrusted. As Gertrude Wilkinson, president of the Sheffield Federated
.1Trades and Labour Council, put it:
If they found themselves in the hands of autocrats who were prepared
to enter into conTnitrments and then lie to the House of Coninons and
the country, then action had to be taken.
Labour felt itself on sure ground because, as well as speaking for a genuine
fear of renewed war, it could also claim to be defending the democratic
process - both in this country and, it was thought, in Russia.
1.	 S.D.I., 25;8;1920.
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The years 1919 and 1920 saw the high-water mark of direct actionism
in the British Labour movement. Lloyd George's massive Coalition majority
was felt to result from an electoral confidence trick, subsequently exposed
by the reactionary policies pursued by the Government since the election.
The impotence and ineffectualness of Labour's small parliamentary Opposition
increased the frustrations of the Labour movement's rank and file, while
social and economic circumstances were unusually favourable to the
possibilities of militant working-class action. But, even at this juncture,
Labour did not seek to undermine parliamentary democracy but sought rather
to defend and extend it. In 1919, the Birmingham Borough Labour Party was
at its most militant in demanding that the Labour Party and the TUC call a
general strike but, as the text of its resolution makes clear, it wanted to
safeguard the parliamentary road, not by-pass it:1
the British Government and Parliament, having broken their pledges
given at the General Election, having treated the will of the people
with contempt, and now having made open war on trades unionism and
liberty of opinion by their new Police Act, there remains only one
legitimate and peaceful method by which democracy can maintain its
authority - namely a general strike.
At best, direct action was conceived of as a reactive and corrective measure
rather than a constructive one.2
Labour's ethical socialism and its deeply ingrained constitutionalism
led to an optimistic, and perhaps naive, assessment of the possibilities for
uncontested change in Britain's capitalist economy and parliamentary
democracy. Its socialism could not give it the grasp of realpolitik
necessary to transform its dreams of change into a machinery of change.
But, if Labour did fail, it failed through the defects of its virtues,
through its trust of the people and its unwillingness ever to go against or
beyond their aspirations.
1. National Labour Party archives, JSM/STR/24; Enclosed in letter from
F.W. Rudland to Arthur Henderson, 15;8;19l9.
2. See: J.E. Southall in T.C., 3;l0;1919.
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7.4 Labour's Politics
Labour's constitutionalism found its political reflection in the
Party's strategy of social and economic transition. By its comitment to
the democratic process and rational persuasion, Labour had no option but to
campaign for and stand on a policy of piecemeal reform. Labour was a
reformist party; the nature of its ethos and ideology, the circumstances
of its birth and growth, ensured that it could never be and would never
desire to be anything else.
It was this fundamental and pervasive reformism that held the Party
together and gave it its rationale and momentum. Whatever the deeper
differences of ideology and goal which divided the Party's membership, all
could unite around the basic objective of reform. To some that came into
the Party from the trade union side, their adhesion to Labour might signify
little more than a coffmitment to the practical but limited improvement of
working-class conditions; their support of the Party rested on its
representation of class interests and its progrann of state and municipal
action. To others, conrnitted to a vision of the Cooperative Corrninwealth,
the Labour Party was a necessary but inadequate vehicle towards that
distant goal. But because it was a distant goal, because they sought to
educate and win over the electorate in the meanwhile, and because, basically,
they were working-class activists with working-class interests at heart, the
socialists too were pledged to the inrrdiate and concrete amelioration of
working-class circumstances. Thus it was that the Labour movement as a
whole could unite behind the cause of workers engaged, even for the most
materialistic of reasons, in industrial action. Thus it was that Eli
Stevens, a right-wing official of the National Society of Brass and Metal
Mechanics, and Percy Shurmer, a left-wing socialist, could campaign with
equal sincerity and zeal for lighting in the courts of their working-class
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constituents. In the rambling structure of Labour Party belief, class
interest and class sympathy were the cement and reform, the basic building
material.
As regards Labour's specific proposals, except insofar as they
required conscious ameliorative intervention by the national and local
authorities, they could rarely be described as socialist; they were
concerned to remedy the practical problems and deficiencies of the status
quo and only rarely threatened its fundamentals. National policies, with
scarce exceptions, were handed down from above - the membership campaigned
on the nationalisation of the mines and railways, the capital levy and
suchlike, as the leadership and Conference determined. It is perhaps,
therefore, in local politics that the true nature of the Labour rank and
file's socialism is best seen, and in this respect, though their proximity
to political power was at wide variance, the Birmingham and Sheffield Labour
movements were as one.
Labour fought for concrete, limited improvements in working-class
life. The abolition of privy middens and fixed ashpits occupied a far more
prominent place in its prograrms than did dreams of universal brotherhood
and peace; its electoral appeal and call to action was based on the need
for more houses, better health care and more efficient municipal services.
Insofar as these proposals added up to any uniform or comprehensive
progranrn., they sought (in the words of the Sheffield Labour Party's
municipal election manifesto in 1920)J
a Healthier City, the Abolition of SLadom and Poverty, equal
Opportunities for All, and the lot of all working men, women and
children made f at happier and brighter than it has been in the past.
Of 217 Labour local election addresses retained by Birmingham Central
Library from the period 1919-1931, just 18 made a specific verbal
1. Newspaper Cuttings Relating to Sheffield, vol. 22, SCL.
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coninitment to socialism; the others were dominated by the imiiediate
demands and issues before the electorate. The most ideological of the
policies regularly proclaimed in the manifestos was Labour's support for
the principle of municipal enterprise and direct labour - one third of the
Birmingham addresses made reference to this.
This practicality was, of course, Labour's strength; it was the
point at which its socialism moved from that never-never land of hope and
vision to become real, practicable and appealing in the eyes of many
ordinary members of the working class. At the parliamentary level, the
major part of the Parliamentary Labour Party's work, which lay in the support
and furtherance of sympathetic state action to improve working-class living
standards, was simply this practical reformism writ large. Though there
were differences in emphasis and style between the Labour leadership and
the Party's membership in the country, it would be mistaken to juxtapose
these two elements in any simple opposition.
If, however, we are to judge the Labour Party by its failure to
achieve socialism (not, it should be stated, an unusual failure), it must
be admitted that the Party's reformism manifested one marked failing - it
lacked an applicable strategy for the economic reform of capitalism. Labour
showed some skill at the national arid, more particularly, at the local level
in treating the symptoms of capitalism's pathology, but it left their root
cause untouched.
There were two basic elements in the Labour Party's economic
thinking. One comprised essentially a refusal of economic thought and
amounted to a belief that, when the electorate was sufficiently educated to
support socialism, problems of production and distribution would be easily
solved by the simple application of human rationality. It was expressed
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very plainly by Jim Simmons who stated that:1
If the wealth producers owned the means of production, they would
own the wealth when it was produced and control the distribution
of that wealth, thus solving the poverty problem.
The actual mechanics of socialist ownership and planning remained, to say
the least, obscure and, though other writers recognised the omission and
sought to remedy it, their solutions do not seem capable of easy
translationinto functioning reality. Fred Longden envisaged that it would
be possible under socialism:2
to place into the hands of the technical and other worker staffs
the internal management of the industries in which they work.
Each industry would be linked up with every other centrally. The
consumers also would be organised, and therewould be periodic
consultations between the two central authorities.
It is easy to sympathise with those, inspired or even dazzled by a vision
of socialism, who lacked the incentive or ability to plan the nuts and bolts
of the new social order they desired. Indeed, to many, even to have attempted
to do so would have been to demonstrate a lack of faith in the possibilities
of human nature and an unhealthily 'materialistic' turn of mind. Belief in
socialism, bolstered by a certainty of its inevitability, was sufficient.
The other broad element in the Labour Party's economics was based
on the underconsumptionist analysis of capitalism and sought to transform
the capitalist economy through control of its demand side. From this
ccxmn starting point, a number of strands developed. That which had the
widest impact among Labour' s rank and file was the 'Living Wage' prograrrme
put forward by the ILP in the mid-l920s. In this, it was proposed that a
future Labour Government should lay down statutory regulations enforcing a
high wage policy throughout industry; those industries which were unable
or unwilling to implement the necessary increases would be forced to
re-organise or, if sufficiently important, be nationalised. It was an
1. Simons Papers, vol. 6; Lecture notes on 'Keir Hardie's Socialism'.
2. F. Longden, Why This Unemployment? A Socialist View of Its Origin and
Solution (1924), p. 10.
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attractive plan to many in the Labour Party, combining as it did the
concrete appeal of high wages with their longer-term hopes for the
socialisation of the banks and industry, and it received widespread support
both in the ILP and in the main body of the Party itself. The Birmingham
Borough Labour Party was among the more important groups to endorse its
1proposals.
The policy which had particular impact in Birmingham, however, and
to which the city even gave its name was the plan for credit and currency
control espoused by Oswald Mosley and John Strachey in the so-called
'Birmingham Proposals'. These too urged that socialist attempts to take
control of industry should be supported by a policy to increase effective
demand by augmenting workers' incomes. They went further, however, in
arguing that the initial increase in national demand should be effected by
the distribution of producers' credits, made possible by the public
ownership and control of the Bank of England and the five main joint-stock
banks.2
In the preface to his exposition of the Proposals, John Strachey
gave the initial credit for their formulation to Mosley but he went on to
say that they were 'much discussed and considerably developed. . .by both the
Birmingham Borough Labour Party and the ILP Federation' . 	 In attempting
to assess the real input of the local Labour movement, it is important to
bear in mind, first of all, Mosley's dominating and charismatic personality
and his desire to build up a local power-base for his policies and career.
Mosley was anxIous to flatter the Birmingham Labour movement and suggested
at an early stage that it should develop its own policies and return its
own 'ginger group' of M.P.s to further their enactment. 4
 With hindsight,
1. BBLP minutes, 13;9;1928.
2. J. Strachey, Revolution by Reason (1925).
3. ibid., p. viii.
4. T.C., 12;9;1924.
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perhaps unfairly, this would seem to have been primarily a means of
securing a wider influence for his own ideas and role. On the other hand,
it is interesting to note that both the Ladywood ILP and the Birmingham ILP
Federation passed resolutions for the nationalisation of banking and the
public control of credit in the weeks before Mosley's adoption as Labour
candidate in Ladywood.' There would, then, appear to have been some
genuine cross-fertilisation of ideas, and, when the Proposals came before
the Borough Labour Party, there was a real debate as to their worth. A
section of the Party was distrustful of Mosley's scheme, claiming it was
designed to bolster up capitalism rather than take contol of the means of
production which they deemed the authentic socialist solution to the
problems of capitalism. In the event, though, the persuasive abilities of
Mosley and Strachey won the day and the Proposals were endorsed by 65 votes
2to 14.	 Thenceforth, Mosley could fairly claim the support of the
Birmingham movement for his proposals while the local movement could
legitimately feel some sense of proprietorial interest in their progress.
How far the ordinary member comprehended or went along with their more
sophisticated reasoning must remain a moot point, though the position of
Will Chamberlain, who supported the Proposals because they appeared 'to his
lay mind to be based on caimn sense and practicability', was probably not
atypicaL3
To a large extent, the adoption of such specific economic policies
depended on the initiative of forceful individuals. Mosley's predecessor
in Ladywood, Dr. Robert Dunstan, was an enthusiast for the confiscation of
the land and its restoration (on lease) to its rightful owners, the
agricultural workers. It seems an unlikely policy for the Birmingham
1. T.C., 27;6;1924;	 ll;7;1924.
2. T.C., lO;7;1925;	 BBLP minutes, ll;6;1925; 2;7;1925.
3. T.C., ll;12;1925.
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movement to take up but it led briefly to the establishrixnt of a Birmingham
Land Restoration Committee and received the endorsement of the Borough
Labour Party and the I Federation 	 Subsequently, interest in land
restoration faded as quickly as Dunstan's influence in the local movement
declined. In the same way, the Birmingham Proposals took a back seat once
Mosley's local role diminished and his own political interests moved to
other fields. An analogous instance from the Sheffield Labour movement is
provided by the temporary support given by the City Council Labour Group to
Cllr. Alfred Barton's scheme for a municipal currency in 1919.2 Nothing
further was heard of the plan when, seven years later, Labour assumed office.
It seems fair to conclude that the average Labour Party member's
interest in practical economics was slight and his approach to concrete
proposals complaisant. The economic weakness of Labour's anti-capitalist
critique was matched, in the vast majority of its supporters, by the almost
complete lack of serious thinking on the means towards socialist transition.
The only excuse for this was that, in the interwar period, Labour never
formed a majority government. This, to most people in the Party, also
excused a great deal else.
There was, however, a section in the Labour movement who did not find
this excuse convincing. They felt that the plea of Labour's minority
position, the argument that not until the Party had the backing of a
socialist majority in the country could it take radical action, was being
used as a cloak to conceal what were, in fact, the genuinely right-wing and
reactionary propensities of those in the leadership.
The ILP was always the principal base of the more radical elements
in the Party but it was supplemented by a number of other ad hoc bodies
1. T.C., 22;6;l923; l9;1O;1923;	 BBLP minutes, 27;3;l923.
2. A. Barton, The Burden of Interest and How to Avoid It (Sheffield, 1920);
S.D.I., l0;12;19l9.
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used by left-wingers to organise and publicise t'rieir position. The Councils
of Action founded in Birmingham and Sheffield were one such body. Though
initially an organ of the entire Movement, they came, as the inmdiate
threat of hostilities declined, to be a powerful vehicle of left-wing
propaganda and prescriptions. The Birmingham Council of Action, with its
resolutions in November, 1920 calling for a general strike to enforce both
trade with Russia and peace in Ireland, was one of the most radical in the
country and, under the peculiar circumstances of the time, achieved a marked
degree of influence within the local Movement.' The work of the Councils
of Action was backed up by the 'Hands Off Russia' Caiirnittees founded in both
cities in 1919.2 Again, it was that in Birmingham which had the longer
and more radical existence, contLnuing to issue pro-Soviet propaganda, while
increasingly dominated by the Cormunists, until 1924	 One other vehicle
of the Party's left-wing in Birmingham, one which appears not to have been
replicated in Sheffield, was the Herald League (initially established to
promote Lansbury's daily newspaper) which claimed to be a forum where
'Labour men and Socialists of all shades of opinion will find a comon
platform'. 4 The Birmingham branch stood well to the left of the Party's
mainstream and was eventually dissolved by the paper's management in 1927
by which time it had become almost entirely a vehicle of Corruunist
intervention.5
Whilst it would be unfair and erroneous to treat these manifestations
of dissent from orthodox Labour politics as the result of 'extremist'
manipulation, it is true to say that in the early 1920s they represented a
1. BTC minutes, Council of Action 12;ll;l920; ].8;11;1920;
National Labour Party archives, CA/GEN/748, CA/GEN/757, CA/GEN/786;
letters from F.W. Rudland, 18;l1;1920; 19;1l;1920; 23;ll;l920.
2. Sheffield ILP minutes, 24;ll;1919; 	 T.C., 28;1l;19l9.
3. T.C., 11;7;1924; 	 28;ll;1924.
4. T.C., 4;11;1921.
5. BBLP minutes, 28;ll;l922; 18;9;1924; 29;8;1927.
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strand of Labour politics which was fairly small and isolated. The strand
received impetus, however, from the conduct of the 1924 Labour Government.
While most in the Party took pride In the MacDonald Government's
responsible and 'statesmanlike' direction of policy, the more uncompromising
socialists condemned the style of Labour's administration. The Birmingham
ILPer, Joseph Southall, wrote that:'
Amid banquets and garden parties, ceremonies and obsequious bowings
(to the infinite amusement of the aristocracy) we played at being
imperial statesmen and gentlemen. . .Labour had literally been knocked
into a cocked hat.
To those on the Left, the court-dress and the hob-nobbing with the upper
classes symboliLsed a drift by Labour away from its class roots and instincts.
To them, Labour was being 'Liberalised', it was becoming middle-class and
'respectable' 2
The National Left-Wing Movement represented a response to these
misgivings. As a national movement, it existed primarily as an instrument
of Comunist policy towards the Labour Party but at the local level it did
reflect an authentic rank and file reaction to trends in Labour politics.
This was particularly the case in Birmingham where a number of specifically
local issues gave point and moinantun to the wider fears of right-wing
treachery. In fact, the Birmingham Left-Wing Group was founded one year
before the national organisation at a meeting in December, 1924 at which the
main speakers were Southall, Jim Sirrimns, Fred Longden and Percy Shunner.3
The issue which became the principal focus of left-wing dissent in
Birmingham was the question of Labour's reaction to the candidature of Dr.
1. J .E. Southall, 'Margate and the Left Wing', Labour Monthiy, 8, 10,
(October, 1926).
Southall was a well-known artist and a cousin of George Cadbury Jr. As
a Quaker, he was a coniuitted pacifist but he combined this Conviction
with a militant left-wing politics. He remained an officer of the
Birmingham City branch of the ILP until his death in 1941. See als9:
J. Bellamy, J. Saville (eds), Dictionary of Labour Biography, vol 5
(1979), pp. 200-05.
2. Leaflet of Sheffield Labour Party Provisional Left-Wing Coninittee, April,
1926 (In possession of Mr. W. Moore).
3. T.C., 5;l2;l924.
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Robert Dunstan in West Birmingham. Dunstan had resigned from the Labour
Party in July, 1924 and had joined the Conimnist Party. He was inrradiate1y
repudiated as Labour's candidate for Ladywood and Oswald Mosley was adopted
his successor just four days later.' Dunstan then seized the opportunity
provided by a vacancy in West Birmingham (where the Divisional Labour Party
had recently decided to replace the ageing Frank Smith) to stand as an
unofficial 'Workers' Candidate'. Labour was unable and unwilling to field
an opponent in the 1924 General Election and Duns tan had secured over 7000
votes.
There is no doubt that Dunstan, who was a popular figure in Labour
circles in Birmingham, enjoyed the support of a large number of Party
members and the decision, in March, 1925, to adopt an official Labour
candidate in the West Birmingham constituency was widely resented.2
Prominent Labour activists continued to support Dunstan until, ultimately,
the Borough Labour Party rived to threaten expulsions. At this point, the
conflict erupted into a wider crisis when Joseph Southall published an
3
article in the Sunday Worker, luridly headlined:
Two Rich Men Who Control a Local Labour Party
How Wealthy Employers Plan Dictatorship
In it, he alleged that the trouble in West Birmingham arose from the attempts
of George Cadbury Jr. and Harrison Barrow (appearing under the soubriquets
'Mr. A' and 'Mr. B') to foist their own pliant candidate and right-wing
policies on the rank and file. Their influence was all the nxre sinister
4because:
a local newspaper (nominally Labour), the Town Crier, is heavily
subsidised by A, and most of the salary of the local organiser comes
from the same source, and the rent of his office is paid by B.
1. B.C., 15;7;1924; Birmingham Despatch, 19;7;1924.
2. B.P., 13;3;1925.
3. Sunday Worker, 20;ll;1927.
4. ibid.
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This, to Southall, was evidence that 'capitalists and their retainers'
were seeking 'to buy up and control the Workers' Party'.
Southall and others continued to oppose the official Labour candidate
in West Birmingham and continued to use the columns of the Sunday Worker to
expose the right-wing machinations apparently corrupting the Birmingham
Labour Party.' At the end of 1927, this behaviour led to their expulsion
2from the Labour Party.	 When two Divisional Labour Parties, Moseley and
Edgbaston, refused to implement this decision, their disaffiliation duly
followed and new loyal parties were established in their stead. 3 After
this, the dissension in the Birmingham movement quietenedthoughit found a
lingering echo in the candidature of George Bridgen as an unofficial 'Left-
Wing Labour' candidate for Moseley in the 1929 General Election. (Ironically,
Dunstan, whose candidature in West Birmingham had sparked off the whole
dispute, was withdrawn and he stood as a Cotununist candidate in South-West
Bethnal Green.)
It is worthwhile attempting to put this episode into some kind of
perspective for it sheds valuable light on the nature of the Labour rank
and file's politics and the platform of the Left. In the first place, it
is clear that, though the pro-Dunstan elements were prominent enough to
gain a lot of publicity, they represented, in fact, very much a minority
current. The West Birmingham Divisional Labour Party consistently rejected
any concessions to Dunstan and his supporters and, as the advocates of the
orthodox positioi always pointed out, the latter can from outside the
Division. 4 It is also significant that the two parties expelled came from
from the most middle-class areas of Birmingham, it being a legitimate
inference that these parties were the weakest and the most open to
1. Sunday Worker, 4; 12; 1927; ll;12;l927; 1O;2;1928; 25;3;1928.
2. BBLP minutes, 28;11;l927; 8;l2;1927.
3. BBLP minutes, 14;6;1928; 20;6;l928; 2l;6;1928.
4. BBLP minutes, 3l;5;1926; 9;6;l926.
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danination by small numbers. Even in these cases, two out of the three
ward branches in each constituency were loyal to the Borough Labour Party.'
The point to be made is not that the revolt was less than genuine but that
it was small-scale.
One of the outstanding traits of the Labour Party was the loyalty
accorded to the Movement's duly constituted leadership and procedures.
Once an official candidate was properly selected and endorsed, the ordinary
members felt honour-bound to give him or her their support. Thus both Jim
Sirrmons and the secretary of the West Birmingham Divisional Party, who had
formerly backed Dunstan's campaign, withdrew their backing once a Labour
candidate had been selected. 2
 This was both the cause and the effect of a
situation in which the Left could easily be isolated as disruptionist and
anti-democratic critics of the majority line. The Left went sane way to
confirming the operation of this factor by its own tendency to personalise
issues and attack individuals. Labour supporters usually closed ranks
against this sort of ad hominem criticism and a good deal of the Left's
critique of leading personalities in the Party was counter-productive.
Perhaps more seriously for the Left, this style of attack reflected
an inability to put forward a genuine alternative to Labour's contemporary
strategy. A textual analysis of the official prograrrrne of the Birmingham
Left-Wing Group illustrates this argument; its proclaimed purpose was:3
To work for a peaceful revolution based on the class struggle, by
a great change of opinion in the masses, and thus to replace
Capitalism and Imperialism by Socialism and the Union of the Workers
of the whole World. To establish peace and abolish standing armies,
navies and Air Forces. To use both united industrial and political
action. To give the worker the fruit of his toil and to end
exploitation of man by man by the workers' control of industry. To
insist on full and equal rights for the Comnunists as members of the
Labour Party and control of the Parliamentary leaders by the rank
and file.
1. BBLP minutes, 20;6;1928; 21;6;l928.
2. T.C., lO;4;1925; B.P., 13;3;1925.
3. B.P., l8;9;1925.
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This was a curious jumble of a programme. It was certainly more 'class
conscious' in its rhetoric, in its espousal of the class struggle and in its
proposal of cooperation with the Conrnunists. It was more 'radical' in the
depth and range of its demands and its willingness to counter the use of
industrial action for political ends. Yet, in the final analysis, its
prograrnie too depended ultimately On the conversion of a majority. As a
result, the thrust of its attack on the Labour orthodoxy was blunted; for
most Labour activists, the necessity remained the winning of converts and
criticism of the leadership was idle and mischievous until such time as
Labour comanded majority support in the country.
The Sheffield conmittee of the Left-Wing Movement was established
at a conference attended by over 160 delegates in September, 1926. It was,
though, far more the creation of national political dynamics and it appears
to have led a moribund existence after the initial enthusiasm of its
founding. 1 This would seem to be another instance where left-wing dissent
was stronger in Birmingham than in Sheffield but, though correct on one
level, such a judgment tends to ignore the deeper realities of the Sheffield
movement. Organisations specifically of the Left were certainly less
visible and active in Sheffield than in Birmingham but this was primarily
because the Left had a greater role in Lhe mainstream of the local movement.
Working-class politics as a whole were stronger and more self-confident in
the Yoikshire city and, in a context where Labour was rapidly rising to and
then exercising power, differences between Right and Left were far more
easily merged in an overall preoccupation with practical issues and policies..
By contrast, in Birmingham the prospects of office were remote, frustrations
were greater, and the room allowed and available to internal debate
consequently larger. The political and financial weaknesses of the
1. S.F., October, 1926.
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Birmingham Labour movement contributed to a situation in which personal
and ideological differences assumed a greater importance and raised issues
(such as those which came to the fore in the Dunstan affair concerning
patronage and right-wing manipulation) which the greater strength and
easier political cooperation of the Sheffield Movement largely precluded in
the first place.
Left-wing dissent in the Party as a whole revived once more during
the period of the Second Labour Government. Now, more than ever, the
caution and orthodoxy of the Labour leadership was defended by reference to
the Government's minority position and the need to win over, as yet, non-
Labour voters. To many in the Party, these excuses were wearing thin. J.A.
Aplin, the secretary of the Birmingham ILP Federation, expressed the Left's
position well:1
the stage of public propaganda work is now almost past, and the
merits and demerits of the Socialist case will be judged by the
success or otherwise of a Socialist Government. Success can only
come in one way and that is not by being ultra-cautious, by
continuous compromises with Capitalism or by fearing to grapple
with great problems.
In practical terms, those that remained in the ILP signalled their
criticism of the Government by supporting Maxton and the ILP Parliamentary
Group in their policy of opposing Labour enactments which were held to
undermine working-class conditions and rights. In both Birmingham and
Sheffield, the majority of the ILP rank and file endorsed the Maxton line.2
Those that did not had, of course, already distanced themselves from the ILP
and included such prominent figures as Jim Sirrrnons, Wilfrid Whiteley, Cecil
Wilson and Arthur Ponsonby. John Strachey was the only local M.P. to join
the 18-strong ILP Parliamentary Group.
2.	 24;l;1930; Preliminary Agenda of Resolutions...ILP Conference,
jpgp19Q, p. 22;
SF'TLC minutes, LP EC 2l;7;1931.
1. T.C., 14;2;l930.
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The ambiguity of its position which had plagued the ILP ever since
the Labour Party had adopted the 1918 Constitution (with its socialist
commitment and provision for individual membership) had now care hone to
roost. For a number of years, it had been sufficient to argue that the ILP's
role was to propagandise while the Labour Party concerned itself with
organisation and electoral work. As Will Chamberlain put it:'
The function of the ILP is to make Socialists and to prepare the
workers for the caning of Socialism. That work must of necessity
be undertaken by men and women whose minds are clear on the
fundamentals of socialism and whose activities are not mainly
concerned with the equally necessary work of organising Labour
opinion in the mass and translating it into votes at election times.
This was, in truth, never a convincing solution to the problem nor a
practicable division of labour. The convinced socialists of the ILP wanted
not only to secure the election of a Labour Government but to ensure that,
once elected, it would carry out socialist policies. To this end, the ILP
formulated and campaigned for its own plans of socialist reform including,
most notably, those embodied in the Living Wage' and 'Socialism in Our
Time' programmes. To the same end, it had come to believe that it should
assert its independence and oppose the Labour Party when it seemed to be
betraying its promises and ideals.
On the other hand, the Labour Party itself could never be a mere
electoral machine. It determined and executed policy and in the eyes of
many, including those whose political careers began in the ILP, it became,
despite its acknowledged defLciencies, the real vehicle of socialist
advance and the most important arena of political struggle. To such as
these, any ILP criticism of a Labour Government could be construed as
destructive. Jim Simmons pleaded with his former colleagues to avoid
damaging complaints:2
1. T.C., 28;9;1923.
2. T.C., 29;5;l93l.
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We are only going to get Socialism through a Labour Government and
if we destroy the faith of the people in Labour representation, we
have no hope of "Socialism in Our Time" or at any time.
The ILP's increasingly public and pointed criticism of leading Labour
politicians also worked at another level to alienate many of its erstwhile
supporters. To Cecil Wilson, it was evidence that:'
the old spirit no longer exists, there is not the same high time,
fault finding has taken the place of good feeling, there is little
or no desire to find points of agreement but every desire to find
points of difference and magnify them...
However much I may differ from my colleagues either in the ILP or
Labour Party, I want to give them credit for being as sincere in
their point of view as I claim to be in mine, and so I will never
hold them up to complaint or ridicule in public.
The behaviour of the ILP had offended not only the instinctive loyalism of
the Labour movement but also, more deeply, those basic assumptions about the
goodwill and good nature of man which informed its entire ideology and
practice. To doubt the good intentions of one's allies was to negate the
faith on which Labour's socialism was built. It is perhaps this woolly-
minded humanism which explains why many on the Labour back benches and many
more in Labour ranks up and down the country who would have classed
themselves as good socialists continued to support MacDonald and the right-
wing leadership even up to the day of their ultimate betrayal. The amiable
vagueness of ethical socialism united those on the Left and Right of the
Labour Party when it might have been expected that policy differences would
divide them.
There were, however, those in Lhe ILP whose disillusionment with the
Labour Alliance was now almost complete. In 1929, when Joseph Southall had
proposed the resolution of the Birmingham City branch for ILP disaffiliation
from the Labour Party (on the grounds that Labour had now 'become the
Imperialist Party') at the Midlands Divisional Conference, he was unable to
2find a seconder. 	 Two years later at the same venue, Southall moved
1. Francis Johnson Correspondence; Cecil Wilson to F. Jowett, 3l;l;l930.
2. T.C., l;2;l929.
-280-
a similar resolution on behalf of the Birmingham ILP Federation; when he
advocated disaffiliation at the national conference of the party later
that year, he could thus claim to be speaking on behalf of a majority of
the ILP's active membership in Birmingham	 Sheffield ILP, however, took
an opposing view and it proposed a resolution that the interests of
socialism would be best furthered by the ILP 'seeking to extend its
influence throughout the Labour and Trade Union movement' 	 ny in
Sheffield clung to this line even in 1932 when the ILP nationally voted for
secession. Jean Thompson urged that:3
There were many good individual Socialists in the Labour Party and
the ILP should recognise the distinction between the late leadership
and the rank and file. Their historic policy had been amazingly
successful and the policies were not really different. To come out
was not to be independent but to be in opposition to the Labour Party.
This was a shrewd assessment which gained considerably from the context of
Sheffield where socialists had, through the Labour Party, gained power and
achieved much practical good. To most, it must have seemed that to isolate
themselves from the strategy which had made possible their gains thus far
would be futile and self-defeating. In Birmingham, the same lessons had
not been learnt and it seems likely, though actual statistics are impossible
to come by, that a larger proportion of the ILP's local membership endorsed
the national decision. In the event, time would reveal that the Labour
Party, for all its failings, remained the principal hope for working-class
advance in Britain.
1. T.C., 6;2;l931; ILP Annual Conference Report, 1931, p. 93.
2. Resolutions to be Submitted to Annual Conference of ILP, 1931, pp. 37-38.
3. port of Special National Conference of ILP, July, 1932, p. 17.
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7.5 Conclusion
There were so many components and layers of Labour Party thinking
in the 1920s that it might seem artificial to judge them as any kind of
unified whole. On the other hand, it has been argued that the points of
view and practice held in common by Labour's constituent parts were more
important than those which separated them. By the interwar period, 'Labour'
was not merely a political label but a political party. The Labour Party
had to present some coomon face to the electorate and it had inevitably to
forge some conmn programrre. It was on these that it was judged
contemporarily and has been judged subsequently. In following this practice,
we will attempt, in conclusion, to deal with a number of the key questions
raised about Labour's politics in the interwar period.
The first is to what extent it is true to say, as so many have
claimed, that the early socialists' ethical socialism was extinguished by
the pressures and persuasions of electoral considerations. Insofar as
ethical socialism is identified with an overtly spiritual religion of
socialism, it was undoubtedly the case that, in its more other-worldly and
and anti-political attitudes, it had declined. But Labour's practice -
its stress on rationality and education - was taken over en bloc from the
British socialist movement's founding fathers and remained unaltered. The
real point is that ethical socialism and electoral politics did not
interact, as sometimes assumed, in a straightforward relationship of
antagonism. The ballot was, in fact, conceived as the instrument p
excellence of an ethical socialism in which a numerical majority of the
people recorded a conscious decision for socialism. Labour activists knew
well enough that the operation of the ballot could be corrupted by outside
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forces but to have rejected it as a means would have been to repudiate the
possibilities and potential of that very rationality on which ethical
socialism placed its hopes. Where it is fairer to say that ethical
socialism was being superseded was in the way that conversion to socialism
was being identified too readily with the mere fact of Labour voting. This
did represent some cutting of corners and some betrayal of the original
definitions of socialism but it would be wrong to lay all the blame at the
door of the Labour Party's obsessive electoralism. Paradoxically, this
decline of ethical socialism reflected one of its own chief failings - its
over-optimistic appraisal of the democratic process and the meaning of
popular participation within it. Labour's electoralism was not the
subversion of some pure and unalloyed socialist inheritance but its
fulfillment in all its virtues and failings.
The second and related question is on the impact of trades unionism.
The trades unions have often been portrayed as a powerful anti-socialist
force whose baleful influence was a major factor in Labour's failure to
carry out its promises of radical change. How far is this assessment
justified on the local evidence? In practice, it is difficult and often
logically impossible to separate socialist and trades unionist currents
in the Party. Most Labour Party members, the men especially, were active
trades unionists and, by the 1920s, many trades union officials were
socialists. As the pre-war generation of Liberal and Lib-Lab leaders was
superseded, most union officials cani to identify the Labour Party as the
proper vehicle for their political ideals. At the same time, as a result
of the War and post-war vicissitudes, these ideals were assuming a more
radical and collectivist hue. Though most, though not all, trade union
officials avoided socialist rhetoric and neglected the more visionary
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aspects of Labour's appeal, trades unionists were no longer ashariEd of
calling themselves socialists. Their claim to this title might be disputed
by some on the Left and their caution and orthodoxy could lead to internal
Party differences but, at this juncture, it is more important to stress
that trades union reformism, in its practice and effects, even in its more
inudiate objectives, was in no way distinguishable from socialist reformism
Cooperation between these elements in the Party came naturally and neither
side made great sacrifices.
As to Fabianism, at the local level it found no role and could claim
no influence. Against those who would argue that the Labour Party was
corrupted by the debilitating doctrines of the Fabian Society, the evidence
from the localities is clear - Labour was cautious, gradualist and reformist
without the help of Sidney Webb. Webb gave Labour's politics an intellectua
gloss and respectability but did not alter their nature.
Like any party which is a genuine popular movement rather than a mere
sect, Labour functioned as a coalition of ideas and attitudes, but it was a
coalition evolving its own conanding identity. This is not to say that
Labour's politics emerged as an outcome of competition between blocs. These
blocs, as blocs, did not exist; there were socialist trades unionists,
tentative socialists, ambitious reformists, timorous radicals - in short, a
whole range of combinations and possibilities which defies pigeon-holing.
There were, of course, differences of opinion and emphasis but what really
impresses about the Labour Party in the 1920s is the extent to which
assumptions and prescriptions were shared. All, from the far left to the
far right, were coninitted to the same methods of attaining power. All
agreed that the first task of Labour was to reform and improve the
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conditions of the working class. As to ultimate ends, which were a long
way off, there was room for variation but even here the congruence of most
objectives and the amorphousness of some enabled an uncompromising
cooperation. Whether represented by the gentle millenarianism of the ILP
'convert' or the practical interventionism of its councillors and
politicians, whether proclaiming a vision of universal brotherhoxl or some
limited industrial collectivism and small-scale reform, Labour succeeded
in the end because it was a working-class party speaking to working-class
nc'ds ind aspi.aL ions. So long as it was going forward, the deeper problems
of its s true ture and be i.e is could ,o	 reiiinrked.
Was Labour, therefore, a genuinely socialist parLy? The simpJc
answer to this is that Labour was a socialist party because it said it was.
No one group (despite the delusions of sc) has yet copyrighted socialism
and no one thinker or doctrine has the monopoly of political wisdom.
However inadequate Labour's socialism may appear to those blessed with
hindsight or superior theoretical insight, to its practitioners it was real
and honest.
Chapter 8
THE LABOUR SUBCULTURE
8.1 Introduction
When Egon Wertheirner, the German socialist journalist, wrote about
the Labour Party in the 1920s, one of the things that most concerned him was
the almost complete lack of party life. The ILP and Women's Sections were
partial exceptions, he observed, but 'in comparison with the German Social
Democratic Party, the Labour Party [was] still a mere voting machine'
This is a judgment that has remained substantially unaltered through the
following decades. Stephen Yeo has written sympathetically about the
socialist subculture which existed before the First World War but generally
it has been assumed that by the l920s changed cultural conditions and the
dominance of Labour's electoral ambitions has effectively killed off the
remnants of 'New Life' socialism. 2
 There have, however, been few empirical
studies to prove or disprove this thesis and those that have been carried
out have mostly adopted a national perspective which has neglected the
specific range and meaning of Labour activities in the local context which
sustained them.3
In this section, we examine the Labour subculture of our two case-
studies and attempt to assess its meaning and import for those who took part.
To do this, we shall, so far as possible, judge Labour's group life not by
what it might have been or should have been but by what it was and by what
its practitioners wanted. The range of Labour's cultural and recreational
activities could not match that of the German Social Democrats and it was
certainly not 'hegemonic' but it did possess its own interest and validity.
1. E. Wertheimer, Portrait of the Labour Party (1929), p. 11.
2. 5. Yeo, 'A New Life: the Religion of Socialism in Britain, 1883-1896',
History Workshop Journal, 4, (Autumn, 1977).
3. D.L. Prynn, 'The Socialist Sunday Schools,the Woodcraft Folk and Allied
Movements...', M.A. thesis, University of Sheffield, 1971;
S.C. Jones, 'The British Labour Movement and Working-Class Leisure, 1918-
1939', Ph. D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1983.
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8.2 New Life Socialism
The principles of ethical sotialism continued to shape not only the
basic nature of Labour's politics in the interwar period but also the ethos
and form of a substantial part of its non-electoral activity. Nowhere was
this more clearly the case than in the Labour Churches which were not, as
so often assiumd, a purely pre-war phenomenon. In Birmingham, the number of
Labour Churches rose from a total of six meeting regularly in 1920 to a peak
of seventeen in 1925. Only at this point did their decline begin; by 1929,
just four remained open and none survived the next few years.' In Sheffield
however, the Churches were far weaker and only one is recorded - the
Sheffield Christian Socialist Church which was operating in 1919.2
The Churches met - in a variety of venues but most often in school
rooms and Cooperative halls - every Sunday evening in a winter session
running from October to Easter and, though the tone and content of the
meetings varied somewhat, their basic format was quite uniform. The evening
opened with a song from the Labour Church hymn-book - 'England Arise', 'Lift
Up the People's Banner', 'Jerusalem' and 'The Red Flag' were particular
favourites. Then, the main part of the evening would be taken up by an
address from a visiting speaker - usually some figure of prominence in the
local Labour movenint but occasionally a leading personality in national
politics. As to the topics of the addresses, there was the utmest variation
principally, they were concerned with sar issueof contemporary political
interest, either locally or nationally, but there were a number of other
talks on items ranging from foreign travel to poetry and art. 3
 In most,
there would be some reference to the spiritual side of Labour's work; even
those speakers who dwelt on the most mundane of political issues usually
1. Calculated from notices in the Town Crier.
2. Labour Leader, 18;9;l919.
3. See Appendix G fora typical prograune.
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drew the moral that it was Labour which was fulfilling most nearly the
teachings of the New Testament. The meeting would be concluded by the
corcmunal singing of another Labour . hynin or two and, perhaps, by the
performance of a musical item, a brief address or reading from the chair
and a collection.' In all of this, the post-war Labour Churches of
Birmingham followed almost exactly the pattern set by their predecessors of
the 1890s. 2 Similarly, too, most Churches were organised by the local
branches of the ILP though there was a tendency, as the twenties progressed,
for their direction to be taken over by joint ILP and Labour Party
cormuittees or by independent ad hoc bodies.3
How, then, are we to interpret the Labour Churches? From many points
of view, their role was undoubtedly primarily secular. They offered a form
of meeting which enabled the dissemination of socialist propaganda on
Sundays at a time when a different style might have offended conventional
propriety. They were also a forum where speakers from the many sections of
the working-class movement could come together and put forward their positior
Of these, most dealt with matters of current political debate and, insofar
as they referred to the ethical values of socialism,these were adduced as
adjuncts to the more concrete concerns of the main line of their argument.
When ethical socialism was proclaimed, it was usually closely identified
with the interests and progrann of the Labour Party.
The Churches also offered, to the more earnest-minded of the working
class, a good night-out - a combination of entertainment and self-improvement
in roughly equal measure. The Balsall Heath Labour Church advertised its
meetings thus:4
An attractive programme is invariably arranged, including excellent
vocal items, interesting readings, and addresses by prominent members
1. Interviews with Ted Smallbone and Lily Moody.
2. K.S. Inglis, Churches and the Working Classes in Victorian England (1963)
p. 234, pp. 241-47.
3. T.C., 12;8;l92l; 24;9;l926; 15;4;1927.
4. Birmingham District Conmonwealth, February, 1922.
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of progressive movements.. .anyorie desiring to spend an hour in an
educative manner would do well to give his Labour Church a trial.
Before the spread of the conirrcial mass media, the Churches clearly had a
significant role to play in catering for the aptitudes and tastes of the
respectable working class.
On the other hand, the very form of their meetings, reminiscent of
those of the chapels which many of their visitors would also have attended,
infused an air of spirituality into the proceedings. The singing of Labour
hymns and even the act of singing in unison with comrades could not but
give rise to a sense of religious feeling, encouraged by the inspirational
nature of the hymns themselves. The Sparkhill and Tyseley Labour Church
was particularly proud of its 'real useful Socialist Corrnunity Singing'
and even compiled its own hymn-book and hymns, including the evocatively-
titled 'Come, Workers of the World, Unite'.'
In general, it would be mistaken to look for the expounding of any
uniform or theologically coherent religion of socialism from the pulpits of
the Labour Churches. Insofar, as they possessed a ccnmon creed, it is best
characterised as an idealistic, Christian-influenced humanism in which the
role of the working class and its secular representative, the Labour Party,
was given especial prominence. The main purpose of the Churches was
avowedly propagandistic but it was a propaganda which stressed the religious
aspect to Labour's cause and the spiritual worthof the individual activist
and the movement to which he or she belonged. Indeed, the Churches made the
movement seem real by imparting a sense of a unity of like-minded
individuals and by reinforcing the message of humanity's ineluctable progress
- and they could do this even while discussing the municipality's approach
1. T.C., 25;ll;1927; 26;2;1926.
Sparkhill was also one of the more overtly religious of the Churches
and proclaimed as its motto the text, 'For Christ and My Brother'
(see T.C., 6;3;l925).
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to sewage disposal! The great strength of the Labour Churches was that
they blurred the frontiers of the secular-spiritual divide and gave an
inspiration and meaning to political work lost in the more prosaic daily
struggles. The enthusiast who wrote to the Town Crier in 1921 was unusual
in the force of his feelings but he was certainly representing a widespread
current of thought:1
The Labour Church has given me something which the orthodox churches
have failed to give - a contemplation of the things that matter, and
rest for the soul, instead of the fantastical dogmas built up from
mere assumption - sure ground for the feet. . .Believe me, after one or
two attendances at the Labour Church, one really believes one has
been standing on holy ground.. .And the Labour Church, more than any
other branch of the people's cause, has in itself that spirit of
fellowship and enthusiasm which will equip men for social service.
Given the value of their work, two questions arise: why did the Labour
Churches decline so rapidly in the later 1920s, and why were there so few
in Sheffield? One reason for their decline would seem to be that, with
the spread of cinemas and wireless and with the growing acceptability of
Sunday entertainments, the form of social outlet represented by the Churches
grew increasingly outdated and unnecessary. At a deeper level, the state of
the Churches seems to reflect the Labour Party's proximity to political
power. The Churches were part of an earlier tradition of socialism in which
the New Life was not merely to be won through the ballot box in the future
but practised in the present. They were meetings of converts, essentially
dedicatory and expressive in function, and Labour's advance to power
nullified their role in two ways. By the late l920s, Labour was no longer
a sect but the second party of the state; its policies had to be translated
from vision to practicality and inevitably, in the process, they lost that
veneer of spiritual idealism which had sustained the pioneers when their
goal seemed distant. The religion of socialism was, by the sense of election
and comradeship it instilled and the certain victory it promised, a form of
1.	 T.C., 5;8;1921.
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belief necessary and comforting to the embattled minority. In Birmingham,
socialists remained such a minority even as their counterparts in Sheffield
were taking power, and this was one reason for the ethicality of Birmingham':
socialism as compared to that of Sheffield. Conversely, as Labour came
nearer to national power, the electoral battle assumed greater importance
and activists were more loath to preach to the converted whenthere were vote:
to be won amongst the electorate at large. The Sparkhill Labour Church
finally and reluctantly closed its doors in February, 1929 because of the
proximity of the impending General Election, after having been let down by
a run of six speakers in succession.' Labour thoughts had moved from pious
hope to reasoned expectation, from the New Life to the second Labour
Government, and the Labour Churches seemed increasingly anachronistic.
The Labour Churches were not, however, the only expression of older-
style socialism; others, principally catering for the young, remained and,
though they never made a large-scale impact even within the Labour movement
itself, they are not without interest. There were, for example, Socialist
Sunday Schools in both Birmingham and Sheffield. In Birmingham, the King's
Norton branch of the ILP ran a school in the early part of the 1920s; in
Sheffield, the ILP ran two Schools (in Heeley and Darnall) and the Atterclif:
Labour Party another - these seem to have been in existence for most of the
decade.2
There are, unfortunately, few details of their local activities and
we can only assume that the Schools in Birmingham and Sheffield corresponded
to the national practice in teaching a rather didactic and moralistic
version of the creed expressed in the Labour Churches. 3 (A Cainist
1. T.C., l;2;1929.
2. T.C., l9;1;].923; S.F., June, 1924; April, 1926; SFILC minutes,
EC 12;4;1927.
3. F. Reid, 'Socialist Sunday Schools in Britain, 1892-1939', International
Review of Social History, XI, (1966).
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Sunday School meeting in Sheffield presumably took a scrwhat more 'class
conscious' line.') The Schools do, however, seem to have prided
themselves on practising an internal democracy which would fit their members
for service in the Labour movement and in the socialist society of the
future. At King's Norton, with minimal assistance from an adult organiser,
all the work was done by the children themselves, and the Heeley School
wanted one of its members to be allowed to address Sheffield's May Day rally.
In an overall context, though, the lack of references to their work suggest
that the Socialist Sunday Schools were fairly small and isolated groupings
which played but a small role in the wider Labour movement.
Another group engaged in comparable activity were the Woodcraft Folk,
the Sheffield branch of which was founded in April, 1929 and the Birmingham
branch five months later. 3
 Established in opposition to the popular Boy
Scout movement, which they conceived to be militaristic and reactionary, the
Folk sought to win over young people to the cause of socialism. The
practical appeal of healthy outdoor activity was blended with a curiously
nostalgic 'back to the land' philosophy which fused elements of athleticism,
bohemianism and ethical socialism. Basil Rawson, then 'headman' of the
Sheffield Woodcraft Folk and secretary of the local ILP, expressed the ethos
4
and activity of the Folk at their most ambitious:
Our Charter is the Socialist Charter. We regard modern civilisation
as decadent with little exception. We believe we must strive to
develop our personalities and abilities to express ourselves and our
ideals, that we must build a sure brain as the foundation of a
virile body...
We hike and camp, study woodcraft, starlore, flowerlore, birdlore,
weatherlore, map reading and regional surveying; go in for supple
limb tests and games, keen eye training; sunbathing, all kinds of
tribal and handcrafts, folk dancing and tribal dances; we study
world history, evolution, biology and sex, local history.(land
1. SCP minutes, 19;9;l921.
2. T.C., 19;12;1919;	 SETLC minutes, EC 12;4;l927.
3. Prynn, op. cit., p. 287; T.C., 23;8;l929.
4. Park and Heeley Gazette, July, 1930.
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enclosures), machinery, etc.; we practise arts of many kinds -
WITh PURPOSE IN EVERYTHING...
An Al Comonwealth will need an Al democracy to build it. In the
Folk we are creating the NEW DEMOCRACY.
At bottom, the Woodcraft Folk were an expression of the ethical socialist
premise that in order to make socialism it was necessary to make socialists.
But here the making of socialists had not been debased to mean only the
recruitment of Labour voters; it remained a practised belief that socialism
had to be lived here and now before it became feasible in the days to come.
Will Rowe, the pacifist socialist who founded the Birmingham Woodcraft Folk -
established, incidentally, under the auspices of the No More War movement
rather than the Labour movement itself - expressed this in a nutshell:1
The aim of the Movement [i.e. the Woodcraft Folk].. .should be to
teach boys and girls to live noble lives, practise Socialism, and
encourage outdoor life...
"To practise Socialism" is a very different matter from mere lip-
service; it is essential to put into practice even small forms of
Socialism before one can put Socialism into being nationally.
These were high-flown aspirations which were only partly fulfilled. The
Woodcraft Folk remained a small organisation and attracted only patchy
Labour support. The Movement as a whole probably regarded their activities
as well-meaning but rather eccentric and Labour's more puritanical members
must have found sane of the Folk's more avant-garde teachings a little
disquieting. In general, the Folk were deemed worthy of moral support but
essentially irrelevant to a Movement which now placed its main hopes for
advancement in the ballot box. The Folk were not part of the Labour
mainstream and the existence of the local groups depended on the enthusiasm
and dedication of small nibers of individuals who retained an old-fashioned
belief in conversion and liked healthy open-air recreation. Will Rowe was
one such, Basil Rawson another; in 1934, Rawson became national president
of the Woodcraft Folk, a position which he occupied until his death 42 years
later.2
1. T.C., 7;9;1928.
2. J. Springhall, Youth, Empire and Soc 	 British Youth MovementsL
883-194O (1977), p. 155.
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Finally, one other, contrasting, aspect of Labour's approach to the
young should be examined - its charitable work among the children of the
poor. In the Socialist Sunday Schools and the Woodcraft Folk, Labour was
dealing with its own supporters and its own social stratum, the respectable
working class. Here, in its activities among the slum dwellers and their
offspring, it was venturing into less certain territory. It went in with
a mixture of motives, ranging from the philanthropic to the instrumental,
the nuances of which are best examined in their actual practice.
At the more high-minded end of the spectrum stood Birmingham's
Clarion Cinderella Club, the only remaining club of a series established by
Robert Blatchford in the l890s with the purpose of providing slum children
with meals and entertainments. The Birmingham Club now concentrated on
running an annual camp in the nearby countryside where groups of twenty or
so children from the poorest parts of Birmingham could spend a fortnight's
holiday over a six week period in the suniir) In 1926, it had looked
after 16 miners' children for ten weeks. 2
 Though the Club had no
organisational connection with the official Labour movement, it was still
run, in its own words, by 'working-class socialists' and it maintained its
links with Labour by giving an annual account of its year's work in the Town
Crier whilst, at the same time, appealing for donations from local working-
class bodies. 3 Its annual reports do, indeed, document a considerable
number of small donations from Labour Party and ILP branches, trades unions
and Cooperative Guilds but the bulk of its finances came now from wealthy
middle-class patrons and private companies. And, though the reports include
many heart-rending descriptions of the poverty and squalor that the Club
came across in the course of its work, they contain no word of socialist
critique as to their causes. The Club, though working-class in personnel,
1. Birmingham Clarion Cinderella Club, Annual Reports, 1918-1927, BCL.
2. BTC minutes, 24;9;1926.
3. T.C., 30;6;l922; 13;7;l923; 1l;4;1924; 5;2;l926.
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was not significantly different from any middle-class charity in the actual
nature of its work and propaganda. Its relationship with the Birmingham
Borough Labour Party ended rather sadly in 1925 when the latter refused a
donation due to the unsatisfactory arrangements made for the children's
surmier camp and the Club itself appears to have folded in 1927 after which
date there is no further record of its activities.'
Other working-class organisations, including a large number of local
Labour Parties, maintained a more direct tradition of socialist charity.
The work of Percy Shurmer in orgariising an annual children's party has alrea
been noted and it must have been he who was the driving force behind the
St. Martin's and Deritend Ward Labour Party's rather tweely nanxd 'Sunshine
Kiddies Fund', established in 1926 to give treats and outings to the local
youngsters. 2 The Fund was serious in its work; the 66 children taken to
Stourbridge for the day in June, 1926 had been nominated by local schools
and re mainly, it was said, the offspring of unemployed ex-seicemen.3
In the following year, its activities included treating 140 children to a
breakfast and a variety concert and taking a further 80 on an outing to
Dedley Castle.4
 The Edgbaston Divisional Labour Party undertook similar
work when, in 1927, it established the 'Harmonic Society' with the object,
among other things, of providing 'treats and a surrirer outing to the poor
children of the district'.5	One year later, the Society estimated that it
had fed and entertained over 1000 children.6
These were unusually organised ventures but the references here to
teas and parties and entertainments and outings for local youngsters could
be multiplied many times over if we include the one-off and ad hoc efforts
of the branch parties. Almost invariably these were managad by the women
1. BBLP minutes, 7;7;l925.
2. See above, p. 121; T.C., 23;4;1926.
3. T.C., 4;6;1926.
4. T.C., 7;1;1927; 	 30;9;1927.
5. l4;l;1927.
6. T.C., 27;l;1928.
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members of the Party and frequently by the Women's Sections themselves.
They were at their most corrnion around Christmastime when both the plight of
the poor and the pangs of conscience were experienced most sharply. Taking
January and February, 1926 as a representative sample, we find that the pages
of the Town Crier record parties organised by the East Birmingham ILP, St.
Mary's Ward Labour Party, Edgbaston Labour Party Northern Section,
Sparkbrook Ward Labour Party, the Ladywood Labour Party Tennant Street and
Johnstone Street Women's Sections, the West Birmingham Labour Party Winson
Green and Albion Street Women's Sections, and the Small Heath Labour Party
Women's Section which in all catered for something over 1000 children.'
Others perhaps went unrecorded but, even as it stands, this represents a
massive effort by Labour's activists. In this area,the documentation for
Sheffield is far weaker but there is no doubt, as the isolated references
to activities in the northern city indicate, that Labour members in Sheffield
were doing similar work.2
Essentially, this was charity and it did not become socialism because
it was carried out by members of the Labour Party. It was a case of the
better-off and more 'respectable' members of the working class helping their
poorer fellows but it could not, except in the loosest sense, be described
as working-class self-help. As Raphael Samuel has suggested, the aristocrati
ideal of noblesse oblige found its counterpart in the socialist movement in
such activity as it did more widely in the welfare reformism that formed a
large part of the Labour Party's electoral appeal to the poorer working
3
classes.
There were, too, other considerations of a more directly political
nature. Edgbaston Labour Party was honest enough to describe the work of
the Harmonic Society with the local children as 'part of the propaganda',
1. T.C., 8;l;l926; l5;l;l926; 29;l;1926; 5;2;l926; l2;2;l926.
2. S.F., September, 1922, September, 1926; S.C., February, 1931.
3. R. Samuel, 'The Middle Class Between the Wars', New Socialist, (March-
April, 1983), p. 32.
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and at most of these gatherings a local councillor or sorrtimes Labour's
parliamentary candidate would make a short speech drawing an appropriate
moral frcxii the event for the children present.' The Labour Party was being
introduced to the children in the guise of a kindly uncle and it hoped, no
doubt, that they would be suitably grateful. The treats were equally
designed to give a good impression of the Party to the children's parents
who, of course, were also voters. They were certainly seen in this light
by the secretary of the Washwood Heath Ward Unionist Association who wrote
to Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland for a donation to help the local branch fund
its first children's Christmas party as a counter to Labour's efforts in
the same field which had been going on for several years:2
I also feel confident that this will be a means of getting at the
parents through the children...
There are cases where the child will insist on its parents recording
their vote so as to make sure of receiving an invitation to the
Annual Party.
Such adult testimony must, though, be treated with caution. Alfred Green,
whose mother and father were keen Labour activists, recalled his yearly
visit to the children's party organised by the local Conservative Working
Men's Club in Attercliffe:3
As a young "Labourite" keenly antagonistic to all Tory enterprise, I
was remarkably open-minded on these occasions. Loot, of any kind, I
regarded as being above party politics or anything else; it was
there to be obtained and enjoyed!
Children could be 'bought' temporarily but they were hardly trustworthy
'converts' and their parents too probably leavened their gratitude at the
efforts of the Party activists with a little cynicism at to their motives.
The parties, though, were a means of establishing a local presence which,
on the whole,wouldbe regarded sympathetically by a range of people not
always amenable to political propaganda of a more conventional nature.
1. T.C., 14;l;l927.
2. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/208; G. Ogston to Steel-Maitland, 12;l2;l92
3. A. Green, Growing Up in Attercliffe (Sheffield, 1981), p. 49.
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The treats and outings covered a gamut of possibilities - from the
philanthropic to the political, from the patronising to the genuinely
compassionate - and without regardto the specific circumstances of each it
is not possible to assess their meaning and import. They do, however, go
some way to correcting the impression that Labour 'has always had an
essentially passive relationship to the working class'.' Here was a case
of Labour going out to the working class, ministering to its needs,
actively seeking its support.
1. of. T. Forester, The Labour Party and the Working Class (1976), p. 124.
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8.3 The Arts and Education
Labour's philosophical humanism and the self-improving motivations
of its more earnest members found their practical reflection in its approach
to the arts and education. Whether the Labour Party really was 'culturally..
the least ambitious organisation ever produced by the British Left' is open
to doubt but if we are to take this to mean that it rarely endowed its
cultural activities with any political purpose, still less with any
revolutionary intention, we may concur.' Labour's attitude to the arts and
education was rarely in any but the mildest sense 'class conscious'; it
regarded the cultural arena as value-free and high art as part of the
working class's cultural inheritance, something to be aspired to and enjoyed
rather than overturned. There were exceptions to this general policy, as
we shall see, but they made little impact on the overall nature of Labour's
artistic and educational activities.
The most pervasive of these activities, if only because they required
the least equipment and effort, were musical. We have noted already the
importance of Labour hymns and music to the Labour Churches and it was a
general feature of many Labour Party gatherings of the tin that the more
serious items would be interspersed by selections of music and song
involving either the participation of the audience or a performance by a
group of Labour supporters. An advertisement for a meeting to be addressed
by George Lansbury in Birmingham Town I-Tall in 1920 was concluded with the
injunction,'Socialist Hymns fran 2.30 to 3, accompanied by organ. Socialists
bring your hymn-books' and the big Sunday night meetings of the Sheffield
1. R. Samuel, 'The Workers' Theatre Movement', History Workshop Journa',
4, (Autumn, 1977), p. 103.
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ILP were enlivened by contributions from the choir of the Heeley Socialist
Sunday School.' The Yardley ILP Guild of Youth made a feature of its
regular 'Community Singing Nights' and the Witton ILP organised a musical
evening each month.2
At one level, these events were simply a case of the working class
making its own entertainment and it would be mistaken to attach too much
ideological significance to them. On the other hand, at a time when working-
class entertainment was increasingly being provided by commrcial
entrepreneurs (in the music ball and cinema) or by the State (on the wireles5
it is noteworthy that the local Labour Parties were trying to establish
forums untainted by outside influence and possible class bias. The politica'
impact of these self-consciously self-sufficient amusements was mitigated,
however, by the fact that they catered principally for those already holding
Labour allegiances and were rarely able to penetrate a wider working-class
culture.
A further illustration of the role played by music in Labour's group
life is provided by the large number of choirs and musical sections which
were organised by the local parties. In Sheffield, the Ecclesall Divisional
Labour Party possessed its own orchestra and Attercliffe ran a children's
3	 .	 .	 .4
choir and orchestra.	 Both Clarion and the ILP formed their own choirs.
In Birmingham, the East Birmingham Labour Choir, the Balsall Heath Labour
Choir, the Selly Oak Labour frlusical Society and the King's Norton Labour
Choral Society catered for Party members of musical inclination. 5 The
King's Norton Society was particularly active, claiming in 1928 some 45
members who rehearsed weekly and gave on average around 20 performances each
year. 6 These efforts, in which Labour was catering priiiarily to the
1. T.C., 13;2;1920; Labour Leader, 3l;7;1919.
2. T.C.,ll;ll;l927; 9;l2;l927.
3. S.F., June. 1922; S.D.I., 23;lQ;1928.
4. S.D.I., 23;4;l923; New Leader, l;l0;1926.
5. T.C., 23;5;1924; 31;8;l923; 26;5;1922; 6;4;].928.
6. King's Norton Labour News, April, 1928.
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interests of its members and the demands of its social network proved quite
successful. Other, more ambitious, attempts to promote a musical side to
the Party's work were less so.
The first endeavour to form a Labour Band in Birmingham began with a
letter to the Town Crier in June, 1920.1 Two months later, the Borough
Labour Party endorsed the proposal and made the first of several donations
to set the venture on its feet. 2 But the £50 that the central Labour Party
and individuals within it spent on the Band did not prove a good investment.3
Though it was initially restricted to Labour supporters, during the Band's
brief six-month working existence it was composed principally of non-Labour
personnel and when it eventually folded it boasted just seven members and
eleven instruments.4
A more successful effort got off the ground in March, 1925 under the
auspices of the Birmingham Labour Musical Society. By July, it was reported
that 70 members had enrolled and eighteen months later the Society gave its
first major concert - a performance of Mendelssohn's 'Hymn of Praise' with
choral accompaniment. 5
 The Society, which had begun as an individual
initiative, came under official Labour auspices when it was re-formed as the
Birmingham Labour h.isical and Dramatic Union in October, 1927 with the
intention of enlisting the local Labour Party musical sections and giving
one or two concerts with massed choirs during the course of the year.6
But such hopes went largely unfulfilled due to the 'apathy in the Divisions'
and by 1929 only two choirs were affiliated. 7 The Union maintained an
active presence in the local Movement by giving performances at the Labour
Churches, the May Day demonstration and a Borough Labour Party Fete but it
1. T.C., 18;6;1920.
2. BBLP minutes, 9;9;1920.
3. ibid., 6;3;1922.
4. ibid; T.C., 24;8;1923.
5. T.C., 3;7;1925; 4;2;1927.
6. T.C., 28;l0;1927.
7. BBL.P minutes, 24;11;l930; BTC Annual Report, 1928-29, p. 38.
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rested too heavily on the ccmnitment of too few individuals. By November,
1930, their enthusiasm was wearing thin and it was decided to open
participation to all regardless of.their politics. 1 Despite the laudable
intentions and high hopes of a few activists and the official support of the
Borough Labour Party, the Birmingham movement had been unable to sustain its
cormitment to musical expression.
The reality belied, therefore, the more pious utterances of Labour's
musical impresarios who believed in some cases that the musical sections
represented not merely a form of improving entertainment but an embryonic
socialism. H.G. Sear, the leading light of the Musical and Dramatic Union,
expressed this view in a revealing statement of the more ultramundane form
of ethical socialism:2
The Millenium is distant, but what is that to a true Socialist.
Labour organisations can never be without active organisation...
A choir or band, because of the interdependence of individuals all
working according to the best plans known, is a Socialist State in
little.
Sear was unusually forthright but there was a widespread belief that the
united and cooperative effort involved in musical performance inculcated a
'deeper comradeship and.. .unity of purpose' in those who took part.3
Perhaps this was true, at least in a modest sense, but though music was part
of the fabric of Labour Party life, it functioned primarily as a diversion
and an educative entertainment. The more ambitious of the hopes placed in
it were not realisable within the modest confines of Labour's cultural
horizons.
Labour's approach to the dramatic arts was not essentially different
though the form of the medium did encourage the expression of more overtly
political statements. Here, too, a number of working-class organisations
1. BBLP minutes, 24;ll;1930.
2. T.C., ll;2;1927.
3. BTC Annual Report, 1925-26, p. 25.
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in both Birmingham and Sheffield ran their own sections. In Birmingham,
the Northfield Ward Labour Party and the Erdington and Sparkbrook branches
of the ILP each ran drama groups; in Sheffield, Clarion, the ILP and
Woodseats Ward Labour Party all produced their own plays and readings.1
The productions which the groups mounted varied considerably in
content but they all tended, through force of circumstance, to have simple
formats and small casts. The Erdington ILP Dramatic Circle specialised in
one-act comedies and farces but occasionally it staged more serious drama
as when it gave a performance of Miles Malleson's anti-war play, 'Black 'Eli'
to a meeting of the Erdington Labour Church. 2 More conionly, it was the
drama of such playwrights as George Bernard Shaw, Upton Sinclair and the
Capek brothers which was staged by the working-class drama groups - theirs
were writings which combined a strong story line with a clear political
message and, as such, they made the ideal propaganda material for socialist
actors.
By far the most 'ideological' of any of these groups was the People's
Theatre Movement founded in Birmingham in 1924 by the Reverend John Lewis
(then the socialist minister of the Broad Street Presbyterian Church, later
the national organiser of the Left Book Club):3
In its claim to be essentially proletarian in outlook and personnel,
the Movement breaks away from all other amateur dramatic societies
and establishes itself as a definite working-class organisation...
Proletarian players with a proletarian outlook are an encouraging
beginning but if the People's Theatre Movement is to be that virile
growth that will keep evergreen the artistic side of Socialism,
then something more is needed. The Movement must produce its own
plays.
This last injunction was not fulfilled but the People's Theatre continued
to perform useful, if less venturesome, work within the local Labour movement
1. For Birmingham, see: T.C., 2;4;l926; 13;3;1925;
for Sheffield, see: New Leader, 15;1;1926; Sheffield ILP minutes,
20;4;l922; Park and Heeley Gazette, October, 1930.
2. T.C., 8;1;1926; 9;4;1926; 2;4;1926.
3. 27;7;1925.
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and in 1930 it linked up officially with the Borough Labour Party. By now
it had dropped its more radical aims and rhetoric and described its role as
being 'to give plays of an Educational, Social and thought-provoking nature'
to Labour Party gatherings.' Within these more limited terms of reference,
the People's Theatre performed valued service in the working-class movement
and, though we may regret the fact that culture had once more becc
srething to be brought to the masses rather than created by them, its new
role was clearly more in line with Labour's philosophy and creative
ambitions.
At the other end of the spectrum stood the Workers' Theatre Group of
the Sheffield Eduational Settlement. The Group was fortunate in possessing
its owm premises and the backing of Arnold Freeman, whose devotion and
comitment kept the Settlement alive. Freeman's concern was with high
culture and among the plays produced by the Workers' Theatre Group in 1923
2
were those by Masefield, Wilde and Yeats.
Similarly well-intentioned but with less discernible impact was the
Workers' Poetry and Art Union which met briefly in Birmingham from 1921.
At its monthly meetings, readings were given (of, for example, 'Twelfth
Night', G.B. Shaw and Rupert Brooke) which the membership were encouraged
to discuss and criticise. 3
 One meeting was given up to readings by the
members themselves including some of their own work but as, at its peak,
the Union had just 25 members and appears to have closed completely in 1922,
it can hardly be said to represent any cultural renaissance among the
Birmingham working class.4
Labour's excursions into the dramatic and literary field reflected
the nature of the Party's ethos and ideology. Plays and readings were
1. BTC Annual Retort, 1931-31, p. 64.
2. Alexander Papers, AVAR 10/2; The Wheatsheaf (Brightside and Carbrook.
Cooperative Society edition), February, 1923.
3. T.C., 20;5;192l; l2;8;192l; 23;9;192l.
4. T.C., 15;7;192l;23;9;1921.
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intended, for the most part, to educate the working class rather than rouse
it. There was a vague feeling that the Labour Party in particular and the
working class more widely had neglected the cultural arena and ought to
take a greater interest in their cultural inheritance. Socialism would need
an active and educated citizenry and working people had to be fitted now for
the increased responsibilities and opportunities that would fall to them in
the future; potential, latent under capitalism, had to be made real. But,
in practice, Labour's efforts were slight in impact and limited in scope.
Only a small minority of Labour supporters were involved in, or even affected
by, the more self-consciously artistic of the Party's activities and these
were people likely, by inclination and attitude, to have becc active in
some similar way in any case. Their socialism gave their art an edge and a
greater purpose but was not its progenitor; Labour served primarily as a
social context for the artistic sensibilities of its members rather than as
a political vehicle though, by its nature, it could not help but be the
latter too.
The conflict in the working-class movement between ethical socialist
and Marxist analyses found its classic expression in the debate over the
different forms of working-class education. In their different ways, both
Labour and the revolutionary parties stressed the role of education in
preparing the way for social change but, whereas Labour principally saw
socialism as the fulfilment of past cultural trends and honoured the arts
as an inheritance that the working class should assimilate, the Marxist-
influenced Left believed change would only ca through the rejection of
past, class-basad, cultures and the assertion of uniquely working-class
values and interests. Whereas to Labour, education was, almost by definition
an uncomplicated good because it increased awareness and widened horizons,
to the revolutionary Left, education waa beneficial only so long as it was
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'class conscious'; education which obscured class divisions and taught
conventional (Tbourgeoist) wisdoms they deemed reactionary, part of the
capitalist 'dope' which prevented the working class fulfilling its
revolutionary potential.
The standard Labour view was epitomised in an article by 'Christopher
Lackpenny' in the Town Crier in 1921:1
Labour does not need to tell half-truths in order to make out its
case. To assume that Labour, too, needs its own system of "partisan
education" biassed to suit its own purpose, is an insult to the
cause of Labour and the truths on which it rests. "Partisan
education" is not education at all. It is mere propaganda.
But while Labour tended to believe that education by itself would bring
socialism, the extreme Left stressed the agency of class. Fred Silvester,
then a member of the Birmingham branch of the Socialist Labour Party (SLP),
argued that 'education was not the weapon but a means of sharpening the
weapon' - the weapon, of course, being a working class which understood
capitalism and its own historic task in overthrowing the system.2
In practical terms, it was the Workers' Educational Association (WEA)
and the Labour Colleges which embodied these two approaches and it was the
question of Labour affiliation to one or the other which sparked off the
fiercest discussions on working-class education. A debate in the Sheffield
Trades and Labour Council as to whether the Council should subscribe to the
WEA illustrates the arguments at their most polarised and even caricatured:3
The workers, [Joseph Madin, organiser of the Sheffield Labour Colleg€
contended, had no time to bother about general culture. What little
mental energy they had to spare after their work should be devoted to
the class struggle.
He therefore preferred the teaching of the Labour Colleges to that of
the WEA, the latter being a "boss-class supported organisation".
Life was too short for the worker to be writing sonnets on dandelions
when the wolf of hunger was snarling at the door...
Mr. J. Hedley (Corrmunist) said he preferred the Labour Colleges
because they had rigid views and took a definite side, but Mr. R.H.
Minshall, the president of the Sheffield branch of the WEA, said he
1. T.C., 4;2;lY2l.
2. T.C., 30;4;l920.
3. S.D.I.., 27;2;l924.
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hoped the Labour Party would never make economics the only thing in
life. Man did not live by bread alone, and he believed that music,
art, and poetry were for the workers.
Labour would not have attained its ideal if economics were to be the
only goal and Karl Marx its only prophet.
The fact that it was agreed to affiliate by 57 votes to 37 gives s
impression of prevailing opinions in the Labour movement at the time.' An
examination of the organisational strength of the different currents in
working-class education will give further evidence.
The Birmingham Labour College originated in a Social Science Class
established by William Paul and Fred Silvester of the SLP in 1913.2 	 1ter
the formation of the National Council of Labour Colleges in October, 1921,
the Class was re-formed as the Labour College and Fred Silvester (now of the
Cormiunist Party) became its first chairman. 3
 In its first year, it operatec
one course (on 'Marxian Economics') but progress was slow. Silvester
complained of the inadequate support received from the official Labour
movement and the Cornunist Party but had to admit that he himself had been
so busy with Coninunist Party work that he had been unable to chair a single
meeting of the College. 4
 By 1923, the only independent working-class
education being offered in Birmingham was conducted under the auspices of
the Amalgamated Union of Building Trades Workers which had been the first
union to affiliate nationally to the National Council of Labour Colleges -
in 1922.
In 1925, the Labour College was revived and J.S. Barr (also Labour's
parliamentary candidate in Tynemouth) took over as full-time Midlands
organiser. 6 It expanded rapidly and by 1926 was running six courses (two
on working-class history, two on economic history, one on Marxism and one
1. SFTLC minutes, 26;2;1924.
2. Plebs, May, 1923.
3. T.C., 2;12;1921.
4. T.C., 10;2;1922; Plebs, May, 1923.
5. T.C., 16;2;1923;	 l9;lO;l923.
6. T.C, 2;10;1925.
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on public speaking) in six different venues in Birmingham.' One year
later, Barr claimed that the College had organised 24 classes attended by
some 509 students - a figure including a number of courses run specifically
for such local groups as the Young Socialist League and the ILP Guild of
Youth. 2 Thereafter, the lack of information would seem to indicate some
decline, compounded in due course by Barr's defection to the New Party.
The Birmingham WEA had a somewhat steadier and sturdier existence.
In 1919, it ran nine courses with a total attendance of 131 students.3
hiring the early l920s, the number of courses varied between six and eight
but in 1927 there was a major expansion when 19 courses were offered in six
different venue. 4 In terms of its membership and affiliated societies,
however, the local WEA seems to have peaked in the first part of the decade.
In 1921, there were some 480 WEA subscribers and 37 affiliates in Birmingham;
5by 1927, their numbers had dropped to 391 and 31 respectively.
As to the character of the courses on offer, these rarely had
anything of the 'practical' bent of those of the Labour College and were
certainly not designed to furnish directly any clear political conclusions.
Of the 19 courses run in 1927, two at most - those on Citizenship and Public
Speaking - had a practical application, and two others - Economics and
Economic History - might have given rise to political speculation. The large
majority, ranging from Psychology to Musical Appreciation and fran
Literature to Folk Dancing, were humanistic and safely non-controversial.6
The ethos of the WEA was improving, moral and progressivist and, insofar
as it possessed an understood political philosophy, it could probably be
best described as right-wing Labour. The King's Norton branch was perhaps
1. T.C., 15;l;1926.
2. B.P., 5;9;l927; T.C., 14;5;l926; lO;l2;1926.
3. Birmingham WEA minutes, 17;12;19l9.
4. T.C., 30;9;1921; 22;9;l922; 3;10;l924; 23;10;l925; 23;9;1927.
5. Birmingham WEA minutes, 8;lO;l92l; 23;5;l927.
6. T.C., 23;9;l927.
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not fully typical but it is interesting to note that two of its four tutors
were moderate Labour councillors and that Harrison Barrow, George Cadbury
Jr. and five other members of the Cadbury family were among its patronsJ
The WEA was a liberal and avowedly apolitical organisation and it was
precisely these attributes of the WEA - in revolutionary eyes, its worst
failings - that made most working people in Birmingham, even in the
organised working class, prefer its teachings to the sterner and more
politicised doctrines of the Labour College. The Labour College, though a
powerful influence in its own sphere, was a minority taste - just as
revolutionary politics were.
It is also important to point out that, while the WEA and Labour
College were battling it out for the loyalties of organised Labour, by far
the most influential educational organisation amongst the Birmingham working
class as a whole was the Adult School movement. In 1926, there were 62
Adult Schools meeting in Birmingham with a total attendance of 4475 scholars
and an average weekly attendance of 2678.2 The Adult Schools, which
originated in Joseph Sturges' attempts to teach illiterate working people
to read the Bible, were a powerful reminder of Birmingham's nonconformist
traditions and, though their work was now more broadly educational, they
retained a strong religious flavour. It would be mistaken to infer any
uniform and directly political influence fran their work but, broadly
speaking, the Schools sustained an atmosphere of progressive liberalism.3
This, in the unique context of Birmingham, might lead as readily to Unionist
sympathies as to support for any of the more usual radical parties. Though
a number of Labour figures had connections with the Schools and four Labour
councillors were class leaders, inasmuch as the Adult Schools reinforced
Birmingham's specific local traditions and loyalties, they must be accounted
on balance a force in favour of the Unionist status quo.
1. King's Norton WEA minutes, 15;5;1926.
2. One and All (Organ of the Adult School Movement, Midland Supplement),
April, 1926.
3. V.W. Garrett, Man in the Street (1939), pp. 109-10.
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Thrning now to Sheffield, here the Labour College had its origins
in a class founded by Charles Watkins of the NUR Education Conmittee in 1912.
It developed rapidly during Sheffield's wartime radicalisation, when J.T.
Murphy and Ted Lismer were among the College's tutors, and by 1920 it was
running eleven classes with a complement of 250 students and it claimed
the affiliation and financial support of some 75 working-class organisations
At this point, most of its leading figures were members of the SLP and the
College admitted quite openly that its purpose was to forward the working-
class revolution. In the words of its prospectus:3
The policy of the College is to teach the organised workers those
social sciences which disclose the processes by means of which social
structures arise and function, providing therefore the knowledge of
those ways and means to be adopted by the Labour movement for the
accomplishment of its historical task.
This was to say, more bluntly, that the Labour College was Marxist and the
courses it taught - on industrial and economic history, economics and
revolutionary history - were dominated by the Marxist interpretation. The
College did, nevertheless, receive support from all sections of Sheffield's
organised working class; among those organisations affiliated in 1920 were
the Sheffield and Attercliffe branches of the ILP, the Park Divisional
Labour Party, the Sheffield branches of the British Socialist Party and SLP,
.4
and the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council.
In the following year, internaldifferences temporarily weakened the
College. The majority of the Sheffield SLP had joined the newly-founded
Coniiiunist Party but most of the SLP stalwarts who ran the Labour College
stayed loyal to the old party. A brief but bitter struggle for control of
the College ensued which resulted in a victory for the Conuiunists.5
1. I.W. Hamilton, 'Education for Revolution: the Plebs League and Labour
College Movement, 1909-1921', M.A. thesis, University of Warwick,
1972, Appendix.
2. Plebs, December, 1917; September, 1920.
3. Madin Papers, JM/1; Sheffield Labour College Prospectus, N.D.
4. ibid; Sheffield Labour College Syllabus of Classes, 1920-1921.
5. ibid; J. Royle to J. Madin, 4;2;1921; B. Rollings to J. Madin, 22;5;192
SCP minutes, 16;l;1922.
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Afterwards, some kind of modus vivendi was patched up and the SLP and the
Comnunist Party were even able to cooperate in the running of a joint course
on 'The History of the Modern Wor1ing-Class Movement' later that year.'
But, for a number of reasons, the College could never regain the
vitality and widespread support which it had enjoyed in the iniidiate post-
war period. The Coninunist take-over, at a time when the Comnunist Party
was becoming hostile to the work of the Labour College movement, weakened
the Sheffield College and lowered its standing in the eyes of the orthodox
Labour movement. The demise of the SLP robbed it of one of its most active
and conniitted elements. More generally, the temper of the times was
changing. The widespread radicalism which had fuelled the industrial and
political militancy of the post-war years declined and the receptivity to
revolutionary ideas narrowed. By 1932, the College was organising just two
classes in Sheffield attended by only 30 students. 2 The College had
flourished briefly at a time when the organised workers of Sheffield were
temporarily united in a wide-ranging and radical questioning of the status
quo. Ikiring the twenties this mood diminished and the political options
open to the working class becan polarised between the reformist Labour
position and the revolutionary strategy of the Cormiunists. Most workers
opted for the former and the Labour College was isolated and marginalised
as a result.
At the same time, the popularity of the WEA was increasing. In 1925
eight course were advertised; by 1931-32, 24 classes were in existence,
attended by a total of 420 students. 3 Like those in Birmingham, these
were avowedly non-political and non-partisan though the courses in Sheffielc
seem generally to have had a more practical orientation. Economics, with
eight classes in 1931, was the most popular subject, followed by Literature
1. SCP minutes, 31;8;l921.
2. G.P. Jones, A Report on the Develont of Adult Education in Sheffield
(Sheffield, 1932), p. 32.
3. September, 1925; Jones, op. cit., p. 30.
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(four classes), Esperanto and Musical Appreciation (two each), Economic
History, Drama, Geology, Biology, Political Thought, Current Problems and
Psychology. There was also a Wireless Discussion Group. There was clearly
enough here to give the politically active worker food for thought, and it
was said that 22 of Sheffield's councillors (most, if not all, presumably
Labour) were past or present students of the WEA in
The WEA did not give the specifically working-class education that
the Labour Colleges espoused - indeed, an occupational breakdown of the WEA'
students in south Yorkshire in 1930 revealed almost one third to be in
white-collar employment (though of these the large majority were clerks,
shop assistants and teachers) - but it had cane to be the WEA rather than
the partisan Labour College which received most working-class support in
Sheffield. 2
 The Labour Colleges were dominated, as often as not, by people
hostile to orthodox Labour Party politics who found it difficult to make
an appeal to mainstream Labour men and women which did not negate their own
revolutionary aspirations. For their part, ordinary Labour activists
endorsed an ethical socialist approach to education which combined, to
their own satisfaction at least, two contradictory propositions. The first
of these was that education - identified unproblematically with the truth -
was politically neutral. The second was that any education - by its
teaching of the truth - would aid the Labour cause. In this scenario, the
doctrines of the Labour Colleges, by their rejection of Labour's ethical
world-view and strategic gradualism, became not merely irrelevant but
objectionable.
Superficially more in tune with traditional Labour thinking, though
possessing its own ideological eccentricities, was the Sheffield Education
Settlement of Arnold Freeman. Freeman was a disciple of the Austrian
1. Jones. op. cit., pp. 30-31.
2. WEA Yorkshire District (south), Annual Report, 1930, p. 3.
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philosopher, Rudolf Steiner, who contended that there was a uniquely
spiritual dimension to man's existence lost in the course of history which
could be recaptured by the development of the higher faculties. What this
meant in terms of the Settlement's actual educational work is best
illustrated by examining its weekly programme of activites in 1923. On
Monday, there were classes in 'Social Problems' and Handicraft; on Tuesday,
a 'Homecraft Club' and classes in rhythmic movement and dancing; Wednesday
featured a class on voice training and study circles on 'Spiritual Problems'
and Alfred Barton's book, A World History for the Workers ; on Thursday,
Freeman lectured on socialism and Steiner's philosophy; and the week was
rounded off by a fireside chat on literature. 1 Despite Freeman's attempts
to proselytise amongst the organised Labour movement and his own descent
into more secular politics when he stoxl as Labour candidate in Hallam, his
rather esoteric and high-minded preoccupations could not but have minority
appeal. To a certain section of earnest, thinking working people, the
Settlement provided a cultural education and haven and, though it made littl€
impact on the Sheffield Labour movement, the Sheffield Educational Settlement
too played its own small role in the Labour subculture of the time.2
1. Alexander Papers, AVAR 10/2; The Wheatsheaf (Brightside and Carbrook
Cooperative Society edition), February, 1923.
2. See the reminiscences of Winifred Albaya in Through the Green Deor
(Sheffield, 1980),
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8.4 port and Recreation
The attitude of the Labour movement to sport was ambivalent. To
many Labour activists, an interest in sport was diversionary, a distraction
from the real business of achieving socialism. But others believed that,
rather than ignoring or attempting to weaken the working class's sporting
instincts, Labour should actively cater for them - both as a means of
preventing capitalist domination of sport and as a method of building up
Labour's organisation. Speaking for the latter viewpoint, W.H. Milner
1
argued that:
the Labour movement should cater for every form of social activity
in which the people were interested, particularly their sports and
recreation, the government of which had previously been in the control
of the capitalistic class. Some of their intellectual friends showed
a tendency to sneer at the workers' love of sport but they must not
be too superior to share in the coninon joys of the people.
In Sheffield, the United Socialist Institute Football Club had deliberately
chosen to enter the Sheffield City League, 'believing that we should play
before large crosds and so popularise Socialism'. 2 They, too, met the
resistance of some of their fellow socialists but they asserted the useful
role that sport could play:3
Our people have mostly been opposed to the football idea, believing
that it side-tracks the workers' minds from the real issue. But...
it is quite the opposite. Their lack of interest allows the young
men to drift into the capitalist clubs which makes propaganda doubly
difficult. Our experience teaches us valuable propaganda can be
done through sporting channels.
Others who advocated that Labour should run its own sporting activities
argued, more grandiosely, that organised workers' sport would foster
international contacts and, in the words of a Sheffield trades and Labour
Council resolution, 'do much to promote the peace spirit and in inverse
1. T.C., 6;5;1927.
2. Workers' Weekly, lO;3;1923.
3. ibid.
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ratio act as a barrier to war'.' And there were also, of course, many in
the Labour movement who simply enjoyed sport for its own sake and wanted to
share their pleasure with their fellow Party members.
All these motivations, singly and in combination, found a place in
Labour's attempts to build up its sporting side in the 1920s. ln the
following section, we examine both these impulses and the activities they
gave rise to in Birmingham and Sheffield.
Amongst the most ambitious attempts to promote a specifically Labour
sporting apparatus was the Birmingham Labour Football League, founded in 1923
at the instigation of the Rotton Park ILP. At the inauguratory meeting, it
was announced that nine Labour Football Clubs were already in existence and
it was decided to increase their numbers by circularising trades unions,
Cooperative Guilds and other working-class bodies. 2 The League's appeal
combined both the more prosaic and most visionary aspects of Labour's
sporting ambitions - its avowed purpose being:3
to combine recreation with propaganda in the Labour and Socialist
movement. Such a combination is absolutely essential if we are to
maintain progress in the movement and keep aglow the spark of keen
enthusiasm in that very important person, the Young Socialist. The
League is but the embryo of what we hope will eventually grow into
the International Socialist Workers' Sports Federation. If we are
to affiliate to any body, it will be to Tom Groom's organisation,
not to any capitalist organisation.
The circular did not add greatly to the League's membership but, with
official Labour support (a delegate from the Borough Labour Party was
appointed in September), the League duly got under way and by April, 1924
could look back with some satisfaction on a successful first year. 4 Eleven
1. S.D.I., 21;ll;1927.
2. T.C., 27;4;l923; 6;7;l923.
3. T.C., 1];8;1923. Tom Groom founded the first Clarion Cycling Club, in
Birmingham, in 1894 and later becan secretary and president of the
National Clarion Cycling Club. In 1923, he was the chief instigator
of the British Workers' Sports Federation which was intended to
encourage working-class sport under Labour movement auspices in Britain
and foster international links with similar bodies on the Continent.
4. BBLP minutes, 13;9;1923.
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clubs had joined and it was said, with some possible exaggeration, that
between 300 and 400 players had become members of the Birmingham Labour
movement through its influence. 1 The League felt confident enough to
reject contemptuously the approaches of the Birmingham Football Association
for its affiliation. The latter, it stated, was a capitalist organisation
which possessed its own share capital and received a portion of its revenues
from money made in the professional matches of the F.A. Cup. In reply to a
letter from a Mr. Eden, secretary of the Birmingham Football Association,
L.A. Byfield wrote:2
we as a Socialist Football League stand in much the same position
today as our party did in the year 1893. Our old pioneers were proud
of their "glorious isolation" as a working-class movement just as we
are of our Socialist Workers' Football League. They have made
progress! We, too, shall make progress when the rank and file of our
class throw off the shackles of the capitalist and remove the
"clinkers" of misunderstanding from their eyes...
Sooner or later, "capitalised sport" will have to make room for the
British Socialist Workers' Sports Federation and when that day dawns
Mr. Eden will be seeking another appointment.
However, such optimism was severely misplaced even in the short term. ThougiT
the League functioned for one more season with 13 teams, for reasons which
3
are not clear it folded in 1925.
In 1927, a serious attempt was made to revive the League. Delegates
from 20 Labour organisations attended the opening meeting at which it was
agreed to start anew. 4
 Four months later, just three Labour Football Clubs
had been formed and, as nothing further is heard of the Birmingham Labour
Football League, we may assume that the high hopes which attended its
founding came to naught.5
It is worthwhile placing this record in perspective by comparing it
with the contemporary success enjoyed by the Birmingham and District Works
Amateur Football Association which in the 1924-25 season was running twelve
1. T.C., 25;4;1925.
2. T.C., 9;5;1925.
3. T.C., l0;l;1925.
4. T.C.., 6;5;1927.
5. T.C., l6;9;l927.
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divisions, comprising 107 clubs and 154 teams.' The Association had been
established by the employers in 1905 and proclaind in its constitution an
ideology and objective that might have been expressly written to confirm
the worst fears of Labour activists about 'capitalist' sport. 2
 It is
doubtful, of course, that these considerations had any profound influence
cn the vast majority of participating sportsmen though the employers'
provision of subsidised sport may have predisposed some towards a more
accomodating attitude. What is certain is that capitalist football, both
in the works' league and at Villa Park and St. Andrews, had a considerably
larger public impact than the socialist version. The Birmingham Labour
Football League had briefly performed a valuable service for the younger and
more energetic members of the local Labour movement hut it had not proved
successful in breaking out of this milieu. Mr. Eden's job was safe for a
few years yet!
The works' football league in Sheffield, conducted under the auspices
of the Sheffield and District Works' Sports Association (it ran cricket,
golf, swiirining and tennis sections as well), was smaller than that of
Birmingham but included representative teams from nearly all the major works
of the city. 3
 It was in opposition to this body that the Trades and Labour
Council attempted to set up its own Sports Section in 1927 , the object of
1. N. Tiptaft, The History of the Birmingham and District Works Amateur
Football Association (1905-1955), (Birmingham, 1955), p. 66.
2. ibid., p. 5. The Association aimed:
To assist in the social unity between employers and employed, and
furthermore to assure employers that the Association will not
countenance, nor becontributors to, any player losing time from
business to the secondary interest of sport.
To help by recreation to fit men better for their daily task, and
make of them more contented workmen because of their employers'
interest in their well-being, and to form character and make of them
better and healtheir citizens.
3. Anon., Sheffield and District Works Sports Association. Golden Jubilee
1919-1969 Souvenir Booklet (Sheffield, 1969), no pagination.
-317-
which wasJ
to supplant the Sports Movement now being fostered by the employers
by a Movement controlled by the Workers themselves and thus stimulate
the Trade Union Movement.
The initial impulse for the Section came from a resolution from the Sheffiel'
Central branch of the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers urging the
establishment of a 'Young Workers' Sports Organisation'. 2 This had led the
Trades and Labour Council to organise a conference of trades union and Labou
bodies in November, 1927, addressed by Tom Groom, where it was agreed to
establish a sports section which would join up with the British Workers'
Sports Federation once it was off the ground. 3 The Council gave its
iniprimatur to the venture in June, 1928 but already misgivings had crept in
as a result of the Cornnunist take-over of the British Workers' Sports
Federation at its congress in the same year. 4 By November, 1928, the Secti
was clearly failing; it had run up debts which it could not pay off and no
affiliated organisation was willing to come to its assistance. 5 Eleven
months later, it was wound up without compunction.6
The Trades and Labour Council's Sports Section was a dismal failure.
Its existence, other than at the organisational level, is uncharted and it
seems quite possible that the Section did not conduct any actual sport.
Given the strength of the Sheffield Labour movement, this failure seems
surprising but it was clearly the case thaL, so far as the majority of
trades council delegates were concerned, the Section was an irrelevance
which, once additional financial and political probleriis had arisen, became
insupportable.
While Labour officials were politically cormiitted to, and would
1. SFYLC minutes, GM 26;6;l926.
2. ibid., 30;8;1927.
3. S.D.I., 2l;ll;l927.
4. SFLminutes, EC l2;6;l928.
5. ibid., EM 27;ll;l928.
6. ibid., EM 22;lO;l929.
24;9;l926.
30;5;l924; 12;9;l924; 25;6;1926; 13;5;1927;
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usually have genuinely welcomed, a strong sporting side to Labour's
activides as a matter of principle, they lacked in practice either the time
or motivation to translate these pieties into concrete action. Reciprocally
oficial initiatives at this level lacked the genuine rank and file input
necessary to sustain them. The real impact of Labour's sporting and
recreational activities was made, with less fanfare and less trwnpethig of
ideological motives but with considerably more spontaneous support, at the
grass roots level and it is to this area which we turn to now.
In Birmingham, the Saltley Labour Cycling and Athletic Club was
founded by the Saitley Ward Labour Party in April, 1923.1 In the first
year of its existence, it concentrated solely on cycling but in 1925 a
swiiuning section was established which rapidly became a popular attraction -
by April, it boasted 40 male and 50 female members. 2
 The Club was
strengthened in July, 1926 by an alliance with the East Birmingham Trades
and Labour Club and something of the role it had won for itself in the local
comunity is shown by the swirrining gala it organised in 1926 which was
attended by over 1600 members of the public. 3 A Walking Section establishe
later in the year added another string to its bow and the Club had clearly
come to be a valued part of local life in this strongly Labour corrnlunity.4
Cycing was a popular pastime in the Labour movement at this time and,
as well as the Saitley club, there were at least eight other Labour-based
cycling clubs in Birmingham in the 1920s. Erdington, Aston and Edgbaston
Labour Parties and the Young Socialist League had established clubs in 1924
and they were followed in subsequent years by the West Birmingham ILP Guild
of Youth, Small heath and Yardley, and the West Birmingham Labour Party.5
1. T.C., 9;3;1923.
2. T.C., l7;4;l925.
3. T.C., l6;7;l926;
4. T.C., 1;l0;l926.
5. T.C., 22;8;1924;
22;6;1928.
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In 1926, the originator of them all, the Birmingham Clarion Cycling Club,
was revived.'
Formostof these clubs and the majority of their members, the
emphasis was on enjoyment. Cycling provided a cheap and easy means for
working people to escape briefly the gloom and dirt of the big cities by
visiting the surrounding countryside. For the Labour cyclists too, their
weekend outings were mainly a source of healthy pleasure but sometimes more
ideological motives would be brought into play. The Ruskin Cycling Club of
the Aston Labour Party claimed 62 members who, it was said:2
take to cycling simply for pleasure and Labour and Socialist
propaganda work. Whilst out riding we chalk the roads with "Read
the 'Town Crier', 'The Herald', etc.", go into public houses and
give speeches "Why I read the 'Town Crier" and so on.
Once under way, the Clarion Cycling Club, too, undertook to spread Labour's
message in the rural areas that surrounded Birmingham. 3 The particular
value of cyclists to the local Labour movement - as despatch riders and
messengers - was never better illustrated than in the General Strike, and
the Ruskin Cycling Club received a formal ccrrniendation fran the Aston
Labour Party in recognition of its seices.4
In 1925, the Birmingham Labour Motor Cycling Club was established
with a rationale and purpose substantially similar to those of its pedal-
powered counterparts though it tended to venture further afield on its
weekend trips. 5
 It developed a small but active membership and was
strengthened in July, 1925 by a merger with the Birmingham Clarion Motor
Cycle Club.6
The landscape of south Yorkshire and Irbyshire was less suited to
cycling but was ideal for walking, and in the interwar period rambling was
1. T.C., 23;4;1926.
2. T.C., 18;9;l925.
3. T.C., l7;6;1927.
4. T.C., ll;6;1926.
5. T.C., 22;5;1925.
6. T.C., 3;7;1925.
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a mass participation sport for the Sheffield working class. The Peak
District, in particular, containingsomeof the most beautiful and unspoilt
countryside in England and easily accessible from Sheffield, exercised an
almost irresistable attraction on many people disencianted with the
notorious dirt and grime of industrial Sheffield. It was calculated that
30,000 people departed Sheffield Midland Station for the rural stops of the
Peak line during an average August.' Others walked directly, cycled or
travelled by coach. Rambling was, by any standards, a major form of
recreation in Sheffield where there were over 30 rambling clubs in
existence in the mid-l920s.2
A number of these had Labour and Cooperative affiliations and the
largest and best known of any of the clubs was the Sheffield Clarion
Ramblers which claimed in 1921 a membership of l530.
	 Of these, it was
estimated that only 200 were regular walkers but the importance of the
Clarion club spread far beyond the narrow confines that this would suggest
through the zeal and determination of its secretary, G.H.B. Ward. Ward
had founded the Clarion Ramblers in 1901 and had beconE, two years later,
the first secretary of the Sheffield Labour Representation Conmittee.
Rambling was not a distraction from his socialism but an integral part of
it; the simple, healthy pleasures of rambling were both a foretaste of the
socialist society to come and a perpetual reminder of the present iniquities
of capitalism and private ownership 4 Virtually all the Peak District was
in the hands of private landlords and large parts of it had been declared
out of bounds - often purely in order that the upper classes could have the
pleasure of shooting grouse. There could scarcely have been a more vivid
illustration of the injustices of the capitalist system than this for the
working men and women of Sheffield.
1. H. Hill, Freedom to Roam (Ashbourne, 1980), pp. 55-56.
2. Sheffield Clarion Ramblers, Handbook, 1926-27, p. 185.
3. S.D.I., 3;l;l921.
4. Hill,	 p. 32.
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In order to remedy this state of affairs, Ward equipped himself
with a unique and unparalleled knowledge of the ancient rights of way of
the Peak which he used to spearhead his campaigns for the revival of former
rights of public access. In 1926, Ward was the chief instigator and first
chairman of the Sheffield and District Ramblers' Federation (comprising 18
clubs), established to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and to
support free access.' Later Ward's efforts, conducted principally through
lobbying and peaceful protest, were supplemented by more direct action.
The first of the famous Mass Trespasses - which were largely under Corrmunist
inspiration - occurred in April, 1932 when 500 people risked arrest and the
violence of the gamekeepers when they deliberately intruded onto a closed
2portion of the High Peak.
Rambling, then, was unusual in being a working-class recreation which,
potentially at least, taught clear political lessons. Ward himself saw this,
writing in 1926 to his friend, J.S. Middleton (national secretary of the
Labour Party), that:3
the youngsters are now leaving the Boy Scouts for the moors of the
Peak at the age limit and the girls are going with them. They're
sometimes noisy like all postwar youth but the propaganda is really
fine for they are converted without preaching and lecturing and the
movement reaps the result of it.
It is also interesting to note that the current (1985) secretary of the
Sheffield area Communist Party dates his support of the Party back to the
days when, as a young man in the early thirties, he was impressed by the
extra fire and sharpness shown by the members of the Young Caunist League'
rambling section. 4
 Among the other parts of the working-class movement to
run their own rambling clubs were the Sheffield ILP and the ILP Guild of
Youth and the Sheffield Cooperative Party. 5 That rambling had a
1. Sheffield Clarion Ramblers, Handbook, 1927-28, p. 150.
2. Hill, op. cit., p. 62.
3. National Labour Party archives, J.S.M. Correspondence; G.H.B. Ward to
J.S. Middleton, N.D. [March-April, 1926].
4. In conversation.
5. G.H.B. Ward to J.S. Middleton, bc. cit.; S.C., August, 1922.
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considerable following is shown by the fact that the main ILP club had over
100 members and the Cooperative Club some 400.1
Aside form these sporting and recreational efforts, there were a
whole range of Labour-associated social activities - less athletic but
serving essentially the sair purpose. Contrary to some assessments, the
Labour Party in the l920s did possess an authentic group life, modest in
scope but certainly significant within the terms of its own members' work
and perceptions.
Dancing was one of the most popular pastimes of the time and a large
number of local Labour Parties and ILP branches organised regular, often
weekly, dances for members and friends. The Attercliffe Divisional Labour
Party, for example, was able, possessing its own premises, to organise two
dances and a members' social each week, and at the Heeley Labour Hall there
was a weekly prograame featuring children's dancing on Mondays, an adults'
select dance on Tuesdays, the Junior League's social and dance on Fridays,
and a further social and dance for the adults on Saturdays. 2 Among the
organisations credited with organisirig weekly dances in Birmingham were the
Rotton Park and Witton branches of the ILP and the Perry ConTnon, Northfield,
Yardley, Saitley, Small Heath and King's Norton branches of the Labour
3
Party.
For the less energetic, there was always cards and, alongside the
dances, many parties ran frequent cards nights and whist drives. The
Attercliffe and Park Divisional Labour Parties ran twice-weekly and weekly
whist drives; Ecclesall went even further in organising four cards nights
each week. 4 In Birmingham, the Rotton Park ILP and Perry Conmn Labour
1. New Leader, 13;8;l926; S.C., August, 1922.
2. S.F., July, 1922; February, 1925.
3. T.C, l3;4;l926; 24;9;l926; 12;2;l926; 3;8;l928;
Labour Torch, April, 1927, February, 1928;
jgjorton Labour News, September, 1928.
4. S.F., July, 1924; February, 1925; June,1922.
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Party were among the groups with regular cards nights, and the West
Birmingham Divisional Labour Party formed its own whist club and even mooted
the idea without, it seems, any real success - of a Labour Whist League.'
Such activities hardly presaged the social revolution, of course,
but, then, that was not their primary aim. They served two principal
purposes in fact; they catered for the social requirements of Party members
and their acquaintances, and they were a means of raising finance. The
whist drives of the Aston Cooperative Party, for example, brought in a total
of £l4-l2-4 in 1930, each making a small but useful profit of around 10/-
Given the fact that most Labour Party and ILP branches met for political
purposes just once or twice a month, these more regular social occasions
must have formed an important, to some perhaps the most important, part of
Party life. At the very least, they impressed the belief and formed an
actuality in which the Labour Party was far more than a mere electoral
machine.
To a lesser extent, they were also a means of presenting a public
face of the Labour Party and recruiting new members. The 'Reservoir Labour
Representation and Social Club', set up in the Reservoir Tavern by the
Rotton Park and Ladywood Labour Parties 'in order to get into closer touch
with the people in these wards', was one example of this type of work.3
It was, however, an unusually outgoing venture for Lhe Labour movement which
tended, in its social activities, tQ look inwards to its own supporters
rather than outwards to the wider public.
Cast in the same mould were the many outings which were arranged by
the local parties for their members. Taking the case of Birmingham for
which we have better records, these ranged from a weekly ramble in sxrQ
1. T.C., l3;4;l923; 28;9;l928; ll;7;l924.
2. Aston Cooperative Party Cash Book, 1930-1931.
3. T.C., 27;2;l920.
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nearby beauty-spot (the Clent and Lickey Hills, lying inrwdiately to the
south-west of the city's borders, were favoured areas) to the annual surriier
trip by 'chara' toa place of interest within driving distance. There were
few, if any, parties which did not arrange at least one outing a year and
many, particularly the Women's Sections, arranged more. It is worth giving
a description of one such outing - that made by 60 members of the West
Birmingham Labour Party to Stratford upon Avon in July, 1922. They were met
their arrival by members of the Stratford Labour Party and then given a
guided tour of the local sights. Tea followed, when they were addressed by
Cllr. Hall (Labour representative for All Saints' Ward) and other worthies
of the local movement. After tea, a boat trip on the Avon:1
during which the West Birmingham songsters charmed the natives and
sundry other boating parties with their vocal efforts, not forgetting
the Red Flag...
Ten o' clock found us back in "Brum", safe and sound, tired but happy
and all concerned voting it one of the jolliest outings they ever had
This was typical. The outings were not political events but often the
trippers would call in on the local Labour headquarters of the town they
were visiting. More occasionally, there would be some overt propaganda -
usually to the members themselves, sometimes to passers-by as when the East
Birmingham ILP sought to enlighten the benighted denizens of Kenilworth.2
Almost invariably, the day would end, after a good walk and some refreshment
with the singing of the group's favourite songs arid Labour hymns. These
outings, which brought together kindred souls in a light-hearted atmosphere
gently permeated by politics, were an important component of what the
Labour Party was and meant to its rank and file. To the Birmingham City
branch of the ILP, theywere 'an incentive to work for the cause of
socialism' .	 We may agree, at least, that they were occasions when the
much-vaunted comradeship and fellowship of the Labour movement became
something real and tangible.
1. T.C., 28;7;l922.
2. T.C., 18;7;1924.
3. T.C., 12;5;1922.
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Taking the process one stage further were those groups of comrades
who aranged annual holidays together. The Aston branch of the Young
Socilialist League took a week's holiday in the Welsh mountains, booking a
field from a local farmer and setting up their cx.n camp complete with Red
Flag. Around 16 went, some cycling all the way, others travelling with the
lorry carrying their equipnent. Lily Moody reckons that it cost them £1
each all-in.' More ambitious were the Sheffield Cooperative Party Ramblers
who in 1922 and 1926 booked bungalows at Claughton in the Forest of Bowland;
in 1926, around 60 members holidayed together in this way.2
To complete this look at the recreational and social side of the
Labour movement's work, we will concentrate on three sections to whom such
activities were of especial significance - women, the young and Clarion.
Writing in 1929, Egori Wertheimer noted the 'impulse to a far more
active social life' in the Labour Party given by the many and varied
activities of the Women's Sections, and it is certainly true that no other
part of the Movement placed as much emphasis on keeping its members
entertained as well as politically active. 3 The Women's Sections usually
met during the afternoons and catered principally for women not in
employment, either housewives or young mothers. As a result, for many of
the women members, who unlike their male relatives had no established role
outside the home, the sections were not merely an expression of their
political beliefs but an important social outlet and it was important that
a bright and interesting calendar of activities was arranged to attract and
retain those to whom politics was not a natural or easily acquired interest
This was recognised by the Sheffield Women's Labour Association who
1. Interview with Lily Moody.
2. Sheffield Cooperative Party Rambling Club minutes, ll;6;1922; 7;2;l926
3. Wertheimer, op. cit., p. 119.
-326-
reported in 1924 that:'
New supporters of the Women's Movement [i.e. the Women's Sections]
have been enticed by means of the prospect of delightful social
hours spent in the company of happy, homely women.
In Birmingham, the Lozells Ward Labour Party Women's Section interspersed
lectures by, among others, John Strachey and O.G. Willey with musical
recitals and songs and it promised that at all its meetings everyone would
get a cup of tea. 2 The Yardley Women's Section, on the other hand,
enlivened its normal political business with a series of visits to an
orphanage and several Corporation departments. 3
 While to some, such
activities may have appeared a dilution of the real business of politics,
in reality the Women's Sections were performing a valuable political servic
in making the Labour Party more accessible and interesting to those to whom
politics was riot a way of life or sole concern. They also encouraged a
genuine friendliness and camaraderie which added much to the Sections'
successful functioning. Will Chamberlain was among the many who acknowledg
that 'women are showing us the value of social functions' .
The Women's Sections also had a specific, not to say unavoidable,
interest in children - both their own and other people's. To cater for the
members' own children, rambles, outings and picnics were arranged during
the sunur months and the Attercliffe Women's Section used to hold some of
its regular weekly meetings in a local park; the children were brought ala
and played while their mothers attended to the day's political business and
afterwards everyone shared a picnic tea. 5 Such activities merged easily
with the women's larger involvement in the Party-organised children's treat
and outings discussed earlier.
Nor was the women's contribution to the social side of the Labour
1. S.F., August, 1924.
2. T.C., l;ll;l929.
3. T.C., 16;7;l926.
4. T.C., l7;8;1923.
5. A. Green, op. cit., p. 60.
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movement confined to their own activities. The Labour Party's corrnnitment
to sexual equality was quickly forgotten whenever the Party had a social or
a dance when, in almost every case, it was the women who were expected to
do the catering. In the same way, should the Party stage sc fund-raising
event, it was usually the female members who did the bulk of the work.
Women did also, of course, take an active part in the orgañisational and
propagandist work of the Labour movement but, in general, most of the more
party political type of activity was undertaken by the men. The overall
balance of female participation in the Party is probably exemplified well
by the wciien of the Woodseats Ward Labour Party in Sheffield who, it was
stated, were:1
amongst our most active workers in the ward party. . .Not only have
they contributed by their gifts of refreshments and assistance on
the occasion of the social gatherings, and by their invaluable work
in connection with the Bazaar, but in the ordinary branch work,
collecting members' subs. and seeking new members, they have in
several cases outshone the efforts of the male members.
As to the young, they were both the principal targets and the most
active participants in the Labour movement's recreational activities. The
Labour Party was keen to recruit young members and many of its sporting
sidelines were designed to appeal to young people who, it was felt, would b
put off by too single-minded a concentration on dry political work. Equa11
it is true that the Labour football clubs, cycling sections and the suchlikE
must, by their very nature, have attracted a predominantly young c1ientle.
An examination of the youth sections confirms the ii'npression that
recreational outlets were particularly important for the Party's younger
membership.
The Birmingham Young Socialist League is a good place to start for i
was set up mainly by the young people themselves and run, in its own words,
1. Park and Heeley Gazette, January, 1930.
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on 'the fundamental principle that only youth can cater for youth' . 	 In
its first year of operations, 1924, the League worked vigorously to ensure
that it offered a balanced programme of political, educational and
recreational activities; tennis, swirrming, rambling and cycling sections
were set up and, of its four meetings per month, the first was set aside fo:
an address, the second for a musical programme, the third for a literary
evening, and the fourth for a debate.2
The Young Socialist League was unusually active but certainly not
unique in the range of amusements it offered. The Soho Ward Labour Party
League of Youth, for example, organised its own swimning, cycling and
fishing sections, the Rotton Park ILP Guild of Youth ran drama, camping,
cricket and rambling sections, and the West Birmingham and Yardley ILP Guil
of Youth possessed their own cycling clubs. 3
 The overall strength of
interest in sport among the young socialists was such that a Birmingham and
District Socialist Youth Sports Association (comprised of delegates from al
parts of Labour's youth movement) was able to arrange annual rallies in the
city in 1929, 1930 and 193l.
Before the First World War, it was the Clarion movement, under the
inspiration of Robert Blatchford, which had done most to bring enjoyment
and pleasure into the Labour movement. The Clarion movement believed that
the healthy fellowship envisaged as part of the Cooperative Corrnonwealth
should also be practised in the contemporary socialist movement - both for
its own sake and as a prefigurement of what was to come. The cycling and
hiking and myriad social activities of Labour activists in the interwar
period were foreshadowed in the work of Clarion's supporters before 1914
1. T.C., 14;5;1926.
2. T.C., 6;6;1924; 18 ; 7 ; 1924.
3. T.C., 12;7;1929;
	 18;7;1930;	 l2;3;1926.
4. T.C., 8;5;l931.
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but, ironically, Clarion itself was in serious decline. The strongly
pro-war attitudes of its old leadership had lost Clarion considerable
respect and affection among the socialist rank and file, and times had
changed.
In Sheffield, though, the Clarion movement was able to maintain a
healthy existence primarily as a result of the vigour of the outdoors side
of the local Labour movement. The Sheffield Clarion Ramblers were, of cour
one major source of strength but the Clarion Club House, conveniently
situated in the nearby Peak on the city's borders at Dore Moor, was also
visited by many other groups of Labour ramblers and trippers. The choral
and dramatic sections already referred to also testify to a local presence
of some siginificance. Although Clarion locally was not irmiune from the
problems that had afflicted the national body (the United Socialist
Institute Football Club had originally been called Clarion F.C. but dropped
the name in protest at the leadership's 'jingo attitude' during the War),
it remained a viable and valued part of the local Labour movement.1
In Birmingham, Clarion fared less well. The Midland Clarion Club -
located in a former isolation hospital at Sheldon on the eastern edge of t
city - had originally been opened in 1914.2 Not much could be expected
during the War but in 1919 the Club House announced its presence in
optimistic terms
The Club House is a rendezvous for Socialists of every shade of
opinion, and rebels of the deepest dye.
On the social side there are numerous CONCERTS, several impromptu
DEBATES, DANCES, WRIST DRIVES, and most of the best PLAYS produced
by the Club House Dramatic Society.
In 1920, the club was running a weekly dance but for the rest of the early
twenties it was largely inactive A meeting in January, 1925 was called t
1. Workers' Weekly, l0;3;1923.
2. T.C., 3;1O;1930.
3. T.C., 10;l0;19l9.
4. T.C., 30;4;1920.
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revive the Club and in May it was reported that 23 organisations were newly
affiliated and that the Saltley and Edgbaston Cycling Clubs had agreed to
use the Club House as their headquarters. 1
 The energetic group of young
socialists now running Clarion locally were also able to re-form its own
cycling club in the following year and a swiriining club in 1928.2
But just two years later, in 1930, the Clarion Club House was closed;
unable to attract enough local support, it finally gave up the struggle afte
running up a deficit in every year since 1918. A number of factors were hel
to account for this, the most important of which appears to have been the
general alienation from Clarion among socialists arising frctn its vehementl,
pro-war attitudes. Neither was the Club House as well placed as its Sheffi
counterpart; it was rather out-of-the-way and could not offer the same scer
and recreational compensations as Fore Moor. Finally, it was said, the
energies and attitudes of the younger enthusiasts who had revived the Club
also had the effect of making the older members feel 'out of place' and
their support dropped off as a result.3
While all these explanations, no doubt, held s
	
truth, the fundame
reason for the closure was that the Clarion movement itself had been
superseded. It had been superseded not because the socialist and Labour
movement had ceased to concern itself with the recreational interests of it
members but, actually, because it catered for them itself in a more organis
and comprehensive fashion. Special circumstances prevailed in Sheffield bu
generally the self-imposed distance placed by Clarion between itself and th
official Labour movement made it, as an independent and largely recreational
organisation, seem increasingly irielevant and unnecessary to the majority
of Labour activists.
1. T.C., 9;l;l925;	 l;5;1925.
2. T.C., 23;4;1926;	 18;5;1928.
3. T.C., 3;l0;1930.
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8.5 Conclusion
To attempt any overall characterisation of the Labour subculture is
a difficult and probably fairly futile task. Labour in the 1920s remained
a coalition of different interests and different strands of thought and
practice. Nevertheless, there is a real sense in which a genuine
coalescence of all these elements was taking place, a process - paralleling
that in the ideological domain - in which a Labour identity was being forrr
and consolidated. As this took place, certain influences were lost or
diminished, others assumed a new prominence, and each left its mark on each
other and the composite that was being constructed. Here, we are concerned
to draw some fairly broad conclusions as to the nature of this composite.
The 'Socialism of the New Life', recreated so sympathetically by
Stephen Yeo and Stanley Pierson, was in a terminal decline. Its strengths
had been the result of its weakness; now, as Labour grew and prepared to
take power, its prescriptions and compensations becan irrelevant. It
lingered on more forcefully in Birmingham precisely because there, in the
heartland of Unionism, Labour activists could still feel themselves pioneer
and the psychological mechanisms of inspiration and dedication had a greatE
necessity and purpose. Where the idea of a genuine and practised conversic
to socialism remained stronger was in work among the young. The prospect
of capturing young minds to the cause, the hope even of bringing up a
socialist generation, were still such as to motivate not a few ethical
socialists. But most now placed their hopes and energies bchindapolitica
revolution won, by argument and persuasion, through the ballot box rather
than a cultural revolution achieved by an ethical conversion.
Nor did Labour as a whole really believe that, in its cultural and
recreational activities, it was building up a force capable of subverting
the capitalist status quo. There was certainly a widespread feeling that
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Labour ought to be developing its non-political presence and this had its
origins in several strands of thought. One derived from a view of the
socialist future strongly influenced by William Morris; this considered
that, if Labour was really to be fit for the Cooperative Comonwealth, it
should be preparing its members and supporters now to a proper realisation
of humanity's achievements and their own creative potentials. Another,
subGramscian view, was that Labour should be increasing the size and scope
of its own activity and organisation in order to combat the capitalist
domination of all the other major sources of public information and
entertainment. Finally, as eyes wandered over the North Sea, there was a
certain amount of guilt, a feeling that, as Labour was now the principal
social democratic party in Europe, it ought to be trying harder to emulate
the Germanic thoroughness of the SPD.
But the true rationale of nearly all of Labour's non-political
activities was, so far as their practitioners were concerned, much simpler.
The subculture was primarily a case of ordinary people making their own
entertainment. Before the cinemas, wireless and television had asserted
their dominance as suppliers of mass entertainment, the working class had
still, to a considerable extent, to amuse itself. In following this patteri
the Labour Party was substantially no different from any other voluntary
association of the time in which the members arranged their own leisure
activities.
Inasmuch as the Labour Party subculture was differentiated from that
of other bodies, it was in degree rather than in kind, by self-assessment
and gloss rather than by actual practice. The LabourParty'srnembership
was composed principally of the more earnest and respectable stratum of the
working class. It tended also to be predominantly socialist. The
coincidence of these two factors led, firstly, to an uncorrrnonly active and
self-improving group life, and, secondly, to an unusually ideological
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appraisal of its significance. In Labour Party terms, friendliness was
transformed into fellowship and camaraderie into comradeship. This was
important not insofar as it was true or false (though the idea that in the
'good old days' Labour had none of the internal wrangling that now
apparently characterises the Party is quite mythical) but insofar as it
became the truth by forming the Party's self-image. The Labour Party did
not imagine, except in rare cases, that its extra-political activities
presaged the New Life or contributed to the crumbling of bourgeois culture
but it could still believe that they offered something larger and more
important than mere entertainment.
It undoubtedly was the case that the Party's group life did serve ar
extremely valuable function in bringing members together and breaking down
the social-political divide. By so doing, the Party became something more
than an organisational framework for political activists; Labour came to
play a valued role in the social life of its members and consequently clam
a greater affection and loyalty than any merely political body could have
done. In Birmingham and Sheffield, at least, this observation applies as
much to the ward parties of the Labour Party as to the branches of the ILP
whose roles, in most respects, appear interchangeable. Nostalgia is alwa
a dangerous commodity for the historian but the reminiscences of Alfred GreE
of his early days in the Attercliffe Labour Party appear justified:1
All these treats and outings and the general sociability were
important.. .and they firmly implanted in my mind the association
of working-class politics with fun and enjoyment. Politics was
not something apart from life, but was there to be enjoyed a:3 well
as understood. This was all very different from the dreary round
of mechanical activity which passes for politics today.
Herein lay the true merit of the Labour Party's extra-political work.
Labour members were not revolutionary and they had no thoughts of 'hegemoni
1. A. Green, op. cit., p. 61.
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They built up not a counter-culture but a subculture, not a state within a
state but a pink-tinged reflection of surrounding society. The Party's
social life arose to service the expressed needs and preferences of its
members; Labour's cultural ambitions were, in reality, modest. Within
these, its own unpretentious terms, the Labour Party developed a successful
group life. To judge its work by other standards is neither historically
valid nor politically objective.
Chapter 9
THE COOPEPATIVE MOVEMENT
9.1 Introduction
The Cooperative movement was the third section - alongside the trades
unions and the Labour Party - of the Labour trinity and, in some ways, it
was the most important. In the interwar period, it remained an almost
entirely, and avowedly, working-class organisation and one which possessed
a very considerable presence in ordinary working-class life. 'Coop' stores
were a feature of most towns and shopping centres and a large proportion of
working people were enrolled as Cooperative members and were thus eligible
for the much-prized 'divi' (the dividend allotted to purchasers according to
the financial value of their custom). But the Cooperative movement went
beyond narrowly trading concerns in providing a comprehensive social and
cultural life for its supporters through its members' guilds, educational
classes and its many and varied artistic and recreational activities.
In 1917, the Cooperative movement went even further when it voted
decisively to enter the political arena by agreeing to stand its own
candidates in local and parliamentary elections. This turn-around -
hitherto the Movement had stood self-consciously aloof from directly politic
matters - was caused largely by a widespread feeling of grievance against
the discrimination the Societies were suffering as a result of wartime
legislation. Specifically, the Government's handling of rationing
arrangements and its decision that the Cooperative stores should be liable
for excess profits tax, and the perceived prejudice of local tribunals in
enforcing conscription against Cooperative employees instilled the view
that direct political action and redress were necessary. 1 The move also
1. T.F. Carbery, Consumers in Politics (Manchester, 1969), pp. 17-18.
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reflected, at least among scima Cooperators, a wider vision of the Movement's
task and purpose; there were scte that felt that true Cooperation required
more than diligent shopkeeping - to fulfil its ideals, its philosophy had
to to be spread and practised politically too.'
The political impact of the Cooperative movement and the flow and
cross-currents of its various activities will be examined in the following
chapter. We will look first at Cooperative politics as such and, then, at
Cooperation's always ambiguous relationship with the other sections of the
Labour movement. The last part studies briefly the work and influence of
the guilds and the Cooperative movement's other primarily non-political
bodies. In conclusion, we attempt some overall assessment of the role playe
by the Cooperative movement in working-class politics in our period of study
1. S. Pollard, 'The Foundation of the Cooperative Party' in A. Briggs,
J. Saville (eds), Essays in Labour History, 1886-1923 (1971).
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9.2 Cooperative Politics
When Labour activists sought to encapsulate the vision of the future
which they upheld, the form of words that they used most often was the phrase
the 'Cooperative Coninionwealth'. Here, Cooperation transcended any narrowly
coninercial meaning and stood forth as the antithesis of all the greed and
destructive competition held to characterise contemporary social relations.
The phrase invoked a picture of free and equal individuals working
harmoniously together to benefit the social and economic democracy of which
they were members; in a sense, it acted as a compressed description of the
socialist ideal and it would be mistaken to view its content as specifically
Cooperative.
There were, however, Cooperative politicians to whom Cooperation
stood in its own right as both the means and the end of social emancipation.
To such as these, the Cooperative stores were not merely a manifestation of
working-class consumerism but were an instrument of social and economic
reform. The opening of a new shop could be heralded as a 'triumph of
democracy.. .an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace',
and,while they delighted in the corrinercial strength and growth of the
Movement, they deprecated any narrow-minded concern with Cooperative finance
or the 'divi' .	 When A.V. Alexander took part in a Cooperative trade
propaganda campaign, he was nonetheless keen to emphasise that:2
The Cooperative movement did not mean the keeping of shops but the
substitution of a system based upon justice, equity and love for
one based on greed, competition and hate.
More practically in this light, the stores were thought to prefigure the
economic mode of the Cooperative Commonwealth and to be subverting the
capitalist status quo from the inside. John Hammond, a keen Cooperator in
1. The Wheatsheaf (Birmingham Industrial Cooperative Society edition),
June, 1919.
2. S.D.I., 5;2;l927.
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King's Norton, argued that:'
By purchasing your goods from the Cooperative Society, you produce
for use; by feeding and clothing yourself by the aid of the
Cooperative movement, you produce your own emancipation.
Such thinking was not uncctrnon among the most active Cooperators - those
people who formed the Boards of Management, Cooperative Education Committees
guild secretariats and suchlike - but though a highly politicised view of
the world, it was not one susceptible of iniriediate translation into
practical politics. Insofar as it proclaimed an anti-statist creed of
working-class self-help and initiative, the Cooperative vision was in a
real sense non-political. It required not so much legislative interference
as legal freedom and it was natural that that the Cooperative Representation
Comittees founded in 1918 were primarily concerned to remove discrimination
rather than promote positive policies of state or municipal intervention.
The Cooperative Party (as the Movement's political wing was re-named in 1919
was founded on essentially negative premises and lacked a clearly defined
purpose and prograrne.
This was to leave it in an ideological no-man's land but, in practice
most Cooperative political activists were drawn by instinct, sympathy and
electoral reality into some form of working alliance with the Labour Party.
The process was always a contested one. Sincere Cooperators, as well as
those with a political axe to grind, worked assiduously to put an end to the
Cooperative movement's political work and, in particular, its links with
Labour. But once the decision for political action was taken, a modus
vivendi with Labour became inevitable. For one thing, those people who
joined the Cooperative Party were just those who were likely already to be
Labour sympathisers and keen trades unionists. Cooperators who did not
share these leanings could still find a useful and ideologically satisfying
role in Cooperative management and education and so, to some extent, a
natural division of responsibilities could arise. Equally, though the
1. King's Norton Labour News, July, 1928.
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Cooperative Party lacked specific policies, its ethos of constitutional
respectability and gradualistic reform brought it broadly into line with
the Labour Party. In any case, the similarities of the two parties made
competition at the polls seem a foolish and mutually damaging option.
In practice, most Cooperative and Labour activists saw no
contradiction in their work in the two working-class parties though their
assessment of the relative importance of each might vary. The most
prominent Cooperative politician of the twentieth century, A.V. Alexander,
was a minister in the first Labour government and a Cabinet member in the
second and third. Though always assiduous in defending the Cooperative
movement's interests in parliament, his politics otherwise appear
indistinguishable from those of his Labour colleagues.' Fred Longden,
elected Labour and Cooperative M.P. for Deritend in 1929, had originally
stood as a Labour candidate and had formerly been a member of the ILP's
National Administrative Council. 2 In effect, most working-class political
activists assumed a division of labour between the two movements: Labour
was concerned with the legislative improvement of working-class conditions
and in this work the Cooperative Party was its assistant; Cooperation itsell
was engaged in an economic attack on the capitalist mode of production.
This analysis of the movements' shared goals and mutual responsibilities
was expressed at its most sophisticated by Fred Longden:3
The basic propositions of both parties must push society on to
socialisation and workers' control. At the moment, the primary
work of Labour is to protect the selling of labour-power and
generally improve the standard of life of the dispossessed. . .On the
other hand, Cooperation represents the irrndiate attempt at control
and socialisation by attacking big businessin the industrial sphere.
That is, whilst Labour aims at future socialisation through Parliamer
Cooperation is accomplishing it piecemeal now.
We turn now to examine what these ideological ambiguities and affinities
meant to the evolution of working-class politics in Birmingham and Sheffielc
1.. J. Bellamy, J. Saville (eds), Dictionary of Labour Biography, vol. 1
(1972), pp. 11-14.
2. ibid, vol. 2 (1974), pp. 239-42.
3. T.C., 12;l;l922.
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The Birniingham and District Cooperative Representation Council
was formed in January, 1918 as a joint venture of the three local retail
societies and two local productive societies. Its total membership was 174,
made up of 55 representatives from the Societies' General Comnittees, 29
from their Educational Comittees, and 8 representatives respectively of
their officials and employees. 48 delegates were elected by the gui.lds and
a further 26 by the membership at large. An Executive Cainittee was formed
by the election of one representative from each of these different interests
The Council's first task was to select candidates for the General
Election which was expected at the end of the War. After negotiations with
the Borough Labour Party, it was agreed to contest King T s Norton and
Sparkbrook Divisions, and candidates were chosen - Cur. Tom Hackett in
King's Norton and Frank Spires in Sparkbrook - whose record of work in
Labour and trades union circles also did much to recormind them to Labour
Party members. 2 It was further agreed to establish Divisional Cooperative
3Conmittees in these areas and, one year later, ward committees too.
Because of its unusual genesis, the Cooperative Party was very much a
creation from above; individual involvement initially came largely in a
representative or delegatory capacity and individual membership seems to
have been very much an afterthought and one which, as the minimum
subscription was set at just 6d. a year, hardly signified any firm or
binding commitment.4
In reality, not much came of the proposal for individual membership
until the Party's hand was forced by the withdrawal of the Ten Acres and
Stirchley Society from political activity in December, 1922. In order to
retain its interests in the King's Norton Division (which the Ten Acres
1. BCoP minutes, 22;1;l9l8.
2. ibid, 28;l;1918; 3;4;19l8.
3. ibid, 29;4;19l8; 6;5;19l9.
4. ibid, 3;4;1918.
-341-
Society served), the Party agreed to the formation of 'voluntary' Cooperati
Parties in the area.' The arrangement was consolidated when in 1925, afte
a period of considerable friction with Labour, the Cooperative Party
finally agreed to establish local ward corrmittees, functioning independenti'
and formed through individual membership, which were eligible to enroll wit]
the Borough Labour Party. 2 It was not until this point that the Cooperati
Party acquired the normal apparatus of a political party, and thenceforth
the number of its local bodies rose from three in the first year of the
agreement to six in 193l.
The process was similar in Sheffield where the first meeting of the
Brightside and Carbrook Cooperative Society Political Council (the Sheffielc
and Ecciesall Society had decided not to take up political work) took place
on January, 5, ,918.	 It, too, was a body which in its early years was
essentially the product of centralised initiative and control, formed of
representatives and delegates of the Societies and guilds - as in Birminghari
and possessing no recognisable grass roots. 5
 Divisional organisations were
set up in Attercliffe, Brightside and Hillsborough and a 'register of
helpers' was compiled but the Party sought supporters rather than a
participant rank and file.6
The Cooperative Party esLablished an early claim on the Hilisborough
Division and, in its own Fashion, expanded rapidly. By 1924, it boasted ward
organisations in Attercliffe, Brightside, Ecciesall, Hallarn and Hilisborough
itself but membership remained a loosely defined concept. 7
 It was not
until 1926 that the Hillsborough Party agreed to establish a specific
membership list in addition to its ordinary roll of supporters, and it was
1. BCoP minutes, 23;l;1923; 20;2;l923.
2. ibid., 17;2;1925; 2l;4;1925.
3. BTC Annual Reports, 1925-26, p. 40;
4. SCoP minutes, 5;l;l9l8.
5. S.C., April, 1923.
6. SCoP minutes, 27;7;l918; 5;9;1918.
7. April, May, 1924.
1931-32, p. 69.
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laid down that members pay just 6d. a year as the minimum fee.1
Agreement with the Trades and Labour Council on affiliation was
harder to come by and it was not until 1930 that a local pact was concluded
After some hard bargaining, it was finally agreed that the Cooperative
Party's Divisional Councils should affiliate to the Trades and Labour
2Council on the basis of an affiliation fee of £5 each. 	 In the first yeai
of operation of the new arrangement, four local Cooperative Parties affilit
The Cooperative Party found it possible to be easy-going on the
question of members' subscriptions because the vast bulk of its finances
came from the local Cooperative Societies who paid an affiliation fee on the
basis of their entire membership regardless of their individual sympathies
or interest in politics. The account books of the Birmingham Cooperative
Party reveal that in 1920 the three affiliated retail societies were paying
a quarterly subscription of ld. on each of their 71,214 members. The
revenue from this source alone guaranteed the Party an annual income of
£ll86-l8-0.	 The Par suffered from the decline of the Soho Society and
the withdrawal of Ten Acres but it was fortunate that the combined
Birmingham Cooperative Society, founded in 1925, went from strength to
strength so that by 1931 its yearly income from this source amounted to just
over £l908.	 The financial arrangements made between the Sheffield societiE
and the local Cooperative Party were essentially similar though they differed
in detail. In 1924, the Sheffield and Eclesall Society (which had taken
up political work in 1921) affiliated on the basis of 6th yearly on its
27,000 members, the Brightside and Carbrook Society paying slightly less
on its 35,000 membership. 6
 In both Birmingham and Sheffield, the figures
varied slightly according to the contemporary state of trade.
1. S.C., February, 1926.
2. SCoP minutes, 30;9;1930; SFTLC minutes, LP EC, 15;7;l930; 7;lO;1930.
3. S[TLC Annual Report, 1931.
4. BCoP Account Books, 1920.
5. BCoP Cash Book, 1931.
6. SCoP minutes, 3;4;1924.
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The financial solvency of the district parties was further eased by
the fact that two thirds of the cost of any parliamentary election campaign
waged by a Cooperative candidate was ritfrom central funds while, likewise,
the district party paid two thirds of the cost af any municipal campaign.
These arrangements enabled the Cooperative Party to make an important
contribution to the local Labour movement's electoral work. un Birmingham,
8 Cooperative and Labour parliamentary candidates were run between 1918
and 1931 with total campaign expenses amounting to £3920; in Sheffield,
6 candidates, with expenses amounting to something over £3000.1 The
financial input was proportionately just as significant at the municipal
level. The Birmingham Cooperative Party ran 39 candidates between 1919 and
1931 and spent £2176 in the process. 2 The surviving accounts for the
Sheffield Party are less comprehensive but suggest that something approachth
£1500 was spent on its 33 municipal campaigns.3
To a usually hard-pressed and indigent Labour movement, all this
represented considerable and apparently easily acquired wealth. The one
drawback was that the Societies"political grants were a highly visible and,
in someways, ethically dubious transaction - visible because the grant came
up for renewal at the quarterly meetings open to all members, dubious in the
sense that only small numbers ever attended these meetings - /nich was alway
under threat from opponents of political action or left-wing politics.
The problems that might arise as a consequence are well illustrated
by the events of 1922 in Birmingham. Industrial depression and unrest had
led to falling turn-over and profits for the Cooperative Societies and in
Ten Acres, where Liberal influence was strong, the Board of Management
decided to reconnxnd an end to the political grant. Their view was endorsed
1. Calculated from the returns of parliamentary candidates' expenses
contained in Parliamentary Accounts and Papers.
2. BCOP Municipal Election Accounts, 1919-1931.
3. SCOP records, CPR7; 1-lilisborough Constituency, municipal elections.
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by the members at a quarterly meeting by 299 votes to 136.1 The Birminghan
Industrial Cooperative Society made a similar recorrnendation - on purely
economic grounds, it was said - but here the supporters of political action
were better organised and the meeting voted by 378 votes to 67 for a
reduction of the political grant rather than its suspension.2
In Sheffield, the situation was even more tortuous. The Sheffield
and Ecciesall Society first opted for political action in March, 192]. and
subsequently joined up with the Cooperative Party both nationally and
locally. 3 It voted to withdraw in the last quarter of 1922 but this
decision was itself reversed three months later when the Society's members
renewed their conmitment to Cooperative politics. 4
 The Brightside and
Carbrook Society was not imune to these difficulties either but it managed
to stabilise the situation somewhat when, in 1923, it intrxh.iced an opting-
out clause for those members who did not wish to be included in the politcal
subscription.
In normal conditions, the grant went through 'on the nod' but on
occasions Labour's opponents agitated for its suspension. In Birmingham in
1927, the Unionist Chief Agent drew up a list of Unionist syrnpathisers who
were members of the Cooperative, containing, it was said, 1000 names. A
Unionist Cooperators' Con'mittee was formed to leaflet and canvass these
sympathisers and, simultaneously, a campaign of protest against the grant
was carefully orchestrated by local Unionist politicians and their press
allies. 6 But, for once, Unionist machinations were defeated; Labour and
Cooperative forces stood firm and it was agreed to pay the grant by 1394 vot
to 894.
1. BCOP minutes, 22;l2;1922; National Labour Party mintes, NEC 26;9;l923.
2. T.C., 8;l2;1923; 15;12;1923.
3. Sheffield and Ecciesall Cooperative Society Quarterly Report, 200,
(1924), pp. 57-58.
4. SCoP minutes, l;1;1923; S.D.I., 7;3;1923.
5. S.D.I., 12;4;1923.
6. BUA minutes, 8;7;1927; 9;9;1927.
For press campaign, see: B.B, 18;6;1927, 20;9;l927; B.M.,23;6;1927;
l6;9;l927; 19;9;1927.
7. B.C., 2l;9;1927.
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In the sane year in Sheffield, the city's Conservative Association
coordinated a 'short but intensive campaign against political activity in
the Cooperative Movement' and some of the divisional associations established
lists and committees of anti-socialist Cooperators) This activity, too,
seems to have brought no tangible result but its effect was to cause
distractions and logistical problems for the Cooperative Party and strained
relations with the Labour Party who came to consider Cooperation an uncertain
and erratic ally.
1. Sheffield Conservative Association, ACM minutes, 8;4;1927;
Ecciesall Conservative Association nlinutes, 9;12;1927.
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9.3 Cooperation and the Labour Movement
Labour always sought a close working relationship with the
Cooperative movement and never ceased to harbour hopes of a full alliance.
To some extent, this was a matter of principle - the Cooperative movement
was a working-class body, possessing aims which were congruent with and
complementary to those of the Labour Party - but it was also a matter of
more practical, not to say financial, concern. Many in the Labour Party
looked covetously towards a Cooperative movement which, in terms of its
financial resources, manpower and premises, possessed a strength and
viablility to which Labour activists could only aspire.
At a minor level, Labour did indeed benefit from the existence and
active sympathy of the Cooperative movement. Many local branches met in
Cooperative Guild Halls and the suchlike, and the 'Coop' could usually be
relied upon to lend some of its vehicles for occasions such as the May Day
parade. But Labour was never able to cement a full political and economic
partnership whilst Cooperative politics retained its independence and
peculiar instability. These facts, alongside others of a more personal or
party political nature, ensured that the relationship between the two
bodies was charged with tension and replete with difficulties.
This was particularly the case in Birmingham. In 1918, Labour had
been happy, as a result of its own financial and organisational weakness,
to cede King's Norton and Sparkbrook Divisions to Cooperation but the
parties' relations were soon to take a turn for the worse. The Cooperative
Party was jealous of its rights and anxious to retain its control in the twc
constituencies; Labour, constitutionally required to organis in every
division and keenly aware of the practical failings of Cooperative
organisation, wanted to extend its presence. \4hen the executive coirrnittees
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of the two organisations met to hamer out a solution, the Cooperative
Party argued that all the forces of Labour in the two divisions should be
consolidated under the auspices of their Cooperative Representative Councils
Labour's case was put by its secretary, F.W. Rudland:'
the Labour Party had no feeling whatever against the Cooperative
Party, it was their desire that the success already achieved should
continue and grow, but we must not forget that the Labour Party was
first in the field.
The success of the Cooperative Party was largely due, in his opinion,
to the propaganda work put in by the Labour Party...
The constitution was broad, it provided for the Coo,perative Council
to affiliate, why not get over the difficulty by that means?
This was a non-starter but an unsatisfactory conprcxnise was worked out by
which Labour agreed to hold its hand in King's Norton until after the next
General Elect:ion when the two parties would negotiate and 'if possible
jointly agree' on the foundation of any further local organisations.2
The General Election, though, when it came in November, 1922,
worsened the parties' relations rather than eased them. In Sparkbrook,
the Cooperative and Labour candidate, E.W. Hampton, deliberately downplayed
his Cooperative connections; he made few, if any, referecices to the
Movement in his manifesto or on the platform, and he snubbed the local
Cooperative Party by choosing to take the election editions of Labour's
news-sheet rather than their special copies of the Birmingham District
Coimonwealth which he contended 'would do more harm than good' . 	 Hampton,
though a sincere Cooperator and a one-time member of the local Cooperative
Society's Management Conmittee, clearly felt that in this instance the
Cooperative label would damage his prospects. The Balsall Heath Ward
Comittee of the Sparkbrook Cooperative Party showed similar misgivings when,
a few months later, it went over en bloc to the Labour Party.4
In March, 1923, the Borough Labour Party formally abrogated the
1. BCOP minutes, 27;7;1921.
2. ibid.; BBLP minutes, 27;7;l92L
3. BCOP Newspaper Subcommittee, 3;ll;l922; See also: BCoP minutes, 28;ll;l
4. BBLP minutes, 8;3;1923; BCOP minutes, 17;4;1923.
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agreement concluded two years earlier on the grounds that the Cooperative
association had damaged both that Party's candidates and its own and because
the bulk of electoral work in both Sparkbrook and King's Norton had been
performed by Labour members in any case.' In fact, the King's Norton
Cooperative had largly ceased to function since the withdrawal of the Ten
Acres Society from political action, and it was said that the Cooperative
candidate's electoral agent and all the Council's leading activists had
joined the Divisional Labour Party which had already been set up there.2
As the national Cooperative Party fought to maintain its hold on the
King's Norton constituency even as its local supporters were opposing any
further Cooperative nominations, relations between the Birmingham Labour and
Cooperative Parties reached their nadir. 3
 Negotiations between the two
national executives were fruitless but Baldwin's surprise decision to call
a General Election for December, 6, 1923 forced some kind of solution. In
Sparkbrook, E.W. Hampton went forward on a straight Labour ticket. In King'
Norton, a conference of Borough and local Labour Party representatives and
national, borough and local Cooperative representatives three weeks before
polling day agreed that a Cooperative Party candidate should stand. The
Cooperative Party had engaged in s 	 political brin1anship and won (the
Labour Party had agreed to stand down only on the understanding that a
Cooperative candidate would run whatever their decision but were subsaquentl
Informed that no candidate had been selected) but it was a pyrrhic victory.4
Mrs.Barton stood on this occasion but a Labour selection conference took
place in March, 1924 and she was eventually forced to resign her position on
a promise by the Labour Party national agent that she would be found 'another
constituency equally favourable'.5
1. BBLP minutes, 8;3;1923.
2. National Labour Party minutes, NEC 26;9;1923.
3. BCoP minutes, 23;1O;1923.
4. ibid., 16;ll;1923.
5. ibid., 1;4;1924; l5;4;1924.
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The complexities of the Labour Party's love-hate relationship with
the Cooperative Party were further revealed by events later in 1924 when
negotiations between the local Cooperative Party, the 1ritend Divisional
Labour Party and the candidate himself led to Fred Longden, prospective
Labour candidate, being re-adopted as a Cooperative and Labour candidate.'
Here, the Cooperators were on firmer ground in that they were taking over
the existing candidature of an individual already known and respected in
Labour circles in a constituency beset by organisational and financial
weaknesses. The Borough Labour Party unanimously opposed the new arrangemen
but it was approved by the national Labour Party, a joint election corrrnittee
of the two parties was formed which cooperated harmoniously, and Longden
himself came within 800 votes of victory.2
This successful example of joint working eased local tensions and,
with compromises on both sides, an agreement was concluded in April, 1925
which seemed to betoken an end to the inter-party strife. The Cooperative
Party was to form ward committees which could affiliate to the Borough Labou
Party on the same basis as other organisations and with the same rights and
responsibilities. The Labour Party, for its part, would accept joint
Cooperative and Labour candidatures and would seek to assist their return.3
Ivelopments in local politics were not, however, to facilitate such
hopes. In the late l920s, the Birmingham Labour movement was, as we have
noted, riven by left-right conflict focussed on the issue of Dr. Dunstan's
candidature in West Birmingham. The Cooperative Party, which had decided
in Fcember, 1925 not to exclude Comrminists from its ward committees, becan
one arena of this struggle. 4 Matters came to a head in 1928 after the
Borough Labour Party had expelled several members for their persistent
campaigning on Dunstan's behalf. The majority of these members transferred
1. BCOP minutes, 30;4;1924; 13;5;l924; 13;9;1924; ll;10;1924.
2. BBLP minutes, 12;9;1924; BCoP minutes, 7;10;1924; ll;l0;l924.
3. BBLP minutes, 20;4;1925; BCOP minutes, 21;4;l925.
4. BCOP minutes, 15;l2;l925; 5;l;1926.
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their activities to the local Cooperative Party branches and were
subsequently to be found at meetings of both the Borough Labour Party and
the Divisional Labour Parties acting as Cooperative delegates.' The
situation reached its most absurd at Deritend where four of the five
Cooperative Party delegates elected to the Divisional Labour Party's General
Management Camiittee were Labour expellees and all were members or close
associates of the ConTriunist Party. 2 The ironic position had arisen in
which the Cooperative nominee, Fred Longden, was being given full support
by the local Labour Party whilst being opposed by his branch Cooperative
Party.3
The reaction of Cooperative Party officialdom was ambivalent. At one
level, organisational pride dictated that they resist the Labour Party's
attempts to intervene in their internal affairs, and they protested at the
Deritend Labour Party's proposals to reduce the number of Cooperative
delegates on its Management Ccxmrnittee and categorically refused to bar from
their membership those expelled or banned by the Labour Party. 4 On the
other hand, they had no sympathy for extreme left-wing politics and
recairnended that no ward party should elect known Cairnunists or their
associates as Labour delegates. 5
 Cooperative officials also worked behind
the scenes with their Labour colleagues to ensure that none of Dunstan's
supporters was proposed as a Cooperative municipal candidat6
The left-wingers remained active in the Cooperative Party but their
ability to intervene in Labour affairs was being progressively diminished.
Their isolation encouraged a new tack in which a more independent line for
the Cooperative Party was canvassed. In March, 1931, a motion that
1. BBLP minutes, ll;6;1928; BCoP minutes, ll;6;1928.
2. ECoP minutes, l;6;l928.
3. BBLP minutes, ll;6;l928; BCoP minutes, ll;6;l928.
4. BBLP minutes, l7;8;1928; BCoP minutes, l;6;1928; 24;7;1928.
5. BCoP minutes, 26;7;l928.
6. BCoP minutes, 24;7; 1928. In Deritend, the doubtful constitutional
procedure of inviting Labour Party members to a Cooperative Party
selection conference had been successfully employed to ensure the
choice of the moderate candidate.
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Cooperative M.P.s and councillors should vote against the Labour whip
where necessary was carried butaresoltion proposed by James Trotter, an
active Caimunist, that Cooperative M.P.s should resign from the Labour
Government was defeated.' To a large degree, this represented the high
point of left-wing influence within the Cooperative Party. Earlier, the
Party's Execut ive Cotmiittee had agreed two amendments to the constitution
- that Party members should undertake to support its prograrrrne and policies
and giving the Cooperative Council the right to expel any member who failed
'to fulfil his (or her) obligations to the Party'- which were clearly
designed to impose a coherency and discipline that the Party had hitherto
lacked.2
In Sheffield, it was the political and organisational strength of
the Cooperative Party rather than its weakness which obviated some of these
difficulties and created others. Having been conceded the Hillsborough
Division, the Cooperative Party proceeded to build up impressive support
and organisation in the area. But it also acted wisely in not opposing
Labour organisation and in 1921 the HiJlsborough Divisional Labour Party,
the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council and the Cooperative Party agreed
amicably that the area should continue to run a Cooperative parliamentary
i3
The pact between Labour and Cooperation was further consolidated
in May, 1924 when it was agreed that the Hilisborough Divisional Labour
Party would give full support to A.V. Alexander so long as he accepted the
national Labour Party constitution and prcxnised to report to the local party
three times a year.. Future candidates would also belong to the Cooperative
Party but the Labour Party would have the right to express in 'general
(not named) terms, criteria of selection'. Municipally, Neepsend ward was
1. BC0P minutes, 3;3;193l.
2. ibid., 18;3;l930.
3. SCoP minutes, 8;9;l921.
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to be fought by Cooperative candidates, Walkley ward by Labour and
Hilisborough ward was split fifty-fifty.' Surprisingly, for reasons which
are not clear, this agreement was terminated unilaterally by the
Hillsborough Labour Party just seven months later but the de facto division
of responsibilities persisted and Labour continued to endorse the Cooperati'
Party's local candidates.2
Relations between the borough organisations of the two parties
worsened at the end of 1926 when Tom Garnett, secretary of the Trades and
Labour Council, sent a letter to Egerton Wake (Labour's national agent)
pertaining to the situation in Hillsborough. Garnett admitted that
Hillsborough was :
the best organised Division in Sheffield but the organisation is the
Cooperative Party and not the Labour Party.
Municipally it has been the practice of the Hilisborough Divisional
Labour Party to centre their activities on the Walkley Ward, and to
leave Hilisborough and Neepsend Wards to the Cooperative Party...
and the complaint of my Executive is that the Hilisborough Divisional
Labour Party are not functioning as they should, but have allowed all
control so far as these two wards are concerned to pass from their
hands, and although the Cooperative Party is not an affiliated
organisation. . . they are permitted at Hillsborough to dominate the
situation.
Wake replied that the Labour Party should be responsible for all constituenc
organisation and suggested that the Cooperative Party be invited to affiliat
to the Labour Party as did the trades unions and ILP. 4 The Cooperative
Party responded in reasoned terms that while such affiliation was 'objective
desirable', it was not currently 'expedient' due to likely opposition
within the two retail societies. However, a joint committee was set up to
harmonise party relations and it was agreed that Cooperative candidates
should go before Labour selection conferences.5
In the following year, 1928, the Trades and Labour Council tried to
1. SCoP records, CPR25; Cooperative-Labour Party relations, Agreement,
May, 1924.
2. ibid., Hillsborough Divisional Labour Party to Sheffield Cooperative
Party, 7;1;l929; 24;2;1925.
3. ibid., T. Garnett to E. Wake, l8;12;1926.
4. ibid., E. Wake to T. Garnett, N.D.
5. ibid., Hilisborough Divisional Labour Party to T. Garnett, 6;9;1927;
SCOP minutes, 8;9;1927.
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force the issue of affiliation when it threatened not to endorse any
Cooperative candidates until the Party joined up formally with the local
Labour Party.' The Cooperative representatives once more replied with a
sensible exposition of the practical problems in the way of affiliation
and it was agreed to continue the working arrangements already concluded fo;
a further year. 2
 An end to these problems finally came in 1930 when in an
agreement whose details were referred to earlier it was conceded that the
divisional Cooperative Parties would affiliate to the Trades and Labour
Council.3
In practice, in Hilisborough, where the issue really counted,
relations between the twe parties had always been good - a situation aided
by the personal friendship of Albert Ballard and the Hillsborough Labour
Party secretary, A.C. Meeke, and the lack of petty partisanship of both.
In a reversal of the situation as it applied in Birmingham, in Hillsborough
it was the Labour Party which was the field of Camunist intrigue but close
cooperation between Ballard and Mecke and some careful manoeuvering
ensured that the Centre and Right maintained control and the Cooperative-
Labour partnership was not weakened.4
We conclude this section by looking briefly at relations between the
Cooperative movement and the trades unions. Trades unionists too believed
that the different sections of the Labour trinity possessed shared
principles and interests and they too had a sneaking belief that these were
best manifested on the part of the Cooperators by their making the Cooperati
Societies' financial resources freely available to unions and party when the
need arose. This was nicely illustrated by the punch line of a resolution
1. SFTLC minutes, 12 EC, 21;2;1928.
2. ibid., LP CM, 28;2;1928.
3. ibid., LP EC, 7;l0;l930; SCoP minutes, 30;9;1930.
4. SCoP records, CPR25; A.C. Meeke to A. Ballard, 2;6;l929; A. Ballard
to A.C. Meeke, 3;6;1929; J.H. Hunt to unknown recipient, N.D.
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passed in Birmingham in 1925:1
That the Birmingham Trades Council invites the local Cooperative
societies to form a Joint Corrrnittee for the purpose of the mutual
develoxrQnt of Trades Unionism and Cooperation. Further, we call
upon the General Council of the TUG to effect the establishment of
a Joint Comittee of the TUG and the Cooperative Union for the
purpose of securing the mutual develop'nent of Trades Unionism and
Cooperation and united action in the form of economic aid in all
disputes.
The up-shot of this was the formation in July, 1925 of the Birmingham and
District Council of Trades Unionists and Cooperators, comprising seven
members of the Trades Council and seven representatives of the local retail
societies, with the espoused aims of encouraging all Cooperative members anc
employees to become trades unionists, and all trades unionists to become
Cooperators, of establishing good industrial relations in the Cooperative
Societies, of getting the trades unions to bank with the Cooperative
Wholesale Society, and of engagingin joint educational propaganda. 2
 If
the unions went in with the ulterior aim of getting their hands on the
Cooperative movement t s cash, it wisely was not mentioned. Apart from the
publication in August of a four-page leaflet entitled 'A Call to the Trade
Union Non-Cooperator', the Council seems to have led a highly inactive
3
existence.
There were, nevertheless, occasions when the Cooperative Societies
did come to the aid of striking trades unionists. In 1919, the Brightside
.4
and Carbrook Society loaned ASLEF £650 during the national railway strike.
In 1926, the Birmingham Cooperative Society agreed to honour all trades
union cheques drawn during the General Strike and consequently cashed
cheques from 36 unions to the value of £28,000. 	 The Birmingham Society
also issued £250-worth of food vouchers to the striking railwaymen and latei
1. BTC minutes, 21;3;1925.
2. T.C., 31;7;1925.
3. BTC Annual Report, 1925-26, p. 9.
4. BTC minutes, 18;5;1926; R.P. Hastings, 'Aspects of the General Strike
in Birmingham, 1926', Midland History, II, 4, (1974), p. 271.
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made a 250 donation to the Miners' Federation.' This was genuine enough
evidence of fellow-feeling and shared working-class sympathies but the
Cooperative Societies were (understandably, given the nature of their
business and the scale of their responsibilities) essentially cautious and
conservative institutions and they were careful to ensure that most of these
outgoings were fully guaranteed and that the unions concerned were likely to
repay..
Trades union and Cooperative relations were not always so smooth.
As well as being working-class activists, the Cooperators were also employer
who applied business criteria to their financial dealings. Despite the
formal identity of interests between employers and employed, strikes were
far from unknown at Cooperative establishments and, in our period, there
were disputes involving sciie 1850 Sheffield members of the Amalgamated
Union of Cooperative Fiployees in September, 1919, and 500 woodworking trades
unionists employed in the Cooperative Wholesale Society's piano and cabinet
factories in Birmingham in October, 1931.2
Relations also came under strain in a dispute between the National
Amalgamated Union of Life Assurance Workers and the agents of the Cooperativ
Insurance Society (CIS) in 1922. In both Birmingham and Sheffield, the
Life Assurance Workers protested fiercely that the CIS had been 'poaching'
former clients of its members by unfair methods. 3
 There would seem to
have been some justice in the charge because the Birmingham Trades Council
passed a resolution condemning CIS practices and the Sheffield Trades and
Labour Council went so far as bar the CIS agents from affiliation.4
Resentment reached such a pitch that in the Washwood Heath municipal electio
1. Birmingham Railway Central Strike Corrrnittee minutes, 6;5;1926;
BTC minutes, 5 ; 6 ; 1926.
2. S.D.I., 2l;9;1919;	 B.G., 9;lO;1931.
3. BTC minutes, l5;3;l922; SFI[LC minutes, 24;l;l922.
4. BTC minutes, 2;9;l922; SFTLC minutes, 25;5;l922; 5;12;l922.
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in November, 1923, a Life Assurance Workers' official and prominent Labour
Party activist, S.L. Treleavan, stood as an Independent candidate in
opposition to a CIS agent standing under Labour Party auspices.' This
dispute was not as trivial as it might otherwise appear because insurance
agencies which kept them free of possible victimisation and allowed them
to organise their own time - were a major source of employment for Labour
activists. In the 1920s, five Sheffield Labour councillors and eight of
their Birmingham counterparts worked as insurance agents.
Conflict makes news whilst harmony passes without trace, and it is
necessary to remember this in any assessment of Cooperative and Labour
movement relations. There were, of course, many instances of quiet
cooperation and mutual support which went unremarked in the contemporary
record. The Cooperative movement, for example, took on many Labour
activists whose political work and comitment had made them unemployable
elsewhere. 2 Nevertheless, the events detailed here stand as a sharp
corrective to any idealised view of the Labour trinity. The interests of
the three wings of the Labour and Cooperative movement were not identical
and the amour-propre of each was easily aroused in antagonism to the
activities of another. In this case, the forward march of Labour sometirrs
more nearly resembled a three-legged race in which well-meaning but
uncoordinated partners succeeded only in impeding each other's progress.
It is not, then, altogether surprising that the editors of both the Town
Crier and Sheffield Forward were among those who called for an end to
independent Cooperative political activity, arguing that the Cooperators'
efforts and money would be better contributed to a comprehensive Labour.
1. BBLP minutes, 'Report on National Amalgamated Unionof Life Assurance
Workers-CIS Dispute', N.D. [becember, 19221.
2. Cllr. Percy Shurmer, who was employed by the Post Office until his
dismissal in 1926 for General Strike activities, was subsequently
found clerical work by the Birmingham Cooperative Society.
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Party.' Equally, it is not surprising that, despite the two parties'
cormon features, little cane of such calls. The Cooperative Party was
established as an independent organisation which possessed its own resource
and developed therefore its own organisational interests and nxxnentum.
This alone accounted for many of the inter-party difficulties. But, as
importantly, the Party also possessed, though its politics were ill-defined
a distinctive form an ethos which could not simply be assimilated into the
Labour mainstream. An examination of the Cooperative subculture may bring
this out more clearly.
1. T.C., 8;12;1922; S.F., April, 1923.
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9.4 The Cooperative Subculture
As a principally non-political organisation, the Cooperative movement
offered a broader .and richer subculture than did its associates in the
working-class movement. Whereas social and cultural activities were
basically subordinate to the real concerns of Labour and the trades unions,
they were part of the essential fabric of Cooperation. While Labour was
founded with a purely political purpose and its social side was developed
later, Cooperation began life as an economic and social undertaking and
never made politics its sole or primary concern. These facts left a
fundanntal imprint on the nature of the Cooperative movement's organisation
and ethos and should inform our interpretation of the Cooperative
subculture's political influence.
Looking at the Cooperative Party first, we see that, though it was
as male-dominated as most political parties in its higher echelons, at the
grass roots its membership was principally female. Of the 47 members of the
Yardley Cooperative Party in 1932 (the first date for which we have details)
30 were women and 17 men.' And at least at the immediately local level,
this dominance seems to have been reflected in the Party's executive
structure; in the Aston branch, for example, three of the Party's five
officers and four of its six-strong . conirittee were women. There was, though
characteristically little sexual equality in the Party's Catering Committee
which was entirely female.2
It may partly have been this strong female input which explained
the Cooperative Party's heavy emphasis on the social side of its activities.
Like some of the Labour Party Women's Sections and youth sections mentioned
1. Yardley Cooperative Party, Membership Contributions Book, 1932.
2. Aston Cooperative Party minutes, 20;2;1930.
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earlier, the Hilisborough Cooperative Party and its Women's Section both
organised a four-weekly progranme in which play-readings and socials
alternated with addresses and political business. Both also advertised the
musical items which were a feature of every meeting) The Longley and
Norwood Cooperative Party, founded in Sheffield in 1930, promised a similar
2
mix of entertainment and politics.	 While sc.iithing of this stress on
extra-political activities may have been due to the particular nature of the
Hillsborough organisation, an examination of the minute books of the Aston
Cooperative Party in Birmingham reveals that this branch too, which offered
lectures at most meetings and a full prograrrne of socials and outings, was
anxious to leaven its formal political work with more broadly educational
or recreational activity. In this respect, there were considerable
similarities between the Cooperative Party's local branches and the movement's
members' guilds which we examine next.
In the interwar period, the Cooperative guilds were, in terms of
their numbers and membership, one of the most important forms of working-
class social organisation in Britain. In 1924 for example, the Birmingham
Industrial Cooperative Society ran a total of 24 guilds (15 wcxTEn's and 9
men's) and Sheffield and Ecciesall some 13 (11 women's and 2 men's). 3 In
the Brightside and Carbrook area - where we are forced to rely on scattered
references rather than a specific list - IL seems that there were at least
19 guilds (10 women's and 9 men's). 4 The l920s were alsoaperiod of
expansion for the guilds and by 1931 the Birmingham Cooperative Society was
organising a total of 39 guilds (made up of 26 women's guilds, 11 men's and -
a new departure - 2 mixed guilds) with a claimed membership of some 2000.
1. S.C., October, 1928.
2. September, 1930.
3. Birmingham Cooperative Society Handbook, 1924;
Sheffield and Ecclesall Cooperative Society, Quarterly Report, 200, (1924).
4. S.C. and The Wheatsheaf (Brightside and Carbrook edition), passim.
5. Birmingham Cooperative Society Handbook, 1931;
T. Smith (ed.), History of the Birmingham Cooperative Society, 1881-1931
(Birmingham, 1931), p. 193.
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The espoused aims of the guilds are best described by quoting a
Birmingham Cooperative handbook of the period:'
These organisations, of an educational and social character, make a
direct appeal to the rank and file of cooperators. In them, members
will find stimulating and helpful thought and social intercourse.
Their objects are
(1) To arouse, maintain and increase interest on the part of
cooperators in the working and developint of the Cooperative
movement,
(2) To make known the principles of Cooperation and assist towards
their universal application in human affairs.
These worthy goals were achieved by a prograurne of weekly meetings in which
lectures (usually on Cooperative affairs but sometimes of more general
interest) were interspersed with visits and outings, social events and the
occasional session devoted wholly to guild organisation or Cooperative
business. We can clothe these bare bones with more detail through the
fortunate survival of the minute books of the Harborne men's and women's
guilds which show that on most weeks delegates would be selected to attend
local Cooperative or Labour conferences, the members would subscribe to
favoured good causes, and arrangements would be put in hand for the guilds'
socials, children's parties and Cooperators' day tableaux. Most meetings
were opened by a song - 'Jerusalem' was a favourite - accompanied by the
guild piano and a brief introductory address by the guild president.2
A large part of the guilds' work centred on specifically cormrcial
concerns. The members wanted the trading side of the Cooperative movement
to succeed and prosper and, to this .end, the ladies of the Manor Women's
Cooperative Guild twice canvassed their newly-built estate on behalf of
the Brightside and Crbrook Society. 3 In Birmingham in 1931, the
District Coamittee of the Women's Cooperative Guilds organised a large
conference and city-wide campaign to increase Cooperative membership and
trade. But in the Cooperative movement, even apparently routine business
1.. Birmingham Cooperative Society Handbook, 1928, p. 41.
2. See Appendix H for a sample progranm.
3. S.C., March, 1928.
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interests could be invested with considerable moral purpose - as the main
speakers' words on this occasion illustrate:'
We should not be in the guild for what we can get out of it but what
we can put in. It is our job to get on the doorstep and so
lead an attack on the multiple shops. Go into the Campaign
determined to increase our membership, capital, trade and make the
whole world feel the grip of Cooperation.
On the other hand, the members were also concerned that they should receive
good service and high quality products, and the Birmingham committee
complained on several occasions about the standard of treatment and goods
purveyed by the local Society. 2 Indeed, there were some in the wider
Labour movement who looked on the guilds cynically as being composed
principally of rather haughty 'dividend-snatchers' - self-consciously
respectable women whose main interest lay in the discount they received
for their custom. 3 This was certainly not the whole story but there is no
doubt that financial concerns were sometimes uppermost. The secretary of
the Harborne Men's Cooperative Guild reproved his membership when they
discussed the issue of the political grant:4
The majority either forgetting the past good work of the Society, or
thinking that they had never been sufficiently rewarded for being
members, were keen on the dividend and against the prices charged at
the Stores, stating that several shilling in the £ [sic] could be
saved by dealing with private traders.
The interests of the guilds did extend further than this, though, and the
women's guilds were an important base of what were, in contemporary terms,
quite feminist attitudes. When the national president of the Women's
Cooperative Guild addressed a conference in Birmingham, she urged that one
of their 'foremost objects was to press forward the claim of women for
equal rights of citizenship and opportunity'. 5
 In practice, the local
guilds fulfilled this injunction in a number of ways. Simply by their
1. Birmingham District Committee WCG minutes, 28;lO;1931.
2. ibid., 5;2;1925; 5;3;l925; 5;1;l928.
3. Interview with Cllr. Albert Jackson.
4. Harborne MCG minutes, 20;3;1922.
5. Birmingham District Committee WCG minutes, 30;9;1924.
-362-
existence, they were a forum in which women could gain self-confidence by
organising and socialisirig independently from men; a joint guilds' meeting
he d in 1920 pointedly refused to have a male chairman in control. 	 More
overtly, the guilds sought to protect and extend women's interests by
district conferences organised on, amongst other things, the 1922 Criminal
Law Amendment Act (held to prejudice the rights of women forced into
prostitution) and birth control. 2
 At one, Marie Stopes ('received with an
outburst of enthusiasm and clapping of hands') argued vehemently that women
were 'enslaved in their motherhood' and had the right to control their own
fertility. 3 The Cuilds' District CaTmittee also affiliated to the
Workers' Birth Control Group founded in Birmingham in 1924 - an organisation
which received additionally the strong support of a large number of Labour
Party Wcxn's Sections.4
As to their direct involvement in politics, the guilds were
ambivalent. A speaker at the Harborne women's guild contended that the
guilds were 'political in character' but urged that 'only Cooperative
politics should be practised therein' and left open the question as to what
the Cooperative movement's politics really were. 5
 One area which was
definitely felt to be of legitimate concern was peace. The Birmingham
District Caunittee organised a large conference on disarmament while, locally,
Harborne had a number of speakers from contemporary campaigns against war
and militarism.6
It was also accepted that the guilds would support the local branches
of the Cooperative Party by appointing delegates to their meetings and
sending small donations to finance Cooperative election battles. 7 Less
1. Birmingham District Conirtittee WCG minutes, 27;2;l920.
2. ibid., 24;l;1922; 8;ll;l923; 3;2;1927.
3. ibid., 8;l1;1923.
4. ibid., 30;9;l924; 	 5;6;1925.
5. Harborne WCC minutes, 5;9;1928.
6. Birmingham District Coninittee WCG minutes, 17;3;1927;
Harborne WCG minutes, 22;9;1926; 14;ll;1928.
7. Aston Cooperative Party minutes, 3;4;1930; 19;ll;l930;
Lritend Labour Party Election Accounts, 1924.
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frequently, they would give money and logistical support to the Labour
Party. In Birmingham at different times, the Sparkhill Women's Cooperative
Guild and the Small Heath Men's Cooperative Guild were both affiliated to
the Borough Labour Party; in Sheffield, the application of two Cooperative
Women's Guilds to affiliate to the Trades and Labour Council had to be
rejected due to their constitutional ineligibility.' The Allen's Cross
women's guild in Birmingham was in no doubt where its political sympathies
lay and even went so far as to canvass for Labour's municipal candidate.2
The Tinsley Men's Cooperative Guild went one step further when, in 1922, it
successfully ran two of its members in the local elections for the Board of
Guardians
Such direct interveritionlnthepolitical field was, however, rare.
The nature and degree of the guilds' political activism varied considerably
according to their memberships' sensibilities and the sympathies of their
leaders of opinion. Some guildswomen did become exceptionally active
politically. Eleanor Barton, who was a Cooperative and Labour councillor
in Attercliffe from 1919 to 1922 and the Cooperative parliamentary candidate
in King's Norton in 1922 and 1923 was the assistant secretary and (after
1925) the secretary of the national Women's Cooperative Guild, and her work
in the guilds' movement was always accompanied by a keen awareness of the
political goals it could help achieve.4
In general, though, the interests of the guilds reflected the full
range of the Cooperative movement's activities and, in this spectrum, party
politics played but a small part. The guilds operated in and encouraged
an environment which was broadly politicised but rarely crudely political,
1. BTC Annual Reports; SFTLC minutes, DN 26;2;1926.
2. Interview with Mrs. Potter.
3. S.C., May, 1922.
4. J. Bellamy, J. Saville (eds), op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 38-40.
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and they instilled an ethos which was humanitarian first and specifically
working-class second. At the Harborne women's guild, for example, a sewing
party for the miners was followed by a whist drive to raise money for the
Cripples' Fund and a donation to the Women's Welfare Centre, and the
Birmingham District Guilds' ConiTlittee sponsored a cot in the local Crippled
Children's Home while, in 1926, sending money and clothes to the Blaina
Cooperative Society in South Wales.' Insofar as these attitudes had a
clear political expression, the gentle reformism and pious aspirations of
the Cooperative Party undoubtedly came closest to matching it but Labour
too, through its own share of these qualities and its close association
with the Cooperative Party, was also looked on sympathetically.
As an indication of the overall impact on working-class life made by
the Cooperative movement, it is worth looking at briefly the range of its
business and educational facilities in Birmingham and Sheffield. In
Birmingham in 1931, the two Cooperative retail societies boasted a total
membership of 183,788 people (18.3 per cent of the city's population) and
a combined annual turnover of over £5m. 2
 The Birmingham Cooperative
Society was the third largest in the country (after London and the Royal
Arsenal), employing 3674 people in 271 branches, with capital amounting to
some E2,l44,000.	 The Sheffield Societies had 104,591 members (20.4 per
cent of the local population) and annual sales worth over
	 They ran
some 257 shops and branches, providing every good and service of which a
working-class consumer might conceivably have need.4
It was this underlying strength which enabled the Cooperative movemeni
to finance a wide range of educational and cultural activities. All the
1. Harborne WCG minutes, 19;12;l928; 20;2;l929.
Birmingham District Comittee WCG minutes, l;l2;l921; 4;2;1926
2. T. Smith (ed.), op. cit., p. 226; H. Vickrage, Seventy-Five Years of
Cooperative Endeavour. A History of.. .Ten Acres (Birmingham, 1951).
3. Birmingham Cooperative Society, Interesting Facts and Figures for
Prospective Members (Birmingham, 1931), pp. 2-3.
4; Sheffield Year Book, 1932.
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retail societies organised their own EducatiQn Committees sponsored, like
the Cooperative Party, by an annual grant of so many pence per member.
(In Birmingham, the amount varied between 4d. and 8d. a member depending
on trading conditions, suggesting that on average the Society spent around
£2000 yearly on its educational work.') The major task of the Education
Committees was to manage the Cooperative's classes. These were split fairly
evenly between vocational courses in accountancy, salesmanship and suchlike
which were conducted primarily for the Movement's employees, and the nre
general interest courses in topics as varied as Cooperative history, music
and psychology which were designed to appeal to the ordinary Cooperator.
In Birmingham in 1931, 75 classes were run, catering for some 2200 students.2
While the classes were certainly not in any crude sense propagandistic, they
were infused with the Cooperative ethos and the children's classes in
particular and the junior guilds (called Comrades' Circles) inculcated an
idealised understanding of the Cooperative story taught through a hagiographic
description of the work of such men as Robert Owen and the Rochdale Pioneers.
Nor was the nusical side neglected; the Birmingham Education Carmittee
coordinated the activities of two choirs and a symphony orchestra, the
Sheffield and Ecciesall Corrrnittee ran its own orchestra.3
One final manifestation of the contemporary strength of the Cooperative
movement is worth recording - the annual Cooperators' Days held in both
Birmingham and Sheffield. In Sheffield, it was claimed that over 70
vehicles with a range of tableaux and Cooperative trade advertisements -
took part in 1924 to form a procession over a mile long; around 10,000
people were participating each year in the mid-1920s. 4 In Birmingham, total
attendances of around 14,000 were claimed for the two annual demonstrations
1. T. Smith (ed.), op. cit., p. 187.
2. ibid., p. 191.
3. ibid., p. 189;	 April, 1930.
4. S.C.., August, 1924; May, 1925.
-366-
organised by the local Movement; 7000 adults took part in the July
Cooperators' Day and a similar niinber of children celebrated the special
Children's Dy organised during the suniiier holidays.1
For those most deeply involved, Cooperation offered not merely a
structure of activism and a social outlet but an alternative woridview. It
taught a history whose heroes were not the kings and' queens of England but
those, such as John Ball and Wat Tyler, who had stood up for the oppressed;
whose progress was not measured by imperial expansion but in the slow and
inexorable rise of working people fran servitude and poverty. It produced
song-books and plays with a message full of faith and prcxnise and almost
naively convinced of the benevolent capacities and will of human nature.2
It provided both haven and hope for those whose class aspirations were most
strongly infused by a profound ethical humanism.
The Cooperative movement had within it. the potential and the propensity
to becane an expansive counter-culture which the Labour Party did not have
But, despite the high hopes of its more cciiinitted members, it did not fulfil
this role. Viewed as a political animal, the Cooperative movement had the
failings of its virtues; the generosity of spirit and inevitabilism which
were the source of its inner strength deprived the Movement of an external
aggression and cutting edge which might have fortified its reforming role and
possibilities. Ultimately, the threat of change that Cooperation once seemed
to hold was dissipated by its very success within the contemporary structures
of capitalist camerce; its teeth were drawn to reveal a mouth sucking at
the teat of capitalism. The aspirations of the heart remained radical and
far-reaching but the body and intellect were equipped to survive and thrive
in the status quo.
1. T. Smith (ed.),p._cit., p. 189,
2. There is a full collection of Cooperative song-books, plays and other
literature in the Social Sciences tpartment of the Birmingham Central
Library.
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9.5 Conclusion
Though to many, probably most, of their members, the Cooperative
Societies were little more than trading concerns, it is clear that in the
1920s the Cooperative movement as a whole could quite justifiably claim to
be considerably more than a mere business organisation. It offered its own
group life and its own potentially distinct philosophy. Cooperation was
still conceived of as a humanitarian ideal as well as a financial
arrangement, and there was still a potent sense in which the Movement was
thought of, and experienced as, a vital and expansive organism of social
amelioration. In this perspective, Cooperation's couurcial growth was but
a manifestation of its deeper purpose and even a Cooperative store could be
hailed as a 'building with a soui'J The Cooperative movement has had a
major part to play both in the developint of a broad-based working-class
movement and as an improving influence within working-class life as a whole;
it is worth further study in its own right.
However, in our own study we are concerned primarily with its role
in working-class politics and here it is necessary to take account of the
ambiguities and arnbivalences of its behaviour and purpose. The Cooperative
movement was not a political organisation and this simple fact lay behind
most of the tensions in its relationship with the Labour Party. Labour
activists found it difficult to understand why Cooperation would not enter a
full alliance so that they might fulfil together the ideals and the interests
which the two movements held in common. But Cooperators were well aware
that, though their concerns were congruent with those of the wider Labour
movement, they were by no means identical with them. The Cooperative
movement's ideals were voluntarist and were to be achieved quintessentially
1. The Jheatsheaf (Birmingham Industrial Cooperative Society edition),
June, 1919.
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by non-political or non-legislative means. Its interests, and by extension
the furtherance of its ideals, required the careful husbanding of its
resources and a sound comercial instinct. Here lay the means and the
measure of Cooperation's progress, rather than in any rhetorical caTrnitrnent
to broader working-class interests - unpalatable fact though this was to
those Labour politicians and trades unionists who desired a more practical
demonstration of class solidarity.
In short, the tripartite split in the working-class movement between
Cooperation, Labour and Trades Unionism was not, as so often claimed, a
merely functional division, The interests of the working class as consumers,
politicians and producers were not identical and no amount of good
intentions could ultimately obscure or override this fact. The
interrelationships between the three sections of the working-class movement
were of almost theological canplexity and we may leave the final word on the
issue to a correspondent to the Town Crier who explained that:'
The "Invincible Trinity" is not a "Trinity" in the Christian sense
of three in one and one in three; nor even a correlated "Trinity".
It is at most a collateral "Trinity".
1. T.C., 5;l;1922.
Chapter 10
REVOLUI'IONARY POLITICS
10.1 Introduction
In terms of popular involvement or sympathy, the revolutionary
parties made little impact on the working class in the interwar years.
Their memberships were small and, with rare exceptions, their electoral
showing was dismal. But the parties of the far Left did have a considerable
influence within the Labour movement itself and, even when their role as an
organised current was slight, the dedication and activism of their
hardworking members ensured that the ideas and strategies of revolutionary
politics could never be ignored.
In the 1920s, the chief party of the revolutionary Left was the
Comunist Party, founded in August, 1920 from a fusion of the British
Socialist Party (BSP), a majority of the Socialist Labour Party (SLP), and
some of the more left-wing membership of the ILP. It was enlarged six
months later by the adhesion of the Corrrriunist Party (British Section of the
Third International) (CP[BSTI]), a developnt of Sylvia Pankhurst's
Workers' Socialist Federation which had been thus re-named at the beginning
of 1920. But while the Conimnist Party rapidly assumed a paramount position
on the far Left of the political spectrum, it was never allowed an
uncontested dominance. Attacks on its beliefs and activities came from
both its left and right and the Party itself never formed a stable bloc as
its members constantly drifted out of their association with the Party, and
the hard choices and demands which it imposed. The. Corrniunist Party also
had to cope with a situation whereby unquestionably the major representative
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of the working class was a moderate and reformist Labour Party. The complex
interrelationship of the Communist Party and Labour - a strange mixture of
attraction and repulsion - was one of the most important shaping forces of
the Party's existence. In this section, we look at the actual conduct of
revolutionary politics in Birmingham and Sheffield, and conclude our
examination with an assessment of the nature of the Communist Party aixi the
attitudes of those in the Labour movement and the wider working class
towards it.
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10.2 Birmingham
At the founding congress of the ConTrunist Party in 1920, Birmingham
was represented by four official delegates. Fred Silvester and G. Smith
attended on behalf of the Comminist Unity Group (an unofficial offshoot of
the SLP desiring revolutionary unity under Cormrunist auspices), Harry Stubbs
was present for the Birmingham Shop Stewards' movement, and William Brain
attended for the SLP itself) There were no representatives of the BSP
which in Birmingham had been a negligible quantity since the city had headed
a pro-syndicalist revolt against the Party's official electoral line before
the First World War.
The early pioneers acted cp.iickly to establish a local organisation
and by mid-August three Birmingham branches of the ConTrunist party were in
2
existence.	 The majority of their membership came from the SLP but
several prominent ILPers joined, including W.T. Cardinal, Harry Shepperson
and Elizabeth Eastgate who just six months earlier had been elected
vice-chairman and comittee members respectively of the Birmingham 112
Federation. 3
	The Party was further strengthened when, in November, 1920,
the Birmingham Central branch of the National Union of Ex-Servicemen
affiliated en bloc. 4 The only section of revolutionary opinion which seems
to have remained aloof was the CP(BSTI) whose Birmingham branch had not
itself been formed until the middle of 1920. It was a small group with just
ten members but they were active and, according to the branch's orgariiser,
'all picked men' .	 The branch survived the arrest and imprisonment of its
secretary in [cember and in January, 1921 was meeting weekly. 6
 Thenceforth,
1. Coninunist Unity Convention, 1920, Official Report, p. 72.
2. The Conirrunist, l2;8;l920.
3. T.C., 12;3;l920.
4. T.C., 5;ll;1920.
5. M. Durham, 'The Early Years of the Communist Party in Birmingham' in
A. Wright, R. Shackleton (eds), Worlds of Labour. Essays in Birmingham
Labour History (Birmingham, 1983), p. 101;
Workers' Dreadnought, 18;9;1920.
6. Workers' Dreadnought, 4;12;1920; 15;1;192.1.
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nothing more is heard of it and we must assume that the majority of its
members joined the official Conuiunist Party when the two organisations
merged later that year.
So far as the mainstream of the Labour moverrnt was concerned, this
was a period of considerable radicalism and receptivity to the analyses and
prescriptions of revolutionary politics. Earlier in 1920, the 112 Federation
had organised a series of three meetings on the soviet system, the
dictatorshipof the proletariat and the rival working-class Internationals
and, though the meetings reserved opinion on the differing merits of the
soviet and parliamentary systems due to incomplete information and were
heavily opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat, those attending
voted strongly in favour of joining the Third (Conujnist) International.'
In May, 1920, even the secretary of the Borough Labour Party had declared
himself unequivocally behind affiliating to the Moscow-based organisation.2
This open-mindedness was not, however, extended to the local branch of the
Conniunist Party whose application to affiliate to the Borough Labour Party
was rejected by 22 votes to 8 though constitutional considerations probably
determined this outcome as heavily as any ideological reasoning.3
(1) Political Work
In turning now to a description and analysis of the Birmingham
Cormunist Party's activities during the 1920s, we make a distinction between
its work in the political and industrial fields. In Caiinunist terms, of
course, this is an essentially artificial division and trades union and
workplace politics were of equal, if not greater, importance to those of a
conventional type.
Nevertheless, taking the more purely political side of its activities
1. T.C., 6;2;1920; 20;2;1920; 5;3;1920.
2. T.C., 14;5;1920.
3. BBLP minutes, 10;ll;1920.
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first, we see that the bulk of the Party's work took place in a variety of
ad hoc groups and single issue campaigns. Though Harry Stubbs stood as an
(unofficial) Cooperative and Shop Stewards' candidate in 1920 and Harry
Shepperson twice stood as a Coninunist Party candidate in 1920 and 1921, the
Party generally placed little store in formal electoral politics and
concentrated its work in areas which won it influence in the Labour movement
and brought it into contact with radicalised workers. Fred Silvester and
W.T. Cardinal had been officers in the 'Hands Of f Russia' Ccxrrnittee since
its inception in October, 1919 and they continued to be active in the
organisacion and its pro-Soviet propaganda throughout the early 1920s)
Such activity had briefly stepped into higher gear when the Birmingham
Council of Action was formed in August, 1920 to mobilise opposition to any
allied military intervention against Soviet Russia. Five of its 26-strong
corinlittee were Communists - though only one sat as an official Party
representative - and four out of five places on the Council's propaganda
coninittee were occupied by Party members or supporters. 2
 The Caiinunists
were also the leading force behind the establishment of the Birmingham Free
Speech Defence CcxmiIttee at the beginning of 1921, charged with the object
of defending the rights of free speech in general and those arrested for
sedition and incitement in particular. 3
 Despite misgivings as to its heavy
Coninunist input, the Comittee received the support of a wide spectrn of
the local Labour movement and official backing from the Borough Labour Party,
the Trades Council and the Cooperative Party.4
However, as we have noted already, the largest part of the Coninunist
Party's activity took place amongst the unemployed and it was in this area
that the Birmingham branch encountered its greatest successes and most.
1. T.C., 9;l;l920; 31;l2;1920; 18;ll;1920.
2. BTC minutes, l7;8;1920; 25;8;l920.
3. T.C., 7;1;l921; 28;l;192l.
4. BBLP minutes, l3;l;192l; 13;4;1922;	 BTC minutes, 8;l;1921;
BCoP minutes, 15;l2;1925.
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severe problems. The success that the Party achieved in terms of its
prominence and influence within the unemployed workers' movement was bought
at a considerable cost in Birmingham where the authorities were the firmest
of any in the country in clamping down on radical dissent. In 1921 and 1922,
there were over 35 arrests and prosecutions in Birmingham for political
offences and the leadership of the local Party was decimated. 1 In May,
1921 alone, Harry Shepperson, William Brain and James Trotter were sentenced
to gaol and Will Chamberlain, not otherwise sympathetic to the Ccxmunist
case, was forced to conclude that the local courts had beccxne 'merely a
machine for the removal of people who annoy our present rulers' •2 Tom
Dingley, a Conininist organiser, described Birmingham as 'a heart-breaking
field to operate in, backward workers and reactionary authorities presenting
a stiff opposition'. 3
 Despite these difficulties, the Party retained around
100 members (80 male, 20 female) in 1922 but by 1924 local organisation had
become so weak that it was necessary to suspend the District Party Canittee
and attach its branches directly to Party headquarters.4
Neither could the Party achieve much impact on the Birmingham Borough
Labour Party. The high-point of Ccmiminist influence came in 1924 when the
Borough Labour Party agreed to apply individual discretion on the acceptance
or otherwise of Conmunist delegates in response to a Trades Council
resolution urging freedom for the trades unions to select as their
representatives anyone willing to sign the Labour Party constitution.5
(Corrrnunists were happy to swallow their principles in this way should the
need arise.) But in the following year, the Borough Labour Party reversed
this decision and opposed suggestions that the Communist Party be allowed to
1. The Conrunist, 14;10;1922,
2. T.C., 27;5;1921.
3. Solidarity, 18;2;1921.
4. CAB24/132/3609, PRO; Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United
Kingdom, 12;1;1922;
eches and Documents of the 6th. Conference of the CPGB, 1924, p. 53.
5. BBLP minutes, l;5;1924;	 BTC minutes, 5;4;l924.
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affiliate nationally to Labour or that individual Cotirnunists should be
eligible for Labour Party trernbershipJ
While the Corrinunist Party was never able to secure much pull in the
Birmingham Labour mainstream, it did, through the evolution of events in the
Dunstan affair, come to play an active part in local left-wing politics.
The Birmingham Left-Wing ConTnittee was a response to genuine needs and
concerns within the local Labour movement but its policies made it fertile
ground for Coninunist intervention and the National Left-Wing Carmittee,
which the Birmingham body supported, and the Sunday Worker, on which the
left-wing movement depended, were both under Cotrmunist control. While the
leading figures in the Birmingham Left-Wing Conniittee were not or were no
longer merrers of the Cormiunist Party, a number of the secondary figures in
the campaign were, and at least six of those expelled from the Labour Party
for their pro-EXinstan activities were card-carrying Communists.
Two streams of left-wing politics were running in parallel at this
time. One was a full-blooded Comainist current, made up of present Party
members, interested in increasing the spread of left-wing ideas within the
Labour Party but equally cciiinitted to causing disruption which might weaken
Labour and strengthen the revolutionary cause. The other current comprised
left-wing Labour members, such as Joseph Southall, and ex-Corrinunists, such
as Fred Silvester and Elizabeth Eastgate whose estrangement from the
Communist Party seems to have owed more to policy differences and personal
factors than any newly-acquired aversion to revolutionary politics as such.2
To the latter, the left-wing movement existed in its own right as a stream
of political thought and activity and was always more than a manipulative
instrument of political tactics. It is notable that, when the Cormtnunist
Party voted to wind up the national Left-Wing Committee, Silvester and
Southall were amongst their most vociferous critics, and George Bridgen
1. BBLP minutes, 7;4;1925; 9;4;1925; lO;9;l925.
2. IXirham, op. cit., p. 97.
-376-
stood as the Left-Wing Labour candidate for Moseley two months after the
movement had been terminated nationally.'
In the Coniunist Party itself, opinions were hardening against any
further attempts to work with or influence the Labour Party which, by the
apparently right-wards drift of its policies and its increasingly strict
enforcement of bureaucratic measures against Ccxmunist participation, seemed
to be placing itself beyond the pale. It should come as no surprise that
the local Birmingham conference of the Carinunist Party voted unanimously
to endorse Stalin's New Line in 1928.2 Though the New Line (in which
Stalin claimed to foresee a revolutionary upsurge and argued that Carinunists
should place themselves in radical opposition to all 'capitalist' parties
including those of the social democratic Left) undoubtedly emerged
primarily as a result of political battles in Moscow, its adoption in
Britain was due to more than mere unquestioning fidelity to Comintern
directives, Opinions were polarising in the British working-class movement
and the betrayal of the General Strike and the subsequent right-wing reaction
of the Labour leadership in particular encouraged many Camunists to
distance themselves from a Labour Party to which they had formerly sought
alliance. Birmingham Labour's own increasing repulsion from the Caiinunist
Party was shown graphically by its ban on Communist participation in the May
Day demonstration in 1928 and thenceforth.3
The policies of the New Line. were fulfilled in November, 1928 when
the Comunist Party stood its own candidates in the municipal elections for
the first time since 1921. Three candidates were run - Harry Shepperson,
Algernon Symes and James Gardner - fighting under a corrurn manifesto which
declared:4
1, L.J. Macfarlane, The British Cannunist Party (1966), p. 228.
2. ibid., p. 203.
3. B.P., 7;5;1928; 	 BTC minutes, 2;3;1929.
4. Birmingham Municipal Election Literature, BCL; All Saints', St. Mary's
and St. Paul's.
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The Comitunist Party...enters this Election as part of the great
class fight, exposing the Capitalist Parties - Tory, Liberal and
so-called Labour, who mislead the workers into supporting Capitalism...
This is the main purpose of our fight against all the Parties of
Capitalism, we seek to rrobilise the workers' army around the slogan
"War on Capitalist Exploitation".
Unfortunately for any Coninunist hopes, though, the revolutionary upsurge
appeared not to have reached Birmingham and the workers' army was decidedly
non-combatant. In total, the three candidates received 258 votes and were
returned at the bottom of the poll in each case. The two Party candidates
in 1930 and the lone battler jn 1931 faxed no better. In the 1931 General
Election, the Coniiunist Party ran Bernard Moore in Deritend and gave its
official support to the Independent Workers' candidature of John Strachey
in Aston who thus began his career as one of the Corrnunist movement's most
1prominent fellow-travellers in the 1930s.
(ii) Industrial Work
Though the Birmingham Cannunists were not very successful in extending
their influence in the political Labour movement, they performed a little
better in the Birmingham Trades Council. In 1921 and 1923, there were three
Party members on the Trades Council 's Executive Cormiittee, and in 1922 the
Party had even been able to get its most eminent member, William Brain,
elected vice-president. The fact that in both 1921 and 1922 the Council
appointed delegates to the pro-Moscow Red International of Labour Unions
would seem a further indication of the sway that Comiiunism had secured.2
By the mid-1920s, the political balance had become more even. The
number of Corruminist representatives on the Executive Canrnittee fell and,
though in 1926 and the following years W.T. Cardinal was elected a vice:
president of the Council, he appears by this time to have been moving away
1. B.P., 13;l0;1931.
2, BTC minutes, 7;5;1921; 2;9;1922.
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from his former Party allegiances. Certainly, he had begun to oppose some
of the Conrnunist Party's more extreme industrial policies as when, in 1927,
he argued against a Cannunist resolution calling for a general strike
against the Government's Trade Disputes Bill.' The Council as a whole
signalled an increasing opposition to Conmunist influence when in 1925 it
twice voted against sending delegates to conferences of the Minority Movement.2
Something of the equilibrium in the Trades Council's political
make-up was shown by events at the end of 1925 when a resolution containing
the full panoply of contemporary Coninunist demands was iroved by William
Brain on behalf of his union, the Foundry Workers, and carried by 39 votes
to 34. Birmingham Trades Council thus became ccximitted to a campaign to
vest full executive authority with the TUC General Council, to a Workers'
Alliance, a joint prograrrire of demands set out by the TUC to rally all
workers, the formation of councils of action, the extension of independent
working-class education, full rights of organisation and association for the
police and arired forces, and the establishment by the Trades Councils of
Workers' Defence Corps.. 3 (It was a typically long-winded and comprehensive
Comunist resolution.) The range and radicalism of the resolution soon
caused rumblings of discontent in the Birmingham trades union movement and
William Brain's request for the names of those willing to enroll in the
Workers' Defence Corps was passed over by the Executive Corrinittee on the
grounds that the time was not ripe for such a scheme. 4 Ultimately, at the
first delegate meeting of 1926, a motion rescinding Brain's resolution
because 'it was revolutionary and not acceptable to the rank and file' was
carried by an overwhelming majority.5
In view of the course of later developments, some of the preparedness
1. BTC minutes, ll;7;1927.
2. ibid., 3;l;1925; 4;7;l925.
3. ibid., 7;l1;l925.
4. ibid., 27;ll;1925.
5. ibid., 2;l;l926.
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suggested by the Coninuriist resolution might have been welcctr but the
Party erred when it tried to push through such proposals which lacked the
grass roots' support necessary to sustain and implement them. Such
Conniunist victories often appeared to be more the result of better tactics
and a questionable use of constitutional procedures than of any real
radicalism among the membership and, as such, they often brought a counter-
productive backlash which more than outweighed the initial publicity gain.
In Birmingham in particular, where the trades union movement was exceptionally
under-developed, it was all too easy for revolutionary politics to slide into
'resolutionary' politics which lacked any real impact on, or applicability
to, local conditions.
The isolation of the Coimunist Party in the industrial field was
shown by the General Strike in which all its members were active but in
which the Party's only official input was through W.T. CardinaFs ex officio
membership of the Birmingham Trade Union Emeigency Cariniittee. The Carrminists
did make some contribution to the Strike, though, by their publication of
a type-written duplicated news-letter, the Birmingham Worker, which
carefully echoed the official line on the dispute by calling for full support
of the miners' demands, nationalisation of the mines under workers' control,
and the resignation of the Baldwin Government and the election of a
Labour administration.' These were moderate demands deliberately in tune
with the contemporary state of working-class consciousness but the
Corrniunists lacked the power to generate any mass support for them and in
Birmingham were silenced by the arrest of the five members responsible for
the production of the bulletin on May, 9th.2
In the aftermath of the General Strike, Cormiunist activists sought
to rally the trades union rank and file in opposition to the increasingly
1. BTC records, 'General Strike, 1926. A Collection of Bulletins, Leaflets,
etc.', vol. 4.
2. BTC records, Birmingham Trade Union Emergency ConTnittee minutes, 9;5;1926,
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right-wing policies of the official union leadership. They achieved scxne
successes as when, in 1927, the Council's delegates voted to condemn the
TUC General Council circular threatening to withdraw recognition frcxn any
Trades Council which associated with the Minority Movement. But this was
largely a protest at the infringement of the Council's autonomy thus implied
rather than the product of any deep-seated radicalism; the same meeting
voted not to send any delegates to a Minority Movement coriferenceJ In the
following year, a Corrinunist resolution condemning the Mond-Turner talks was
first passed by 29 votes to 21 and then defeated at the next delegate meeting
by 48 votes to 46.2 It was a close-run thing but Conirn.inist influence was
certainly not growing as strongly in antagonism to off ical developints as
the Party would have hoped.
This was even more clearly the case in the area in which the Party
increasingly placed its hopes for revival - the shopfloor. In 1926, there
was not one group of the Minority Movement in Birmingham' s large engineering
industry. 3 Even by the late 1920s, the whole of Birmingham boasted just
one factory group and one factory newspaper, both of which were found in
4the Bournville Works of Cadbury Brothers. 	 This small group contained
just six members and clearly owed more to the unique tolerance of Cadburys
towards known working-class activists than to any indigenous rank and file
militancy. 5 At around the same time, one estimate of the number of Party
members and Minority Movement sympathisers in Birmingham reckoned there were
just 153, of whom almost exactly half were described as active. 6
 The
1. ETC minutes, 2;4;1927.
2. ibid., 7;1;1928; 2;2;1928.
3. R. Martin, Comrrunisin and the British Trade Unions 1924-1933 (Oxford,
1969), p. 58.
4. Workers' Life, 27;l;l928.
5. Interview with Ted Smallbone.
6. An undated list of members and supporters is included in ETC records,
'General Strike, 1926. A Collection of Bulletins, Leaflets, etc.',
vol. 1. It is likely to have been used by the Borough Labour Party
in its attempts to root out Cainunist influence in 1927 and 1928
and appears to date from this period.
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survival of the minutes of the Midland Bureau of the National Minority
Movement enables us to give more precise detail; in 1929, there were 43
Minority Movement rnerribers in the Transport section, 29 in Metal, 20 in
Building, and 11 in Distribution in the city of BirminghamJ Considering
Birmingham's importance as an industrial centre, in particular as a centre
of metal-working and engineering, this was a record of severe disappointment
for the Ccimiunist Party.
Matters were brought to a head by the sudden eruption of a non-union
strike at Austins in March, 1929 which the Conunist leadership regarded as
a unique opportunity for the local activists to assume the direction of a
genuine rank and file movement. This was always slightly unrealistic given
the weakness of the Minority Movement in the locality and in the event
only one supporter of the Movement was elected to the Strike Cotrmittee and
2
only four others were active subsequently. 	 The Minority Movement remained
completely without influence; its offer of help was rejected by a mass
meeting of strikers and the Factory Caiinittee, formed in the aftermath of
the strike as the company was briefly unionised, refused all association with
it. In the post-mortem on their failure, the Corrrnunists drew widely
differing conclusions. The national leadership blamed local activists for
having encouraged the workers to join reformist trades unions and in not
pushing hard enough for independent organisation. 3 The local members, with
considerably more realism and first-hand knowledge, felt their error lay in
adopting too dogmatic a line regarding the Factory Corrmittee's association
with the Minority Movement . The real lesson, unpalatable though it may
have been to the Party ideologues, was that wage-based militancy did not
translate readily into an industrial version of the 'Class against Class'
tactic. The Party, rather than acting as a rallying-point for class
1. NMM Midland Bureau minutes, 27;lO;1929.
2. ibid., 23;ll;l929;	 Martin, op. cit., p. 115.
3. Martin, op. cit., p. 115.
4. NMM Midland Bureau minutes, 25;l;1930.
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conscious workers opposed to the reactionary equivocation of the official
Labour and trades union leadership, had alienated their support by its
wilful sectarianism.
The position in Birmingham was too far-gone to be retrieved. In
March, 1930, it wa reported that 'there is no organisation of the Minority
Movement in Birmingham' and subsequent attempts to revive its fortunes were
shattered on the Cannnnist Party's very weak industrial base in the •area
and its membership's preoccupation with other contemporary issues and
campaigns. 1 In the first half of 1930, the local Comunists were busy in
Party campaigns on behalf of the Meerut prisoners, an unemployed march, the
Daily Worker, the Friends of Soviet Russia, and a Textile Aid Coumittee
raising money for the striking wool workers of Yorkshire
	
The demands of
timeand energy that these various activities made simply left no space for
the ambitious plans for factory concentration groups and news-letters to
be fulfilled and it is understandable, given the unpropitious circumstances
in Birmingham, that most Party members did not make industrial politics
their top priority.
Where the Cormunist Party was once again more active was amongst the
unemployed whose neglect by the official Labour movement enabled the
National Unemployed Workers' Movement to win some support and influence
in Birmingham. A second front in the Conirunist offensive against the
Labour Government was opened by the inauguration of the Workers' Charter
campaign in August, 1930. This followed a ccnin Comrrunist tactic in laying
down a set of :iirrnediate demands (in this case, for a seven hour day, a ban
on overtime, increased benefit and an end to benefit disqualifications)
around which ordinary workers would fight in the hope that they would be
radicalised by the struggle and bytheir disappointment in the demands'
1. NMM Midland Bureau minutes, 23;3;l930.
2. ibid., 23;3;l930; 25;5;l930.
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non-fulfilment. By January, 1931, it was reported that two local Charter
Corrmittees had been established in Birmingham and that there was a third in
the offing.' Ultimately, however, the Charter campaign too proved a flop
from which it must be surmised that the working class either felt that the
Charter's objects were not realisable or did not wish to realise them under
Coninunist auspices. In all likelihood, it was a combination of these two
mutually reciprocating factors and the Charter's failure must be seen as
another illustration of the way in which the Corrnunists in Birmingham, as
elsewhere, were isolated from the working-class masses whom they dearly
wished to represent and whom they worked so hard to serve.
1. NMM Midland Bureau minutes, lO;1;193l.
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10.3 Sheffield
At the first congress of the Cocrniunist Party, five delegates
represented Sheffield; three were present on behalf of the BSP, one on
behalf of the Coninunist Unity Group, and one on behalf of the Sheffield
Workers' Committee.' 18 days later, these same three groups came together
in Sheffield to form the local branch of the Carrnunist Party. It was duly
agreed that the BSP and the Comniinist Unity Group should merge their identity
but the Workers' Committee was to continue in existence as the 'industrial
counterpart' of the Party itself. Subscriptions were set at the high level
of 116 per month, G.H. Fletcher (formerly of the BSP) was elected branch
chairman, W.H. Jackson (Workers' Committee) vice-chairman and J.L. Royle
(SLP) secretary. 2 By the end of the year, branch membership stood at 92,
of whom 75 were good on the books.3
The Comnunist Party, however, had not been successful in winning over
all those in Sheffield who deemed themselves revolutionaries. The SLP was
split; many members decided to follow the lead of several prominent SLPers,
including their own J.T. Murphy, in supporting the Ccxrra]nist Unity Group
but a rump stood loyally by the old party. 4 After the actual formation of
the Communist Party, the SLP's membership slumped precipitously from 54 to
12 but the loyalists, led by Joe Madin, took comfort in the fact that:5
The bulk of these ex-mernbers came in during the war period.. .The stress
of the times and the then lack of facility for doing so prevented the
inculcation of that knowledge of social science and Socialist
principles which constitutes the basis of efficient, enduring and
uncompromising efforts on behalf of the revolutionary movement.
The Workers' Socialist Federation had also been active in the town for a
number of years and continued to agitate and propagandise in its new
1. Communist Unity Convention, 1920, Official Report, pp. 71-72.
2. SCP minutes, 18;9;1920
3. ibid., 8;12;1920.
4. The Socialist, 17;7;1920.
5. ibid., 16;9;l920.
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manifestation as the CP(BSTI). The branch, led by A. Carford, was rigidly
opposed to any association with the Labour Party or any use of Parliament
and resisted all attempts to inveigle it to join its larger namesake in 1920.1
The branch attended one meeting held by the Ca'nnunist Unity Group locally
but, according to Carford, they:2
came away all the merrier knowing that the August Corrmunist Party,
having either a majority or a minority of reactionary elements, must
sooner or later break up and then our Cctrnunist Party, being composed
only of Genuine Conmnunists, would come out top at the end.
Though small in numbers, these revolutionary fractions had at least the
consolation of knowing that they were the true keepers of the revolutionary
flame and, indeed, something of this self-belief (or self-deception) trust
have been a psychological necessity in sustaining them in their arduous and
normally futile struggle.
As it turned out, national and international events in the ComTlunist
world dictated a change of course for the CP(BSTI) and the Sheffield branch
duly brought its 57 members into the main Conminist Party in February, l92l.
But it was a fusion born out of tacticsand political necessity rather than
conviction, and in Sheffield, as we shall see, relations between the
different sections of revolutionary opinion continued to be strained.
With regard to the attitudes of the broader Labour movement, it was
a time of considerable fluidity and openness. Several prominent Labour
activists joined the Conrunist Party on its inception, including Alfred
Barton and Frank Womersley, both of who were billed as speakers for the new
Party. 4
 Barton was even selected as a Conrnunist candidate for the
Brightside municipal election and he only resigned regretfully from the
Party when he learned that it would not be possible to stand as a joint
Labour and Comunist candidate. 5 Womersley too continued to support the
1. Workers' Dreadnought, l4;6;1920; 26;6;1920.
2. ibid., 8;3;1920.
3. SCP minutes, 9;2;1921.
4. ibid., 25;8;1920.
5. ibid., 19;9;1920; 22;9;1920.
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electoral work of the Labour Party and was forced to cease his Ccrminist
activities as a result.'
This sympathy for the Carniurist position extended into the Trades and
Labour Council itself where, in September 1920, the Executive Carinittee
passed a resolution by 14 votes to 3 urging the Labour Party nationally to
accept CarrrLlnist affiliation:2
on the grounds that the Party should include in its ranks all those
who were out for the cormion object, irrespective as to opinions
held as to methods.
When this application was turned down, the local Comrainist Party voted
unanirriously to withdraw its affiliation from the Trades and Labour Council.
For its part, the Council demonstrated the earnestness of its hopes for
joint working by sending a letter to the local branch suggestrig that the
Camiunist Party nationally should re-draft its application so that the matter
might be reconsidered. In fact, ironically, the Sheffield branch was
unequivocally opposed to Labour Party affiliation and went so far as to
forward this letter to their headquarters with the advice that it be ignored.3
This perverse resistance to cooperation in a situation where, for once, the
local Labour movement was sympathetic to the idea even aroused the ire of
the Coniiunist national executive, but the Sheffield branch was unabashed in
its view that no good would cczi out of affiliation, either nationally or
locally, to a Labour Party deemed hopelessly reactionary.4
(i) Political Work
The large bulk of the Cctrminist Party's activity in Sheffield was
taken up in work with the unemployed and there is no need here to repeat the
description of Comnunist organisation and propaganda among the workles
given in chapter 2.9. We may note, however, that, while something of the
1. SCP minutes, 22;12;1920.
2. SFTLC minutes, EC 27;9;l920.
3. SCP minutes, 29;9;1920.
4. ibid., 6;10;l920; l3;lO;1920.
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Party's independent stance was carried over in its attempts to lead and
control the unemployed workers' moverrent, the Party did not apply its full
logic and continued to cooperate fruitfully with the official Labour
rnoverrent in its practical defence of the unemployed's interests. The role
of the two Camunist representatives, G.H. Fletcher and Mrs. Cree, in the
Labour Group on the Sheffield Board of Guardians was the clearest evidence
of this joint working but it was manifested too in the Labour Party's
sanctioning and support of the Unemployed candidatures of Albert Smith and
A. Haydock In 1921 and 1922 respectively and its endorsement of Ted Lismer
as an official Labour candidate in 1923.1 The Sheffield Trades and Labour
Council further facilitated the working relationship between the two parties
when it decided in 1922 not to enforce the new Labour Party rules which
required all delegates to local parties to be willing to sign the Party
constitution and to be independent of any organisation promoting . rival
candidatures 2
The rest of the Comiinist Party's politicalwork was taken up in
education and propaganda. Coninunist involverrent with the Labour College
has been discussed already but the Party was also anxious to improve the
political knowledge of its membership more directly. It was agreed in 1920
that half an hour of each meeting should be devoted to discussion of
Caniiunist theory and practice, and in the following year J.T. Murphy was
prevailed upon to give a course of six lectures on 'Party Organisation and
Work' .	 In 1922, after it had been discovered that 'few members had
familiarised themselves with the Theses of the Third International', these
were read out and discussed at the branch rreetings. 4 In line with the
generally strict views held on membership in the revolutionary parties, the
Sheffield ConTnunist Party instituted a one month probationary period during
1. SFI'LC minutes, EC 18;lO;1921; lO;10;l922; 23;10;1923.
2. ibid.., Reorganisation Subcanrnittee, 4;9;1922; EC 12;9;1922.
3. SCP minutes, 1;9;1920; 9;11;1921.
4. ibid., 25;l;1922; 22;2;l922.
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which new members were expected to acquaint themselves with Ccmiunist
analysis and were allowed to attend meetings but not to vote.' If, in
this period, the probationers failed to attend the meetings or showed
insufficient activism, they were expelled.2
In its propaganda work, the Party was active in the 'Hands Off Russia'
Cairnittee and the Council of Action, though neither of these appear to have
been as influential as their Birmingham counterparts, and in a Free Speech
tfence Committee which it founded in May, l92l. 	 A 'Russian Famine Week'
was organised to raise money and supplies for the Soviet Republic during a
periodof considerable privation in August, l92l.
	
Later that year, the
Sheffield Party also founded its own Wcxin's Section and a branch of the
Young Communist League. 5
 The Women's Section, in particular, proved to be
a considerable source of strength, holding afternoon meetings with talks on
revolutionary politics followed by tea and refreshments, active in canvassing,
active too in work within the Labour Party Wonien's Sections and the
Cooperative guilds. It was also the women who ran the Sheffield Party's
weekly social and dance.6
The early 1920s were, however, a period of considerable turmoil for
the Sheffield Comriunist Party and it suffered a number of ultra-left
secessions - some of these occasioned by the Party's ready cooperation with
the orthodox Labour movement, most by the tactical blunders it made in its
attempts to organise the unemployed. In the case of R.G. Murray, who
resigned from the Party in 1921, it seems likely that incompatibilities
between the Party line and his support for the syridicalist-inspired One Big
Union precipitated the split. 7 (The One Big Union was to be an attempi to
1. SCP minutes, 7;2;1922.
2. ibid., 25;3;1922.
3. ibid., 21;5;l921.
4. ibid., 17;8;l921.
5. ibid., 7;ll;192l; 5;12;1921.
6. Workers' Weekly, 7;l2;l923.
7. SCP minutes, 28;9;192l; S.F., October, 1972.
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supersede all sectional trades unions by the establishment of a single
organisation representing the entire working class, irrespective of craft
or trade, directed by one central comandJ)
A. Carford's alienation from orthodox Comriunist politics went deeper
and reached its breaking point when the Party expelled Sylvia Panithurst in
1921. In a letter to Pankhurst's newspaper, the Workers' Dreadnought, early
in the following year, Carford expressed his view that:2
Many Sheffield comrades can see that the opportunists have captured
the CP /ic7. The ILP opportunists and the reactionary elements of
the BSP appear to control the policy, although there is a small
revolutionary element in the Partyq
Until a Party is formed in which every member is a revolutionary and
all are agreed as to general tactics and every member pledges himself
or herself to go to the scaffold if necessary, we need not hope to
see it do anything.
Carford lived up, at least partially, to his own strictures on revolutionary
behaviour when he organised, independently from the Comrrunist Party, the
illegal seizure of a hall for the unemployed but, not surprisingly, his
criticism of the Party and his insubordination led to his expulsion in March,
l922.
It was presumably Carford who joined with an ex-SLPer, F. Horsfield,
in forming the Sheffield Conminist Workers' Group in mid-1922 which was
actively propagandising for the One Big Union. 4 As for the SLP itself, it
maintained an independent but feeble existence and had also expressed support
for the One Big Union in a letter which had been sent to (and ignored by)
the Comunist Party.5
Though the intricacies of extrems left-wing politics are difficult
to decipher after a gap of sixty years, it would appear that these various
ultra-left factions were brought together, through their shared interest
in syndicalist ideas, in an umbrella organisation, the United Workers'
1. Madin Papers, 16/1; Leaflet, 1924, 'The One Big Union'.
2. Workers' Dreadnought, l4;1;1922.
3. ibid., 23;2;1922; SCP minutes, 8;3;l922.
4. Workers' Dreadnought, l;7;l922; 30;9;1922.
5. SCP minutes, l4;9;1921.
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Propaganda Council, set up in 1923.1 The municipal elections, in which
seven revolutionary candidates stood variously as Unofficial Labour, One
Big Union and SLP representatives, would also seem to indicate the existence
of some agreed working alliance and concerted plan of action.2
On the face of it, it seems surprising that these various groupings,
all of which claimed to hold electoral politics in contempt, should stand
for election but clearly their purpose was primarily propagandistic - they
were all returned at the bottom of the poll in any case - and marks the
failure of syridicalist ideas to make any headway industrially among the
Sheffield working class. Neither industrial conditions nor political
develoçtnents were favourable to the ideas that these revolutionary
activists were proposing and this effort in 1923 represented very much the
swansong of syndicalist-inspired politics in Sheffield.
The ultra-left parties were to fade away and, while sane of their
members drifted back into orthodox Coninunist politics, others, faced with
the abject failure of their policies to win any place or influence in the
wider working-class movement, dedicated their energies henceforth to the
radicalisation of the Labour Party. Joe Madin joined the Labour Party in
1925 and rapidly assumed a prominent position, being elected to the Labour
Group as Trades and Labour Council delegate in 1927 and to the executive of
the Council itself in the following year. 3 R.G Murray joined the Park
Divisional Labour Party sometime in the mid-1920s and both men were founder
members and cocrinittee representatives of the Sheffield Left-Wing Labour
Coninittee founded in l926.
1. The Socialist, September, October, 1923.
2. The candidates and their votes were as follows:
Attercliffe; Hardwick (Un. Lab) - 227: Darnall; Woodhead (OBU) - 188
Brightside;	 Gibson (Un. Lab) - 243k Ecciesall; wright (U.Lab) - 501
*Broornhall;	 Gibson (Un. Lab) - 1690: StPhil ts; Concannon (OBU) - 578
Crookesmoor; W. Madin (SLP)
	
- 42.
*No official Labour candidate stood.4
3. Madiri Papers, JM/l0; Biographical Information;
SFTLC minutes, EC 15;l1;19l7; ACM 27;3;l928.
4. S.F., October, 1926.
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In the Labour movement as a whole, attitudes towards the Ccxmiinist
Party continued to be sympathetic though there was a more even balance of
opinions on the question of official relations with the Party. In 1924,
the Trades and Labour Council Executive Coninittee voted by 5 votes to 4 to
accept the local affiliation of the Cotmunist Party but, as this decision
clearly infringed the position of Labour's national conference, it was
rescinded at the following delegate meeting by sane 63 votes to 51.1
Later in the same year, the Executive Coninittee went so far as to elect G.H.
Fletcher the Council's delegate to Labour's annual conference and, though
this decision was reversed in a further meeting of the Carrnittee, it was
subsequently endorsed by the full Council by 44 votes to 32.2
In 1925, controversy stirred when the Trades and Labour Council
decided reluctantly on definite Head Office instructions that it could no
longer officially endorse the Board of Guardian candidatures of G.H. Fletcher
and Mrs. Cree. 3 The decisionwent through by a majority of just five f ran
115 votes cast, and the overall sympathy which remained for Labour-Ccimunist
cooperation was shown by the delegates' majority support for resolutions
urging the ending of all discrimination against Carrnunist Party members and
backing the idea of Con'rnunist affiliation to the Labour Party. 4
 At the
same time, opposition to the Trades and Labour Council's open involvement
with the Conimmists was developing and in 1925 and 1926 the Council's
decision to invite Camiunist participation in the May Day demonstrations
led to the events being boycotted by the Cooperative movement and the
Yorkshire Miners' Association.5
By 1927, attitudes within the national Labour Party were such that
the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council no longer felt able to tolerate the
1. SFTLC minutes, EC 26;l;1924; EM 26;l;l924.
2. ibid., EC 1;lO;1924; 5;1O;l924; EM 4;11;1924.
3. ibid., EM 27;l;1925; 24;2;l925; S.D.I., 28;l;1925; 25;2;1925.
4. SFTLC minutes, EM 24;2;l925; 30;6;1925.
5, ibid., EC 5;5;1925; EM 8;4;l926; S.D.I., 9;4;1926.
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Coffmunist participation in its proceedings that it had hitherto allowed.
A letter from Arthur Henderson himself informed the Council that it could
not accept the election of Camunist trades union delegates and ought not to
cooperate with the Party in the May 1Ty demonstration) In fact, the
Council leadership voted by a large majority to ignore the latter
reccxmndation and Conirunist involverrnt in May Day went ahead, but they
were adamant that they could not jeopardise the Council's role in the Labour
Party by deliberately flouting its constitutional rules. 2 Henceforth, the
Comnunists were allowed no official part in the deliberations of the Trades
and Labour Council's political executive and the dividing line between the
Council's political and industrial functions was more rigidly drawn, It Was
also agreed later in the year (though by a margin of two out of 114 votes
cast) •that the Ccximinist Party would be officially excluded from the May
Day demonstration.3
It is not surprising, therefore, given their increasing isolation
fran any permitted involvement in the local Labour movement, that the
Sheffield Comunists enthusiastically supported the New Line. 4 In the
municipal elections of 1928, the Cotmunist 1arty stood its own candidates
in opposition to those of Labour for the first time, and it followed this up
in 1929 by two further municipal candidatures and the endorsement of C.H.
Fletcher as the Party's parliamentary candidate in Attercliffe. In his
municipal election fight of the same year, Fletcher endorsed the New Line
in its entirety, mercilessly attacking the Labour Government and Sheffield's
Labour Council, and stating:5
If I go to the City Council, I shall not go to represent the
"Conmunity" (Landlords and Factory Owners) but under the banner of
CLASS AGAINST CLASS will serve only the interests of the working
class, for no man can serve the interests of both sides in the class
war.
1. S'1'LC minutes, EC 5;4;l927.
2. ibid.; S.D.I., 27;4;l927.
3, SFTLC minutes, EM 27;9;l927.
4. Workers' Life, 1;6;1928; 21;12;1928,
5. SCOP records, CPR8; Municipal Election addresses, Brightside, 1929.
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The height of the Ccximjnist attack on Labour occurred in 1931 when
the Party stood nine candidates in the municipal elections (five narrd
officially as Ccxrrnunist candidates, four standing under the auspices of the
Workers' Charter campaign) and two candidates in the General Election.'
But all this was to little avail. Despite unquestioned rking-class
disillusionment with Labour's record and though the Corririunist Party was in
the forefront of agitation amongst the unemployed, the Camiunist claim to
be 'the only Party leading the fight against the capitalists and the landlords
and their Labour lackeys' fell on deaf ears. 2 The Corrinunist Party was simply
unable to bridge the credibility gap that lay between its aspirations and
working-class perceptions. The New Line, far fran enabling the Party to
capitalise on working-class alienation fran Labour, isolated it further and
heightened the air of unreality that attached to its revolutionary rhetoric.
(ii) Industrial Work
Before the clamp-down on its participation in the Trades and Labour
Council, a large part of the Sheffield Coninunist Party's work in the
industrial field took place within the Council and the Party achieved a
considerable presence in the Council's organisation. 	 In each of the years,
1920, 1922, 1924 and 1925, G.H. Fletcher was elected vice-president of the
Trades and Labour Council, and his successor to this position in 1926,
Will jam Ward of the AEU, was another Party member. The high-point of the
Party's organisational influence occurred in 1924 when it not only secured the
election of Fletcher but took four of the twelve places on the Council's
Industrial Executive Comnittee. 3 These successes illustrate not only the
1, The Party's municipal candidates and their votes were as follows:
Attercliffe;	 W.Joss (CP) - 208: Manor;	 .J. Burke (WC) - 203
Brightside; H.Wilde (CP) - 183: Moor; Mrs. Keaton (CP) - 154
Burngreave; Mrs.Astell (WC) - 138: Neepend; Mrs.Wilde (CP) - 125
Crookesmoor; Fi.Dronfield (WC) - 216: St. Phil's; A.Hague (CP) - 309
Darnall;	 G.H. Fletcher (CP) - 499.
2. SCOP records, CPR7; Municipal Election addresses, Neepsend, 1931.
3. SF11C minutes, AGM 29;4;1924.
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widespread receptivity to Comnunist politics in the Sheffield Labour
movement already remarked upon but also the trust and respect that pruninent
Party members had earned through their assiduous work in the trades unions.
It was less an indication of specific Con*iunist sympathies though,
and in the early 1920s the Council twice voted against affiliation to the
Red International of Labour Unions (RILU) .	 The subccxrinittee appointed in
1921 to investigate the question of the rival Internationals concluded not
unfairly:2
That as the trades unionists whose representatives form the Trades
and Labour Council have not yet endorsed the Dictatorship of the
Proletariat, etc., it is unreasonable to urge them to join the RILU.
There was, however, more sympathy for the RILU's later, specifically British
incarnation, the Minority Movement, to whose conferences the Trades and
Labour Council sent delegates in 1925 and 1926.
Outside of the Trades and Labour Council, the Party had fewer successes
to its credit in the industrial field though it was an area to which, because
of Sheffield's traditions of industrial militancy a pd the Party's own
antecedents, it paid especial attention. Though it was initially intended
that the Workers' Comnittee should function as the industrial attn of the
Party, the collapse of the shop steward tnovent in the concx'nic and
industrial turmoil of the post-war years seems to have rendered this forum
largely valueless. Instead, in November, 1921, a separate Industrial
Conrnittee of the Party was set up which comprised of Ted Lismer, J.T. Murphy
and Evelyn Rayner - all of whom had been leading members of the wartime
shop stewards' movement.4
Through the medium of its industrial membership, the Party sought a
role in all the major disputes of the period. In 1921, a special Propaganda
Cotrrnittee was formed during the national coal strike, and in 1922 regular
1. S.D,I., 4;5;1921; SFrLCrninutes, EC 24;1;1922,
2. SFTLC minutes, EC 24;1;1922.
3. ibid., EM 6;l;l925; EC 6;lO;1925; EM 26;2;1926.
4. SCP minutes, 23;1;1921.
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consultations took place between the AEU members of the Party and the
Industrial Coninittee) But while the Industrial Coninittee could urge that
the 'locked-out and unemployed coninunists in the AELJ should be in the
forefront of all mass pickets', it could not single-handedly reverse the
objective economic conditions which were condemning the working-class
movement to division and defeat during these years. 2 Industrially, the
Sheffield Labour movement was devastated in the post-war depression and it
was simply not possible for the Comunist Party to salvage anything from
the wreckage - except insofar as its activists, in most cases victimised
and workiess, were able to assume the leadership of the unemployed movemerit.
In 1924, in a review of local Party organisation, Ted Lismer urged
3that they try to establish factory groups. 	 Just one year later, the
Party could look back with sare satisfaction on a record of work that had
seen the establishment of six local factory groups and one factory
newspaper. 4
 The Minority Movement had also been developing its presence
within the local trades unions arid was receiving support from, amongst others,
ASLEF, the National Union of Foundry Workers and the AEU.5
The Comnunists' larger industrial base in Sheffield, as compared to
that of their counterparts in Birmingham, was further revealed by events in
the 1926 General Strike, On the first day of the Strike, the local branch
wrote to the Trades and Labour Council offering the full-tine services of
J.T. Murphy and its local organiser, Harry Webb, and the use of two pages of
a four page Conmunist bulletin. The offer was rejected and the Party went
ahead independently with the publication of its own Special Strike Bulletin.6
It was not, however, the case that this reflected any forced or self-selected
isolation for the Conmmist current in Sheffield. Though the Party had no
1. SCPminutes,6;4;l921; 3;5;1922; 6;5;1922.
2. ibid., 2;5;1922.
3. ibid., 18;3;1924.
4. Workers' Weekly, 31;7;1925.
5. ASLEF no. 1 minutes, 11;1;1925; NUF'W Sheffield Comnittee minutes,
28;4;1926;	 S.F., March, 1925.
6. Workers' Weekly, 21;5;1926.
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official delegates on the Central Disputes Coninittee, it had three ex officio
representatives, and most of the mass meetings organised by the Trades and
Labour Council were addressed by George Fletcher or other members of the
1Party.	 The Special Strike Bulletin was avowedly established to put across
the official Camiunist line on the dispute but it included notices for the
Central Disputes Committee's mass meetings and urged support for the
Cormiittee's official organ, the Sheffield Forward. 2 The production of the
Bulletin was, in itself, a major logistical achievement for the local Party;
according to James Klugmann, it had a circulation of 10,000 copies and it
appeared on every day but one of the Strike despite the arrests of the twelve
members responsible for its production and the police seizure of the
Cctununist party duplicator. 3 While the Central Disputes Corrrnittee stuck
to the industrial organisation of the General Strike and an economic
explanation of its purpose, the Cotmiunist Party placed the Strike in its
political context and sought to achieve a political victory. Wruilst there
was probably a majority on the Central Disputes Corrinittee who would have
questioned the Coninunist analysis, while the Strike was in progress the two
positions existed not in antagonism but in parallel and, in sc ways, they
usefully complemented each other.
The inndiate effect of the General Strike in Sheffield was to
radicalise the industrial labour movement and facilitate cooperation with
the Corrrriunist Party. This was graphically illustrated when Frank Thraves -
formerly a leading opponent of the Cotmiunists and the butt of fierce
Coniiiunist criticism for his moderation as leader of the trarnciaynen's union -
became the chairman of International Class War Prisoners' Aid (an organisation
set up under Coninunist auspices to defend and support those arrested for their
1. W Moore, 'Introduction' to Holberry Society, General Strike in Sheffiel'
Documents of the Strike (Sheffield, 1981), p. xiii,
2. See copies reprinted in above.
3. J. Klugmann. History of the ConTnunist Party in Great Britain, Vol. II
(1969), p. 157;
W. Moore, op. cit., pp. xviii-xix.
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political activities) . 	 Addressing a fund-raising rally for the group,
Thraveshiniseif stated that:2
If anyone had told me a week at two back that I should be speaking
on the same platform as Comrade Webb, I should certainly have
expressed doubts, but adversity makes strange bedfellows. . .Painful
incidents have come to us recently and I believe it is absolutely
necessary to find funds out of which we can draw as camon people.
The Industrial Cotmiittee of the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council went
further when, in June, 1926, it voted by 11 Votes to 8 that the Council
should affiliate to the Minority Movement. 3 This, however, was to go
beyond what most members would accept and a subsequent delegate meeting
reversed the decision by 61 votes to 54•4 The closeness of the votes also
reflects the hard work put in by the Sheffield Comnunist Party into gaining
position and influence within the Trades and Labour Council; at the end of
1926, Party organisers reported that 'the fraction on the Sheffield Trades
Council is one of the best in the country and had many successes to its
credit'
In the following year, the Council as a whole voted (by 77 votes to
46), on a motion moved by G.H. Fletcher and Harry Webb, to refuse to endorse
the TUC circular prohibiting trades councils from any association with the
Minority Movement. 6 The Council later deemed it inexpedient to prolong its
rebellion but it gave in with obvious bad grace. In a resolution actually
proposed by J.T. Baker, the leading supporter of the Minority Movement, it
was recorded that:7
Recognising the importance of this Trades Council being represented
at the National Conference of Trades Councils in May, in order to
offer more effective opposition to the arbitrary interference of the
General Council of the TUC with the autonomous rights of Trades
Councils in their association with an organisation of the character
of the Minority Movement.. .this Council agrees under protest to sign
the declaration demanded by the TUC.
1. SFTLC minutes, tM 30;ll;].926.
2. S.D.I., 3l;5;1926.
3. SFLC minutes, EC 8;6;l926.
4. ibid., LN 29;6;1926.
5. CouTnunist Party Annual Conference Report Summary, 1926.
6. SFTLC minutes, EM 29;3;1927.
7. ibid., AGM 26;4;1927.
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The matter, however, was not quite closed for in 1928 a Trades and Labour
Council delegate meeting voted to send an official delegate to the Minority
Movement's London conference. 1 This sparked off a number of protests fran
local trades union branches and some, no doubt, fairly critical
correspondence from the national Labour Party and the TUC. A special meeting
was convened three weeks latt to reconsider the decision and it duly voted
by 133 votes to 44 to rescind the previous motion.2
As C1lr William Asbury stated at the time, this represented the final
'parting of the ways' for the Labour and Coniminist Parties of Sheffield.3
The New Line had been adopted several months earlier and, since then, G.H.
Fletcher and Mrs. Cree had been expelled from the Board of Guardians' Labour
Group while the Coninunists, for their part, had provocatively taken part
unofficially in the May Day demonstration and announced their intention of
opposing Labour candidatures. The effect of these develonts as
inevitably to mark the Minority Movement too; it was undeniably an
instrument of Conirrunist policy and it was becoming increasingly implausible
to portray it merely as a forward and ambitious section of trades union
opinion. To E.G. Rowlinson, addressing the special meeting of the Trades
and Labour Council, the moral was clear; 'the people who are speaking
tonight (in favour of the Minority Movement] are those who want to smash
our movement. Let us quit this fooling' . By 1928, he was undoubtedly
speaking for a majority within the. orthodox Labour movement. A process
initiated by central diktat on both sideshad developed its own dialectical
logic and momentum. Little by little, reformist and revolutionary ideas and
tactics had becc polarised until, by the late 1920s, the differences
between the various sections of the xrking-c1ass movement appeared
irreconcilable.
1. SFTLC minutes, EM 24;7;1928.
2. ibid., EM 14;8;1928.
3. S.D.I., 15;8;1928.
4. ibid.
EM 4;6;1929.
EC 23;6;l93l.
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Attitudes and behaviour on both sides :jf the political divide were
growing more extreme and in 1929 J.T. Baker (though known not to be a member
of the Carinunist Party) was removed from the vice-presidency of the Trades
and Labour Council for appearing on the same platform as G.Fl. Fletcher at a
May Day rally.' The Minority Movement and the Comunist Party responded
by taking the New Line to its illogical conclusion when, in June, 1930, they
sought to set up a 'Sheffield Workers' Industrial Council' in opposition to
the existing Trades and Labour Council. J.T. Baker, G.H. Fletcher and
William Ward were among the leading figures behind the new venture but,
despite this high-powered support, it failed to get off the ground.2
Fletcher was subsequently suspended from the Trades and Labour Council but
he enjoyed the confidence of his union, the Operative Bakers and Confectioners
and continued to haunt the Council's meetings as a delegate even though he
had leftfewdoubts as to his belief in their futility. 3 Finally, the
Executive Conrnittee felt that it had no option but to ban anyone as
a delegate to the Council who was a Coninunist Party member or who had
supported a candidate standing in opposition to an official Labour
representative. 4 At the Annual General Meeting of the Council in 1932,
this decision was endorsed by a large majority.5
The fruitful cooperation that had once characterised Labour and
Conmunist relations in the Sheffield working-class movement was now a thing
of the past and the interests that.working-class activists held in ccmion
seemed to have paled into insignificance besides the points of ideology
that separated them. Both sides must take their share of the blame for
this failure and neither side received any obvious benefit from it.
Sheffield's militant traditions had enabled a longer-lived and more
1. SFI'LC minutes, EC 14;5;1929;
2. S.D.I., 25;6;l930.
3, SFILC minutes, LM 19;5;l93l;
4. ibid., EC 4;1l;l93l.
5. ibid., AGM 23;2;l932.
-400--
fruitful partnership between the different sections of the working-class
movement than had been possible in Birmingham but, ultimately, the internal
evolution of the two cities' working-class politics had been closely
similar. Local autonomies and peculiarities were being diminished as
working-class activists increasingly cane under the sway and discipline of
national or, in the case of the Comiiunists, international organisations and
policies. Local politics retained their individuality but, in terms of the
character of the working-class parties, it was an individuality of degree
rather than kind and one that was becaiing less significant as centralising
tendencies became stronger.
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10.4 Conclusion
In attempting any overall assessment of the nature of revolutionary
politics and its role within the wider working-class movement, it is first
necessary to clear away some of the prejudices and misconceptions which have
surrounded the Conuunist Party, The Party was not simply, as sometimes
portrayed, an alien implant into uncongenial and hostile native territory.
In fact, it belonged to an authentic British revolutionary tradition and its
activists, not merely the dupes of Moscow, were working-class men and wcxrn
who genuinely and urgently wished to see a revolutionary improvement in
the lives of ordinary people.
Probably the best way to understand the nature of the Coniriunist Party
is in terms of a natural division between two types of membership. In
positions of leadership and authority were what Kenneth Newton has called
the 'steel-hardened cadres' - men and women with a thorough understanding of,
and ideological coninitment to, Marxist-Leninist theory and an almost
overwhelming dedication to the practice of revolutionary politics.' To
give but one example of the sheer energy and hard work of such activists, we
may note the case of William Brain who in 1922 was an official of his trade
union, a delegate to the Labour Party, vice-president of Birmingham Trades
Council, chairman of both the Birmingham Conirwnist Party and its Midlands
Divisional Council, chairman of the Birmingham Unemployed Workers t District
Camiittee and Midlands organiser for the unemployed.2
It was not, of course, within the abilities of many people to maintain
such a level of activity, and the majority of Cormiunist members were ordinary
working-class activists who had been radicalised by their own experienes
1. K, Newton, The Sociology of British Conirrunism (1969), p. 23.
2. Straight Forward, February, 1922.
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and associations or disillusioned by the failure of the Labour Party.
While to sane in the higher echelons there was a sense in which the Party
could become something dominating and almost dangerously obsessive, to such
as these it was always a means and not an end - and the end remained a
straight-forward and honest desire to improve the lives of their fellow
workers. These people saw the Caiiminist Party as a radical and aggressive
alternative to a compromising and equivocating Labour Party but their actual
knowledge of Comnunist theory and tactics was often slight. Party leaders
in both Birmingham and Sheffield had occasion to criticise the poor political
knowledge of their membership; according to E.V. Smitham in Sheffield:'
most members were not conversant with Party policy and. . .most members
did not know the decisions of the International which are essential
in [the] building up of a capable party.
Though, as we have seen, the Party tried to rectify these failings, the
demands which it made on its members served to intimidate many of its actual
or potential supjxrters and ensured a very rapid membership turnover.
Membership of the Corrrnunist Party could never be merely a matter of paying
a small annual subscription, as the application form used in a recruiting
campaign in Sheffield made clear when it asked prospective members to sign
the following, rather daunting, declaration:2
I desire to make application for membership of the CPGB and pledge
myself to place my time and energy, as far as I can dispose of them
under existing conditions, at the disposal of the Party and will
regularly pay the established fees and subscribe to the Party organ.
Party members fought a constant battle between their political idealism and
the necessity of earning a living and the desire to keep time for family and
friends. It is not surprising that in both Birmingham and Sheffield a number
of memberships lapsed through the pressure of domestic circumstances.3
1. SCP minutes, l8;3;1924. For Birmingham, see: Plebs, May. 1923.
2. 'Special Recruiting Campaign' Leaflet, September, 1924. (In possession
of Mr. W. Moore).
3. Durham, op. cit., p. 97;
	 SCP minutes, 6;7;192l.
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The ambivalent response of the official Labour movement to the
Conirunist Party reflected a whole spectrum of attitudes and feelings in
which support and sympathy merged with fear and antagonism. To begin with,
though, the Communist Party possessed one great asset - the backing of the
Soviet Union and the moral example of the Russian Revolution. The Russian
Revolution in 191], the first workers' revolution, coming at a tine when
imperialism and militarism were slaughtering working-class lives on the
battlefields of Europe, was a beacon of light and hope to almost the entire
British working-class movement. It seemed to hold out the prospect of an
end not only to this war but to war itself, and it offered a tantalising
glimpse of a future radically different and better than any ordinary people
had known before.
Such unalloyed idealism could not long survive the disclosure of the
problems which the Revolution faced arid the publicity given to the more
questionable of Bolshevik methods. But working-class activists had a healthy
contempt for the capitalist press and, psychologically, they could not bear
to turn their backs on that vision of a workers' utopia which had once filled
them with such elation. Scxrething of this feeling was manifested in 1920
when the no. 10 branch of the Mialgamated Society of Engineers in Sheffield
passed a resolution urging their executive to apply for passports to Russia
on their behalf. An official of the union stated that he knew:'
personally many rrn in Sheffield who would be glad to have the
opportunity of going to work in Russia; not only to find work. . .but
to see Marxian principles actually worked. It is not everybody who
believes the stories about Bolshevik atrocities and our men who ask
to go have no misgivings as to their reception in Soviet Russia.
There would be no shortage of volunteers if passports were granted.
There was a widespread need to believe in Russia in the British Labour
movement and in 1924 the Birmingham Trades Council could describe the country
as 'strong, self-reliant, and sounder financially, probably, than any other
1.	 S.D.I., 1;3;1920.
-404--
nation' whilst, on the following page, without any apparent sense of
contradiction, it gave details of its financial 	 iFrs to relieve the.
Russian famine)
Naturally, this idealisation of Russia was strongest amongst the
most convinced adherents of the Corrrnunist Party and it is worth quoting frau
G.H. Fletcher's description of his visit to Russia in 1922 (where he was a
delegate at the fourth Congress of Canintern) to give an idea of its full
force:2
Russia, the Workers' Hope! A phrase used by speakers and writers;
to me a living reality after a visit to the first Workers' Republic.
What a country! What a proletariat!! what a government!!!
The very atmosphere is electric; totally different fran other
countries...Just as thousands rally to a football match in England;
these people rally tenfold, with more enthusiasm, to a demonstration.
I decided that this revolutionary enthusiasm is another product of
the revolution. Words fail to express its greatness.
Even when a more balanced view of Bolshevism's successes and failures was
taken, working-class politicians felt they had to defend the Revolution
against its detractors who were, after all, the same people who opposed
their own attempts to improve working-class conditions. This was particularly
the case in 1919 and 1920 when allied intervention against the newly-born
republic seemed to threaten its very existence. Under conditions of reaction
at horne it was all too easy to see this as part of a concerted attack on
working-class aspirations - as a resolution passed unanimously by Sheffield
Trades and Labour Council makes clear:3
we view with horror and indignation the attempt of the Government to
suppress the Workers' Soviet Governments of Russia and Hungary by
sending troops, munitions and money to assist Admiral Koichak and the
Reactionary Governments of Finland and Roumania. Further, we point
out to British workers that this new war means the continuance of
conscription and war taxation for a number of years, and that the
Government whichis attacking Russia is also responsible for the
sending of tanks and troops to Glasgow, and for the recent circ1ar
to Conmanding Officers asking for information as to whether their men
are willing to act as strike-breakers.
1. BTC Annual Report, 1923-24, pp. 7-8.
2. S.F., March, 1923.
3. SFFLC minutes, IXI 27;5; 1919.
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Four years later, the irrmediate danger had passed but the Soviet Union was
still encircled by hostile capitalist powers and was still suffering a.
barrage of criticism and misrepresentation. In the British Labour rnovenent,
the sense of fellow-feeling remained; Joseph Southall epitornised it when
he spoke to the ILP conference:'
There were plenty of people to find the faults of the Bolsheviks.
There was a world of detectives to look after them, and ILPers need
not join with Alec Gordon and Sir Basil Thomson. Let them look at
the virtues of the Russians. We made speeches; they did things.
They had truinpetted much at this conference but the walls of Jericho
had not fallen; whereas the Russians had occupied the Kremlin.
Stephen Graubard has written on the British Labour movement's reaction to
the Soviet Republic and has accurately portrayed the psychological
parallelism that connected the two phenomena despite their radically
different composition and rationale:2
The Labour Party was bound to Russia by an identity of status.
Organised as a protest against existing political parties, labour
suffered humiliation and ridicule as the price of mere existence.
Russia experienced the same treatment In the ccxrrnunity of nations.
Those forces, within Britain, who were most critical of the Labour
Party, led the operation against Russia, with what appeared to be
precisely the same motives. Those who compassed the Soviets'
destruction, it was argued, would have been equally ready to destroy
an internal socialist opposition if the opportunity had presented
itself.
The Labour Party's adversary was also Russia's enemy; how sensible
that the party should be Russia's friend.
4hile the Conniunist Party was able to bask in the reflected glory of the
Russian Revolution, it also had other attributes to its credit. For one
thing. , it was undeniably a working-class party, both in its canposition and,
ideologically, in its goals. Supporters of Labour links with the Communists
never failed to point out the irony of the Labour Party welcoming the
adherence of middle-class activists whilst, at the same time, rejecting
cooperation with proven working-class activists. As William Ward argued,
1. ILPjnnual Conference Report, 1923, pp. 82-83.
2. S.R. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1924
(Cambridge, USA, 1956), p. 242.
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the resolution moved at the national Labour Party cohference in 1923 was
proposed by a civil servant and seconded by a barrister and 'would exclude
from the movement such gladiators as Tom Mann while it took in Lord Haldane
and Noel Buxton' . 	 When the ban was applied to respected local figures,
such as G.H. Fletcher, it seemed even more indefensible.
The Cainunist Party was, then, widely viewed as a genuine part of
a brcad working-class rIx)vement and, though its policies and goals were
acknowledged as being more radical and advanced than those of the orthodox
Labour movement, it was not felt that they were in any fundamental way
antagonistic or contradictory to those of Labour. This attitude was nowhere
better seen than in the comparative success of the Minority Movement which
Len Youle and others have argued represented the Carnunist Party's 'apex of
influence' 2 The Minority Movement presented itself, at least in the early
years of its existence, as a forward section of trades union opinion and
specifically rejected any sectional intentions. Insofar particularly as
the Minority Movement attracted support from outside the Comnunist Party,
there was some truth in this and the argument convinced most delegates at
both the Birmingham and Sheffield trades councils who protested at the TUC'S
ban on relations with it in 1927. In Birmingham, A.P. Cassidy, a mainstream
Labour man, make3
that inside the trade union movement there were always men who wanted
to get ahead of the others. It would be a bad day for trades
unionism if they said that these men should be exccxrniunicated.
He was backed up by Walter Lewis, a trades union official and Labour
councillor, who thought 'they should encourage healthy criticism'.4
But by the later 1920s, Labour sympathies for the Comnunist Party were
dissipating and such positions were becoming increasingly untenable. At one
1. S.D.I., 25;4;l923.
2. 'An Interview with Len Youle', Bulletin of the Society for the Study of
Labour History, 20, (Spring, 1970), p. 38.
3. B.P., 4;4;1927.
4. ibid.
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level, it was felt that Carnunit demands were unrealistic, or were
perceived as such by a majority of the working class, and that their
rhetoric alienated potential support. When Alfred Barton (who had moved a
long way from his previous Conniunist leanings) opposed links with the
Minority Movement, he argued that Labour's policy was:'
to build up a Cooperative CannDnwealth by the votes and industrial
cooperation of the workers. It has a long way to go yet to get the
masses to adopt that policy. Why spoil its chances by high-falutirig
(sic] talk of force and dictatorship!
And George Fletcher himself reported, of his Attercliffe parliarrntary
election campaign in 1929, that 'the little opposition which showed itself
at our meetings centred around the "extravagant" nature of our demands'.2
More particularly, there was a growing feeling that the demands
which Coimrunist activists espoused were not disinterested; they were not
really made to improve working-class conditions but were used as a means of
securing the Corrmjnist Party additional support and influence. Again, it
was Alfred Barton who expressed this most clearly when he argued that the
prograirne of the Minority Movenent:3
was only a cloak for the real move. It was really a move to get them
to join the Conriunist Party and would not make for unity but disunity
of the workers.
Had he attended a branch meeting of the Sheffield Corrrnunist Party in 1924,
he would have heard his position fully vindicated by none other that Ted
Lismer who told the comrades present:4
our position inside the Minority Movement was not just to fight for
better conditions, they were secondary. But to inspire confidence
and get the workers to accept the Party lead.
There was, then, a specific, if narrow, sense in which the Camunist Party
viewed the working-class as a means and not an end and, because of this, it
was never able fully to win the trust of the people it set out to help.
1. September, 1926.
2. Workers' Life, 28;6;1929.
3. S.D.I,, 30;6;l926.
4. SCP minutes, 28;5;1924.
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That the Conjminist Party genuinely wished to improve the lives of working
people is incontestable, but it believed that the only method by which this
could be achieved in a real and durable way was through a working-class
revolution. All its agitation and organisation within the working class
were designed to further this goal and ordinary people, who did not doubt
the assiduity and commitment of the Party, widely believed that it was
using their grievances for its own ulterior ends. The limited but undeniable
truth that lay behind this conviction created a barrier between the
Conznunist Party and its working-class constituency which it was rarely able
to cross.
Another handicap to the Party was its loyalty to the Russian road
and the current Moscow line. By and large, Corrmunist activists seemed
unable or unwilling to make the necessary adjustments in rhetoric and tactics
that might have won over a workingclass which belonged to its own distinct
national culture. Len Youle, an ardent revolutionary throughout his
political life, left the Cotmiunist Party in the late l920s because, in his
words, itwas 'not basically a British organisation. . . fbut] was imposed on
this country by the Soviet Union'
The Comiunists also lost some support for simpler, more personal
reasons. The sheer combativity and cock-suredness of some Party members
alienated the sympathies of many of the more easy-going and less zealous
working-class activists. It was possible to stomach only so much criticism
of one's sincerely held and practised beliefs and, at times, the Corrinunists
went too far. In 1922, the fourteen Birmingham branches of the NUR
threatened to disaffiliate from the Trades Council in protest at the constant
Conmniunist attacks on their General Secretary, J.H. Thomas. 2 Five years
1. 'An Interview with Len Youle', bc. cit., p. 38.
2. BTC minutes, 28;4;1922.
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later, Harry Shepperson even had the effrontery to spoil the Trades
Council's biggest set-piece occasiof-1 for years - a Town Hall meeting
addressed by Egerton Wake and Ben Thrner to celebrate its fiftieth
anniversary - by continually heckling and interrupting the speakers.' If
there was political gain in such behaviour, it was more than outweighed by
the loss of personal popularity.
Such disfavour was strengthened by the Conirunists' ability, through
good organisation and individual effort, to achieve what undoubtedly
seemed to many to be an exaggerated influence in the forefront of trades
union politics. There was a certain heart-felt honesty in the cciiiplaints of
a delegate to the Birmingham Trades Council in 1924:2
The Cartriunists are so pugnacious and smart, we don't get a chance.
They don't forward business at all. We who come here to discuss
trade union matters cannot do it because of these Conuunist people,
who are intoducing all sorts of side issues.
His arguments echoed those put forward one year earlier in a debate in the
Sheffield Trades nd Labour Council.on the question of Conimmnist affiliation.
According to a report in the Sheffield Daily Independent, one speaker:3
twitted the "Reds" with being more bitter against anybody who held
modern [ic - moderate?] views in the Labour Party than against the
capitalists. He said their conduct in the Council during the year
had at times almost convinced him that atendance was not worth the
bother.
It is perhaps significant that, after what the Independent described as a
'year of sustained hooliganism', fewer members of the Comnunist Party were
elected to official positions in the Trades and Labour Council in 1923 than
in any other year in the early l920s.4
The political single-mindedness and revolutionary asceticism of the
most active Corrmunists could create an insensitivity to the feelings of the
less ccxmiitted which isolated them from the class they wished to lead. It
1. BTC minutes, 2l;1;1927.
2. B.G., 8;12;1924.
3. S.D.I., 25;4;l923.
4. ibid.;	 SFI'LC minutes, ACM 24;4;1923.
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is an irony which revolutionaries have rarely appreciated that their very
zeal to win position and influence within the working class has been one
of the factors which has contributed to their isolation and impotence.
But the greatest problem.that the Comunist Party faced in the 1920s
was, quite simply, that it was living in non-revolutionary times. The
British working class had, for good reasons, long-established constitutional
traditions and, though it was suffering the effects of industrial depression,
it was not the victim of the total economic breakdown which has preceded
most revolutions. The British ruling class, though one might question its
administrative competence, remained firm and self-confident in its
government. There was no economic crisis or power vacuum which a
revolutionary minority might benefit from and little prospect that working-
class loyalties might be wrenched away from a cautious and respectable Labour
Party.
As to the Conutunist Party's relationship with the orthodox Labour
movement, it was never easy and the differences of ideology and psychology
between the two sections of working-class opinion were very real. Whilst,
in principle, it might be expected that two parties springing from the same
class and claiming to uphold the same interests would be able to cooperate,
in reality it was precisely these qualities which held them in mutual
opposition. Whilstjoint working in the pursuit of limited and shared goals
was possible, ultimately the world-views of Labour and the Conuunists were
mutually exclusive and, because they were both dependent on the same strata
of the population, the antagonism that their competition engendered was all
the fiercer.
Chapter 11
JRKING-CLASS CONSERVATISM
11.1 Introduction
Working-class Conservatism is a large and important phenomenon
which in social history has rarely received the full and understanding
coverage to which it is entitled. A significant section of the working
class has always supported the Conservative Party but few attempts have
been made to analyse empathetically the ideas and beliefs of the working-
class Conservative. There are, perhaps, understandable reasons for this
state of affairs. History has been concerned, almost by definition, with
progress and the forces of the past that constituted, or seemed at the time
of writing to constitute, the basis of history's forward march. In this
schema, and set against the organisational and political growth of the
Labour movement, working-class Conservatism has always seemed an historical
curiosity - interesting in its own right but essentially on 'the wrong side'
in that it does not fit in to preconceived notions of what was the 'proper'
course of working-class history. This was always misguided and its
shortsightedness has been amply demonstrated by the results of recent
elections which cast into severe doubt the idea that the Labour Party has
any Cod-given or historically determined right to represent the interests
of the mass of working people.
A second problem for the historian in dealing with working-class
Conservatism has been that it was not a separate organisational current.
Working-class Conservatives seldom participated actively in political life
and, when they did so, they were almost invariably subordinate to the middle-
and upper-class politicians who ran the Conservative Party and decided its
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policies. With rare exceptions, it was these people who left their
historical mark in the minute book.s, personal papers and suchlike.
A third, related, problem has been that working-class Conservatism
was not self-expressive. In contrast to other forms of working-class
politics whose very existence depended on their aptitude for self-publicity
and propaganda, working-class Conservatism was strangely silent. It was
willingly and avowedly silent, taking its cues from the middle-class leaders
of opinion and choosing quite consciously to defer to the judgment of
upper-class politicians who, it was felt, had the truer grasp of current
affairs and the national interest. Working-class Conservatism has been a
largely mute and passive actor on the historical stage and has tended, as
a consequence, to be neglected and ignored.
In the earlier sections, we tried to locate and explain the specific
economic, social and political bases of working-class Conservatism as they
operated in Birmingham and Sheffield. We have examined the conservatising
influences of small-scale industry, the social and political conservatism
of the slum working class, and the unique character of Birmingham Unionism
and the continuing strength of the Chamberlain tradition. In this section,
we are concerned with working-class Conservatism as a generic phenaitenon -
examining, in the first chapter, its ideology and ethos and, in the second,
its existence as a social-cum-political current of working-class life.
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11.2 Ideology and Ethos
While socialim, however vague or ill-understood, purported to be a
theory of the world and a progranirie of action, working-class Conservatism
was essentially a state of mind. Though containing an understood and
implicit woridview, it consciously avoided systematic analysis or plan.
Working-class Conservatism, while boasting none of the intellectual
coherence and rigour - real or supposed - of its rival philosophies, did,
however, possess a number of carrnon and identifiable ideological ccinponents
which were to form and shape its outlook and activity. One of these was
deference (defined here as the willingness of large numbers of working
people to respect and defer to the upper classes on account of the special
abilities and attributes which were held to pertain to wealth and status)
and several of the major studies have given the phenomenon an important
part in their explanation of the Tory sympathies of many lower-class people.
[fererice had a number of supports but one of the simplest was a
straightforward calculation of financial interests; in the words of one
Sheffield working-class Conservative, 'Tories have money and money is the
main thing' 2 In more sophisticated circles, money in this context might
have been termed 'capital' but, in the concretised and personalised world
of ordinary working people, money was an artefact in its own right and its
concentration in the hands of the. few dictated the relationship of
dependency in which they existed. For the working-class Conservatism,
'capital' and more-so its associated 1 -ism' were barely realisable concepts;
their realities were a job, a weekly wage packet and their reliance on the
prosperity and goodwill of an upper-class employer. Impressionistic
1. R. McKenzie, A. Silver, pgels in Marble. Working-Class Conservatives
in Urban England (1968), chs. 4 and 5;
E. Nordlinger, The Working-Class Tories (1967), ch. 3;
B. Jessop, Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture
(1974), ch. 2,
2. St. Philip's Settlement, The Equipint of the Workers (1919), p. 203.
-414-
evidence also suggests that those most directly obligated to upper-class
individuals (rather than to a more impersonal agglcxiration of management
and shareholders) tended to be more frequently Conservative in their
political leanings. The case of Birmingham's jewellery workers has already
been cited.' At a less exalted level, a number of charwomen in both
Birmingham and Sheffield admitted Conservative affiliations.2 One, Mrs.
Bellamy, sunird up the more practical aspect of deference when she explained
why she resolutely voted Conservative despite the Labour sympathies of her
husband:3
I looked at it from my own point of view. I thought they employ me,
they pay me my wages, they've got the money. I was dependent on
them, that was the cleaning jobs, 7/6 a week. What's the good of me
voting against them, I was dependent on them. That's how I looked
at it.
But deference, of course, went beyond such material considerations. The
wealth of the upper classes was one aspect of their fitness to govern but
they possessed other, more intangible, assets too including, importantly, a
certain self-confidence and air of authority. The impact of the British
class system and some of its principal ideological supports, such as the
public schools and armed forces, in inculcating a reciprocal understanding
among rulers and ruled of their respective positions should not be
underestimated. It is easy to understand how the self-belief, or arrogance,
of those 'born to rule' could enthrall or intimidate the powerless and
unlettered masses who possessed none of their advantages of breeding and
station. Working-class Conservatives those to be governed by those whose
background and connections were believed, on both sides of the class divide
to qualify them uniquely for positions of authority and coninand, and they
rarely sought political responsibility or the public limelight for
themselves,
1. See above, pp. 55-56.
2. St. Philip's Settlement, op. cit., p. 203, p. 284.
3. Saltley Local History Project; tape transcript.
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It is symptcxnatic of this that Birmingham, a bastion of working-
class Conservatism, boasted just 11 working-class Unionist councillors
and alderrrn during our period of study (of whan five were elected for
normally Labour seats in the Conservative landslide of 1931). In Sheffield,
the Citizens' Alliance and its successors could claim six working-class
representatives. Alderman A.R. Jephcott, formerly a working engineer and
active trades unionist and onetime president of Birmingham Trades Council
(between 1887 and 1889), a Liberal Unionist councillor, and frcxn 1918 to
1929 Conservative M.P. for Yardley, was a singular exception to the general
rule which prescribed an essentially passive and subordinate role for the
working-class supporters of Conservatism.
It would, though, be mistaken to view this as a failing for which
the Party leaders alone were culpable; the evidence suggests that the
Party's rank and file were resentful and suspicious of those few working-
class activists who became prominent on the grounds that they were getting
ideas 'above their station' or were, in sane way, 'on the make'. These,
of course, were precisely the charges which could not be levelled against
the upper-class Conservative politicians whose own political work was
usually portrayed as impel led by 'duty' and 'service' rather than any of
the baser motives of self-interest and self-aggrandisement that have
occasionally influenced our political actors. This node of thinking
extended to the base of the Party's structure; in 1922, for example, a
correspondence between Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland and his agent concluded
that Lady Steel-Maitland rather than a local activist should becane
chairman (sic) of the Washwood Heath Unionist Women's Association on the
grounds that the latter was 'sufficiently near to the others in social
standing that they might be jealous of her
A third quality of the upper classes that did much to maintain the
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/95/3; Steel-Maitland to Gradwell, 3;2;1922
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deferential respect with which they were received was the aura of glamour
and sophistication which attached to their breeding, manners and life-style.
Far from resenting the extravagance and occasional dissipation of their
social betters ) many in the working class took a vicarious pleasure in an
excitement and way of life which contrasted sharply with their own drab
existence. Away frcin the more puritanical strains of the respectable
working class, there was a considerable empathy with those 'gentlemen'
whose charm belied their easy virtue. The working man who liked his beer
and enjoyed a goad night-out could see himself writ large in the behaviour
of some of those of more exalted status. Even when their personal lives
were as pedestrian as those of most of their supporters, upper-class
politicians were still expected to look and play the part. Though to modern
eyes, Austen Chamberlain, with his impeccable but old-fashioned dress, his
monocle and button-hole, might appear a rather ridiculous imitation of his
famous father, to many contemporaries he was a 'proper toff' - a term of
approbation not abuse - and they enjoyed his studied flamboyance and
personal charm. In comparison, his brother Neville appeared a pallid and
Iuiiourless figure, dour and middle-class. Austen himself recOgnised the
problem as he confided in a letter to their sister:1
The future of Birmingham gives me great anxiety and Neville's
positioninparticular...Boiled down, it all ccmes to this, N's [sic]
manner freezes people. His workers think that he does not appreciate
what they do for him. Everybody respects him and he makes no friends.
It is, perhaps, not surprising that when the time came to select a successor
to Neville, Ladywood's Unionists sought a very different personality to
replace him. Neville himself listed their criteria in a sardonic letter to
Conservative Central Office:2
The idea of the Selection Comittee is a young man of talent, energy,
and determination. He should be rich, handsome and accomplished; an
1. Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC5II/339; Austen to Ida Chamberlain,
8;ll;l924. See also: D. Dilks, Neville Chamberlain. Vol. i,
Pioneering and Reform, 1869-1929 (1984), p. 397.
2. Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC5/lO/68; Neville Chamberlain to Sir
Herbert Blain, 24;7;1926.
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eloqient speaker, a man of the world, and, not least, should be
accompanied by a wife who ccxnbines perfect charm of manner with
good looks and inexhaustible physical strength. No doubt you will
have a number upon your list who will combine these various
qualifications; and, if you would look out a few of the best of
them, I should be very grateful,
In the end, the Ladywood party settled for Geoffrey Lloyd who was unmarried
and not overly wealthy. He was, on the other hand, tall and handsome and
a product of Harrow and Cambridge so he possessed at least some superficial
attractiveness.
But deference was a two-sided phenomenon and its ideological alter
ego was reciprocity. As Howard Newby has argued, deference is best
understood as a 'form of social interaction', the dynamic aspect and
ideological reflection of the prevailing status system rather than its
source,' Where traditional authority was not superseded by a purely
legalistic or meritocratic system, its functioning was lubricated and
validated by the operation of a system of mutual duties and obligations.
The role and status of the rich and powerful was legitimated by the services
they performed for the poor and weak. In short, the deferential working
class expected sane return. What made their deference subordinating and,
in many eyes, naive was not that they made no demands on their social
superiors but that the exchange in which they participated was unequal.
One of the chief ways in which the upper classes made at least partial
atonement for their good fortune was charity. As Newby again has argued,
the gift was a peculiarly powerful buttress of the traditional social
hierarchy because, while acting as a material symbol of the wealthy's
honoured obligations, it enhanced the status of the donors and could be
used discriminatingly in favour of the 'deserving' poor - a quality nre
often judged by their good behaviour and proper gratitude than by any
1. H. Newby, 'The Lferential Dialectic', Comparative Studies in Society
and History, 17, (1975), pp. 141-46.
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objective standard of penury.'
Wh have referred already to the charitable works of Srrdley Crooke,
the M.P. for Deritend, and Neville Chamberlain's wife, Annie. 2 Such
activity was, perhaps, the clearest illustration of the gift relationship
in action, but Unionism as a whole worked hard to secure its local status
and support through charitable involvement. The Birmingham Mail organised
one of the largest local relief funds and was a major provider of new
boots and distinctive yellow jumpers to the city's slum children. 3 The
Corporation also established a philanthropic role for itself through its
support of various Lord Mayor's Funds for boots and clothing, and through
the ad hoc appeals it gave its name to in cases of special need, These
were, of course, non-political but it would be naive to suppose that no
capital was ever made out of the political canplexion of the Mail and City
Council. Labour allegations about the improper use of charitable funds were
certainly not uncarmon, as when it was reported to the Trades Council that
a 'prcininent Tory' had been distributing meal tickets frau the Mail fund
with the comrent, 'there you are. The Labour Party wouldn't do as much
for you' .	 Unionist leaders too clearly believed that their Party' s
involvement with such ventures could bring dividends and stated quite
explicitly in 1924 that:5
Arrangements should be made so that praninent Unionists.. . secure
appointment on all local Ccmnittees for the administration of the
Lord Mayor's Unemployment Fund, the Birmingham Mail fund, and other
similar funds and charities.
The way in which the credit accrued in charitable work was cashed in on a
personal basis at election time was well illustrated by the contest in St.
1. Newby, op. cit., p. 161.
2. See above, pp. 116-17. Dilks, op. cit., p. 272 provides additional
examples of the charitable involvement of Neville and Annie Chamberlain,
3. K. Dayus, Her People (1982).
4. T.C., 13;1;l922.
5. BUA minutes, 12;12;l924.
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Martin's and Deritend in 1922. The manifesto fo the sitting Unionist
councillor, Alfred Chovil, was a bland restatement of the need for economy
in national and local government which would have held little attraction
for working-class voters. But Chovil supplemented this with two leaflets:
one, from the Adult School of which he was leader, telling of his years of
devoted service, his help to soldiers during the War, and his organisation
of sports clubs and outings; the other, stating that he was the buying
chairman of the Lord Mayor's Boot and Clothing Fund. The latter concluded
rhetorically, 'Are you so foolish and ungrateful as to desert him for a
stranger?'
	
The answer, in this instance, was that the electors were,
for Chovil's Labour opponent, the so-called stranger, was Jesse Williams
who had become chairman of the ward coninittee of the Lord Mayor' s
Unemployment Relief Fund in the previous year. Labour infiltration into
the field of organised charity, previously the prerogative of the well-
heeled, became a source of some concern to local Unionists who believed that
it was sapping their traditional support.2
Nevertheless, Labour activists could not really hope to compete with
the resources and local celebrity of the more prominent Unionist
representatives. The Town Crier's attacks on Alderman Talbot, a slum
landlord and fierce opponent of Labour influence on the Housing Cotanittee of
the Council, aroused one Henry Barnes to write in his defence. It is worth
quoting Barnes: firstly, as a rare unmediated expression of authentic
working-class Conservatism; secondly, for the evidence his letter gives of
the influence of old-fashioned religious values on at least sane of the
working-class Conservatives. Barnes wrote (in a style which the Town Crier
pointedly omitted to correct):3
1. Birmingham Municipal Election Literature, BCL; St. Martin's, 1922.
2. Neville Chamberlain Papers, NC5I1O/23; P.J. Hannon to Neville
Chamberlain, l;l2;l924.
3. T.C., 30;12;192l.
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I could give you a real side of Mr. and Mrs. Talbot's personal
work for All Saints Ward, and both their real brotherly and
sisterly sympathy, and so very often personal help done, on behalf
of the many, more so the poorer brethren. . . and though they possess
and are keepers of more than I shall ever possess, in noways am I
at all jealous, or more so envious, for they both lovingly know,
being Stewards of their own, which is the right and proper ways so
to do.
Clearly, Talbot's involvement in the ward's religious life and conscientous
social work had won him respect in the locality and it is noteworthy that,
when Austen Chamberlain sought ways to arrest Labour's seemingly inexorable
advance in 1929, one of his suggestions was that churches and chapels in the
well-to-do districts should establish links with their sister foundations
in the poorer areas. Chamberlain argued that such activity-would have
formed:'
a natural nucleus around which social workers could gather for such
charitable work as is done by the Citizens' Camiittee, for visiting,
and for movements like the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides.. .it would not
be difficult to find among these social workers a sufficient number
who were interested in politics and would take on the political
education of a population whom they already knew and to whom they
were already known.
The Ladywood Ward Women's Unionist Association had already implemented a
similar scheme when it agreed, in 1919, to undertake sc welfare work with
the help of sympathetic local health visitors. 2 Ladywocd and the Deritend
Unionist Association were also among the local parties actively countering
Labour's efforts in the same field by their organisation of children's
parties and donations to the needy.3
There is also a suggestion that the Unionists were keen to harness
the status and prestige of doctors for their own political ends. Harrison
Barrow, who had been opposed for two years running by doctors standing
undet Unionist auspices, was certainly of this opinion and claind there
was 'a deliberate attempt on the part of the Unionist Party to utilise the
1. BUA Letters relating to West Birmingham Constituency; Austen Chamberlain
to E.R. Canning, 20;6;l929.
2. Ladywood Ward Women's Unionist Association minutes, ll;4;1919.
3. ibid., 29;9;1924;	 BUA minutes, 12;3;1926.
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medical profession to defeat the Labour candidate' 	 Perhaps this was a
little paranoid but there is no doubt that Conservative thinking saw
nothing wrong in buttressing the Party's appeal by local influence; indeed,
it was believed part of its vocation to establish just such personal ties
of respect and affection between the different ranks of the social
hierarchy in order to give the lie to socialist rhetoric of class war and
prejudice.
Conservatives genuinely believed that it was the Labour Party and
its revolutionary allies who were responsible for fcnting social unrest
and class consciousness, and they worked hard to counter the baneful effects
of left-wing propaganda. Charity was one such means but an irruense amount
of Conservative influence was secured by methods that were deliberately
and necessarily informal and unorganised. For an intimate insight into
this world of patronage and treating, we are indebted to the survival of
the ccmplete collection of Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland's correspondence with
his Erdington constituents and local agents.
The letters reveal that, so far as his constituents were concerned,
one significant aspect of a Tory M,P.'s job was that he should be a
generous benefactor of local organisations and activities. A wide range of
clubs and societies sought financial donations to boost their building
funds, subsidise their socials and provide prizes and there were many
requests that the M.P. should attend the opening of a flower show or pet
show or visit some gala evening of celebration. In Erdington, there were
so large a number of such requests that many had to be turned down but
Steel-Maitland was careful to avoid antagonism and offence and constantly
sought the advice of his agent about which ventures were (in political terms)
1. T.C., 22;lO;1926.
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most worthy of support, He was, thus, persuaded to purchase 18 medals
and a shield for the Nechells Thg of War team but could be inveigled to
donate just one guinea to the Nechells Angling Club which, he was assured
by his agent, had only a small membership.' Similar examples could be
multiplied many times.
Steel-Maitland also worked more specifically to secure the loyalties
of his working-class followers through treating. In 1923, the inaugural
meeting of the Ward End branch of the Men's Unionist Association took place
(characteristically) in a local pub. 45 attended and a round of drinks
for everyone present was bought in Sir Arthur ' s name by his agent.2
another occasion, the Washwood Heath Unionist Association organised a
smoking concert in the Cross Guns Hotel, and the agent's description of the
event provides a fine example of the way in which treating was used by both
sides for their mutual advantage. As he explained, the organisers:3
thought it would be a good thing in order to bring your name before
them, and in a good light, to stand all present a drink, which I
did. This was accepted in a most hearty spirLt, and when we mentioned
your name and apologised for your non-attendance through accident,
all the members present inrrdiate1y arose and joined in singing "For
he's a jolly good fellow'. However, the cost of refreshments was
£l-5-O. . .1 hope you will not mind refunding me this. I think it
will repay itself.
Such individual outgoirigs, small in themselves, mounted up and Steel-
Maitland was careful to urge discretion in such dealings. But expectations
raised could not be disappointed save at the risk of losing considerable
rank and file support. In 1928, he Erdington Divisional Unionist
Association organised a train trip to London culminating in a guided tour
of the Palace of Westminster. Steel-Maitland put out discreet feelers as to
whether it was anticipated that he would pay for the Cost of refreshments
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/89/2; Steel-Maitland to Gradwell,
2;ll;l923;	 Gradwell to Steel-Maitland, l5;9;1923.
2, ibid., GD193/95/2; Gradwell to Steel-Maitland, 26;2;1923.
3. ibid., GD193/277; Gradwell to Steel-Maitland, 13;ll;1923.
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and, to his chagrin, received the reply that a lot of people, especially
in Washwood Heath (the most working-class ward of his constituency), would
feel distinctly disgruntled if he did not) In the event, Steel-Maitland
•	 2had to pay for 604 teas at the Westminster Lyon s tea house. 	 Treating
could prove dear, even to one of Steel-Maitland' personal fortune.
To those of lesser means, it was an even greater trial. One of the
most active working-class Unionists in Washwood Heath was Bert 0llis and
his letter to Steel-Maitland gives an excellent picture of the bothomie
and good cheer that was counted on to oil the sinews of the Unionist
machine:
In spite of defeat, our organisation has to be carried on and our
efforts increased, if we are to win, social events will have to be
maintained...
At these functions, they often turn out expensive. The glass of ale
still holds good for many here, and although I have done so several
times to those whom I knew expected it, I could not afford it, but
I would not allow them a lever against the party.
Again, I have arranged to go round visiting districts with the
chairman and secretary of the following district, down goes youi hand
again, they expect it.
In short, Sir Arthur, and I speak quite financially and candidly, as
acting chairman...it is a costly job.
To overcome some of the problems that 011is faced, Steel-Maitland
confidentially mooted the idea of a £5 annual retainer to cover his out-of-
pocket expenses but the suggestion was discountenanced by his agent on the
grounds that others would jump on the bandwagon in the expectation of
4
similar treatment.
The third aspect of the deferential relationship's reciprocality
lay in personal contact. Deference was not founded on continuous face-to-
face contact but those who presumed to lead were held to have a certain
duty to socialise and make themselves known to their lower-class supporters.
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/209; Beardmore to Steel-Maitland, 15;9;l928.
2. ibid., GD193/209; Beardmore to Steel-Maitland, 18;9;1928; 2;lO;1928.
3. ibid., GD193/95/l; B. 011is to Steel-Maitland, 24;ll;1921.
4. ibid., GD193/208; Steel-Maitland to Gradwell, 20;l2;1921; Cradwell
to Steel-Maitland, 22;12;1921.
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If they failed in this minimal requirement, it became all too easy for the
working-class rank and file of the Unionist Party to feel themselves 'used'
and sense that their efforts were not being properly appreciated. Steel-
Maitlands agent explained the political lethargy of the Erdington
Conservative Club by their complaint 'that their councillors in the ward
and their notables never bother to cc and make themselves pleasant unless
they have an axe to grind'
	 The Club level led the same charge against
their M.P. who, it was said, only put in an appearance at election time.2
The ordinary constituents of Birmingham's Unionist politicians also
expected that their M.P.s would at least visit the locality and be seen.
When these expectations went unfulfilled, as was increasingly the case when
local politicians achieved prominence in national government, their long
absences became a source of considerable dissatisfaction amongst the
electorate. Neville Chamberlain hardly had a winning personality in any
case but his wife worked hard to compensate for his inadequacies. An
election leaflet, put out in her name in 1924, shows how assiduously the
Unionists sought to personalise their appeal, emphasising, in this instance,
the 'good-neighbourly' rather than patronal side of the inter-class
relationship. In her address to the women electors, Annie Chamberlain
claimed to:3
have often thought how lucky it is that we live so close that I can
come into any part of the Division on my bicycle in a few minutes,
and in this way I have got to know some thousands of you and every
year I increase the number of my friends...
I am not going to talk politics to you in this letter, but I want
you to realise that I am just a woman like yourselves, with children
of my own to bring up, and that I can sympathise wi,th you in the
hard struggles that many of you have.
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/l17/3; Dallas to Steel-Maitland, 7;9;1925.
2. ibid., GD193/95/2; Gradwell to Steel-Maitland, lO;3;1923.
3. NeviJie Chamberlain Papers, NC5112/28; Election leaflet, October, 1924.
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Perhaps not all were convinced by the apparent concern and fellow-feeling
evinced in this letter and Annie's social work, but to Ladywood's working-
class Conservatives such sentiments must have been gratifying evidence of
the close interest their upper-class leaders took in the lives of their
ordinary supporters.
Once Neville's departure for Edgbaston was announced, his successor,
Geoffrey Lloyd, made strenuous efforts to establish his own following. One
of the major points in his favour was that he had time to give to nursing
the constituency and in 1928, it was stated, he made over 1500 personal
calls, each followed by a personal letter and propaganda. 	 His ccrnitment
was not enough to prevent Labour winning the seat in 1929 but the small
margin of victory - just 11 votes - undoubtedly owed something to the
individual support he had built up
In the neighbouring constituency of West Birmingham, the name and
character of Austen Chamberlain were still just enough to retain the seat
for Unionism though Austen was harried by a Labour opponent who was a full-
time propagandist in the Division. The chairman of the West Birmingham
Unionist Association bemoaned the difficulties in counteracting:2
the work of a man for four years, visiting courts and spreading the
rumour that all visits to Geneva were holidays, and if re-elected
our member would be off the week after for another holiday.
3
But he went on to state that there was:
still a great tradition running through the Division. The presence
of Sir Austen and Lady Chamberlain in any street acted like magic.
The work of Lady Chamberlain in her court meetings was very
successful. As one capable worker reported "Lady Chamberlain left
delightful impressions and I hear of waverers voting through her
cottage visits"..
The glamour and graciousness of such visitations were still enough to turn
1. BUA minutes, 16;ll;1928.
2. BUA Letters relating to West Birmingham Constituency; E.R. Canning to
Austen Chamberlain, 21;6;l929, 'West Birmingham Election. Chairman's
Report'.
3. ibid.
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a few working-class heads and convince scxi of the essential beneficence
and magnaminity of their upper-class rulers, and their success was such
as to persuade Austen Chamberlain to abandon conventional political
meetings in 1931 in order to concentrate on house-to-house canvassing.'
We have dwelt at some length on the role of deference within working-
class Conservatism as the sentiment has rightly been judged to play a major
part in the explanation of the Tory sympathies of many working people.
But whereas the questionnaires and opinion polling have simply treated
deference as something attitudinal and, by extension, basically irrational,
the historical record shows it to have been a structural phencxrnon
contingent upon certain modes of behaviour and a particular balance of
social forces. Deference was by no means a merely material calculation
of mutual interests but it was an exchange in which both parties
participated with a consciousness of duties and obligations and an
expectation of at least partial reciprocity. For those with the advantages
of education and a more meritocratic ordering of the social hierarchy, it
remains a grotesquely ill-balanced exchange, scarcely rational if judged by
any purely pecuniary standard or liberal notion of social justice. But to
the poorest and least-educated sections of the population, ideas of
equality were pipe-dreams; they were concerned simply to survive the
inhospitable conditions in which they found themselves and to take, as a
bonus, such compensating pleasures as contemporary society allowed. In
this light, deference may be viewed as a strategy to get by in, and make
the most of, a situation in which few saw any hope or possibility of change.
It was not, in any sense, an articulated or coherent strategy but it was
one which, to those with the least power and resources, must have seemed
1. Austen Chamberlain. Papers, AC5/l/561; Auscen to Ida Chamberlain,
24; 10; 1931.
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more viable and more available than many others.
The deferential interaction also formed and encouraged a traditional
and almost feudalistic view of the world in which the hierarchical ordering
of society was accepted as God-given, sanctified by usage and legitimated
by practice. Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland expressed exactly the Conservative
woridview which, in more inchoate form, was shared by his working-class
followers :1
The Socialist Party is the really class Party. It represents one
class only, with a sprinkling of the intelligentsia "on the make".
The Unionist Party represents all classes. It looks upon the
country as an organic whole. As in every organic whole, the parts
differ and the rewards will also differ, but it is the duty of the
Unionist Party to see the treatment is fair while it has regard to
economic laws, the disregard of which will bring the whole country
to disaster. But if this is the right view, it follows also that
there should be friendliness and intercourse between members of
different classes just as there was on the battlefield and just as
there is in many a village cricket field today.
Steel-Maitland's idyll hardly seems capable of application to the habitat
of the industrial working class but it was the success of Unionism in
Birmingham to have built up strong personal links between its politicians
and constituents and to have fostered a distinct local pride. These
provided a context where the traditional orgariicist ideals of Conservative
philosophy could maintain their influence and, for so long, override the
antagonisms of class that the form of local society might otherwise have
been expected to engender. It is, indeed, suggestive that, when one Labour
propagandist sought to describe the mentality of the average Birmingham
worker in the 1920s, she chose to compare it to that of the village
labourer twenty years earlier. 2 Labour, in general, could only view such
attitudes with a mixture of incredulity and contempt. An article in the
Town Crier was exaggerated and unsympathetic but it did portray conviricingly
something of the life-style of those working-class Conservatives whom it
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD1931209; 'Memorandum on Reorganisation of
the Erdington Division', August, 1929.
2. Margery Newboult in T.C., 17;7;1925.
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described graphically as the 'Snobs of the Abyss':'
poor wretches who eagerly swallow the flatteries of their "betters"
on all occasions, who preen their ill-clad backs when Messrs.
Chamberlain and Co. tell them that beneath their deceptive exterior
lies the "backbone of the Empire". They are steeped in a
pathetically weak solution of local respectability and would Vote
a china dog or brass fire-iron into Parliament if they thought it
was the proper thing to do.
The reality was trore nuanced but the writer correctly emphasised the 'local
respectability' of the slum-dwellers for it was precisely this quality
whichgave meaning and consolation to an otherwise fairly squalid existence.
Labour attacks on the habits and conditions of lower working-class life,
when they were perceived as denigrating or undermining even this ideological
capensation, were antagonising and counter-productive; the pat on the
back, however patronising it might seem to outsiders, was valued.
However, to characterise popular Conservatism as merely a reflex of
the lower working-class life-style would be mistaken. There were many
others in the working class who believed quite honestly and intelligently
that Conservative policies were the most just and practicable possible in
the present state of society. Like probably the majority of their Labour-
voting ccxnpatriots, these working-class Conservatives made no heavy demands
on the system in which they lived; they wanted fair pay and treatment and
some sensible reform. What differentiated them, perhaps, was a nre
fatalistic acceptance of the basic. irritability of the current order and a
patriotism in which class interests were thought to be in antagonism to a
supraordinate national interest which found its principal representative
in the Conservative Party.
Unfortunately, in an historical survey, without access to membership
lists, opinion polling and the like, it is simply not possible to go much
1. T.C., 29;5;l925.
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beyond this. There is some evidence, judged from the few biographical
details we have of the most prominent working-class Conservative activists,
that this type of Conservative support came disproportionately from the
clerical and supervisory strata of the workforce and, insofar as this was
the case, it ties in with latter-day research which has shown heavier Tory
voting among those with middle-class connections and contacts. 1
 But the
deleterious influence of bourgeois associations cannot be held wholly to
blame. It does seem from the evidence, or lack of it, that Conservative
voting was as much a matter of individual choice as of socio-econanic
structuration; indeed, to believe otherwise would lead to the arrogant
assumption that ordinary working people were incapable of forming their
own judgment and taking their own decisions. Many people voted Conservative
simply because they considered, rightly or wrongly, that the Conservative
Party was the most likely to achieve economic prosperity for the country
and individual and social stability for the nation as a whole.
On the other hand, while a lot of Conservative support has derived
from essentially pragmatic verdicts, the Conservative Party has always been
able to tip the balance in its favour by its consistent claim to be the
only true guardian of the national interest. A large part of Conservatism's
appeal has rested on its devotion to the Flag and Firipire, and history has
shown many times that patriotism is the most easily aroused and mobilised
of popular emotions. When the crunch came, the workers of Birmingham and
Sheffield, as did those elsewhere, put the interests of their country
before the interests of their class, and there is no doubt that one of the
strongest, if least tangible, aspects of the Conservative Party's
1. McKenzie and Silver, op. cit., p. 92;
K. Roberts et al., The Fragmentary Class Structure (1977), p. 56;
W,G. Runciman, Relative [privation and Social Justice (1972), pp. 175-76.
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attractiveness lay in the vague sense that it stood for the country in a
way that no other party did or could.
This was certainly the message persistently trumpeted in the Party's
propaganda which constantly vilified the personal and political integrity
of its opponents and their patriotism. When it came to election time, the
gentlemen of England fought with their gloves off in a manner which can
only be adjudged unscrupulous and underhand. We have referred already to
the use of the Zinoviev letter, the Russian treaties and other such
electoral 'stunts'. Beneath these periodic scare-stories, there was a more
persistent undercurrent of propaganda which linked Labour with atheism,
industrial conscription and even the 'nationalisation of wcmen' . 	 All the
worst sins of Soviet Russia, real or imagined, were attached to the Labour
Party in a crude campaign of guilt by association. Building from a nucleus
of truth and the genuine sympathy that existed for the Russian Revolution
in the British Labour movement, the Conservatives systematically painted
the Labour Party in a lurid and extremist light which appears fantastic
when set against the stolid terrperament and deep respectability of the vast
majority of its supporters. The significance of this lay not so much in the
fact that many in the working class swallowed wholesale the lies and half-
truths which were fed to them, but in the way that they contributed to a
climate of opinion in which Labour was perceived as a disruptive and antiS-
national threat to the established political order.
To some Conservatives, perhaps, all this was merely cynical vote-
catching but it did represent, more deeply, a genuine belief that the
Conservative Party was the only safe and sane choice of government and that
the alternatives were both impractical and dangerous. A Unionist leaflet
1. Birmingham Parliamentary Election Literature; 'Fighting Notes Against
Liberals and Socialists', Ladywood, 1923;
	 T.C., 1l;ll;1927.
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issued in West Birmingham in 1924, on 'The Ethics of Canvassing', brings
out this mode of thought very well:'
Have a bold talk. Show them we are not "down-hearted", we have a
policy which is absolutely essential to the Trade and Prosperity
of the Country. Point out that the Political Labour Party - a
mixture of Socialism and Corrmunism - will be a national disaster.
Remember it is absolutely impossible for any reasonable man or
woman to be a Socialist or Corrrnunist - and if he or she is unbiassed,
they cannot logically vote for Labour.
Partly, such certainty reflected the self-belief and assurance necessary
to bolster and motivate the political work of any activist but, more
profoundly, it sbolised the deep confidence of the Conservative Party in
its self-appointed and proclaimed role as the unique custodian of British
customs and institutions. While Labour was the party of movement,
Conservatism represented the party of order; as such, it was attractive to
many in the working class whose political philosophy was fairly surrmed up
in the old adage, 'Better the devil you know...'. Though Marxists
correctly believed that economic and technological deve1opints impelled
change, they failed to take into account the fact that popular sentiments
have stood most often for inertia.
1. Birmingham Parliamentary Election Literature, BCL; West Birmingham,
1924.
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11.3 Organisation and Activism
In turning now to look at the nature of the Conservative Party's
political work, it is not sutprising to find that the Party's organisation
exhibited a strong hierarchy and distinct division of labour based on a
clear view of the proper roles and duties of the different social classes.
Positions of leadership and authority were occupied almost exclusively by
those of breeding and status. Even in Birmingham, despite its mass popular
membership and an organisation described by Neville Chamberlain as
'thoroughly democratic', it was pointed out in 1929 that not one member of
the Birmingham Unionist Association's Management Cctunittee belonged to the
working classes.' To be fair, it was as a consequence agreed to co-opt
one, and later, three working-class representatives. 2
 But such moves were
essentially tokenistic; power resided with those accustciited by upbringing
and experience to such responsibility, and few working-class Conservatives
-	 would have thought to question such arrangements.
The same principle was extended to the divisional level where the
tendency was for the president of the local association to be either the
sitting M.P. or the most prestigious local worthy, preferably one with a
title. These possibilities were denied the Brightside Conservative
Association but it was characteristic that the president of the party was
Douglas Vickers and that three of its ten vice-presidents were members of
the Firth family - all, of course, leading industrialists in the area.3
To some extent, such positions were honorary and ornamental, though certain
duties - principally of a financial and social nature - were extracted.
lower down the Party, it was expected that the notables would earn their
salt. It is suggestive of this that seven of the ten officers elected at
1. BUA minutes, 19;9;l924; l2;7;l929.
2. ibid., 12;7;l929; 1l;lO;1929.
3. Brightside Conservative Association minutes, 22;7;l918.
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the founding meeting of the Ladywood Ward Women's Association came fran
neighbouring Edgbaston and, though many of these were superseded as the
branch got off the ground, it remained the case that the leadership of the
branch remained firmly in middle- and upper-class hands. 1 In a similar
way, in tritend 25 businessmen were delegated to take charge of the
Division's polling districts.2
It is interesting to note that when the Party's 'natural' leadership
failed to fulfil its expected tasks, the deference that might have been
anticipated from the grass roots rapidly evaporated. In Ladywood in 1924,
E.J. Denton (a railway clerk and one of the few working-class Unionist
councillors) felt compelled to complain:3
that many of our leaders did not take part in the ordinary propaganda
work of the Association, and were only on view at Annual Meetings and
at Elections; scx only at Parliamentary elections. They trust take
their share along with the rank and file, and take an interest in
their work.
Five years later, after the disappointment of the 1929 General Election, the
Unionists of All Saint's went even further when they forwarded the following
resolution to the Birmingham Unionist Association:4
We, the All Saint's Ward Executive Corrinittee (comprising working men
and wixnen) deplore the apathy shown by the business men of
industrial wards towards the workings of the Unionist Party and
trust that the Management Ccxrnittee will endeavour to educate the
business men and men of leisure to take a rrore active part in the
activities of the Party.
Such rumblings of discontent were, admittedly, hardly typical but they are
further evidence that deference expected sane return.
Beneath this higher stratum of leadership, there was an important
second rank of upper working-class activists who acted as the non-conTnissioned
I. Ladywood Ward Women's Unionist Association minutes, 28;2;1919; 23;2;l921;
6;9;l923.
2. BUA minutes, l4;lO;1927.
3, Ladywood Division Unionist Association minutes, 23;l;1924.
4. BUA minutes, ll;1O;l929.
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officers of the Tory high comiiand. Of the ten working-class UniOnist
councillors in Birmingham in our period, four held white-collar positions
and two were foremen; of Sheffield's six working-class Citizens'
councillors, two were in clerical jobs and one was a foreman. If the
evidence of Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland's correspondence in Erdington is more
widely applicable, such working-class leaders appear to have played an
important role in the Conservative Party's smooth running, acting both as
intelligence agents for the upper-class leadership whose social status
prevented them gaining a true cciiiprehension of rank and file feelings, and as
transmitters to the Party faithful of the leadership's current
preoccupations. Though accorded little formal recognition in the Party
organisation, there is no doubt that the work of such men and women was
deeply valued by those Conservative politicians who wished to achieve a
genuine understanding of popular sentijiEntsJ
The records also suggest that the Conservatives' active membership
(as opposed to the majority who merely subscribed to, or voted for, the
Party) tended to come from the upper strata of the working class too. Even
in the solidly industrial constituencies, a definite social hierarchy
existed and the evidence from Birmingham is that working-class Unionists
sometimes felt uneasy in canvassing the pOorer districts of their own
locality. The chairman of the West Birmingham association went so far as
to threaten to get outside help from the 'comfortable suburbs' when the
branch's own workers were unwilling to 'tackle the bad streets' 	 Such
findings do not contradict the evidence of lower working-class Conservatism
but they do reinforce the general impression that working-class activists
of all persuasions tended to come disproportionately from the respectable
and better educated sections of their class.
1. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/89/3, GD193/286; Steel-Maitland to H.C.
Young, 25;l;1924, Steel-Maitland to Sir William Morris, 28;l;1929.
2. BUA Letters relating to West Birmingham Constituency; E.R. Canning to
Austen Chamberlain, 2l;6;1929, 'West Birmingham Election, 1929.
Chairman's Report'.
-435-
It was women who formed the backbone of Conservative organisation;
in Birmingham, for example, they formed the majority of the membership in
every division but one - King's Norton being the solitary exceptionJ
Nor was this preeminence merely numerical; the Conservative Party's female
membership also seems to have undertaken the bulk of its conventional
political activity. This was particularly the case at election time when,
in both Birmingham and Sheffield, most of the tedious but important work of
addressing envelopes, folding leaflets, delivery and canvassing was done by
women. 2 At first glance, given the generally subordinate status of
in the political arena, this seems surprising but it clearly reflects to a
large degree the traditional discriminatory assumption that routine, clerical
and non-skilled work was best performed by females. It was certainly the
case that those in supervisory roles, Conservative agents and officers,
were predominantly male. It also reflects a situation in which wanen
members had, by and large, more free time and greater flexibility than
their male counterparts who were more often in full-time employment.
On the other hand, the phenomenon of female political activism should
not be dismissed as merely superficial. There is plentiful survey evidence
to suggest that women tend to be more heavily ccmxiitted to the Conservative
cause than men, and the contemporary records of the l920s indicate that,
then too, women were perennially the most active section of the Conservative
membership. 3 The disparity in ipale and female political activism was
unusually well illustrated in the Handsworth Division of Birmingham where
it was reported in 1926 that the three women's branches met at a set time
every fortnight while the numerically smaller men's membership had no
1. BUA minutes, 14; 1; 1927.
2. ibid., 13;4;1923; 6;9;1929; lO;12;1931;
Sheffield Conservative Wccrn's Advisory Coniiiittee minutes, 9;5;1932.
3. McKenzie and Silver,
	 p. 86;
Runciman, op. cit., p. 175.
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regular meetings.' In Handsworth, in a complete reversal of the normal
sex roles, it was the women who established a new men's branch of the
Unionist Association. 2
 More generally, and more typically, waxen also
played a major part in the setting-up of the Conservatives' junior Sections
and branches of the Young Britons' League.3
The outlook of the male working-class Conservative was frequently
rooted in a culture which was non-political, even in many cases anti-
political, in nature. Their Conservatism derived from their patriotism and
their unquestioning acceptance of the 'natural' social order; their
distinctly Tory sympathies were fostered by the beery conviviality and ethic
of good cheer by which the Party spread its appeal among the poorer classes.
While the women were given recitals in local school halls, the men were
entertained with smoking concerts in pubs, and it was the normal practice
of the Men's Unionist Associations to hold their meetings on licensed
premises. 4 The old connection between the drink interest and the
Conservative Party lived on into the 1920s and, in 1924, a Unionist
Subccxmiittee on Orgariisation quite candidly reccxrrrnded 'as close a
friendship as possible between the Divisional Associations and the Licensed
Victuallers' on the grounds that:5
Every licensed victualler can become, with a little helpful
encouragement, a discreet but successful propagandist for the
Unionist Party.
This had certainly been the case .in the previous year when one well-known
local brewery had circularised its pubs with anti-Labour literature.6
1. BUA minutes, lO;12;1926.
2. ibid., l;4;l927.
3. Erdington Division Women's Unionist Branch Corrmittee minutes, 11;1O;1923
Ladywood Division Unionist Association minutes, 23;1;1924;
Park Division Women's Unionist Council minutes, 7;4;1932.
4. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/209; R. Edwards to Steel-Maitland,
ll;3;1929;	 BUA minutes, 16;4;1926; 1O;9;1926.
5. BUA minutes, 12;l2;1924.
6. T.C., 9;ll;1923.
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The structural manifestation of this tendency in working-class
Conservatism was found in the Unionist Workingmen's Clubs, of which there
were 14 in Eirmingham. For those who looked to the Clubs to provide
evidence of enthusiastic Conservatism and a core of political activists,
they were undeniably a disappointment. In 1928, the Unionist Chief Agent
reported that the Clubs' political work was 'practically negligible', and
it took considerable effort to persuade just seven of the Clubs to accept
Party speakers in the run-up to the 1929 General Election.' The experience
of Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, who spent £1500 on providing a Unionist
Workingmen's Club in Nechells, was salutary. He wrote in reply to an
enquiry on the venture's feasibility from Sir Evelyn Cecil, the M.P. for
2
Aston:
I have been very disappointed in the result. There are one or two
good fellows at the Club but for the most part it is a social
centre, and instead of being more keen on politics than before I
think that the men are less so.
By 1929, he was certain that 'no new Clubs should be created of the type
with which we are familiar'; if premises were made available, he was
adamant that 'no alcoholic drinks and no billiards' be allowed to add to
their attractiveness
Clearly, then, the Clubs failed to fulfil the politicians' hopes
for their impact but, while they never became centres of political activism,
they did, nevertheless, serve as an important social base of a type of
working-class Conservatism which by its nature was politically passive and
whose very attraction lay in its proclaimed lack of moral and political
earnestness. A large part of the Conservative Party's appeal to the lower
working class lay in its endorsement of their mores and life-style and its
1. BUA minutes, 14;12;l928; l5;3;l929.
2. Steel-Maitland Papers, GD193/ll/l; Steel-Maitland to Sir Evelyn Cecil,
?/l/l925.
3. ibid., CDl93/209; 'Merrorandurt on Reorganisation of the Erdington
i)ivision', August, 1929.
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message that politics were best left for others to worry about.
The same implicit understanding informed many of the activities of
the women's associations. Like their sisters in the other parties,
Conservative wcxrn placed a heavy emphasis on achieving a healthy mix of
social and political activities by which to recruit and maintain a large
membership. The minutes of the Ladywood Ward Women's Unionist Association
show that outings and parties played an important part in branch life and,
in Moseley, the King's Heath branch arranged a fortnightly winter prograiTrr
in which socials alternated with meetings of an educational character.'
In addition, in some areas a definite equivalent to the Unionist
Workingmen's Clubs existed in the Women's Unionist Institutes; in 1924,
there were six of these in the Ladywood Division alone. 2 But, in sharp
contrast to the male preserves, the women's centres appear to have been
highly active in the political field. The 'Women's Club' established in
Ladywood in 1920 was adjudged an 'unqualified success in every way'; its
110 members distributed the Unionist organ Straight Forward, undertook
canvasses every three months, and organised their own polling districts.3
4It was considered that:
if any move were made to separate the ward work and Club work, a
weakening if not disaster would follow.
Some reasons for the greater political activism have been given already.
What appears to have been the principal factor in the political effectiveness
of the women's clubs - apart, that is, from their lack of alcohol - was the
way in which the clubs encouraged an air of domesticity which found
reflection in much of the Conservative Party's propaganda for women. The
1. Moseley Divisional Unionist Association, King's Heath Wain's Branch
Programmes, 1927-28, 1928-29, 1931-32.
2. Ladywood Division Unionist Association minutes, 23;l;1924.
3. Ladywood Ward Women's Unionist Association minutes, 23;2;192l.
4. ibid.
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women ' s clubs prcxroted rational recreation with a distinct emphasis on
the home and family; Conservatism proclaimed itself the chief defender of
the sanctity of marriage and the religious values which upheld family life.
Whereas male working-class culture tended to divorce the Conservative
Party's male membership fran active political participation, female
Conservatives were encouraged to see a close connection between their social
and domestic lives and the Party's political work. The effectiveness of
the liaison thus constructed was illustrated by the practical devotion of
Conservative women to the Party's cause cane election time.
We will conclude this chapter by a brief examination of the
Conservatives' organisation of youth. Like all political parties, the
Conservatives placed considerable importance in the recruitment of the young
but more than most, and in keeping with the general tone of Conservative
philosophy, they were anxious not to 'bore them with politics' . 	 In
general, there was little danger of this for the Party's junior sections
advertised a balanced and wide-ranging prograrme of activities, instructional
meetings predominating in the winter and recreational occasions in the more
hospitable conditions of surmer. 2 Most junior branches net weekly or
fortnightly and most arranged dances and socials with the sane frequency.
In Ladywood, for example, political lectures alternated with socials but
even the lectures were followed by dancing and games. 3 The same mix of
education and entertainment was fcnd in the three junior branches of the
King's Norton Unionist Association.4
Similarly, and like their counterparts in the Labour Party, the
junior Unionists placed great store in organising their own sporting and
1. Ladywood Division Unionist Association minutes, 23;l;1924.
2. BUA minutes, 6;ll;1925.
3. Nevil le Chamberlain Papers, NC5/lO/96; Ladywood Division Junior
Unionists' Prograrme, September-December, 1921.
4. BUA minutes, 16;7;1926.
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recreational activities. Among their noresuccessful ventures was a Junior
Football League with eight participating teams and a SWIIIiiIing Club with a
membership of 260.1 Besides these city-wide associations, the juniors
organised a whole range of cricket, rambling and cycling clubs and dramatic
societies which were simply too numerous to be listed. Given that, in 1925,
the 21 branches of the Unionist youth organisation had over 3000 members,
there was undoubtedly considerable scope for such non-political diversions.2
It may be taken as indicative of a far wider spread of social activity that
in April, 1926 the juniors of Yardley were advertised as taking part in two
dances, a whist drive, a bicycle outing, a jumble sale and their annual
sumer camp.
The Young Britons, which catered for those aged 7 to 14, were less
ambitious in recreational terms and less sophisticated in their politics.
But the 'games, patriotic songs and short addresses on Fxnpire' which it
organised were similarly designed to drive home the universal message that
a young Briton or an old one, if a true patriot, found his real home and
safeguard in the Conservative and Unionist party.4
1. BUA Junior Council minutes, 23; 3 ; 1932.
2. BUA minutes, 6;l1;1925.
3. (Organ of Yardley Divisional Unionist Association), April, 1926,
4. BUA minutes, 16;7;1926.
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11.4 Conclusion
In this section, we have discussed working-class Conservatism in
terms of its ideological and behavioural characteristics. In conclusion,
we should recall, as noted in previous chapters, that it was a phenanenon
with a specific, located, existence in working-class life with certain
structural supports and socio-econornic conditions which prarioted its
occurrence and facilitated its operation. On the other hand, we wish to
rescue working-class Conservatism from its actual or implied treatment as a
species of political irrationalism; it represented, too, a choice and a
strategy. Though we may question its realism and viability as a means of
defending working-class interests, we should not dismiss the assessment it
stood for but seek to understand it in its own terms.
Many observers and writers have viewed politics as a choice between
fundamentally opposed ideologies and systems. This, however, is merely a
reflection of their own standpoint as intellectuals who interpret the
world and not infrequently wish to change it! It is also to accept the
rhetoric and self-image of those active in politics at their own estimation.
In fact, there is plentiful evidence to suggest that ordinary voters do not
see the decision they make as one between basically antagonistic and
counterposed alternatives; their choice is made upon an assessment of which
of the main political parties seems trost likely to manage the present order
in a reasonably efficient and humane way. Both Conservative and Labour
voters have accepted the fundamentals of the status quo The mass of people
have rarely demanded radical change; more often than not, their expectations
were limited to hopes of decent treatment, modest prosperity and a lit1e
cautious reforms
The search for political objectivity is chimerical but, placing
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preconceived notions and preferences to one side, it must be said that
the Conservative Party has seemed at least as likely to fulfil these
inexacting requirements in the 20th. century as its chief rivals, It is
interesting to note that even in the work of Robert McKenzie, by no means
a left-winger, there is an implicit but pervasive assumption that the
working-class Conservative was an eccentric whose defiance oE his 'natural'
class loyalties demands special explanation. There is an intellectual
arrogance and an anti-Conservative bias in this treatment for it is based
on the presupposition that working people could not choose to vote
Conservative for quite intelligible and rational reasons. In fact, many
working-class people who did vote for the Right employed almost precisely
the same criteria and modes of thought as their ccxnpatriots who opted for
the alternatives of the Left.
This perspective also leads to a questioning of the distinction
made by both McKenzie and Nordlinger between 'deferentials' who voted
Conservative because of their belief in the natural fitness of the upper
orders to govern, and 'seculars' and 'pragrnatists' who voted Conservative
because they thought the Party was the better economic manager l it is
clear that these two groups were, in reality, making the same type of
assessment arid drawing the same conclusion; both sets believed that the
Conservative Party would rule the country with better results. The
difference between them lay in the grounds on which they based their
decision but, rather than dismissing the 'deferentials' as naive and
irrational, we might on the contrary conclude that they were, in sane ways,
making an informed and quite sophisticated choice. Within the rules of the
game as contemporarily applied (and few envisaged any essential alteration),
the Conservatives, with their inherited and inculcated belief in their
1. McKenzie and Silver, op. cit., p. 164;
Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 64.
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unique capacity to lead, and, more practically, their social and ideological
connections with big business and the Civil Service, may well have been the
better qualified to keep the ship of state on steady course. At any rate,
even if this were proved not to be the case, the grounds for supposing it
so were far from inconsequential.
Finally, in the context of the academic discussion of working-class
Conservatism, we should point out that it has been firmly rooted in a
particular temporal reality. For a number of years in the post-Second
World War period, it did appear that Labour had becar the normal and
natural representative of the working class in government. Then, in
strictly numerical terms, the working-class Conservative had become the
eccentric and his or her political affiliations stood out more sharply in
contrast to the prevailing tide of popular opinion. Subsequent elections,
however, have caused us to re-define our perspectives as the working-class
voting base of the Labour Party has been progressively eroded and as the
-	 Conservatives have become, again in strictly numerical terms, the majority
party of the working class. Once Labour is no longer viewed as inevitably
the major representative of working-class interests, the status and
significance of the working-class Conservative can be considered more
objectively.
The elements of working-class Conservatism were basically constant
just as, until recently, the essential nature of Conservative philosophy
was constant. Its supporters accepted the tradttioal and established
social order, desired its stability and were patriotically proud of the
national culture which it upheld. On the other hand, the weight and
configuration of its elements were in flux. The structural supports of
slum Conservatism were being eroded and local influence was in decline;
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the more jingoistic effusions of national sentirrnt had becc unfashionable.
Toryistn based on the local seigneur, an ale-house culture and military
glory had to adapt to changed conditions, and new-style Conservatism had to
make specific references and concessions to working-class interests. It
had also to cope with a situation in which the Labour Party was increasingly
winning for itself a position of trust and responsibility within the
working-class corrnunity.
Essentially, though, the ideological bases of Conservatism remained
constant for the Party stood fast by its claim to be the only real
custodian of the British national interest, Labour's principal appeal to
the working class - its class identity - also limited its attractiveness
because most in the working class have assessed themselves more readily in
terms of their role within a national culture than as the victims of a
class system, still less as participants in a class struggle. The realities
and identities forrrd and fostered by a sense of national belongirigness
have, with rare exceptions, been stronger than those enjoined by
affiliations of class) Working-class Conservatism has not been an
aberration but part of the very mainstream of working-class politics.
1. F. Parkin, 'Working-Class Conservatives: a Theory of Political Deviance'
British Journal of Sociology, 18, (1967).
cONCLUSION
We have now completed our survey of working-class politics in
Birmingham and Sheffield and the time has come to draw scxie overall
conclusions. In the first instance, it is necessary to refer once more
to the strong contrast that existed between the politics of the two towns.
No simple explanation underlies this contrast; a whole range of historical
and contemporary, structural and human factors merged and interacted to
shape the towns' working-class politics, and it would be quite erroneous
to focus on one set of circumstances in neglect of the others.
In the first three chapters, we described some of the socio-economic
factors which influenced Birmingham and Sheffield's political evolutions.
The topographical and geological conditions which favoured Sheffield' s growth
as a centre of steel-founding and the geographical considerations which
fostered Birmingham's develojxnent as a centre of ccxlriErce and industry were
each, in turn, to affect the nature of the towns' working-class corrinunities.
Sheffield came to boast a concentrated, heavy industrial, manufacturing
base while Birmingham developed to provide a diverse range of goods and
services. The one led to a homogeneous, strongly proletarian, form of
society; the other, to a highly differentiated and franted working
population. Sheffield's social environment conduced to the growth of a
life-style which fostered and strengthened specifically working-class mores
and loyalties; that of Birmingham was, on the whole, less solidary and
more open to outside and cross-class influences. By the 1920s, support for
the Labour Party was becoming one aspect of the working-class cornrrunity's
self-identity and, as we now know, in 1926 Sheffield was the first major
city to fall under Labour control. Birmingham, on the other hand,
remained a bastion of working-class Conservatism.
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Such an explanation trips readily from the pen but it does, of
course, slide easily into a form of crude economic determinism. The
reductio ad absurdum of this analysis would be that Sheffield becarr a
Labour stronghold because it had reserves of iron ore and five fast-running
rivers. To write the argument is sufficient to derronstrate its fatuity.
Politics were made by man and their character was, in the final analysis,
the responsibility of human agency.
In chapters 4 to 6, we examined some of the forms of political
organisatiori and activity and some of the national events which shaped the
character of politics in our two case-studies. The nature of both national
and local government had a strong influence on popular political perceptions
and affiliations; the parties' local organisation and propaganda played a
significant role in mediating and refining the impact of the politicians'
rule and reinforcing or countervailing their popular appeal.
Birmingham had a powerful heritage of radical middle-class leadership
- personified above all, in the figure of Joseph Chamberlain - which lived
on into the interwar period. Middle-class politics in Birmingham was
Unionist - a political philosophy which combined elements of Conservatism
and Liberalism but which possessed, most importantly, its own uniquely
local identity and pride. Unionism, through its ideological catholicity
and through the abilities of its leading proponents, continued to speak to
both the sectional interests of the Birmingham working class and its distinct
civic patriotism. The Unionists' athiinistration of the city was sanctioned
and facilitated by the widespread popular support they possessed and still
sought to encourage.
Sheffield's traditions were of independent and sometimes militant
working-class action. The form of local industry and society and the
city's strong trades unionism came together to form a powerful base for an
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independent working-class politics. The local Labour movement was
fortunate in possessing an indigenous leadership capable of fulfilling and
consolidating this potential while Sheffield's right-wing politicians were
distinguished by the reactionary nature of their rule and their failure,
and lack of any apparent desire, to appease the interests of their working-
class constituents. The middle-class politicians' blind refusal of the
economic, social and political realities of Sheffield reaped its reward in
1926 with their eviction from office.
At the same time, in both Birmingham and Sheffield, circumstances
and develoents in national government were conspiring to thrust Labour's
claim to be the only true defender of working-class interests to the
forefront of political discourse. Local conditions in Sheffield,
particularly its mass unemployment, fortified the trend of national
dynamics while in Birmingham they tended to diminish their impact but, in
both towns, the reality was of a Labour Party growing in size and status
and consolidating practically its ideological claim on working-class
loyalties.
Having fleshed out the skeletal outline of socio-econanic conditions
with some political history, we can see the crucial role played by
Birmingham and Sheffield's political actors in shaping local affiliations.
Nevertheless, it is clear that they were, to some extent, acting within the
parameters laid down by the social and economic character of their localities.
Socio-economic conditions provided the terrain of the politicians' struggle
and the politicians' impact lay in their ability to utilise and rnobilise
those factors in the local environment favourable to their political
aspirations whilst minimising the influence of those that were not. To mix
the metaphor, the local economy and the forms of cairnunity to which it gave
rise were the raw materials of the political process but its end-product
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owed everything Co the skill of the politicians and the parties they led in
working and refining these elemental resources.
The 'Forward March of Labour' was not inevitable, and it was a far
slower and more chequered process in Birmingham than in Sheffield. If, in
the 1920s, Labour's progress had cane to possess a certain air of
inexorability, this owed more to the contemporary political climate than to
the Party's inherent qualities. Economic conditions and legislative
enactments gave class an unusual salience in the post-war years, and the
failure of the middle-class parties to appease the working class lent
credence and credibility to Labour's claim to be the only genuine defender
of working-class interests. This failure on the part of middle-class
politicians was not, of course, merely contingent; their class affiliations
and ideological sympathies limited the specific appeal they could make to
the lower-class electorate. But had economic circumstances been more
propitious, had there been a politician with the charisma and populist
appeal of Joseph Chaitherlain, things might have been different, As it was,
Labour's working-class credentials became a conspicuous advantage at a time
when Conservatives and Liberals seemed unable and unwilling to satisfy the
demands of their working-class supporters.
There were some differences, though none so marked as those of their
political complexion, in the content of Birmingham and Sheffield's politics
but what really stands out in the 1920s is the extent to which the ideas
and activities of the main political organisations were the same in both
towns. Local flavour remained and local initiative was imperative but the
style and platform of the political parties were increasingly dictated by
their national, and even international, leaderships. In the second half of
the thesis, we abandoned the comparative perspective for it no longer seemed
applicable.
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Chapters 7 and 8 dealt with the Labour Party as we sought to give a
comprehensive and empathetic description of the Party's principles and
group life. Labour's ideology, reflecting the circumstances of the Party's
formation, was an amalgam of different strands and influences which combined
elements of high idealism and visionary hope with a short-sighted focus on
irrnediate and limited reform. There have been critics enough to point out
the inadequacies and failings of the Party's thinking and there were many
contemporarily, and many more subsequently, who have been quick to condemn
Labour for its betrayal of socialist ideals. Such criticism can come
glibly from those whose own ideas and strategies have not been, nor are
likely to be, put into action. Here, we have tried to assess Labour in its
own terms, not in the belief that its principles were inviolable or £ts
practice pristine, but on the assumption that it is meaningless to judge it
by criteria which its own followers did not profess to endorse. Labour was
flawed but it was the authentic representative of a working class springing
from a distinct national culture and possessing its own unique qualities of
practicality and sentimentalism, idealism and tolerance.
The Labour Party's subculture catered for the interests of its own
membership. If it failed to fulfil sane of the more radical hopes placed
in it then and now, that is because it succeeded in its chosen field - the
diversion and entertainment of the Party's supporters. Labour's group life
ostensibly failed to subvert the status quo but it did make it more pleasant
and enjoyable for those whose inclinations led them into Labour politics.
This was a modest enough cultural achievement but it paralleled Labour's
political project which the Party envisaged, in the short term at least, as
the reform and amelioration of the prevailing system, not its overthrow.
Neither political Cooperation nor revolutionary politics made a
larger impact but each played an important role in the life of those working-
class activists attracted by their divergent analyses. Cooperation was
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well-meaning, respectable, toothless and rather dull. Revolutionary
politics had the dash and fire that orthodox Labour politics often lacked
but its influence on working-class life was correspondingly less. Few
wanted revolution, fewer still thought it likely, and the parties of the
revolutionary Left, though undeniably vocal and belligerent, remained
small in numbers and weak in effect.
Objectively, it is clear that the Conservative Party had a far
greater popular appeal. Conservatism spoke to the working class not as it
ght to be but as it was. Jhile revolutionary politics demanded change
and threatened conflict, Conservatism pranised stability and appealed to the
patriotism, resignation and deference which were important elements in the
real consciousness of the working class. Chamberlainism was unquestionably
a truer representative of working-class sensibilities than Marxism, and the
historian's task is to explain this state of affairs rather than to
denigrate it.
The politics of the working class have been both inspiring and
disheartening, daring and ccxip1acent, but they have been, above all, their
own - formed under oppressive and inhospitable conditions, in circumstances
demanding sacrifice and endurance fran the poorest and most disadvantaged
sections of society. Those who follow should applaud their successes,
understand their failures, and conduct themselves with all due humility.
4,
The Irnier Ring Warde
1. Market Hail
	
4. 5
2. Ladywood	 5. Du4deetofl
3. St. Paui'e	 6.	 t. Bartholomew'S
7. St. Martin's and Deritend.
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-s	 = Ward boundaries
Divisional boundarie
''
LI8LD / \._
0	 i
I-
BIRMINGHAM
37,990
27,530
32,270
14.170
17,090
18,220
16,fldo
21,730
8,130
10,620
5,650
4,540
3,120
3,400
6,470
3,030
2,330
3,700
2,740
(1,570
2,860
1,400
2,350
2,020
2,190
i,56o
1,900
1,530
2,330
3,190
2,570
37,940
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Appendix C: THE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE INSURED WORKFORCES
OF BIRMINGHAM AND SHEFFIELD; JuLY, 1923
BIRMINGHAM
	 SHEFFIELD
Miscellaneous Metal Goods Industries
Distributive Trades
Motor Vehicles, Cycles and Aircr,tft
Building	 . .	 . .
General Engineering
Metal Manufacturing (other than
I ron and Steel).
Brass and Allied Metal Wares
Electrical Engineering	 .
Watches, Clocks, Plate, Jewellery
Cocoa, Chocolate, etc.
Rubber	 , .	 .	 .
Printing. Publishing and Book-
binding.
Furniture Making. Upholstering, etc.
Chemicals (iticludi ng Explosives, Oil,
Paint, Soap, Ink, etc.).
Public Works Contracting
Hotels, Boarding House, etc., Service
Railway Carriage and Wagons, etc.
Electrical Cable, Apparatus, Lamps,
etc.
Bread, Biscuits, Cakes, etc.
Stoves, Grates, Pipes, etc.
Bolts, Nuts, Screws, Nails, etc.
Gas, Water, and Electricity Supply
Road Transport (other than Tram-
way and Omnibus Service).
Laundries, Job Dyeing and Dry
Cleaning.
Tailoring	 ..
Drink Industries..	 .
Scientific ann Photographic Instru-
ments and Apparatus.
Shirts, Collars, Underclothing, etc..
Glass and Glass Bottles
Cardboard Boxes, Paper Bags and
Stationery.
Miscellaneous Food Industries
Drcssmaldng and Millinery .
Leather and Leather Goods
All other Industries and Services
Troll and Stecl (inchiding Pig Iron
Manufacture).
I land-tools, Cutlet y, etc. .
Distrjl,utive Trades .
	 .
General Engineering, etc...
	 -.
Building	 . .	 . .	 .
Watches, Clocks, Plate, etc.
Coal Muting . . 	  .	 .
Miscellaneous ilktal Goods Industries
Metal Manufacture (other than ,Iron
and Steel).
Gas, 'Water and Electricity Supply
Tramway and Omnibus Service . -
Public Works Contracting .
Road Transport (other than Tram-
way and Omnibus Service).
Printing, Publishing and Book-
binding.
Furniture Maid ng, Upliolstcri rig, etc.
Hotel, Boarding House, etc., Service
Cocoa, Chocolate, etc.
Chemicals (inclu ding F_plosivc, Oil,
Paint, Soap, Imik, etc.).
Bread, Biscuits, Cakes, etc.
Brick, Tile, Pipe, etc.
	 .
Motor Vehicles, Cycles and Mrcraft
Laundries, Jot) Dyeing and Dry
Cleaning.
Drink Industries	 . .	 .
Electrical Engineering . . -
Shirts, Collars, Underclothing, etc.
All other Industries and Services
Total, all Industries and Services
29,
18,520
12,300
20,510
6,280
7,710
9,26(1
1,840
2.110
2, 8o
2,2 10
850
1,840
1,050
I,970
700
870
1,030
fioo
520
580
1,1 So
i3o
450
19,410
I45,&94i
Total, all Industries and Services	 322,420
Source: Royal Colmlission on the Geographical Distribution of the
Industrial Population, 1937-1939;
Minutes of Evidence; 3, February, 1938, p. 302, p. 306.
70
•1
50
.1
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Appendix D(i): UNEIyIPLOYMENT IN BIRMINGHAM AND SHEFFIELD, 1919-1931
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Source: Local press; Ministry of Labour Gazette.
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Appendix E(i): MUNICIPAL ELECTION RESULTS IN BIRMINGHAM, 1919-1931
Ward	 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 19
Acock's Green md md Con md md Con md Con Con md Con Con C
All Saints'
	
Lab Con Lab Lab Lab Con Con Lab Con Lab Lab Con C
As ton	 Lab Lab Con Lab Con Con Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Con C
Balsall Heath Lab Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con C
tiddeston	 Ten Con Lab Ten Con Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab C
Edgbaston Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con C
Erdington N. Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con C
Erdington S. Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con C
Handsworth	 md Con Con md Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con C
Harborne	 Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con C
Kings Norton Lab Lib Lib Lab Lib Con Con Lib Con Con Lib Con C
Ladywood	 Lab Con Lab Con Con Con Con Lab Lab Lab Con Con Ci
Lozells	 Lib md Con Lib Ten Con Con Con Con Lib Con Con L
Market Hall Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con C
Moseley	 md Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Ci
Northfield	 md Con Con Lib Con Con Lib Con Con md Con Con C
Perry Barr	 Ci
Rotton Park Con Con Lab Con Con Con Con Lab Con Con md Con Ci
St. Bart's	 Lib Con Lib Lab Con Lib Con Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Ci
St. Martirs	 Con Con Lab Lab Con Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab C
St. Mary's	 md Con md md Con Ind md Lab Lab md Lab Con I]
St. Paul's	 Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Lab Con Con Lab Con Ci
Sal tley	 Lab Lab Lab Lab md Lab Lab Ind Lab Lab Lab Lab Ci
Sandwell	 md Ind Con md Ind Con Ind md Con Ind md Con Ii
Selly Oak	 Lab Con Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Con Ci
Small Heath	 Lab Lib Lab Con Lib Con Con Lab Con Lab Lab Con Ci
Soho	 Lab Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Ci
Sparkbrook	 Lab Con Lab Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Ci
Sparkhil 1	 Con Con Lib Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Con Ci
Washwood Heath Lab Lib Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab
Yardley	 Lab md Con md md md md Ind md Con Con Con Ci
Key: Con = Unopposed return 	 Lab = Labour Party
Con = Unionist Party	 Lib = Liberal Party
Ten = Tenants' Association	 md = Independent
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Appendix E(ii): MUNICIPAL ELECII0N RESULTS IN SHEFFIELD, 1919-1931
Ward
Attercl iffe
Brightside
Broonihal 1
Broornhill
Burngreave
Crookesmoor
Darnal 1
Ecciesall
Firth Park
FIallam
Handsworth
1-leeley
Hilisborough
Manor
Moor
Neepsend
Nether Edge
• Owlerton
Park
St. Peter's
St. Philip's
Sharrow
Tinsley
Walkley
Woodseats
1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 19
Lab Lab SCA Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab L
Lab SCA SCA Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab La
SCA SCA Lab SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA
Con SCA SC
Lab SCA SCA Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab SC
Lab SCA Lab SCA Lab SCA Lab Lab SCA SCA Lab SCA SC
Lab md Lab Lab SCA Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab La
SCA MW MW SCA Con Con Con md Con Con Con Con Cc
Lab SCA SC
SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA Con md SC
Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab La
SCA SCA SCA Lab SCA SCA SCA Lab SCA SCA Lab SCA SC
DSS SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA Lab SCA SCA SCA SCA SC
Lab Lab La
Lab SCA SC
Lab Lab Lab md Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab La
Con Con Co
Lab SCA SC
SCA Lib SCA Lab SCA SCA Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab SCA SC
DSS DSS SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA Lab SCA SCA Lab SCA SC
SCA SCA Lab SCA SCA Lab SCA Lab Lab Lab Lab Lab SC
DSS SCA SCA Lab SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SCA SC
Lab Lab Lal
Lab Lib Lab Lab md Lab md md Lab Lab Lab md Inc
SCASCASQ
Key: Lab = Unopposed return 	 Lab = Labour Party
Lib = Liberal Party	 Con = Conservative Party
SCA = Sheffield Citizens' Association/Municipal Progressive Party
DSS = Nat. Fed. of Discharged and Demobilised Sailors and Soldiers
md Independent	 MW = Middle Class Union
a. - —. -.a I. - —I 10
100
10
40
50
%40
30
2.0
I0
0
I0
0
Io
3A
2.o
0
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Appendix E ( iii): LABOUR AND ANTI -LABOUR VOTING
IN THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, 1919-1931
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Appendix F(i): PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, 1918-1931
BIRMINGHAM
	
1918
	
1922
	
1923
	
1924
	
1929
	
1931
As ton
	 CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
LAB
	
CON
Deritend
	
CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
LAB
	
CON
IXiddeston	 NDP
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
LAB
	
CON
Edgbaston
	
CoG
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
Erdington	 CoG
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
LAB
	
CON
Handsworth
	
CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
King's Norton CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
LAB
	
CON
	
CON
Ladywood
	
CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
LAB
	
CON
Mose ley	 CoG
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
Sparkbrook
	
CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
West B'ham
	
CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
Yardley	 CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
LAB
	
CON
SHEFFIELD
Attereliffe	 CoL
	
LAB
	
LAB
	
LAB
	
LAB
	
CON
Brightside	 CoL
	
LAB
	
LAB
	
LAB
	
LAB
	
CON
Central
	
CoG
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
LAB
	
CON
Ecciesal 1
	
CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
Hallam	 CoC
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
	
CON
Hilisborough
	
CaL
	
LAB
	
LAB
	
LAB
	
LAB
	
CON
Park
	
CoL
	
CoL
	
CON
	
CON
	
JAB
	
CON
Key: CON = Unopposed return	 CoC = Coalition Conservative
LAB Labour Party	 CoL Coalition Liberal
CON Conservative and unionist Party
• 5 C
3.z5
oo
25o
.25
15
00
-Is
So
15
0
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Appendix F (ii):	 LABOUR AND ANTI-LABOUR VOTING
IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 1918-1931
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Appendix G: A SAMPLE PROGRAMME OF THE LABOUR CHURCH;
SPARKHILL AND TYSELEY. 1926-1927
October, 3, 1926: 	 Labour Church Orchestra. Readings by the Guildhouse
Players.
October, 10, 1926: 	 Miss E. Shanks, 'The League of Nations'.
October, 17, 1926: 	 Wilfred Wellock.
October, 24, 1926: 	 Fred Longden, 'The Need for a Workers' Moverrnt'.
October, 31, 1926:
	 Oswald Mosley, Frank Coleman (Labour's uunicipal
candidate). Mary Sheldon, 'Listening'.
November, 7, 1926: 	 Hubert Humphreys with readings from 'Androcles and
the Lion' by G.B. Shaw.
November, 14, 1926:
November, 21, 1926:
November, 28, 1926;
December, 5, 1926:
December, 12, 1926:
December, 19, 1926:
Harrison Barrow, 'A Visit to Czechoslovakia' *
A.H. Noble, 'The Mining Situation'.
Jesse Hanirond, 'The League of Nations',
A. Purcell, M.P.
Jack Mills, 'Housing and Labour ' s Prograrm'.
Musical Evening.
January, 2, 1927:	 W.H. Ayles, 'A Survey of World Politics'.
January, 9, 1927: 	 Rev. Mason, 'Rent, Interest and Prof it'.
January, 16, 1927: 	 Cllr. Watkins, 'The City's Trading Concerns'.
January, 23, 1927:
	 Miss F.B. Widdowson, 'Education'.
January, 30, 1927:
February, 6, 1927:
February, 13, 1927:
February, 20, 1927:
February, 27, 1927:
March, 6, 1927:
March, 13, 1927:
March, 20, 1927:
March, 27, 1927:
Source: Town Crier
Tom Hackett, '19th. and 20th. Century Democratic
Movements'.
S.B. Potter, 'China'.
Orchestral selections and discussion.
Mrs. Carol Ring, 'Tragedies of Industry in the Past'.
Tom Henderson, M.P., 'Rumours of War'.
Mrs. Sproson, 'The Mental Deficiency Act'.
Dr. Ernest Bulmer, 'Problems of the Birth Rate'
(Open to those over l8yrs. only).
Cur. Sawyer, 'The Politics of the Land Question'.
Musical Evening.
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Appendix H: SAMPLE PROGRA4ES OF THE COOPERATIVE GUILD
Aiston Cooperative Womens' Guild, January-June, 1928
I. Opening social 	 15. 'Emergency Fund'
2. 'Aftercare Work'
	
16. 'Convalescent Fund'
3. 'Guild Organisation'	 17. Open date
4. 'Purpose of Coop. Education' 	 18. 'Cooperation and Parliament'
5. Shop Practice	 19. Annual report, Congress resolutions
6. Election night	 20. Visit to dairy
7. 'Feet and Footware'	 21. Discussion of BCS balance sheet
8. Visit to Confectionery Dept.	 22. Outing
9. 'The Family Income'	 23. Congress report
10. Discussion of BCS balance sheet 24. 'Cooperative Education'
11. 'The Work of the Education Ctee.' 25. Meeting at playing fields
12. 'Flowers of the Coop. Garden' 	 26. 'Bernard Shaw'
13. 'Care of the Mother'	 27. Visit to Crippled Children's HarE
14. Sing, Say or Pay	 28. Open date
Ward End Cooperative Men's Guild, January-June, 1928
1. New Year's social	 12. Games competition
2. Games competition	 13. Social evening
3. W.T. Cardinal	 14. Debate
4. Five minute speeches	 15. 'Through Trade to Coop Corrmonwealth'
5. General business and reports 	 16. Debate
6. Social evening	 17. Election of officers
7. Games competition	 18. Social evening
8. 'A Few Thoughts on Banking'	 19. Open night
9. General business and reports 	 20. Bowls practice
10. Birthday party	 21. General business
11. 'Extraordinary Men of 19th. C.' 	 22. Games competition
Items in quotation marks are addresses by visiting speakers.
Source: B[irrningham] C[ooperative] S[ocietyj Handbook, Jaru.iary-June, 1928.
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